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SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER I. The Introduction.
As we recall St. Augustine’s influence down the ages upon Philos- 
-ophy and Christian Doctrine, the many volumes he himself wrote, 
and the literature which has gathered around his name; it becomes 
an impossible task to deal in an exhaustive way with so great a 
personality in a brief Introduction. His Polemical writings, his 
letters, and the record of his life as Bishop of Hippo, must, 
therefore, be passed by.
The difficulty of an accurate survey is enhanced 
by the fact that (I) there is no systematic exposition of his 
doctrines; (2) his views were considerably modified in the course 
of his mental and spiritual growth. Hence, many Schools of 
Thought claim Augustine as their authority.
St. Augustine the connecting link between the 
middle ages and modern times. What we owe to him.
The secret of his power; his passionate nature, 
his genius for friendship, his responsiveness to the movements 
of his day, his great analytical gifts. Two sides to his nature;- 
a mystic by reason of the influence of Plotinus, a dogmatist as 
he assumed the role of a Theological Statesman.
Although he was brought up under Christian influ- 
-ences, yet he was stirred to spiritual things- (a) by the read- 
-ing of the Hortensius, and, (b) by the books of the ’Platonists’.
The basis of Augustine’s Psychology rests on 
Neo-Platonism. Influence of Plotinus on his doctrine of God, on 
his view of Providence and the Order of the world, on Evil,
Matter, and Freedom of the Will. Augustine a founder of Modern 
thought. His doctrine on immediate certainty. He is influenced 
by and yet differs from, Plotinus.
CHAPTER ?. "The rise of Neo-Platonism, together with
a brief survey of its Doctrine".
The background to the period in which Neo-Platonism took its rise. 
The Third Century and its pessimism.Cosmopolitan character of 
Roman society. Introduction of strange deities- from Egypt- Isis, 
Osiris, Anubis, Serap^is; from Persia- Mithraism, its popularity. 
Despite the prevailing Polytheism, a prevailing consciousness of 
the One-ness of God arises. This is due- (I) to the imposed wors- 
-hip of the ’Genius’ of the Emperor, and (2) the sense of common 
basal qualities in all Deities. A time of Spiritual Revival. 
Judaism bidding for a world-wide supremacy.A season of Philosoph- 
-ical Revival. Neo-Platonism a rival of Christianity.
(11).
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 2. (Continued)
Philo, as fore-runner of Plotinus; Philo’s doctrihe of God, the 
Logos and the Powers. Unity and Spirituality of God; the Absol- 
-ute Being, above space and time. Best known by negation. Philo 
on Matter; God’s relationship with the world through ’The Ideas’; 
his doctrine on Ecstasy. Plotinus, his life and character.His 
attempt to explain the first Principles of the Universe, and the 
origin & nature of the world. His Triad of The Absolute, the 
Nous, the Soul. Man, as Spirit, Soul, and body. His view of 
Matter and Evil. His Mysticism, Plotinus ’the father of the 
Mystics’; Ecstasy.,
CHAPTER 3.
"The relationship between Christianity 
and Neo-Platonism".
An enquiry as to how far the doctrines of Philosophy had permea- 
-ted the thought of the Christian Church before the time of St. 
Augustine. Ammonius Saccas, a Christian before he became a 
Neo-Platonist. Was Christianity indebted to Neo-Platonism, or 
did Neo-Platonism owe much to Christianity? Views of Clement 
and Tertullian on the matter.Abundant evidence of the presence 
of Neo-Platonism in the works of the Christian Fathers.At first 
Christianity had little to do with Philosophy, but as there 
arose a need for the Church to give reasons for its Faith,, it was 
compelled to set forth a Philosophy. Gnosticism, the first attem- 
-pt to give a philosophical colouring to Christian speculation. 
The principles of Gnosticism outlined. Its dangers and its value. 
The influence of the School of Alexandria in the direction of 
Neo-Platonism. Justin Martyr. Clement of Alexandria, his doctrine 
of God outlined. His negation; the attempt he makes to reconcile 
his Christian conception of God with the ideas which he has 
received from Philosophy. His doctrine of the Logos,and the Holy 
Spirit. Evil enters by reason of man’s free-will.Evil, is not 
a substance, therefore, it could not be regarded as the work of 
God. Origen the most eminent of the early Christian writers.
God’s nature and His relation to the world, according to Origen. 
The Logos, Origen*s view of ’the eternal generation’ of the Son. 
The Holy Spirit and His work. His subordination of the Son .
His doctrine of the relationship of God and the world. Origen 
adopts the view of Plotinus as to the triple division of the 
nature of man. His optimism, and the final triumph of God.
The Chapter concludes by asserting that St. Augustine would
enter Christian Church which was greatly indebted to the 
spirit of Hellenism.
(111).
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 4.
The Life of Saint Augustine.
Part I.(From 354-386).
Aurelius Augustine, born at Thagaste, November I3th.354,A.D., 
died at Hippo, on August 28th,430. Family influences, his father 
Patricius, a pagan until a year before his death, worldly,quick­
tempered, sensual. His mother Monnica, a type of Christian piety, 
uncommon amid such pagan surroundings, filled with deep concern 
for Augustine’s spiritual state, frequent mention of her tears, 
her prayers, her pleadings on his behalf. From his birth August- 
-ine a dedicated spirit.Impressions of Augustine’s character, he 
confesses, his love of praise & play, his dislike for Greek, love 
for Latin, especially Latin poetry. He reveals his faults, but 
records the fact that he was considered ’a hopeful boy*. At 15, 
he is sent for a few months to Madaura, to learn grammar & 
rhetoric, as a preparation for the African bar.His sojourn there 
did him little good, he had too much time on his hands, and he 
becomes the victim of sensual desire. Leaving Madaura he spends 
a year in idleness at home. At 17, he is sent to Carthage where 
his life was of the wildest. He forms an alliance with a young 
woman, with whom he lives in strict fidelity for fifteen years. 
When Augustine was but 18, a son was born, to whom they give the 
name, Adeodatus, who becomes a gifted and devout youth, dying 
early. At 19, a decisive hour isS is reached in the life of Aug- 
-ustine, when he reads the Hortensius, which turns his thoughts 
to better things.He searches the Scriptures, but is offended by 
their ’unadorned & rugged style’. Moreover the fact that in the 
Hortensius ’the name of Christ’ was not present, troubles him.
He is attracted to Manichaeism, becomes a ’hearer’, associates 
with the followers of this Faith for nine years.It seemed to 
appeal to him in many ways.At 20, Augustine becomes Professor 
of Rhetoric at Thagaste, but leaves it on the death of a friend, 
to whom he was greatly attached.He opens a School of Rhetoric at 
Carthage. Writes his book on ’The fair and the fit’, when^ 26 or 
27. Evidently a sign that his thoughts were turning towards 
Platonism.Augustine^ow is disappointed with Manichaeism, he feeld 
that its pretensions^ollow, it gives him no release from his 
burden of sin, no peace of heart. He goes to Rome. Is inclined 
to the Scepticism of the New Academy. Still struggles towards 
the truth. Gives an account of his troubled thoughts concerning 
God and Evil. Disappointed with Rome, he goes to Milan.There 
Augustine meets with Bishop Ambrose, and is impressed by his 
preaching. Augustine becomes a catechumen of the Catholic Church. 
But still he is tortured, and his heart is torn between belief 
and doubt.
(17. )
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 5*
The Life of Saint Augustine.
Part 2. (Prom 386-430.)
In the year 386, when Augustine was 32. help comes to him. He 
discovers the books of the ’Platonists , translated into Latin 
by Victorinus. None other than the Enneads of Plotinus. There is 
’kindled’ within him ’an incredible ardour’. Here he sees the 
name of Christ and recognises in the Nous of Plotinus the Logos 
of St.John’s gospel.He perceives the Spirituality og God; light 
is shed on the origin of Evil, it is really not-Being, a depriv- 
-ation of Good. Evil, he learns, springs from a Will & an Imagin- 
-ation, which has turned aside from God. Moreover, he is taught 
to enter into himself, that he may ascend to hold communion with 
the Absolute,These books gave him soul direction.Yet these 
books fail him, since he finds no Redeemer in them, no deliver- 
-ance from his burden . He sees afar off the land of his desire 
but knows not the way there. Now he turns to the Epistles of St. 
Paul, & these complete the good work which Neo-Platonism had 
begun.He consults Simplicianus, hears of Victorinus & his conver- 
-sion.Still he halts, debates hesitates.He is told of others who 
have surrendered all & found peace. Then follows the garden scene 
when he hears the voice crying, ’Take up & read’. He responds & 
passes into the light.He resigns his position as Professor of 
Rhetoric; entires upon a period of retirement at Cassiciacum 
in preparation for his baptism.Still, however deeply engrossed 
in Philosophy. On Easter eve (April 24th.387.) Augustine is bapt-' 
-ized, along with his son Adeodatus, and Alypius his friend. 
Augustine plans for a life of contemplation in Africa; his moth- 
-er’s death alters his intentions. A wonderful experience of 
Neo-Platonic Ecstasy is given to Augustine & Monnica at Ostia, a 
few days before her death. In his description of what took place 
Augustine uses the very language of Plotinus. Augustine returns 
to Africa, sells his possessions , lives in retirement for three 
years, busy with literary work, prayer, meditation.In 391 he 
visits Hippo, and is summoned by preacher, the aged Bishop Valer- 
-ius, and people to enter the Church.Is dismayed, but feeling 
the hand of God may be in this Call, he accepts the Call. Begins 
his duties in 392, a year later at 42, becomes sole-bishop, having 
been associate-bishop previously. His work is sketched, his char- 
-acter as Bishop outlined.The last 20 years of his lifewere years 
of sorrow. Rome sacked by Al^aric in 410. Augustine begins his 
great work De Civitate Dei, which occupied thirteen years, before 
it was completed. The siege of Hippo takes place, in the third 
month Augustine is attacked by fever, he dies August 28th 430.
A brief outline of the influences at work upon his life brings 
the chapter to a close. '
(I),
A FOREWORD.
For the sake of clearness, it might be well here to give a brief 
outline of the present work. This outline, it will be seen, is 
further developed in the synopses of the chapters.
The Thesis has been divided into three sections.
PART I deals with a background of the period in which Neo-Platon- 
-ism came into prominence. Philo is considered as a forerunner 
of Plotinus as well as a bridge from philosophical Judaism to 
Christian Theology. A sketch of the life of Plotinus follows, and 
a survey of his system of Philosophy* A study of the inter-relat— 
-ionship which existed between Christianity and Neo-Platonism is 
then dealt with, and an attempt is made to explain something of 
the "borrowings" of ideas and rites which took place. Justin 
Martyr and the part he took in this matter are mentioned. The 
work of the Gnostics, and that of the Christian Platonists of 
Alexandria, Clement and Origen, come under consideration. All 
preparing the way for a somewhat detailed study of the life of 
St. Augustine.
PART II opens with a suggestion that the life and writings of 
Victorinus Afer may have been a determining force in the theology 
of St. Augustine. Then follows the account of St. Augustine’s 
reading of the books of the Enneads. Direct quotations from the 
works of Plotinus and Porphyry are presented, showing that St. 
Augustine had intimate knowledge of the writings of Neo-Platonism. 
A study of the Christian philosopher at Cassiciacum is given 
together with the earlier writings of St. Augustine which are 
associated with this period. Chapters then follow dealing respect- 
-ively with St. Augustine’s psychology; his doctrine of God; of 
the Christian Trinity; of God’s relation to the world; of Provid- 
-ence and evil; of the freedom of the wil]^. And these are 
examined in order to discover what influence Neo-Platonism haXd 
upon the thought of St. Augustine. A final chapter, giving a 
general statement of the results of our examination, brings Part 
2 to a close.
PART III is taken up with Appendices.
Appendix I. Bibliographical, being a table of books 
consulted in the study for the Thesis.
Appendix II. Chronological, giving the chief dates of 
the life of St. Augustine.
Appendix III. Comparative passages in the writings of 
St. Augustine, with those to be found in the Enneads.
References are marked at the foot of the pages. Fuller notes & 
longer quotations are placed at the end of each chapter. Parallel j 
references to the Enneads are to be seen in Appendix III in the 
order of the books of the Enneads. For the translations from the 
Enneads (Books I-V) I am indebted to Mr. Stephen Mackenna,
(2 ).
"The Library of Philosophical Translations: Plotinus". Four 
volumes: ( I9I7-I92 6 ); for Book VI. of the Enneads to the 
French translation of M.N.Bouillet, "Les Enneades de Plotin".I86I.
The English translation of the earlier writings 
of St. Augustine is in most cases my own from the
"Opera omnia Sancti Aurelii Augustini, Hipponensis 
Epiecopi", Benedictine edition, e congregatione S.Mauri." 
Vol.I. 1836.
Due acknowledgment is given where I have adopted another trans- 
-lator’s work.
many v:
(3).
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
In this Introduction to the study of the influence of Neo-Platonism 
on the life and thought of St. Augustine, it is not our intention 
to deal in any exhaustive way with that greatest of the Christian 
Fathers, who not only towered like a giant above those of his day, 
but who also has never ceased to leave the impress of his personalfe- 
-ty upon the life and thought of each successive generation.
For "there has been no crisis of Religious 
history in later days when men have not turned to him for direction. 
....There is hardly a topic in the whole range of Theology and 
Philosophy on which he has not something to say. However diverse 
our interests may be, whichever of the many problems of life weighs 
on us most heavily, we may learn that it is not peculiarly our own 
but that the great African Father wrestled with something similar 
in his time". (S).
Hence it would be an impossible task to 
attempt, within the compass of half-a-dozen pages, more than the 
briefest description of so great a personality.
When one calls to mind the many volumes 
which came from his pen; and the literature which has gathered around 
his name; and when one takes into account the minute study given to
Foot Notes- (I). "S.Austin and his place in the history of Christian 
thought", pp.4,&13. W .Cunningham, Hulsean Lecture,1885.
Cambridge University Press, 1886.
(4 ).
his writings, on the part of French and German Savants, to say 
nothing of those of our own land, one is inclined to agree with 
M.Louis Bertrand when he declares that "this great Saint is 
hidden behind a perfect rampart of print".
In touching upon our theme, we shall, therefore, 
have little to say concerning his polemical writings against 
the Manichaeans, the Donatists, the Pelagians, the Ariane, 
important as they undoubtedly are. These, for the most part, 
must be passed over in silence as foreign to our subject. In like 
manner his letters, which cover a period of something like ^3. 
years, that is from 386-429, and of which we have 276 in our 
hands, can only be referred to casually by way of illustration, 
although these in themselves are not only of the deepest interest 
from the point of view of the history of religion, but oÆ special 
value as giving us an insight into the real kindliness, warmth 
and sympathy of St. Augustine’s heart. They indicate too how he 
grew in prestige and power during these years.
Furthermore, we shall have to disregard those 
last thirty-five years (395-430), during which St. Augustine was 
bishop of Hippo. But important years these were, years of cease- 
-less activity, and growing responsibility, during which he 
filled the part of a great Church Teacher, laying the foundations 
of those doctrines and shaping those dogmas which, in after years,
Nf
became famous under the name of "Augusti^nism", with the result 
that it could be said, concerning St. Augustine, that "he was 
incomparably the greatest man between St. Paul and Luther that
(5).
the Church has possessed", (l). To show how great a position
St. Augustine held in the Church of Rome, we are told that the 
question was solemnly and seriously debated as to "whether plen- 
-ary authority were really to be attributed to him, or whether 
he were only to rank as the first of the Church’s authorised 
teachers". (2).
But, fortunately, we have our field circumsc- 
-ribed dor us, and we must needs leave such notable parts of this 
great life in a large measure out of our consideration.
There is, however, another difficulty which 
faces us, as we attempt a rapid survey of St. Augustine’s work.
In the first place, he has left us no systematic exposition of 
his doctrine in*any single treatise; we have to search through 
many of his volumes, which treat on a variety of subjects, to find 
out what was his considered thought upon any particular theme. 
Again, in the second place, in his eager search for^ Truth, St. 
Augustine was ever reaching out after clearer and more reasonable 
conceptions. Hence impression after impression flashes forth, & 
is seen reflected in his writings. How well this is illustrated 
for us on the pages of his Confessions! As a result of this, his 
views underwent considerable modifications. It was only in his 
last years that he set himself to revise, correct, and amend what
Foot Notes- (I). Harnack, "Monasticism & the Confessions of St. 
Augustine", Williams & Norgate, 2nd.impression, I9I3. 
page, 12%.see also page Iv.preface. Nourrisson,"La Philos- 
-ophie de Saint Augustin",Vol.I.&.2, Paris, 1865.
(2).Warfield, article- ’Augustine*, Vol.2.Hastings’ 
Encyclopaedia of Religion & Ethics.
(6 ),
he had written. In this direction, however, he was but partially 
able to fulfil his intentions. These emendations or revisions 
we find in his Retractationes, (426-428).
Thus it follows that it is scarcely fair to formulate 
a doctrine upon any single statement, or depend upon it as being 
his considered judgment. Indeed, in many of his doctrines, St. 
Augustine is hardly consistent. It is not then to be wondered 
at that so many very different schools of thought should have 
found in his treatises aspects of truth which they recognise as 
their own. At the Reformation, for example, we find Romanists & 
Protestants alike accepting St. Augustine as their teacher,
Alfaric says, "there have been attributed to St. 
Augustine the dogmas of Luther or of Calvin, and,successively, 
those of the Council of Trent. Men have made him maintain the 
Theses of the Jansenists, or of the Thomist School of Dominicans 
and those of the Jesuit disciples of Molina". (I).
But then, we must remember, St. Augustine was 
standing, if we may put it in this fashion, between two worlds, 
on the one hand, the ancient world that was dying, and on the 
other, the new world that was just about to be born. The old 
Philosophy was passing: it had lost its vision. It could no longer 
speak with certainty, for it was floundering in the morass of 
scepticism. Christianity with its message of a Saviour was appeal- 
-ing to the ignorant and illiterate, by means of its new truth &
Foot Notes- (I). "L’Evolution Intellectuelle de Saint Augustin", 
par Prosper Alfaric, Paris, I9I8. Preface page,2.
(7).
fresh gospel; and St. Augustine sought to make clear that it 
had a message for the elite and cultured as well.
It was then that this great Church Father played 
the important part of gathering up much that was precious in the 
teaching of Philosophy, and handing on that rich treasure of 
thought which had been moulded by his massive intellect, he made 
use of it in the interests of the Christian Faith.It was then 
largely through him that the great Christian doctrines came to 
receive their present form.
How much we owe to St. Augustine , may be
summed up in the words of Dr. Glover :-"He gave to Christian thou-
-ght on God and man, on sin and grace, on the world and the 
Church, an impulse and a direction the force of which is still 
unspent. He shaped the Catholic theory of the Church, he gave to 
the great Popes the idea of the City of God, of God's empire; he 
was the Father of the Mystics, the founder of the Scholastic 
Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and, above all, the hero and master 
of the Renaissance and the Reformation. He gave the Catholic 
Church the baleful doctrine, 'Compel them to come in*. He gave
Calvin the doctrine of Predestination, and he was the only Father
from whom Luther really learnt." (I).
Now, is it possible for us to arrive at the 
secret of St. Augustine's power? Can we account for his great- 
• ness and the widespread influence which he exercised?
Foot Notes- (l). T.R.Glover, "Life and letters in the Fourth Cent- 
-ury", St. Augustine's Confessions, page, 194. Cambridge,
I90I.
(8).
There is no doubt that he was endowed with many precious gifts.
He had the passionate nature of the African, a sense of feeling 
which was remarkable in its intensity, a quick and keen response 
to sight and sound and even smell. Eager and alert, his whole 
self seemed to respond to all the movements of his day, and he 
was able to sense the needs and desires of the human heart most 
accurately.
Is it to be wondered that he had a genius for 
making friends, that he called forth devotion, and hero worship, 
on every hand? He himself received just because he gave. Illust-
Urc (nh'i
-rations of this abound on the pages of his Confessions. Call to
^ I
mind his overwhelming grief upon the death of his friend Nebrid- 
-ius, (I) or the beautiful picture of friendship he gives us,(2). 
Witness how St. Augustine reveals his heart not only in the book 
of the Confessions, where he is unfolding the story of his very 
soul, but also in his letters. In his retreat at Cassiciacum, how 
he would break off in the midst of a learned and abstruse disc- 
-ourse to introduce little personal touches which are so reveal- 
-iiig! That he was a live man no one can doubt; this living 
throbbing spirit of his is in evidence continually. Recall his 
description of the battle of the cocks, given to us in one of his 
earliest writings, (3) "the necks craned forward at full stretch- 
the erected combs- the vehement blows- the skilful evasions".
Foot Notes- (I). Confessions, IV.4.9. (2). ibid,IV.8.I#. (3).
De Ordine, 1*8.25. Col.544,Vol.I,"Omnia Opera, St. Augustine,
(9).
Then we come upon the personal note- "The moving incidents of the 
fray induced in us a certain pleasure in the spectacle".
That is one side of the man. We have/ another 
glimpse when we recall his great intellectual gifts. He possessed 
a keen analytical mind; he probed and searched his inner life, and 
with remarkable power and deft touch he was able minutely to desc- 
-ribe his inward spiritual states, never satisfied until mind conf- 
-irmed what the heart had already proclaimed. The Truth! the Truth! 
How eager he was to obtain that!
He has been described as 'the real Father of Cath- 
-olic Mysticism'(I)• And, without a doubt, much of this he learned 
in the school of Plotinus. The Confessions reveal to us seasons 
when he was lifted out of himself and saw the vision ineffable, 
when he was 'alone with the Alone*. Many of his sentences and 
indeed moods are truly mystical in their temper. But it is imposs- 
-ible to speak of him as wholly a mystic. We do not suggest this 
because St. Augustine was also a man of practical affairs. Plotinus 
was a mystic, but he had many practical gifts; indeed Porphyry 
tells us in his life of Plotinus, (2) that the great Neo-Platonist 
had often the estates of minors entrusted to his care, and that 
in the management of these he acquitted himself in a very credit- 
-able way. No,'it is when one considers other elements in his 
character, that seem incongruous with the spirit of Mysticism, that
Foot Notes- (I). Rufus Jones, "Studies in Mystical Religion",
Macmillan, 1923. page 87. (2). Vit. Porphyry,(translated
by Stephen Mackenna, Vol. I. ) see section 9.
(10).
we are draim to the conclusion that he cannot be regarded as
purely a Mystic. There is,for example, his work as a theological
statesman, "his power as an architectural genius, whose supreme
task was the construction of an imperial system- a Catholic
Church- as the mysterious instrument of grace in the midst of a
ruined world". Moreover, we remember how "more than any other
man he forged the iron system of dogma and authority".(I)
And yet, in spite of all this, the Mystic in him
clung to the belief that the true fatherland was 'yonder*, that
his spiritual home was the Father, that there was a 'way' for a
man to rise and enter into union with the 'One*.
It is not needful here to do more than briefly
state the surprising fact, that although he had been "sealed with
the mark of the Cross in infancy and salted with His salt",(2)
it was through Philosophy that he was first drawn towards the
Religious life. Amid the riot of pleasure with which he was
surrounded at Carthage, in his I9th year, Cicero's book of the
Hortensius, now lost, fell into his hands. (3) It was this that
led him to prayer and to the study of the Scriptures. Again, it
was after his wanderings in the maze of Manichaeism and his
experience with the scepticism of the New Academy that Philosophy
a second time saved him. "Plotinus, read in a Latin translation,
was the schoolmaster who brought Augustine to Christ". (4)
Foot Notes- (I). See Jones for quotations here and above- (op.cit) 
page, 88. (2). Confessions, I.XI.17. (3). ibid H i . IV. (7, 8. ) 
(4). Inge, "The Philosophy of Plotinus", (2nd. Ed.Longmans 
Green & Co. 1923) Vol.I. page, 12.
(II).
It was Neo-Platonism that first opened his eyes to the true 
Spirituality of God. The basis of St. Augustine's Psychology 
is to be found in Neo-Platonism. From Plotinus Augustine learned 
to enter into himself, and through his own soul to mount up to a 
knowledge of God.(l). It was thus that St. Augustine became one 
of the "founders of modern thought". As he sought to find truth 
in what has been called "the immediate certainty of inner exper- 
-ience", (2) so he, influenced by Neo-Platonism, enriched 
Christian thought. When St. Augustine describes the upward climb 
that the soul takes as it seeks for union with the Infinite, he 
follows very much the same way as Plotinus. And "in giving exp- 
-ression to his deepest religious feelings we find that he 
repeats the thoughts and almost the very words of Plotinus". (3)
But more than that, we shall see^in St. Augustine'£ 
doctrine of Providence and the Order of the world, in his teaching 
on Evil, on Matter, on the Freedom of the will, he owes much to 
Neo-Platonism; whilst not only are his earlier writings strongly 
imbued with the thought and spirit of Plotinus, but also many of 
the illustrations he makes use of are drawn from the books of the 
Enneads. We shall, however, be able to mark how in several 
directions he very clearly differs from his great teacher, and 
in what respects Neo-Platonism was but the gateway to a fuller 
Christian truth as expounded, in many of his books, by the
Foot Notes- (I). De vera religions, 39,72. 'Noli foras ire, in
te ipsum redi; in interiors homine hablClt veritas*, see also 
Confessions, VII.X. 16. (2 ).WindelC.band, "A History of Philos- 
-ophy,(Macmillan, I9I0 ) page,276. (3). Edward Caird, "The 
Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers",(MacLehose 
& Sons, 1904) Vol.2.page 286.
(12).
Doctor of Grace.
St. Augustine by his intimate knowledge of human 
nature and his personal experiences of the inner states of the 
Spiritual life speaks to-day even as he did to his own age, and 
many have confessed that, notably of his book of the Confessions, 
his experiences described therein have seemed like the echo of 
their own. (I).
Foot Notes- (l). See Inge, "Christian Mysticism",(The Bampton 
Lectures for 1899, 5th. Ed.Methuen & Co.London. 1981. ) 
page 219. Quoting from the Autobiography of St. 
Theresa, IX.9.
—
:
(13).
CHAPTER 2.
"THE RISE OF NEO-PLATONISM, TOGETHER WITH 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF ITS DOCTRINE".
It is well for us to consider, at the beginning of our Thesis, 
something of the background of the period in which Neo-Platonism 
took its rise.
The third century A.D. was a sad and gloomy tôme; 
pessimism seemed to be the prevailing note; men's hearts were 
failing them from fear; the golden age of literature had gone 
and an era of decadence had set in. The old world, sick and 
weary, seemed to many to be crumbling to decay. (l).
The Roman Empire, having practically reached a 
dominion of world-wide importance, held sway over many lands.The 
Imperial city itself was crowded with peoples that had come from 
far. Juvenal even in his day had bewailed the fact that the 
Orontes was emptying itself into the Tiber ; (2). and since then 
the barbarian population had steadily increased. Those who were 
rapidly populating the empire were, for the most part, from 
Eastern lands; slaves who had been brought to the city to grace 
a Roman triumph; merchants who had travelled thither, bringing 
their wares with them, bent on doing business in the market of 
the world. One great feature, then, of Roman society was its 
cosmopolitan character.
From that inrush of foreign peoples there naturally
Boot Notes-(I)lnge, 'The Philosophy of Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.I. 
page 25.indeed the whole of the chapter. (2).Juvenal (c A D
(14).
followed an influence upon the form and spirit of Religion. 
Because of the instinct in the heart of man for worship and the 
haunting sense of the supernatural, wherever they went, their 
Gods must go with them, together with religious customs and 
ritual. As a consequence of this, strange sanctuaries and deities 
were in evidence everywhere. (I).
Moreover, outside the Imperial city itself, 
the Roman legions, on outpost duty in different parts of the 
empire, came into contact with new forms of Faith. Many, influen- 
-ced by what they saw, took the Gods of these conquered peoples 
to be their own, or became missionaries of attractive cults to 
their fellow soldiers. Hence, at Antioch and at Alexandria, which 
had now become influential cities, as well as at Rome, there was 
Religious syncretism to be seen. Now the Roman people themselves 
were, for the most part, broadly tolerant of the introduction of 
these strange faiths; sick and weary of their own religion, which 
had seemed to fail them, many turned to find, if possible, some- 
-thing better elsewhere. Indeed,"the Roman Faith and worship were 
too dry and meagre to satisfy the cravings of the Romans them- 
-selves in the altered conditions created for them by the possess- 
-ion of a world-wide empire; still less could they furnish a
Foot Notes- (l). See J.Reville, "La Religion à Rome sous les
Severes", also A.W.Benn, "The Greek Philosophers",Chap,13. 
for an illuminative study.
(15).
meeting ground for all the populations which that empire was 
rapidly fusing into a single mass". (I)
It is not possible, within the limits of this 
thesis, to do more than mention the names of the more important 
Eastern religions which did much to influence the Roman people, 
deeply interesting though a fuller study would be. There was Isis, 
the Egyptian goddess of fertility. She seems in a marked way to 
have attracted the Romans, possibly because she reminded them of 
certain features which they were accustomed to associate with their 
own Venus and Ceres. Temples were erected in her honour, and even 
Emperors took part in her imposing festivals. Other deities from 
Egypt were Osiris, Anubis, and Serapjifis; the latter becoming 
afterwards even more popular than Isis. We have also deities intro- 
-duced from Phrygia, Syria, and Phoenicia, with an order of priests 
a ritual marked by its 'mysteries*, and by elaborate ceremonial. 
These, however, mainly drew adherents from the lower classes.
Of considerable importance was the Persian 
divinity Mithras, or Mithra. He was the sun-god among the Persians 
chief of the kindly spirits created by Ormuzd. He was regarded 
as the god of faithfulness and purity, the special protector of 
man in this world and the next. Mithraism was very popular through 
-out the Roman Empire, especially in the army, in the Third Cent- 
-ury, and was, at that time regarded as a formidable rival to 
Christianity. (2).
Foot Notes- (I). Benn, op.cit.page, 479. (2). C.p.Renan, "Marc- 
-Aurele,Histoire des origines du Christianisme",5th.Ed.1885, 
Vol. VII., page, 579. where he^says, "on peut dire que si 
le christianisme eut été arrête dans sa croissance par 
quelque maladie mortelle le monde eut été Mithriaste"
(16).
But now, amid this multiplicity of Gods, there began to spread an
earnest feeling after communion with some unseen power. There
was an evident hunger after spiritual certainty. Strange though
it may seem, amid the polytheism which abounded, there came into
being the consciousness of the one-ness of God. This arose in
two ways. We have already referred to the widespread toleration
in Religion which existed in the Roman Empire; but this toleration
in Religion was conditioned on the varied peoples agreeing to the
worship of the Emperor. Or rather, lest the character of the
reigning Emperor should be unworthy of a nation's devotion, and
so a baser thought of deity might arise, it was the 'Genius' of
the Emperor which they worshipped. (l).
Such worship was enforced in order to give
unity to the different parts of the Empire, and was at the same
time a means of encouraging a loyalty and patriotism wherever
Rome held sway. In the first place then, the worship of the
Emperor, in this way, tended to a unification of the conception
of deity in the minds of men.
But further, despite the presence of varied
cults in their midst, it came to be seen that there was much that 
if
was basal and common to them all. Indeed philosophers declared 
that they were not worshipping many gods, but the One, who was 
behind them all. As Plutarch put it- "There is one sun, and one 
sky, over all nations, and one deity under many names". (2).
Foot Notes- (l). The idea of a 'Genius' was a common thought in 
the mind of the Roman people. See Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit. 
Vol. I. page, 38. (2). Tlutarch, De Isid.et Osir.67. quoted
by Elsee, op.cit. page, 14.
(17).
Now all this helped towards a clearer conception of the God, for 
whom men longed.
I cannot enter into the many ways in which 
this Spiritual revival manifested itself. For one thing, there 
arose a more definite belief in a future life, and a clearer 
idea of holiness, a sense of God's guidance of man's will, and 
a desire for purification that the worshippers might be made fit 
for a closer fellowship with deity. In the second place, a kinder 
gentler spirit seemed to be abroad; the poor were being considered 
as never before; slaves were recognised as being human, and as 
having rights. In a word, there was very evidently the breath 
of a new spirit abroad which was destined to bring with it a 
fuller life to the Graecè-Roman world. (I).
Now, it might have been thought that Judaism 
would have here become the Religion of the Empire. It is true 
that many of the Greeks were attracted to it, especially as some 
of the Jewish teachers , drawn to the Greek culture, were led to 
embrace many of the philosophical tenets of Platohism. Indeed, at 
one time, it seemed possible that Judaism hand in hand with 
Hellenism, might prove a formidable rival to Christianity itself 
for world-wide supremacy. But it was one thing to receive the 
Faith of Israel, and quite another to become a Jew. Moreover, the 
Jews made a fatal mistake when, under Barcochib^ (A.D.132-135) 
they endeavoured to throw off the Roman yoke. This ended in 
disaster and Judaism lost its chance of world dominion.
Foot Notes- (I).see W.R.Halliday, "The Pagan background of early 
Christianity", Liverpool Univ.Press, 1925. page, 139.
(18).
Steadily Christianity gained ground, and despite its terrible 
persecutions scores of adherents joined the number of those who 
believed.
But it was not merely a time of Religious 
quickening, it was also an age of Philosophical revival, a time 
when Philosophy had its Religious movement, as it sought to 
interpret for man his deepest needs. "A Religious development of 
Platonism is the fundamental character of this period", says 
Windelband. (I). The more enlightened spirits in the Empire, who 
had ever cherished in their hearts a love for culture, sought to 
make their appeal to the hunger of their age through a philoàophy 
which was deeply impregnated with Religion.
Side by side with Christianity, and indeed 
a strong rival to it, was Neo-Platonism, which has been eloquently 
described by Hatch as- "that splendid vision of incomparable and 
irrecoverable cloudland in which the sun of Greek philosophy 
set". (2). We must not think of Neo-Platonism as being solely 
a Philosophy. It was really a great religious movement, which 
took place at a transition time, when Graeco-Roman paganism was 
engaged in its last great struggle with Christianity for supremr- 
-acy. We shall see that Philosophy, in Plotinuç,the last and 
greatest of all the Neo-Platonists, becomes a religion. If 
we may quote from one who has made the writings of Plotinus a 
life-long study, "There is no Greek philosopher who did not 
intend to be an ethical teacher; and in Plotinus the fusion of
Foot Notes- (I), Op.cit. page 212. (2).Hatch, "The Influence of 
VgB. i t T  upon the Christian Church-,1898 Ed.
(19).
religion, ethics, and metaphysics, is almost complete. He must 
he studied as a spiritual director, a prophet and not only a 
thinker. His is one of the most ambitious of all philosophical 
systems, for he not only attempts to unite and reconcile what 
was best in all^ Greek philosophy, but he claims to have found 
the way of deliverance and salvation for the soul of man, in 
whatever circumstances he may be placed". (I).
Now although Plotinus professed simply to 
expound the philosophy of Plato, nevertheless Neo-Platonism was 
more than a mere revival of the teaching of the great master.
It was rather a fusion of the main doctrines of Hellenistic 
Philosophy; for Plotinus not only outdistanced Plato in his 
abhorrence of things material, but the teaching of Aristotle had 
a very real bearing upon his philosophy. We must not suppose, 
however, that Neo-Platonism as expounded by Plotinus was a pure 
syncretism. True, he was indebted to many sources for his 
essential doctrines, but he fused these elements of thought into 
a philosophy essentially his own, and made a very real personal 
contribution.
Before we deal with Plotinus, however, it 
might have been of interest to trace many of the Neo-Platonic 
doctrines back to their original source, and show how this and
that philosopher had passed on his contribution. (2).
e
But that would add g^atly to the length of our chapter, and it 
is an aside which we cannot undertake.
Something perhaps should be said about 
Foot Notes- (I).Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.I.page, 7.
(20).
Philo the Alexandrian Jew, not that he had any direct influence 
upon the philosophy of Plotinus, but that he was of the lineage
of those who prepared the way. (I).
The writings of Philo are of the greatest 
importance, since "they gather together, without fusing into a 
symmetrical system, the two dominant theories of the past, and 
they contain the seeds of nearly all that afterwards grew up on 
Christian soil...If we could find a key to the chronological 
arrangement"- of his writings- "we should find in them a perfect 
bridge from philosophical Judaism to Christian Theology". (2).
We may notice, in the first place, Philo's 
doctrine of God, the Logos and the Powers hu 5^ ). He pro-
-claims the existence, unity and spirituality of God. He is 
Absolute Being, above space and time ; He is Himself space and 
time, since time can only be associated with finite beings, and 
when God made the world. He also brought time into being. He is 
the unchangeable One; nameless, for names are but symbols, and 
speech fails us when we attempt to describe Him. He is, therefore, 
best known by negation. Philo himself speaks of Him as 'The ONE';
He that IS; 'Himself. God is without quality, ) (3).
quantity and relation. That is. He is pure Spirit. (4).
Foot Notes- (I). "Philo inaugurated Neo-Platonism", J.B.Crozier,
'History of Intellectual development', 1897. Vol.I.pages, 70,
& 450. (2). Hatch, op.cit.page, 182. We are, of course, antio- 
-ipating what will be more fully dealt with in the next chap- 
-ter, but this seems to be the proper place to speak of Philo.
(3). Windelband, op.cit.page 237.foot-note, Phil.Leg.Alleg.
47.a. (4).Bigg, in the "Christian Platonists of Alexandria", 
Clarendon Press, 1886, page 9. says-"In the extravagance of 
his recoil from materialism, Philo transferred the good Fath- 
“*®^^<^„Lord of the Bible into the eternal negation of dialect-
(21).
In what relationship, then, does He stand to the world? The 
world was created out of pre-existing matter. And matter, though 
eternal, was evil,-*lifeless, erroneous, divisible, unequal*.(l).
Such a conception of matter, however, must remove 
it far from God, since He was the pure and holy one. Hence Philo 
had to conceive of such matter as being outside God and uncreated 
by Him. God was but the moulder, the shaper of the world. In 
his desire to show how God is related to the world, Philo con— 
-trasts the * Intelligible Cosmos* with the world of sense. The 
sensible world must be a copy of the divine image, and the arche- 
-typal seal which we call the intelligible world must be the 
pattern, the idea of ideas, the Supreme Reason ( koyos ) of God.(I
But how was God able to get into contact with the 
world and shape matter to His purposes? He could only do so by 
the intervention of those powers through the Logos who were ready 
to do His bidding. Many names are used to describe them; they 
are sometimes so closely associated with the Supreme Being as to 
appear as attributes; at another time it would seem as though 
Philo had appropriated Plato*s conceptions of Ideas. At other ' 
times, using the language of the Old Testament, he thinks of 
them as Angels, or according to the popular mythology of his day, 
as Daemons. Or, yet again, he has made use of the Pythagorean 
speech and has called them Numbers. (2).
Foot Notes- (I). Bigg, op.cit.pages, 9, and II. (2). John Watson, 
"The Philosophical Basis of Religion", Maclehose & Sons,1907. 
page, 471. I have been particularly helped in ray study of 
Philo by Dr. Watson*s extracts from Philo which he gives in 
his Appendix, pages, 468-479. of the above volume.
(22).
If, however, we remember that the Logos was the Mdnd or Thought 
of God, and that the Logoi are, under whatever name we think of 
them differing manifestations of the Logos, then it seems clear 
that these Logoi are closely associated with God. As Hatch tells 
us- "Philo never loses sight of the primary truth that the 
world was made, not by inferior or opposing beings, but by God.
It is the expression of His Thought." (I)
There is one other point in the philosophy of 
Philo upon which we must touch. It is his doctrine on Ecstasy. 
How can a God so transcendent come into touch with human life, 
and how can man approach unto such a Deity? Philo points out 
that it is the Logos who stands as the connecting link between 
man and God. "For man, as regards his reason, is the image of 
the Logos, as the Logos is the image of God. Hence the Logos is 
the Mediator, the Heavenly man, who represents, in the eyes of 
God, the whole family upon earth...The Knowledge which He gives 
is a lower knowledge, the knowledge of God in nature, and our 
allegiance to Him is therefore but temporary and provisional.
But He is necessary as the door through which we must pass to 
direct communion with the Father". (2)
The wise man, who desires to apprehend God, 
meets with the Divine Reasons, as he travels along the path of 
wisdom. Wisdom leads him first into the ante-chamber of the Divine
Foot Notes- (I) Hatch, op.cit.page, 187. (2).Bigg, op.cit.pages, 
18, and following.
(23).
Reason. It is only as man begins to climb upward through fear 
and love that at last he attains to his Vision. Here we have the 
mystical experience of Ecstasy. Philo tells us that this exper- 
-ience has 'happened to himself a thousand times', and in a 
well known passage he describes this state.(I).
We can see how, again and again, Philo 
anticipates Plotinus. His Logos is really very much the same as 
the Nous of Plotinus; his thought of the Absolute also closely 
approximates to the conception which Plotinus had of the Supreme; 
the doctrine of the upward climb and his teaching on Ecstasy, at 
any rate, foreshadow, what the great Neo-Platonist taught his 
disciples in after days. Notwithstanding these close resemblances, 
we must not suppose that there was any direct influence on Plot- 
-inus from the writings of Philo. Philo but contributed to the 
common stock of ideas regarding God, matter, the world; how man 
could attain to fellowship with God. These ideas filtered through 
other minds and Plotinus found them ready to hand, and by his 
eclectic method he made use of them to serve his immediate purp- 
-ose. (2).
But now let us pass to Plotinus. According
to tradition, the founder of the school of Neo-Platonism at
Alexandria, was Ammonius Saccas. We have little reliable inform-
-ation, however, as to his teaching. Porphyry(according to
Eusebius, who at the same tame throws doubt upon Porphyry's
Foot Notes- (l), Philo, Migrât,Abrah.7. quoted by Inge, 'Plotinus' 
op.cit.Vol. 2.pp.154,5.see fuller notes at the end of this 
chapter for the quotation. (2).I have received help for the 
study of Philo from Inge, Bigg, Hatch, and Watson, op.cit.
(24).
story) (I) tells us that Ammonius was of Christian parentage, 
but that he afterwards became a pagan. The date of his birth is 
unknown, but he was probably lecturing at Alexandria about 231,A.D, 
and he must have died sometime between 240 and 245.
It is said that Plotinus disappointed by what he 
heard from many teachers at Alexandria, on the advice of a friend, 
visited the lecture room of Ammonius. So charmed was he by his 
teaching that he exclaimed to a companion, "This is the man of 
whom I was in search". He remained with Ammonius for upwards 
of ten years, becoming one of his most highly distinguished pupils.
Plotinus has always been considered the head 
of the school of Neo-Platonism, and his books of the Enneads have 
been regarded as its classical documents. Concerning Plotinus we 
have quite a wealth of information, for not only is there a short 
biography written by Porphyry, his beloved disciple, who also 
edited and arranged the six books of the Enneads, each containing 
nine parts; but we have also notices of his career in Eunapius* 
"Vitae philosophorum ac sophistarum". According to Eunapius, 
Plotinus was born at Lycopolis, in Egypt, possibly about 204,5. 
A.D. Plotinus would never talk of his ancestry, parentage or 
birthplace, and would never sit for his portrait. Porphyry tells 
us- "he seemed ashamed of being in the body". (2). There is no 
need to go into details concerning what must have been a very 
saintly life; he won many friends, was greatly beloved and trusted.
Foot Notes- (I). Eus.Hist. Eccl. A.19. (2). See Stephen Mackenna's
translation of Plotinus, Vol.I. pages, 1-28, for a translation 
of the life of Plotinus by Porphyry.
(25).
Porphyry places it upon record that during the 2 6 years his 
master spent in Rome he never made an enemy, although he was 
chosen as arbitrator in many a dispute, (I) Whilst he was contin- 
-ually serving others, Porphyry adds, these labours "never inter- 
-rupted during waking hours his intention towards the supreme".(2).
We must now proceed to give a brief outline of 
the philosophical system of Plotinus, ere this chapter is brought 
to a close. (§) It is difficult indeed almost impossible to treat 
this with the careful consideration it demands. As we proceed, 
however, in further chapters to deal with the points of resemb- 
-lance which exist between Plotinus and St, Augustine, we shall
be able more fully to appreciate the magnitude and the importance
of his doctrines.
The system of Plotinus set forth in his Enneads 
is an attempt to discover what are the first principles of the 
universe, and an endeavour to explain the origin and nature of the 
world. Furthermore combatting a materialistic doctrine he procl- 
-aims the fact that the universe rests on a Spiritual basis, owes 
its very being and the continuance of its existence to the "One", 
who is high over all.
At the one end of the scale is the 'Absolute*
at the other there is Matter, The One cannot descend and enter
Foot Notes- (I), Porphy. vit Plot.9. (2). ibid. 9. (3). For a full 
account of the system of Plotinus see "Neo-Platonism", by 
Dr. Bigg, S.P.C.K., 1895. pages, 191-279. "The Neo-PlatonistS' 
% A Study in the history of Hellenism, by Thomas Whittaker, 
2nd. Ed. Camb.Univ.Press, I9I8. Chapter V.pp.40-91. "The 
Preller-Ritter extracts forming a conspectus of the Plotinean 
system".Mackenna, translation. Vol.I. Plotinus, *917.pp.130- 
158. Also W.R.Inge's monumental work, "The Philosophy of 
Plotinus", to which reference is frequently made.
(26).
into touch with matter, nevertheless there is an indirect connec- 
-tion between the two by a series of emanations. Furthermore, if 
man would hold fellowship with the source of all beauty and 
return to 'the beloved Fatherland', he must take the upward path 
and ascend from stage to stage until^purified,the mystic vision 
is granted to him.
His system may be best understood by considering 
first his doctrine of the Divine Hierarchy. According to the 
philosophy of the day, and possibly influenced by the number-myst- 
-icism of the Pythagoreans, Plotinus conceives of it as a Triad.
Of these three Principles or, as they are sometimes called, Hypos­
tases, the First Principle is the Absolute, and is variously styled 
To cL'>fu0i>v , (O ^ K , Ï /I /-c? V ^ essential Existence, 
Goodness, Unity. The Second Principle is Spirit, )
sometimes called the Intellectual Principle, or the creative power 
of the world of Ideas. The Third is (//c» X V , or the Soul. The 
second Principle emanates from the first, and the third from the 
second. The Nous by contemplating the Absolute produces all that 
truly exists, that is, the world of Ideas. Similarly the Soul 
creates by contemplation, not directly of the Absolute but through 
the medium of the Nous. The Soul, like the Nous, is immaterial 
but as it lies between the Nous and the world of phenomena it has 
chosen to become disintegrated, and creates the Individual souls 
of men, plants, and animals. These separate souls can look up 
towards the source from which they have sprung and rise into union 
with the World Soul, or sink back into the material environment 
with which they are associated.
(27).
Corresponding to the three fold division of the Divine Nature we 
have a like interpretation of the nature of man as Spirit, Soul, 
and body. Dr. Inge tells us that "in their objective aspect,
Body, Soul, anc^ jspirit are, respectively, the world as perceived 
by the senses ( ) ; the world interpreted by the
mind as a spatial and temporal order; and the spiritual world
I t
( Ko(Tf^o6 \ro^^To^ ), The organs which perceive the world under 
these three aspects are the bodily senses, discursive thought 
( ?/€<.  ^ and spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge
( ). Of these, the last alone perceives the world as it
really is, sub specie aeternitatis." (I).
Below the Divine Trinity, that is,directly 
after the World Soul is ^  cr/s or Nature; this is on a lower 
level as being concerned with matter. Nature gives form to 
formless matter and thus the physical world is created*
But to return to the Three Principles or 
Hypostases. Above and beyond all else, according to Plotinus, 
there is the Absolute, the One, True Being. It is beyond exist- 
-ence, above goodness. It is an activity which transcends all 
else. It is beyond all powers of description. It is impossible 
to predicate anything of the Absolute for to do this would be to 
limit it and make it finite. And yet, "the one must be taken to 
be infinite, not in the sense of some mass or number never to be 
measured or traversed, but in the sense of inconceivable power".(2)
Foot Notes- (I). Inge, 'Plotinus', op.cit.Vol.I.page,I23.
(2). Mackenna, translation Plotinus, Vol.I. page, 141.
Enneads, VI.9.6.
(28).
How Plotinus struggles to express himself as he seeks to describe 
the Absolute which is beyond description! "How can we make a 
statement about It seeing that all else we say of it is said by 
negation".(I). Our slender knowledge, our limited thought, 
our inadequacy of speech cause us to fail when we seek to 
describe the One who is above all being. Plotinus tells us that 
the One does not even possess will, if will implies the desire 
for something not present,-"The One, therefore, can experience 
no Good nor any will to Good; it is the Beyond-Good, or It is 
good, not in regard to Itself, but in regard to the lower that 
is capable of partaking in it." (2).
If we call It the Source and the Cause, this 
is not a definition of the One but merely a statement of the 
relation which the lower has to it. "All things, however exalted, 
august, are later than This; It is the source of all, though in 
some sense It is no source;we must keep all things apart from 
It...freedom of action...It can enter into no relation with the 
realm of Existence".(3).
How then can the Absolute act upon the 
world of existing things? It cannot part with Itself, it will 
not descend to nature or material things. It acts through the 
Nous, By contemplation the Nous receives its powers and energy 
from the Absolute, Not that the Absolute lessens Itself by 
imparting. Plotinus uses the images of the sun and of the light.
Foot Notes- (l)Mackenna, op. c it .'Enneads, VI.3.II. (2).ibid.
Enneads, VI.9.6, (3). ibid. VI.8.8,
(29).
As the sun radiates its light, without at the same time losing 
any of it or, to use another figure, as a cup which eternally 
overflows because its contents are infinite, so the Absolute 
imparts without wither change or lessening of its fulness.(I)
The second Principle, as we have seen is the 
Nous. Plotinus refrains from calling it the Logos. Here we find 
the Ideas. It is by contemplation of the Absolute that the Nous 
is able to pass on to the third Principle, that which shines 
forth or overflows from the Absolute. The Nous is called the One- 
many because each thought of the Divine Mind involves each and 
all the rest, so that each idea in a sense is the whole mind 
(Nous). Yet each is separate, having a separate life and energy 
all its own, and is an Intelligence ( Tff ).(2).
But, like the Absolute, in imparting it does 
not lapse. "Nothing within the series of the three intelligible 
principles can be said to lapse in production; the term being 
applicable only to the descent of the individual soul. The order 
throughout, both for the intelligible causes and for the visible 
universe, is a logical order of causation, not an order in time’.'(3)
The third Hypostasis in the Divine Triad is 
the All-Soul, or the Universal Soul, the . It is the
emanation and image of the Nous. Just as the Nous had an upward
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, V.I.6. (2).Bigg, 'Neo-Platonism* p.242.
(3). Whittaker, 'The Neo-Platonists*, page, 55.
(30).
contemplation of the One, so the All-Soul at once contemplates 
the Nous and generates the Individual Soul. It then becomes the 
creator of all that is lower than the Divine three. Plotinus lays 
great stress upon the importance of an exact knowledge of the 
soul. Whilst Eternity belongs to the Nous, Soul has to do with 
time. (I). Hence it is that which bomes nearest to us all, 
entering into contact with the world of beauty, and with the life 
of man.
"Before all let every Soul remember that itself
is the creator of every living thing, having breathed the life
into them; into all that the earth nourishes and the sea; all
that are in the air and all the stars in the heavens; itself has
formed the sun and this vast firmament of sky; itself has given
them their stately ordering and leads them around in their ranks;
and it is a Nature apart from all to which it gives the order and
the movement and the life, and must of necessity be more honourab-
-le than they; for they are things whose being has had a begin- 
-ning, and they perish when the Soul that leads the chorus-dance
of life departs, but the Soul itself has ever-being since it
cannot suffer change."(2).
Thus we begin to see that the Universal soul
from one standpoint separates itself into Individual Souls, and
yet Plotinus assures us that it is not dismembered, but remains 
"present as a unit and as an universal". (3). Or again he says
Foot Notes-,(I). Enneads, 3.7.II. cf.Enn.4.4.I5.
voCv )^ fôYû^  Pi Û ipt (• u  ^^  (2) Enneads, 5.1.2. 'On
the grandeur of the Soul" (Human and Divine ).(3).ibid.
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"The particular Souls merge into one Soul which has given itself
to form the Multiplicity and yet has kept its character; it is
of a quality to remain one though it bestow itself upon all; its
potency runs to all at once; it is present in every particular
Soul and is the same in them all; ho one need baulk at this
doctrine if he will but think how a science, with all its detail,
constitutes one whole; the whole remains a unity and yet is
divisible into its parts". (I).
"There is a soul above the soul of each,
A mightier soul which yet to each belongs:
There is a sound made of all human speech.
And numerous as the concourse of all songs:
And in that soul lives each, in each that soul,
Tho* all the ages are its life-time vast;
Each soul that dies in its most sacred whole 
Receiveth life that shall for ever last." (2).
I cannot enter fully, here, into the question of the descent of
the soul into the body. It would seem according to Plotinus that
the soul on the one hand runs the risk of degrading itself by
coming into touch with nature, and yet on the other hand he
clearly points out that it is the ordinance of God that man may
by the help of the soul be lifted up to a higher estate. So that
the things 'here* may be like unto those 'yonder'. Dean Inge
suggests that "The Soul is a spiritual being, with its home in
heaven- the heaven that is within us, even while it is in the
body. But it has brought down this heaven with it into the time-
process in which it energises. There is no contamination whatever
Foot Notes- (l). Enneads, 4.9.5. Mackenna's translation, Vol.I 
page, 133. (2). Stanza by Richard Watson Dixon, quoted by
Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 120.
(32).
in these activities, so long as the Soul remembers that it has 
been sent into its present life as God's fellow-worker, 'to imi- 
-tate the Divine providence,' as Proclus says. The more deeply 
it penetrates into the darkest recesses of the nature which has 
fallen furthest from God, the more faithfully it is fulfilling 
the Divine will, and vindicating its Divine origin. Its inmost 
life and being are safe, because the Soul is the child of God; 
but it is not allowed to remain always on the mount of vision; 
there are devils to be cast out in the plain below." (l).
This makes very clear to us the work of the Soul, the help that 
it may become to man even at the risk of polluting itself by the 
things of the body.
We now come to see what Plotinus has to say 
concerning the three-fold nature of man, Man is Spirit, Soul, & 
Body, or, as Mackenna puts it, he has an Intellective or Intuit- 
-ive Soul, a Reasoning Soul, an unreasoning Soul. As Spirit he 
comes into touch with real existence, contemplates the divine, 
identifies his being with the highest and holiest, enters upon 
Sainthood. As Soul, he acts as a normal being. He is in the 
body, but he uses the body for higher ends. As Body, he lives the 
Animal life as distinct from the life which he has been called 
upon to share. Here he is at his lowest, having forgotten his 
high estate. Here we have, in this stage. Imagination, which 
concerns the senses, and appetites rooted in the flesh.
Foot Notes- (l). Inge,'Plotinus', op.cit. Vol.I. page, 263.
(33).
A word must be said upon the view of Plotinus concerning Matter 
and Evil. In thinking of Matter, we must banish from the mind 
all thought of it as material. Matter ( ) is rather a form-
-less mass, if we can think of such a thing; rather, perhaps, we 
should say it is that upon which Soul works, the thing out of 
which forms are made, itself being formless. Mackenna says"it is 
almost non-being; it would be non-being except that Absolute non- 
-being is non-existent, impossible in a world emanating from the 
bounty of Being".(I). Plotinus tells us- "Matter is not Soul; it 
is not Intellect, is not life, is not Ideal-Principle, not Reason- 
Principle; it is not limit or bound, for it is mere indeterminat- 
-ion; it is no#4a power, for what does it produce? It lives on 
the farther side of all these categories and so has no title to 
the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, 
and this in the sense not of movement (away from Being), or 
station (in Not-Being), but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is 
no more than the image and phantom of Mass, a bare aspiration 
towards substantial existence..." (2).
Passing to Evil, he tells us, that it is assoc- 
-iated with matter. In so far as Evil exists, its root is in 
matter. But then Evil, according to Plotinus, does not exist,bec- 
-ause it implies an absence of Good; it follows therefore, that 
about it there is an absence of Being. Rooted in Matter it part- 
-akes of its negative qualities. Yet Plotinus, in his optimism &
Boot Notes- (I). Mackenna, Translation Plotinus,Vol.I.page,123.
(2). ibid. Enneads, 3.6.7. Vol.2.page 77.
(%).
and earnest endeavour to insist upon a Spiritual Principle as 
Lord over the universe, tells us that the very Evil in the 
Universe may contribute to its good. (I).
A further word must be said concerning the 
Mysticism of Plotinus. He was indeed rightly called the Father 
of the Mystics. His experiences have been shared by many who have, 
like himself, been partakers of the Divine vision. It is here 
that we reach the heart of the Religion of Plotinus, for it is 
not as a Philosopher that the revelation of the Divine comes to 
him, but as one who hungers after God. In that revelation which 
springs from a deep experience, we have Neo-Platonism coming 
into the closest touch with the Christian Religion and becoming 
a formidable rival.
How is it possible to attain the Vision? We 
must prepare ourselves, cleanse mind and heart of all impurity, 
and take the upward path, up and up until the Soul has become 
pure intellect. For that which apprehends the One is Intellect, 
purged and purified. Then as we wait, eager to feel, to experi- 
-ence the holiest communion, the vision comes filling the heart 
with joy unspeakable. "One that seeks to penetrate the nature 
of the Divine Mind must see deeply into the nature of his own 
Soul, into the Divinest part of himself. He must first make 
abstraction of the body, then of the lower soul which built pp 
that body, then of all the faculties of sense, of all desires & 
emotions and every such triviality, of all that leans towards
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads,3.2.5. for a translation see Fuller Notes 
at the end of this chapter.
(35).
the mortal." (l). How well Plotinus has described for us this 
Mystic Vision! (2). And we shall also see that St. Augustine 
had a like experience, and tells us of it almost in the words 
of Plotinus himself. Porphyry informs us that Plotinus , during 
the six years that he was with him, enjoyed the ecstasy four 
times, whilst he adds concerning himself this note- "I,Porphyry, 
in my 68th year, I too was once admitted and entered into Union"(3
In his 66th year the health of Plotinus, never 
robust, began to fail seriously. He apparently suffered from a 
serious internal malady. All his friends were away when the last 
moments drew near, with the exception of his friend and physician 
who had hurried from Puteoli to be by his side. As Eustechius 
entered the death chamber Plotinus said to him, "I have been a 
long time waiting for you; I am striving to give back the Divine 
in myself to the Divine in the All",(4) and passed away.
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, V.3.9. Mackenna's translation. Vol.I. 
page 155. (2). Enneads, 1.6. (7,8,9.) for translation see 
the fuller notes at the end of this chapter.
See also, Charles Bigg, * Neo-Platonism*, (l895. /S.P.C.K.)
The whole of the 21st. chapter, for a good account of the 
vision. (3). Porphyry vit.Plot.23. (4).ibid.2.
(36).
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Page, 23. Foot Note- (I).
Migrât, Abrah, 7. (quoted by Inge,’Plotinus* op.cit. Vol.2.Pages
154,5.)
"Sometimes, when I have come to my work empty, I have suddenly 
become full, ideas being in an invisible manner showered upon me, 
and implanted in me from on high; so that through the influence . 
of divine inspiration I have become filled with enthusiasm, and 
have known neither the place in which I was nor those who were 
present, nor myself, nor what I was saying, nor what I was writ- 
-ing, for then I have been conscious of a richness of interpret- 
-ation, an enjoyment of light, a most keen-sighted vision, a most 
•distinct view of the objects treated, such as would be given 
through the eyes from the clearest exhibition."
Page, 34. Foot Note- (I).
Enneads, 3.2.5. Mackenna, Vol.I.page 150.
"Vice is not without its usefulness to the all; it exhibits the 
beauty and the rightness of virtue; it calls up the intelligence 
to oppose the evil course; it manifests the value and grace there 
is in goodness by displaying the cost of sin. No doubt evil has 
not essentially anything to do with these purposes, but once it 
is there it serves in working out great ends; and only a mighty 
power could thus turn the ignoble to noble uses and employ to 
purposes of form what has risen in formless lawlessness."
Page, 35. Foot Note- (2).
Enneads, 1.6. (7,8,9.) Mackenna, translation. Vol.I.pages87-89. 
"Therefore we must ascend again towards the Good, the desired of 
every Soul. Anyone that has seen This knows what I intend when I 
say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired 
as a GOOD. To attain it is for those that will take the upward 
path, who will set all their forces towards it, who will divest 
themselves of all that we have put on in our descent;- so/^.those 
that approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are 
appointed purifications and the laying aside of the garments worn 
before, and the entry into nakedness- until passing, on the upward 
way, all that is other than the God, each in the solitude of him- 
-self shall behold that solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, 
the Unmingled, the Pure, that from Which all things depend, for 
Which all look and live and act and know, the Source of Life and 
of Intelligence and of Being.
And one that shall know this vision- with what pass- 
-ion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, 
what longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering del- 
-ight! If he that has never seen this Being must hunger for It 
as for all his welfare, he that has known must love and reverence 
It as the very Beauty; he will be flooded with awe and gladness, 
stricken by a salutary terror; he loves with a veritable ^ove, 
with sharp desire; all other loves than this he must desptse, and 
disdain all that once seemed fair And for this the sternest and
(37).
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the uttermost combat is set before the Souls; all our labour is 
for This, lest we be left without paht in this noblest vision, 
which to attain is to be blessed in the blissful sight, which to
fail of isX to fail utterly.
For not he that has failed of the joy that is in
colour or in visible forms, not he that has failed of power or
of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he that has failed 
of only Shis, for Whose winning he should renounce kingdoms and 
command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, spurning the 
world of sense from beneath his feet, and straining to THIS,he 
may see.
But what must we do? How lies the path? How come
to the vision of the inaccessible Beauty, dwelling as if in the
consecrated precincts, apart from the common ways where all may 
see, even the profane? He that has the strength, let him arise 
and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the 
eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once 
made his joy. When he perceives these shapes of grace that show  ^
in body, let him not pursue; he must know them for cppies, vestige^ 
shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of. For if anyone 
follow what is like a beautiful shape playing over water- is 
there not a myth telling in symbol of such a dupe, how he sank 
into the depths of the current and was swept away to nothingness? 
So, too, one that is held by material beauty and will not break 
shall be precipitated, not in body but in Soul, down, to the dark 
depths loathed of the Intellective-Being, where, blind even in 
the Lower-World, he shall have commerce only with shadows, there 
as here.
"Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland": 
this is the soundest counsel...But what is this flight? How are 
we to gain the open sea?...The Fatherland to us is There whence 
we have come, and there is The Father. What then is our course, 
what the manner of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; 
the feet bring us only from -and to land; nor need you think of 
coach or ship to carry you away; all this order of things you 
must set aside and refuse to see: you must close the eyes and 
call instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, 
a vision, the birthright of all, which few turn to use.
This is the only eye that sees the mighty 
Beauty. If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, 
impure, or weak, and unable in its cowardly blenching to see the 
uttermost brightness, then it sees nothing even though another 
point to what lies plain to sight before it. To any vision must 
be brought .an eye adapted to what is to be seen, and having some 
likeness to it. Never did eye see the sun unless it had first 
become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the first 
Beauty unless itself be beautiful.
Therefore, first let each become Godlike, 
and each beautiful, who cares to see God and Beauty. So, mounting, 
the Soul will come first to the Intellectual-Principle and survey 
all the beautiful Ideas in the Supreme, and will avow that 
this is Beauty, that the Ideas are Beauty. For by their efficacy
(38).
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comes all Beauty else, by the offspring and essence of the 
Intellectual-Being. What is beyond the Intellectual-Principle we 
must affirm to be the nature of Good radiating Beauty before it. 
So that, treating the Intellectual-Kosmos as one, the first is 
the Beautiful: if we make distinction there, the Realm of Ideas 
constitutes the Beauty of the Intellectual Sphere; and the Good 
which lies beyond is theFountain at once and Principle of Beauty; 
the Primal Good and the Primal Beauty have the one dwelling-place 
and thus, always. Beauty's seat is There".
(39).
CHAPTER 3.
"THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY 
AND NEO-PLATONISM".
We shall now proceed to enquire how far Christianity had been 
influenced by Neo-Platonism previously to the time of St.Augustine 
that is, how far the doctrines of Philosophy had permeated the 
thought of the Christian Church.
It has already been suggested that Ammonius 
Saccas had been trained in the Christian Faith before he gave 
himself to the exposition of the doctrines of Neo-Platonism,
One would, therefore, expect that, perhaps unconsciously, he had 
learned much as a Christian which would be of value to him in 
his study of Philosophy, At any rate, as Grandgeorge points 
out, it was hotly debated whether, on the one hand, Christianity 
W8.8 not deeply indebted to Neo-Platonism, or, on the other, 
whether it was not nearer the truth to declare that Neo-Platonism 
owed everything to Christianity. (I).
Some went so far as to say that the philosophers 
had "stolen" their main principles from the Scriptures. "They 
have borrowed from our books", says Clement of Alexandria, "the 
chief doctrines they hold, both on faith and knowledge and 
science, on hope and love, on repentance and temperance ahd the 
fear of God": and Clement goes on to show that "Philosophy was
no less the schoolmaster of the Greeks than the Law was of the 
Jews to bring them to Christ". (2).
(40).
In like manner Tertullian asks, "What poet or Sophist has not 
drunk at the fountain of the prophets? From thence it is, 
therefore, that philosophers have quenched the thirst of their 
minds, so that it is the very things which they have of ours 
which bring us into comparison with them". (I).
On the other hand there were not a few claiming 
Plato as their master, who adopted the Christian Faith, and who 
after their conversion sought to find a ground of agreement, 
between Platonism and Christianity. Justin Martyr after he became 
a Christian continued to wear his philosopher's cloak, and trav- 
-elled about proclaiming his doctrines, so that Eusebius described 
him as "an ambassador of the Divine Word in the guise of a phil- 
-osopher". (2).
Without a doubt the Fathers of the Church owed 
a great deal to Platonism. It was their custom, whilst they combat- 
-ted the doctrines of Philosophy, to endeavour , by means of 
allegory, to reconcile them with Christianity. It is not therefore 
surprising to find, in the works of Tatian, Athenagoras, Theoph- 
-ilus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, and many others, 
abundant evidence of the influence of Neo-Platonism. The truth 
lies here- living side by side, meeting the same problems, and 
seeking to find a solution for them, endeavouring also to disc- 
-over the way of deliverance from the misery of their age, each 
had turned to the same source and had found help from the words
Foot Notes- (I). Apol.47. quoted by Hatch, op.cit.page, 127.
(2). Eusebius, H.E. IV.II.8., Foakes-Jackson, "History of the 
Christian Church", 5th. Ed.1909, Cambridge, page, 159.
(41).
of the master, Plato, as well as guidance from the best that 
could be drawn from other pagan philosophies and from the Holy 
Scriptures. Indeed, as Hatch has pointed out, it was due to the 
fact of "kinship of ideas of current philosophy and the leading 
ideas of Christianity", that, "within a century and a half after 
Christianity and philosophy first came into close contact, the 
ideas and methods of philosophy had flowed in such mass into 
Christianity, and filled so large a place in it, as to have made 
it no less a philosophy than a religion." (I).
Justin Martyr, the ablest of the Apologists, sought to 
explain this by his firm belief in a scattered word. He says- 
"The teachings of Plato are not alien to those of Christ, though 
not in all respects similar...For all the writers (of antiquity) 
were able to have a dim vision of realities by means of the indw- 
-elling seed of the implanted Word". (2).
At first Christianity had little to do with Philosophy. 
Those who became Christians in the first instance, were for the 
most part humble men and women of little education. Moreover, the 
appeal which Christianity made rested upon a life, and that the 
life of the Lord Jesus Christ; it did not depend on the philos- 
-ophy of the Schools, but upon purity of living, holiness of 
character, likeness to Christ. But as the new Faith gained ground, 
it received as converts those who had been trained in Philosophy.
Foot Notes- (I). Hatch, page 126. (2). Apol.2.I3.,
Hatch, page 126.
(42).
Hence there arose a need for the Church to give reasons for the 
Faith delivered unto the Saints; in a word, it was compelled to 
set forth a Philosophy as well as to proclaim salvation through 
Faith in a Person.
Now the first attempts to give a philosophical 
colouring to Christian speculation are to be found in the heresy 
known as Gnosticism, (I). We cannot enter into details here as 
to the varied Gnostic sects or discuss their tenets. We must 
confine ourselves to a brief outline of the doctrine of Gnosticism 
generally as it influenced the Christianity of the first century.
Gnosticism has been defined as "an aristocracy 
of enlightenment, explaining a popular creed". (2) It was an 
attempt made to unite Christianity with philosophical speculations 
in order to win the approval of the Intellectual world. As Harnack 
says,- "These Christian philosophers formulated the content of 
the gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all 
the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, 
they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, includ- 
-ing the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish 
this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had 
hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain". (3).
Gnosticism, however, was really a serious 
attempt to probe the deep mystery which surrounded human life, 
caused by the presence of evil and suffering. "How could these 
things be reconciled with the belief that the world had been made
Foot Notes- (I).See Foakes-Jackson, op.cit.Chapter, VII., also 
Bigg, "ffhe Christian Platonists of Alexandria", 1886, Ed, 
Clarendon Press, pages, 27-35. (2) Foakes-Jackson,page,126.
(3). Harnack, "History of Dogma", Eng.Trams.page,*70. VaL.2.
(43).
by a beneficent Deity?" they asked. Now whilst the Orientals, 
notably the Persians, had dwelt much on this aspect of human life, 
the Greeks, in their philosophical reasonings, had never given 
an answer to these questionings; rather had they clung to the 
sunnier side of life. With the Gnostics as with the Manichaeans, 
the mystery of good and evil is explained by dualism, and the 
conclusions they came to were that all that could be perceived by 
the senses, that is, all that was material, partook of the nature 
of evil.
The principles of Gnosticism may be summed up 
briefly in the following way-
(l). The Gnostics, whilst professing to believe in 
the Christian Faith in its entirety, nevertheless interpreted it 
by means of a knowledge ( y  ^ ) which they had received and
which enabled them to understand what was beyond the realm of 
sense, such knowledge giving them deliverance from the bondage of 
the evil which was associated with material existence.
(2). Since the world contained so much that was 
evil, they claimed that it could not have been made by a good God; 
it must, therefore, have been fashioned through the media of 
lesser powers; at any rate, it was obvious that the Creator must 
be of a nature lower than God Himself.
(3). Hence they sought to bridge the gulf between 
the world and God by aeons or angels. By means of such emanations 
only could man draw near to God.
(4). But if matter is essentially evil, then 
Christ €ould not have been polluted by any earthly form. So the 
story of the Incarnation must have been pure fiction.
(44).
(5). If the body is thus evil by reason of its assoc- 
-iations with matter, then it follows that man must either 
conquer his desires by asceticism or give way to the lusts of 
the flesh, since the body, being already polluted, could suffer 
no degradation. The danger of Gnosticism thus lay in the fact 
that such a view of the body destroyed man’s sense of responsib- 
-ility, for how could he be held to be responsible for sin, when 
his very body was essentially evil, and he had been placed in an 
environment of evil,
t /
From this resume, it will readily be seen that 
here we have traces of Platonism among the Gnostics. "Like the 
Neo-Platonists they taught that the Soul, which has lost its way 
in the dark, must return to God. Like them they believed that th- 
-ere is a divine spark in the Soul which can light us through the 
gloom. Like them again, they held that this desire to return to 
God is not an individual affair only, but a cosmic movement.
They also spoke of the Godhead as beyond existence. (I).
Despite the danger of Gnosticism in the early 
Churc%, it was, indirectly, a very real help. It compelled men 
to examine their position as to what they really believed, and 
led them to formulate their doctrines. It also cleared the way 
for a stronger faith, and, ultimately it was conquered and made 
of service to the Church. (2).
Foot Notes- (I). Inge, 'Plotinus', page 106, Vol.I.
(2). See Bigg, op.cit. Page .'^5. foot-note, for what the 
Church owed to Gnosticism.
(45).
But now we will notice further influences which were at work upon 
the Christian Faith, notably from the School of Alexandria.
At Alexandria there was a large colony of Jews of 
considerable wealth and influence, who were desirous of convert- 
-ing the Greeks. The translation of the Hebrew Scripturds into 
Greek not only inagurated a period of wide-spread literary aetit-
A
-ity; it made it possible for the Greeks to read the Scriptures 
in their own tongue. Along with this new interest in the Sacred 
writings there arose by means of the writings themselves an ear- 
-nest endeavour to reconcile Greek thought with the Faith of 
Judaism. Indeed distinct evidences of the presence of Platonism 
in the Pentateuch, and of Stoicism in the Apocrypha, are manifest,
(I). There is also an attempt made to modify the anthromorphic 
conceptions of God by a change in the translation, whilst the 
Targums or Aramaic versions of the Scriptures go a step further 
by representing God as acting through His Memra,or Word, which 
becomes,in this way,personified, (2).
Moreover, in order that their strong belief might 
be justified, that the Scriptures were a sufficient guide for 
life, they proceeded to discover Greek Philosophy in the Law, by 
means of symbolic and allegorical interpretations, and to argue 
that Plato was but "an Attic Moses", declaring that all that was 
best in the Philosophy of the Schools had been taken from the 
Holy Scriptures.
Foot Notes- (I). See Bigg, op.cit. page,4.for such evidences.
(2). Foakes-Jackson, page, 155.
(46).
All this but serves to indicate the tendency towards reconcilia­
tion which was at work.
Let us, however, pass rapidly onward and notice 
how that, within the Christian Church itself, there arose a like 
endeavour to blend the doctrines of Christianity with the teach- 
-ing of Plato, so that a Christian Philosophy might be theirs 
which would enable them to refute the Gnostic heresies and at 
the same time justify Christianity to the cultured people of the 
•day.
Justin Martyr (c.100-165) was the first of these 
philosophical Fathers. By birth a Greek, Justin had received his 
early training in the schools of the Stoics and Platonists; it 
was only late in life that he was converted to Christianity.
In two passages, (I) Justin declared that the Logos was the 
means by which God had instructed the whole world, and that the 
entire human race was partaker of that Divine Logos. It is of 
importance to notice that Justin was the first Christian writer 
to make use of the word Logos in its two-fold sense, that of 
Reason, in its philosophical import, and that of the Word , as 
the Christian understands it. (2). Whilst Justin adopts the 
Christian vieia/ of our Lord, he is in danger at times of making 
Him but a manifestation of the power of God, thereby denuding 
Him of personality; and at other times he so emphasises Mis 
personality {aU^(T7o«ri<Ç J as to be apparently guilty of the
Foot Notes- (I). Apol. I. 44, &59. (2). Hatch, op.cit. page,262.
(47).
heresy of Di-Theism. But.the work of Justin is of value, in 
giving Plato a place in the Divine revelation, and by his use
of Philo's conception of the Logos, which he imbues with a def-
-initely Christian spirit.
It was at Alexandria, however, that there sprang 
into being that great school of Christian Platonists with which 
we are accustomed to associate the names of Clement and his still 
more famous successor Origen. Of that school at Alexandria, 
Harnack makes the remark that it was "of inestimable importance 
for the transformation of the heathen empire into a Christian 
one, and ofCreek philosophy into ecclesiastical philosophy".(I).
Clement, who was born about the middle of the 
second century, A.D., and who probably lived until 220, was a
Greek, probably an Athenian, and came of heathen parents. (2).
Eager to discover the Truth, he sought for her in the varied 
schools of philosophical thought of his time. He rejected Epicur- 
-eanism, and, whilst he was influenced by the Stoics, he yet 
quarrelled with them because they conceived of God as being in 
corporeal form. Plato and Pythagoras were the philosophers for 
whom he had the warmest regard. Concerning the former he says^ 
"Plato is the friend of truth, he is inspired by God Himself",(3). 
Concerning the latter , it was the Pythagoras of legend rather 
than the Pythagoras of history that quickened his fancy.
Still, Clement had the eclectic spirit characteris-
-tic of his age, and drew his doctrines from many sources. "I
Foot Notes- (I).Harnack, op.cit.Vol.2.Chap.VI. (2).see Foakes- 
Jackson, page 162 and Windelband, page, 217. for the names 
of his various books. (3). John Watson, "The Interpretation 
of Beligious Experience", Gifford Lectures, (I9I0-I2), 
Maclehose K& Sons, I9I2., page 39.
(48 ).
call philosophy”, he says, "the sum of doctrines which teach 
justice and piety, of which each school furnishes a part". (I).
Making use of the allegorical method of interpretation 
common to his age, he was able to interpret the Christian writ- 
-ings in the language of Plato. "There is one river of Truth", 
he says, "but many streams fall into it on this side and on that". 
(2). It is not possible to dwell here, upon Clement's concep- 
-tion of the relation of Faith ) to knowledge or wisdom
(yv6t)C'f5 ). Faith, with Clement, is the necessary basis of Know- 
-ledge; and, in his eyes, the true Gnostic is the Christian 
believer.
In Clement's doctrine of the Godhead, as we might 
expect, we find a strange mingling of Platohic and Christian 
ideas. He had learnt that God was a Spiritual Being, but when he 
tries to explain His nature he does so in the language of Plato- 
-nism. It is impossible to define the nature of God, he tells us, 
for He is beyond our conception of either the phenomenal or the 
intelligible world. He adopts the principle of abstraction or 
elimination. (3). But in this way Clement comes perilously near 
the idea of God as one of negation, that has been emptied of all 
content. He has described for us by what stages we attain unto
Ofi
the most abstract of conceptions. (4). By the adopting of this 
method Clement seems to have entered upon an impassable road.
Foot Notes- (I), Strom. 1.37. Watson, "The Interpretation of Rel- 
-igious Experience", page, 40. (2 ).Strom.I.5.29. Bigg,op.cit. 
page 42. (3 ) o ( ^  Strom. V.II.7I. (4). Strom.V.II.see 
Watson, ib.page, 4y. and fuller notes at the end of this 
Chapter.
(49).
"The great First Cause is not space, hut beyond space, beyond 
time, beyond language , and thought. We know not what God is, 
only what He is not? In another passage, he tells us, it is 
difficult to apprehend the principle of things, and much more 
difficult to apprehend the First Cause, the Cause which is the 
Principle of all other things. And he concludes that- "our idea 
of the unknown is solely the effect of Divine Grace, (I)
But Clement cannot stay here. He has his 
Christian conception of God, which he must endeavour to reconcile 
with those ideas which he has received from Philosophy. God is 
absolutely good; otherwise He would not be God, for goodness is 
the expression of Has self-conscious Personality. So he adds 
to the philosophical thought of God that fuller conception which 
has become his from Christian experience. "Our Father", we find 
Clement saying, "full of tenderness, does not cease to exhort us, 
to warn us, to discipline us, for He does not cease to save 
us". (2), How different this is from the idea of the abstract 
Being which Clement has attempted to describe in terms of negation
When we turn to his thought concerning the 
Logos we find a further development of his Christian ideas on 
the Godhead. In the main, Clement adopts Philo's doctrine, but 
he amplifies it and makes it clear that the Logos is "the Word 
which has become flesh". How can a Being, absolutely self-com- 
-plete and transcendent, manifest Himself to men? Clement agrees
Foot Notes- (I). Strom. V.8I,2. Watson, op.cit.page,48. See
fuller notes at the end of this chapter. (2). Watson ibid 
page, 51.
(50).
with Philo that He does so by means of the Logos, who stands as 
the Mediator between God and man. According to Philo, the Logos 
was at work in Old Testament times, speaking to Moses, delivering 
Israel from Egypt, speaking through the prophets. He it was who 
supplied the Greeks with wisdom. But the Logos is more than 
that- He is, in the mind of Clement, the teacher and redeemer of 
men from their sins; He is also the conqueror over death, and has 
gained immortality for men. Clement proclaims in no uncertain 
language the unity, equality, and eternity of the First and 
Second Persons. In a certain passage he seems to think of the 
Holy Spirit as also co-equal with the Father and the Son, as 
when he says:- "0 mystic wonder. One is the Father of All, One 
also the Word of All, and the Holy Ghost is One and the same 
everywhere". (I). Clement proposed to deal more fully with the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit, but this intention was never carried 
out.
Whilst Clement rejects the thought of the 
pre-existence of the Soul, and denies the eternity of matter, he 
for the most part closely follows Philo in his view of Creation.
We saw that with the Platonists matter was the cause of Evil and L 
therefore could not have been created by God, whose purpose was 
frustrated by the nature of the substance from which he moulded 
the world. Clement, however,does not trouble to explain the 
evil properties of Matter. With him, God was the Creator of all
Foot Notes- (I). Paid. 1.6.42. , Bigg, op.cit. page, 67.
(51).
things, and, giving to man the freedom of the will. He endowed 
him with the power of choosing evil. It was through man there- 
-fore that Evil came into the world. But Clement declared that 
evil is only an action, not a substance (Oacr-/c< )  ^ and that it 
therefore could not be regarded as the work of God. (I).
We have, however, said enough concerning Clement 
and his association with Hellenism to understand how close a 
union there existed between this Christian Father and Neo-Platon- 
-ism, and to perceive how into Christian Theology there entered 
many of the ideas of Platonism.
On theuother hand, it may be that even the great 
Neo-Platonist himself was influenced by the writings of the 
Christians, (2) although this is nowhere acknowledged, and he 
never makes direct reference in his writings to the Christian 
Faith.
Let us now pass forward and briefly touch 
upon the work of Clement’s successor and pupil in the School of 
Alexandria. Origen (185-254, A.O.) was born at Alexandria, of 
Christian parentage. His father died a martyr's death when 
Origen was 17, and, it is said, that he would gladly have followed 
in his father's steps had not his mother and a numerous family I 
been dependent upon him for support. He received from his father 
a thorough knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures: in addition to 
this he became widely learned in Hellenistic culture. At 18 it 
is said that on account of his piety #  learning he obtained an 
Foot Notes- fl). Strom. IV.13.605., see Windelband, op,cit.page 
252. (2). It may be that Plotinus was influenced somewhat 
by Clement's desci 
(12,13) and the Cl 
ty. Stroma.4.158.
by Clement’s description of the Beatific Vision. Strom 7
father’s account of the Holy'Tr in-
(52).
unsalaried position as Catechist in the Alexandrian Church.
On account of the fact that many of his pupils had been trained 
in Neo-platonic philosophy, Origen himself , in order that he 
might be more fully acquainted with its tenets, became a pupil 
in the school of Ammonius Saccas. It was there that he came into 
contact with Plotinus, who was a scholar at the same time, (I).
Origen was the most eminent of the early Christ- 
-ian writers, indeed the number of his works is stated by 
Epiphanius to have exceeded six thousand; he was also the father 
of Biblical criticism and exegesis. "Origen it was who actually | 
founded Christian Theology as a philosophy, and who established I 
his views so firmly that although the Church has rejected much 
3ln detail!, its dogmas still bear the stamp of his system". (J.).
It will readily be seen how impossible it is 
to give anything like a detailed account of the writings or 
doctrines of this great master. It will be well for us, however, 
to notice the personal contribution which he made to the influ- I 
-ence of Neo-Platonism on Christian Dogma. For Origen has been 
considered to be the most important representative, in this 
period of Christianity,coloured by Hellenism. (&).
In dealing with the nature of God and His 
relation to the world, we find Origen placing emphasis upon the 
Spirituality of God. "God is a Spirit, God is Light. It must not
Foot Notes- (I). We have this on the authority of Porphyry.
(2). C.H.Moore, "Religious Thought of the Greeks", Oxford 
University Press, I9I6. page, 342. (3). For a detailed acc- 
-ount of the doctrine of Origen, see Bigg, op.cit. pages. 
115-234. '
(53).
be supposed", he says,"that God is a body or is in a body, but 
a simple intellectual nature admitting of no addition at all.
There is in Him no greater or less, no higher or lower, for He 
is the Monad, the Unit, Mind, the Fountain of all mind", (ij..
Being Mind, God is incorporeal, and therefore. 
He is independent of the laws of Space and Time, omnipresent, 
omniscient, unchanging, incomprehensible. But here Origen parts 
company with both Clement and Philo, and whilst Clement had 
emphasized the negative aspect of God, Origen takes pains to show 
that our knowledge of Him is clearly positive. If we speak of God 
as being incomprehensible, it is because of our human frailty 
and the limitations of our speech and knowledge. But we can see 
God revealed in Creation and more truly in His word, and there 
is a possibility that, by the Divine Grace, when we are purged of 
evil, we may yet know him more perfectly.
iîhilst, moreover, it is untrue to conceive of 
God as swayed by passions like men, yet He is by no means passion- 
-less. " The Father Himself and God of all", he says, "is long- 
-suffering, merciful and pitiful. Has He not then in a sense 
passions? The Father Himself is not impassible. He has the passion 
of Love". (2).
Again, with Origen, God is not Absolute,
but Perfect. He is perfectly wise, perfectly just, perfectly 
mighty, but the perfection of these attributes consists in the
Foot Notes- (I).De Principiis, I.I., see Bigg, op.cit.pp.155,6.
(2). In Ezech. Hom.VI.6. ; also in Num.Hom.XXIII.2.where he 
deals at length with the same subject. See Bigg,ibid,Page, 
i 158.
(54).
fact that they are limited by one another. (I).
As we consider his idea of the God-head, we 
find that whilst he places emphasis on the Trihity, he makes 
clear also the Unity of the God-head. Bigg tells us that with 
Origen the word for Person is most commonly Hypostasis, whilst 
that for the Divine Nature is frequently Ousia. (2).
The Logos with Origen is verily and substantially God, and hence 
co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. "There never can have 
been a time when He was not", says Origen. "For when was that God, 
whom John calls the Light, destitute of the radiance of His proper 
glory, so that a man may dare to ascribe a beginning of exist- 
-ence to the Son?...Let a man, who ventures to say there was a !
time when the Son was not, consider that this is all one with I
I
saying there was a time when Wisdom was not, the Word was not, j
the Life was not." (%). Origen declares the doctrine of the
eternal generation of the Son. "The Father’,’ he says,"did not beget 
the Son and send Him free when He was begotten, but He*ever begety
9 \ r» o '
-teth Him y^ \rv'bi oCt/<ov )". This generation he illust-
-rates by the continual generation of Light from the Sun.(4).
With regard to the Third Person in the Christ-
-ian Trinity, whilst Origen does not give to Him the title of God,
Foot Notes- (I), See de Princ. II.9.I."Non enim, ut quidam volunt 
finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non 
est nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest." 
quoted by Bigg, op.cit.page 159. foot note. (2).ibid.page, 
163. (3). De Princ.IV.28,"Qui autem initium dat Verbo Dei, 
vel Sapientiae Dei, intuere ne magis in ipsum ingenitum Pat- 
-rem impietatem suam jactet, cum eum neget semper Patrem fui- 
-sse, et genuisse Verbum, et habuisse Sapientiam in omnibus 
anterioribus vel temporibus vel saeculis vel si quid illud
(4) FoakeJ
( 55).
Still he gives us to understand that he regards Him as being
Divine. He maintains His eternity and suggests in several
passages His equality. He is 'associated in honour and dignity
with the Father and the Son'. He is one of the adorable Trinity
wholly present in the work of the Godhead; and Origen himself
invokes the Holy Spirit in prayer. (I).
In the beginning, He moved on the face of the
waters; sharing in the work of Creation; (2). it is by the cease-
-less ministrations of the Holy Ghost that the work of Sanctific-
-ation is accomplished. "It is He that creates in a man the
capacity to receive Christ, first as Justice, then as Wisdom, and
so on in ever deepening affinity, till at last the gift of
being becomes worthy of the Giver". (3). In a word, the Holy
Ghost is "the substance of the graces of the Father". (4).
Now it will be naturally asked, since Origen's
doctrine of the Godhead appears so completelyXin harmony with
that of the Christian Church, in what sense then has Origen been
influenced here by Neo-Platonism?We must point out that Origen's
conception of the generation of the Logos by the Father, left in
his mind the thought of the inferiority of the begotten . "When
he turned to consider the origin ofvthe Logos he did not hesitate
/
to speak of Him as a ^  ^ /(T/coi and to include Him amongst the
I
rest of God's spiritual creatures. A /C(((Twhich is at the same
Foot Notes- (I).De Princ.,Preface 4. and elsewhere. See Bigg, op. 
cit. page, 173. (2).De Princ^^IV,30. Bigg, page,^J73.
(3). Bigg, page, 174. (4) )(oi fi I(Pci. 7co
Bigg, page, 174, foot note.
(56).
time was no contradiction to him,
simply because he held the immutability, the pure knowledge and 
the blessedness which constituted the Divine Nature to be commun— 
-icable attributes? (I) Indeed, Origen accepted the Platonic 
view that God was the 3 V and exalted in essence even above His 
Nous or Logos, and taught that there was a difference of essence 
( p  ^ ) between the Father and the Son. In
his division of humanity into *hree classes Origen again lays 
emphasis upon the subordinate position occupied by the Son, The 
first class contained those who were capable of understanding the 
ckuTo ÔZo^ , then came those who knew Him by the Logos, and 
lastly those who know God by recognising the divine essences 
which animate the planets.(2).
When v/e come to Origen*s doctrine concerning 
the relationship which existed between God and the world, we 
find him asserting that the world took its beginning in time: 
but it is not the first, nor will it be the last of such worlds.(2 
The matter as well as the form was created by God; made by H^m, 
and to Him it will return. Origen clearly sees the disorders 
that are in the world, the inequality a^ nd apparent injustice |
which exist. Whence then hath this evil come? Not from God, nor 
from matter, since this came from God. It is the work of man.(4)
As Windelband puts, it,- "the sin of free spirits consists rather I
Foot Notes- (I). See Article, 'Origen* by Harnack, Ency Brit.
Vol.20. pp.270, et seq. (2). Foakes -Jackson, op.cit.page,
163. (3). De princip. 2.9.4. Hatch, op.cit.page, 205.
(4). Contra Celsum, IV.66.'Evil is not of God nor yet ofr 
mat ter J , ^ v  oT’ir to\/,TÎ/[s o «ôcrTctcr»^ s
i V < S i<TT/v' , ^T(S iO'Ti To K^KoV
196, foot note. •
(57).
in their rebellion against the will of God, in their longing 
after an unlimited power of self-determination, and only second- 
-arily in the fact that they have turned their love toward God's 
creations, toward the world instead of toward God Himself. Here 
too, then, there prevails in the conception of evil the negative 
element of departure and falling away from God; (I) but the whole 
earnestness of the religious consciousness asserts itself in tnis, 
that this falling away is conceived of, not merely as an absence 
of the good, but as a positive,perverted, act of will." (2)
Brigen then maintains that the evil in the 
world is the result of man's evil choice. God has given freedom 
to man and man has chosen amiss.
We may note in passing, that Origen adopts the 
view which appears in Plotinus, of the triple division of man into 
body, soul, and spirit, and he developes it in a specially inter- 
-esting way. In this passage, (De Princ.III.$-5), the 'Soul* is 
treated partly as motive power, partly as faculty of ideation & 
desire, while the spirit, on the contrary, is presented as the 
principle of judging, on the one hand, between good and evil<p on 
the other hand, between true and false; in this alone, teaches 
Origen, consists man's freedom. (3)
A word may be said concerning the optimism of 
Origen. Since the very world itself is built on spiritual lines 
and since all that is spiritual is incapable of being destroyed, 
at the long last God must triumph and every spirit must return 
to the Good. (4).
Foot Notes- (I).Windelband,op.oit.P.?5.%F.N.'In this sense even
(58).
In bringing our brief study of Origen to a close and 
completing our chapter, we may well quote the words of Harnack 
as he writes on Orig&n. "The Science of Faith as expounded by 
Origen, bears unmistakably the stamp both of Neo-Platonism and 
of Gnosticism, As a Theologian, in fact, Origen is not merely 
an orthodox traditionalist and believing exegete, but a specul- 
-ative Philosopher of Neo-Platonic tendencies. As a Philosophical 
Idealist he/transmutes the whole contents of the Faith of the 
Church into ideas which bear the mark of Neo-Platonism and were, 
accordingly, recognised by the later Neo-Platonists as Hellenic. 
Porphyry says of Origen- KdiT< ToiS n fay yr fcoci
Too O ^ (ou Euseb. H.E.YI.I9."(I),
Thus, along many avenues and by means of varied 
influences^we find that Neo-Platonism left its impress on the 
life and thought of the Christian Church. In this way St. 
Augustine would enter a Church which,already,was greatly indebted 
to the spirit of Hellenism, And,by means of his keen subtle 
intellect he too was destined to enrivh this heritage and,in his 
turn,do so much towards clarifying the thought of the Church; 
broadening its spirit; furnishing it with material which would 
enable that Church not only to meet and overcome its opponents, 
but to obtain a reasoned ground for the Faith which must be 
fearlessly proclaimed.
Foot Notes- (I). Harnack, Article on Origen, Encyc. Brit.
(59).
FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3.
Page, 48, Foot Note- (4).
Clement himself has given an account of the process of abstract- 
-ion or elimination.
"By analysis we reach the first conception, starting from things 
that are subordinate to it and stripping off from bodies their 
physical properties. In this way weX abstract from the three 
dimensions of length, breadth and depth. The residuum is a point, 
or, as we may say, a unit occupying a certain position. Eliminate 
position, and what is left is simply the conception of unity.
Now if, removing from bodies the properties that are inherent in 
them, and from incorporeal things the properties by which they 
are characterized, we throw ourselves into the greatness of Christ 
and by the energy of holiness advance to His immensity, we shall 
in a sense reach to the comprehension of the Almighty, understand- 
-ing no% so much what He is as what He is not. For we must not 
suppose that the terms used in Scripture, such as figure, motion, 
state, throne, place, right hand, left hand, are literally appli- 
-cable to the Father of the universe. The First Cause is not in 
space, but beyond space, beyond time, beyond language and thought? 
Strom. V.II. See Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experi- 
-ence", page, 47.
Page, 49, Foot Note- (I).
"It is difficult," says Clement, "to apprehend the principles of 
things, and a fortiori much more difficult to apprehend the First 
Cause, the Cause which is the principle of all other things.
For, how can we define that which is neither genus nor species, 
nor difference, nor individual, nor number, nor accident, nor 
that to which accident belongs? We cannot properly call Him the 
All, for the All implies magnitude. Nor can we speak of His parts, 
for the One is indivisible and infinite, not as incomprehensible, 
but as being without dimensions or limits. Nor can we say that 
God has shape or name. If we speak of the One, the Good, Reason, 
Being in itself, or even of Father, God, Creator, Saviour, we 
employ terms that are not strictly appropriate. Such high names 
we employ because of our impotence to fond the veritable name, in 
order that the mind may have something to rest upon and steady 
it. None of these names taken separately expresses God; combined, 
they but indicate His omnipotence. We designate things by their 
qualities, or by the relations they bear to one another; but we 
cannot do so in the case of God. Nor can He be apprehended by 
demonstrative knowledge; for such knowledge presupposes better 
known principles, and there is nothing prior to the Uncreated.
It follows that our idea of the Unknown is solely the effect of 
Divine grace."
Strom. V.81, 82. See Watson, ibid, page, 48.
(60).
FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. (Continued).
Page, 57, Foot Note- (4).
We may note the Optimism of Origen. This is how he expresses 
himself- "It is an indication not only of His wisdom but of His 
goodness that, while no creature is coerced into acting rightly, 
yet when it lapses it meets with evils and punishments. All 
punishments are remedial. God calls what are termed evils into 
existence to convert and purify those whom reason and admonition 
fail to change. He is thus the great Physician of souls.(Contra 
Celsum, 6,56. also. De Princ. 2.10.) The process of cure, acting 
as it does simply through free-will, takes in some cases an 
almost illimitable time. For God is long-suffering, and to some 
souls, as to some bodies, a rapid cure is not beneficial. But in 
the end all souls will be thoroughly purged. (De Princ. 3,I,14,17J 
All that any reasonable soul, cleansed of the dregs of all vices, 
and with every cloud of wickedness completely wiped away, can 
either feel or understand or think, will be wholly God: God will 
be the mode and mea,sure of its every movement; and so God will 
be 'All*. Nor will there be any longer any distinction between 
good and evil, because evil will nowhere exist; for God is all 
things, and in Him no evil inheres. So, then, when the end has 
been brought back to the beginning, that state of things will be 
restored which the rational creation had when it had no need to 
eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; all sense of 
wickedness will have been taken away; He who alone is the one 
good God becomes to the soul'ALL', and that not in some souls 
but in all. There will be no longer death, nor the sting of death, 
nor any evil anywhere, but God will be All in all."(ibid, 3.6.3.) 
See for a fuller statement of what Origen here says on this 
matter. Hatch, pp.234,5,6. "The Influence of Greek Ideas and 
Usages".
Foot Note-
I had meant to say something about that fascinating 
character Synesius (365-414), who became Bishop of Ptolemais in 
A.D.4I0, but the chapter is much longer than I had intended.
There is not the slightest evidence, moreover, that 
Synesius and St. Augustine ever met or that Synesius influenced 
him in the slightest degree. But as we read the hymns of 
Synesius, ten of which have come down to us, we can see how easily 
one steeped in Neo-Platonism could pass from it to the Christian 
Faith. An excellent account of the life and writings of Synesius 
is to be found in the Dictionary of Christian Biography, pages- 
757-780, in an article by the late X T.R.Halcomb.See also A. 
Gardener, "Synesius of Cyrene", (The Fathers for English readers 
1886) Also H.O.Taylor, "The Classical Heritage of the Middle Agea" 
I90I, pages, 78-82. And references in Foakes-Jackson, op.cit.
(61).
CHAPTER 4.
THE LIFE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.
Part I. (From 354-386,A.D. )
Aurelius Augustine (l) was of North African descent, born at 
Thagaste (sometimes written as Tagaste), a small municipality in 
Numidia, on November I3th. 354 A.D. (2) He died, during the 
siege of Hippo by the Vandals, on August 28th, 4 30 A.D., in his 
76th year.(3) His father, Patricius remained a pagan until a year 
before his death. Patricius appears to have been a man of consid- 
-erable position in Thagaste, for he evidently lived in a house 
of no mean dimensions; St. Augustine himself refers to several 
servants. (4) He also belonged to the 'ordo decurionum', an 
honour which was only enjoyed by the most distinguished citizens, 
and which carried with it membership of the Municipal Senate.(5) 
Still Patricius was by no means rich, for Augustine tells us 
that his patrimony consisted of a "few small fields, (6) and 
"a vineyard bordering upon an orchard" (7); moreover, when August- 
-ine had to journey to Carthage to complete his education, we 
learn that the expenses were met by a friend of the family, prob- 
-ably by a wealthy patron of the neighbourhood, called Romanianus 
a relative of the family. (8)
Foot Notes- (l). The name Aurelius is not to be found in any of 
his writings, but his contemporaries make use of it. (2) 
de beata vita, B."idibus novembris mihi natalis dies erat". 
(3).PossidiuB, Vit.Aug.31. Poi^dius adds some further notes 
to Augustine's story and gives us an account of his Apostol- : 
-ate. (4). Conf.IX.9.20."Library of the Fathers",edition by 
Pusey.(5).Conf.2.3.5. (6)."paucis agellulis",Epist.CXXVI.7.
(7).Conf.2.4.9. (8). He is often referred to with deep 
gratitude, by St. Augustine. ^ |
(62).
Patricius was a man of the world, bent upon enjoying 
the good things of life, kindly upon occasion, but of quick 
temper, and somewhat loose in his morals- St. Augustine hints at 
the fact that his mother must have suffered much by reason of his 
infidelity. (I) The father was quick to perceive that his boy had 
unusual gifts and was eager that he should make his mark in the 
world. Augustine owed a great deal to his father despite his 
pagan ways and sensual habits,and Patricius left on his son's 
early life the impress of his personality.
But it was his mother Monnica (2) who was destined 
to exercise the predominating influence upon his character. At 
the time of the birth of Augustine, although Monnica had been 
brought up in the Catholic Church, it would seem, she had not 
yet become a Christian. (3) Still she was soon concerned for her 
son's spiritual state, and whilst at his birth he had not received 
the sacrament of baptism, lest the sins of his early days might 
render that sacred rite of none effect, nevertheless he had been 
"sealed with the mark of His cross and salted with His salt". (4) 
Thus from his earliest days St. Augustine was a dedicated spirit.
(5). Monnica therefore stands out early in the life of St. Aug- 
-ustine as a type of Christian piety by no means common in such 
pagan surroundings. Again and again we have glimpses given to us
Foot Notes- (I). Conf. IX.9.I9."toleVhifit cubilis iniurias.."
(2). All the Augustinian M.S.S. have the spelling thus.
(3).Conf.2.3.6; 2.3.8. (4). Conf.I.XI.(I7-X 18).
(5). Conf.3.IV.8. see also Contra Academicos, 2,5."in illam 
religionem, quae pueris nobis, insita est et medullitus 
implicate". All references to St. Augustine's early writings 
are taken from Opera omnia Sancti Aurelii Augustini,
ed.l836. Vol.I.
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of her gentle forbearance, her tactfulness, her deep concern that 
her son should become an earnest Christian. It could not have beer 
always easy to live with a husband of the spirit and temper of 
Patricius, yet we are told that they dwelt together in complete 
harmony; that she avoided provoking her husband; so that the 
neighbours could neither perceive nor hear by any token that 
APatricius had beaten his wife or that there had been any domestic 
difference between them, even for one day". (I)
Monnica's influence on the life and character of 
Augustine grew year by year. We are reminded frequently on the 
pages of the Confessions how deep her concern was that her son, 
amid all the insidious forms of temptation which surrounded his 
early days, and especially in the passionate time of adolescence, 
should keep himself from the sins of the flesh.
Very early Augustine must have received religious 
instruction from her lips, and in all probability he attended with 
her the services of the Church, so that he was continually in 
touch with Christian influences. Reflecting upon his mother's j 
anxious solicitude for his wellbeing, Augustine acknowledges that ! 
it was this, by the help of the Holy Spirit of God, which kept 
him from making total shipwreck of his life. He tells us that 
when, in her anxiety, she had turned to a certain bishop and 
besought help that she might guide her son aright, he made answer- 
"let him alone awhile, only pray God for him, he will of himself 
Foot Notes- (l)Conf. IX.9.19,
(64).
ty reading find what that error is, and how great its impiety". 
When, however, she urged him the more, "with entreaties and many 
tears", he added, "Go thy waya, and God bless thee, for it is not 
possible that the son of these tears should perish".(I).
We have dwelt thus at length with these early 
home influences because they would seem to explain much which took 
place in the impressionable period of his life. On the one hand 
we have the father, a man of the world, enjoying luxury, and 
sensual pleasure, delighting in the games at the Coliseum with 
their lascivious display, eager for his son's advancement and 
worldly success, but caring little for his spiritual life; on the 
other hand we have the mother, a Christian, devout, an adherent 
of a Church which had placed its ban on the luxury and pleasure 
seeking in which the father delighted, and mother-like,knowing 
full well the sins which surrounded her son, eagerly desirous 
that the growing youth should be kept in safety. These gave dir- 
-ection to his life. As Boissier puts it- "He received in his 
early years two contrary impulses, which seem to me to explain 
the indecisions and contradictions in which he passed his youth"
(2). We know now that Augustine^, destined to
become the great Father of the Church, responded at last to the 
spiritual influence of Monnica rather than the adverse and wholly 
worldly direction which proceeded from Patricius. But Augustine 
had yet to travel far before he was ready to confess himself a
Foot Notes- (I). Conf.3.12.21.St. Augustine in one of his early 
writings, ( de util credendi, 1.2.)declared that he had been 
"a Catholic Christian from his early years". (2) Gaston
Boiseier, "La fin du Paganisme",(7th.Ed.2 .Vols.Paris,1913.% 
Vol.I.page, 204. ’
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Christian,
Following his own story in the Confessions, we have 
there vivid pictures given to us of his boyhood. We see him at 
school, with a boy's natural love for play , scamping his lessons 
dreading the consequences, praying that he may not receive punish­
ment; and when his prayers were not answered, feeling that God had 
done him grievous ill. (l) He chronicles the fact that sometimes 
he did not speak the truth; that he pilfered from the pantry & 
the table so that he might enjoy the good things or share them 
with his companions; and sometimes, he confesses, he cheated at 
games. In those early days he is fired with ambition to stand 
well in the eyes of his masters and being fond of poetry, he 
learned it 'willingly with great delight, and for this was pron- 
-ounced a hopeful boyl His recitals won for him great praise, 
even among those who were older. He tells us of his intense 
dislike for Greek, and his love for Latin, his* mother tongue.
A childish illness of the stomach had taken a somewhat serious 
turn, 80 that he was 'near to death', whereupon his mother would 
would have had him baptized. However, he quickly recovered, and 
the Holy Rite was postponed lest 'the defilement of sin' might 
'after that washing' bring greater and more perilous guilt.(2).
The school days at Thagaste come to an end and he 
must needs go to Madaura a neighbouring town, twenty miles away, 
to learn grammar and rhetoric with a view to the African bar.(3).
He was then 15, a growing lad, awake to all the mysteries of self
Foot Notes- (l)Conf. I.IX.14. (2). ibid,I.XI. 17. (3).ibid,2.3.5.
(66).
and sense. His sojourn there evidently did him little good; he 
became the victim of fleshly desire; too much liberty was given 
him, and, evidently he had much time on his hands, with the natur— 
-al result that his Faith became weaker and the world oÉ sense 
took him captive. Madaura was the birthplace of the gifted 
rhetorician, Apuleius (born about 125). He had become reverenced 
there almost as a God, and many strange stories had gathered 
around his name as a worker of miracles. M.Bertrand suggests that 
the youthful ambition of St. Augustine may have been fired by the 
local reputation of Apuleius. (l)At any rate we know that St. Aug- 
-ustine in after years held him in high esteem , and often speaks 
of him in his role as a Neo-Platonist.
After leaving Madaura, having spent probably less 
than a year there, he remained for a time in idleness, at home; 
drifting from his early promise of godliness and mixing with 
lewd companions, he sought to outdistance them in sin that he 
might win their admiration. (2).
At 17, he is sent to Carthage, the great capital 
of the western Mediterranean. His parents could ill afford such 
expense, but the^ were willing to make every sacrifice, and as 
we have already stated, Romanianus, their wealthy relative, who 
had a villa at Carthage , generously came to their aid.Carthage 
was a gay, pleasure—loving city and there Augustine was drawn 
into scenes of a most degrading character. (3) He joins a band of
Foot Notes- (l)De Civ.Dei, IX,4. "Vir elegantissimi ingenii et 
multae ac facundae scientiae". (2)Conf.2.3.8; 2.4.9.
(3).Conf.3.I.I;2.3.7. "There sang all around me in my ears 
a cauldron of unholy loves", "Among my equals I was ashamed 
to be less shameless."
(67).
* subverters*, 'eversores*, wreckers; his life at this time was 
of the wildest, but no one save his mother seems to have been 
concerned as to his state. His father dies whilst Augustine is 
at Carthage, but his mother shouldering the burden of his support 
with the help of Romanianus keeps him at the Rhetorical school, 
where he shows great promise. It was here that Augustine formed 
an alliance with a young woman,whose name has never been recorded; 
and with her he lived in strict fidelity for fifteen years.Such 
unions in that day, seem to have been quite common,and excited 
little comment. To them, in 372, when Augustine was but 18 a 
little son was born, to whom they give the name of Adeodatus. He 
was a gifted and devout child and became a youth of much promise.
(I). It was when Augustine was 19 , that a great
event took place which left upon his mind and life an abiding 
impression. He came upon a book by Civero, the Hortensius, now 
lost; the reading of that book turned his mind to better things.
It was a decisive hour in his spiritual pilgrimage and must be 
regarded as the first step on the way which was to lead him,in 
Later days, to become the Father of the Church. He tells us- "This 
book altered my affections, and turned my prayers to Thyself, 0 
Lord;' and made me have other purposes and desires. Every vain hope 
at once became worthless to me; and I longed with an incredibly 
burning desire for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to
Foot Notes- (I).Adeodatus was with Augustine at Cassiciacum, later! 
and was baptized, in his ISth.year along with his father.In 
the book entitled *De Magistro*, St. Augustine has preserved 
for us many of the thoughts of this gifted lad who unfortuna- 
-tely died early.
(68).
arise, that I might return to Thee". (I) Augustine now became 
determined to search for Truth, and at all costs find it. Strange 
to say, whilst the polished phrases of Cicero appealed to his 
literary taste, one thing was a source of trouble to him- "the 
name of Christ was not in it*. (2) It was not indeed for 
Wisdom herself that Augustine sought, but for something that would 
bring peace to his soul and still the tossings of his restless 
spirit.There awakened within him the devout reflections of his 
early years, and, compared with Religion, the systems of/the Phil- 
-osophers seemed incomplete and empty. He turns to the Sacred 
Scriptures for guidance, but these with their ’unadorned and ruggec 
style* repel him. Yet no Philosophy could satisfy him, he must 
find the truth- truth about God, and truth concerning his own 
tortured spirit.He had grown weary of his senseless round of plea­
sure and self-indulgence; but he could not see eye to eye yet, with 
his mother in matters of Faith, there was much in the/stories of 
the/ patriarchs on the pages of the Old Testament that repelled 
him; he was not ready to become a Catholic Christian.
At that moment, the claims and promises of Manichaeism 
seemed to meet his needs. To the teaching of this powerful sect 
then, when a youth of nineteen, Augustine surrendered himself.
And, whilst he never became one of the initiated, he was yet a 
’hearer*, and remained such until his twenty-eighth year,It is not 
needful for us to enter fully into the origin of this Religious 
Faith; nor, indeed, is it worth while to outline its chief tenets.
Boot Notes- (I). Conf. 3,4.7. (2).3.4.8.
( 69 ) .
It is sufficient to say that Manichaeism contained elements drawn 
from Persian Zoroastrism, Syrian Gnosticism, Christianity, and 
perhaps from Buddhism. It found the origin of evil in the 
strange dualism which they taught existed between Light and Dark— 
-ness. Good and Evil,and their continuous warfare. Mani rejected 
the old Testament as the work of the devil: Jesus he set among
the prophets, although, he declared, His flesh was but a phantom, 
and his crucifixion merely a semblance. Jesus had foretold 
the coming of a Paraclete, and Mani claimed that he was himself 
the promised Holy Ghost.
A much more important consideration for 
ourselves is to see how it was that such a system could make its 
appeal to Augustine and how it seemed, at this stage of his life, 
to answer his heart's cry for Truth. Harnack tells us- "At that 
time anyone who had studied the Scriptures, but had no confidence 
in Ecclesiastical exegesis, especially in regard to the stumbling 
-blocks presented by the Old Testament, anyone who knew not the 
perils of free speculation, yet who enquired into the nature of 
the world and attempted to frame a conception of the spiritual 
world and the problem of evil, naturally became a Manichaean"(I)«
It is of interest to recall the passage add­
ressed by St. Augustine to his friend Honoratus, written about 
391, in which he gives an account of what the Manichaean teachers 
professed to offer, and the specious appeal which their system 
made to restless and enquiring minds. (2).
Foot Notes- (I). Harnack, Augustine's Confessions, page, 20.
(2). de util cred, 1.2. ^
(70).
He was evidently drawn to Manichaeism by its offer of Truth, its 
specious promises of enlightenment, its parade of Divine Know- 
-ledge. It made use of Christian terms, he found too 'the name 
of Christ there': it spoke of God and the Holy Ghost, it recogni- 
-sed prayer, and it insisted on a certain asceticism. Augustine 
had shrunk from the enforced dogmas and doctrines of the Church, 
but Manichaeism did not thrust its faith upon its converts. He 
was able to become a 'hearer* without committing himself to all 
its tenets, reserving to himself the right of a certain freedom 
of thought. Still further, Manichaeism rejected the Old Testa- 
-ment, and refused to countenance the conduct of the patriarchs, 
and such had always seemed a perplexity to him.
Another thing which had given him no little 
concern; aftd this was the existence of evil in the world. 
Manichaeism, here, by reason of its dualism, seemed to satisfact- 
-orily explain this. Their doctrines freed God from the onus of 
such evil and in like manner acquitted man , in such a way that 
he was not altogether answerable for his sins. Augustine, seeking 
to be right intellectually, and wishful of deliverance from the 
bondage of his passions, saw in Manichaeism an explanation of not 
a little that troubled him; such an explanation as appeared to be 
acceptable alike to his vanity as to his reason. Moreover, he 
was not required to break with his mistress.
His mother Monnica, distressed by his errors, 
forbade him her house for a while. She was however, encouraged by 
a dream wherein she saw a shining youth coming towards her, and 
comforting her, bidding her rest content, for where she was, there
(71).
also her son would he, 1/Vhen Augustine heard this, he interpreted 
it in this wise- that Monnica herself would one day stand where 
he was, that is, that she too would become a Manichaean.(I).
At twenty, Augustine was elected Professor of 
Rhetoric in his native town at Thagaste. But, becoming conscious 
of his growing powers, he desired to settle down in Carthage.
His departure, perhaps, was hastened by the death of a friend to
whom he was passionately attached, who had followed him into 
Manichaeism. Taken seriously ill, this friend lay unconscious, 
and indeed was thought to be dying. In that state he received
the sacrament of Holy Baptism. % e n  he rallied and it seemed as
though he would recover, Augustine jested with him on what had 
been done in his unconscious state, when, greatly to Augustine's 
surprise, his friend shrank from him, and bade him, as he valued 
his friendship, nevermore to speak in that way again. A few days 
after, the fever returned and he passed away. This event so preyed 
upon Augustine that long years after he could record on the pages 
of the Confessions how sore was his heart. (2) If he tried to 
comfort himself by saying, 'Trust in God*, what God had he to 
trust in? (3) Life was insupportable in the place where every- 
-thing reminded him of the friend who was no longer with him. 
Hastening away to Carthage, probably about 376, his friend Roman- 
-ianus again aiding him, he opened a School of Rhetoric, and ere 
long he vms firmly established and acquiring an increasing reput- 
-ation.
Foot Motes- (l).Conf. 3.XI.(19,20).(2). Conf.< 4.4.9. See fuller 
notes at the end/of this chapter. (3). ibid.
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He was little more than 20 years of age when, there fell into his 
hands a book of Aristotle on the TeW Predicaments. He quoted it 
with pride and proclaimed the fact that he had read and understood 
it unaided.(I) Meanwhile he was deeply engaged with Manichaeism, 
and whilst in order to gain a victory in a theatrical contest,he 
would^not accept the help of magic, he yet ventured to consult 
the astrologers, despite the fact that his friend , Nebridius, 
did his utmost to prove to Augustine their falsity.(2).
St. Augustine tells us that when he was 26 or 27, year
A
of age he wrote two or three books on 'The Fair and the Fit*,
(de Apto et Pulchro) (3), dedicating this work to Hier^s who had 
become famous as a Professor of Rhetoric at Rome. - Later he 
expressed himself as being glad that it had been lost, for he 
wished he had never written it. It is of interest to note that 
even in this youthful essay into the fields of literature there 
is an indication that St. Augustine's thoughts were already 
turning in the direction of Platonism. (4).
During his stay at Carthage , St. Augustine still
sought to discover whether the Manichaeans were right in all
their affirmations; for example they believed that the stars
were connected with the lives of men and had a direct influence
on human conduct. Now Augustine could not be sure as to the truth
of that. It might serve as a sop, and dull the pangs of conscience
to believe that man might blame his.^moral failure on the stars,
or declare that sin was a matter of necessity; (5)but Augustine
Foot Notes- (l).Conf. 4.16.28.(2). ibid, 4.3,6. (3). ibid, 4.13.20
(4). see R.L.Ottley, "Studies in the Confessions of St. Aug- 
-ustine", Robert Scott, I9I9. page, 16. (5), Conf.4,3.4.
"Do caelo tibi est inevitabilis causa peccandi,"
(73).
could never be satisfied with half truths, he must press ever on. 
His friends, Nebridius and Vindicianus, often debated the matter 
with him, vehemently affirming that strange coincidences had but 
been the result of accident, (I) One day a conversation with 
Firminus, an educated man, well taught in Rhetoric, greatly impr- 
-ssed him. Augustine had raised the question of the connection • 
of the stars in the heavens with the destiny of men on the earth; 
Firminus then told him of how he and the child of a slave woman 
had been born at precisely the same time, that the stars and their 
positions were carefully noted, and yet- Augustine says-"Firminus, 
born in a high estate in his parents* house, ran his course 
through the gilded paths of life, was increased in riches, raised 
to honours; whereas that slave continued to serve his masters, 
without any relaxation of his yoke..." (2) This illustration
seemed conclusive, and yet Augustine was loth to give way.
Furthermore, Nebridius used to propound a diffic- 
-ulty. Suppose, he would say, that when the darkness attacked 
the light, the God of Light refused to fight, was the Darkness 
able to injure the Light? If that were possible, then the God of 
Light was subject to violation and, therefore, corruptible.
But if, on the other hand, the Daikness could inflict no harm on 
the Light, then the position of Manichaeism was ridiculous; for 
why should there have been a war at all? Or the defeat of the 
primal man? Or where was the need of the intervention of God's
Foot notes- (I) Gonf. 7.5.R. (2), ibid.
(74).
own substance, Jesus Christ? Or His work of redemption? (I).
Still Augustine was not even then, fully persuaded. He would 
wait, he said, until the coming of the great Manichaean preacher, 
Faustus and put to him some of the questions which had troubled 
him. On the arrival of Faustus, however, Augustine, whilst 
pleased by his fluent discourse, was grievously disappointed 
with the result of his interview with him. Frankly, Faustus ach- 
-nowledged that he could not solve many of the problems with 
which Augustine had confronted him. (2).
Augustine now had his faith shaken in Manichae- 
-ism; he had become suspicious of its empty and pretentious 
claims. He realized some of the absurdities that were present in 
its doctrines, and,above all, he was shocked by many of the 
inconsistencies that were present in the lives of some of that 
sect who made the/greatest profession. More than this, Manich- 
-aeism had failed him; it had brought no peace to his troubled 
heart.
It was in this state of mind that Augustine 
left Carthage for Rome, His mother, however was very much against 
his going to the Imperial city, but he managed to escape from her 
by a^base and unworthy subterfuge, pretending that he was about 
to bid farewell to a friend . He persuaded Monnica to remain 
in a little chapel near the sea; there she spent the night in 
prayer, and weeping. St. Augustine says- "And what, 0 Lord, was
Foot Notes- (l).Conf.7.2,3. (2). ibid.5.7.13.
(75).
She with so many tears asking of Thee, but that Thou wouldest 
not suffer me to sail? But Thou, in the depth of Thy counsels 
and hearing the main point of her desire, regardent not what she 
then asked, that Thou mightest make me what she ever asked", (I) 
During the whole of his sojourn in Rome, he 
seemed, however, to be destined to disappointment and failure. 
Almost immediately, upon his arrival, in August or September 383, 
he was taken ill with a grievous fever; at one time he appeared 
to be dying, but, thanks to his mother's prayers his life was 
spared. (2). Moreover, he had not the success that he had hoped 
for; there was much competition, he was an unknown man, and, to 
add to the trouble, his pupils often disappeared without paying 
their fees.
Still at Rome he had the opportunity of a clearer 
insight into the inconsistencies of Manichaeism, with the result 
that his allegiance to that Faith was strained almost to breaking* 
-point. He became inclined towards the Scepticism of the Academic- 
-ians, for he despaired of ever reaching the Truth which he so 
eagerly sought; until, thinking of the mind of man, "tarn vivacem, 
tarn sagacem, tarn perspicacem", he realised that with such a gift 
from God truth must be discoverable, but that it must perchance 
come by means of a revelation. But whence? (3)
Foot Notes- (I). Conf.5.8.I5. (2). ibid, 5.9.16. (3) 5.10.19.
see also- de util bred. 8.20."Saepe mihi videbatur non posse 
inveniri (verum) magnique fluctus cogitationum mearum in 
Academicorum suffragiura ferebantur."
(76).
Fortunately for St. Augustine a way of deliverance 
came to him. The Magistrates of the city of Milan were in ne I 
of a Professor of Eloquence for their public schools. By the 
influence of Symmachus, the prefect of the city, to whom August- 
-ine had been introduced by one of his friends, he was successful 
in obtaining the post. In the autumn then of 384, or the beginn- 
-ing of 385, Augustine removed to Milan, He was then 30 years 
of age, having passed through much of folly and dissipation, 
ill health, sorrow, and disappointment. He was now losing heart 
and hope in Manichaeism, but he was still in quest of Truth.
He gives us an account of his belief at the 
time."IThen I wished to think on my God", he says- "I knew not 
what to think of, but a mass of bodies,... this was the greatest, 
and almost only cause of my inevitable error",(I) Of Evil too 
he tells us- "I believed Evil also to be some such kind of subst- 
-ance, and to have its own foul, and hideous bulk;"...TARD I 
seemed to myself more reverential, if I believed of Thee, my God, 
...as unbounded, at least on other sides, although on that one 
where the mass of evil was opposed to Thee, I was constrained to 
confess Thee bounded; than if on all sides I should imagine Thee 
to be bounded by the form of a human body. And it seemed to me 
better to believe Thee to have created no evil,...than to believe 
the nature of evil, such as I conceived it, could come from Thee. 
Yea, and our Saviour Himself, Thy Only Begotten, I believed to 
have been reached forth, as it were for our salvation, out of the 
Foot Notes- (I). Conf.V.X.19.
(77).
mass of Thy most lucid substance, so as to believe nothing of 
Him, but what I could imagine in my vanity," (I)
Such was the state of Augustine's mind when he 
left Rome for Milan. Manichaeism had failed him, and he had come 
to the conclusion that Astrology was but a baseless superstition, 
iîhen he reached Milan, he almost immediately came into touch 
with Ambrose, the Bishop vfho had then been for some ten ÿears 
the head of the Church there, Boissier tells us- "He was then 
the greatest personage in the Western Church, and perhaps the one 
of the greatest importance in the Empire. He surpassed the other 
bishops by his talents, his virtues, the affection which he insp- 
-ired in the hearts of his people, and the respect which the 
princes showed to him. His birth, relationship, habits, bound him 
to the ancient society; whilst he was linked to the new by his 
beliefs and his dignity, and was thus able to be a link between 
them". (2& Augustine informs us that Ambrose received him as 
though he were a father, and that he showed him an Episcopal 
kindness. There was much that Augustine wanted to talk to him 
about, but the great Bishop was so busy, and had such constant 
audiences that Augustine never seemed to get an opportunity of 
pouring out his heart and receiving from him the guidance which 
he needed. Later, in his Soliloquies, Augustine expresses himself 
thus- "It is my only grief in not being able to disclose to him 
as much as I should have liked of all my affection for him and 
for his wisdom" (3).
Foot Notes- (l),Confes.V,X.20, (2).Boissier, "La fin du paganisme" 
Vol.I. page, 308. (3). Solil.2.26.
(78).
We must remember that Augustine was a heretic, that,
moreover, he had been introduced to the post of public orator by
the pagan Symmachus, with whom Ambrose would hardly be on speaking
terms. Again, it is possible that Ambrose, taken up by his many
duties, did not realize the great future that was in store for
this young man who so persistently haunted his presence.(I)
However, when Augustine heard the Bishop preach,
he was captivated by the grace of his diction, rather than by his
matter. One thing impressed him, that was his treatment of the
Old Testament Scriptures. His favourite text was- 'The Letter
killeth, but the Spirit giveth Life'. His allegorical treatment
of Holy Scripture led Augustine to see that there was far more to
be said for the Old Testament than ever he had imagined. The
result was that a new meaning was given to him of the sacred
books. Further, his attendance at the services of the Church led
him to take a nevf interest in Catholic Christianity. He was a
man 'haunted by Cod', and he could not help but feel that despite
his wanderings from the Faith of his childhood he still belonged
to the Church. He therefore became a catechumen.(2)
Still he panted after honours, gains, marriage. He
had separated from his mistress, the mother of Adeodatus, but
after her departure he had succumbed to one more beautiful. Says
Boissier- "It was not passion but custom, and habits are of all
the cords most difficult to break. To change suddenly the life he
Foot Notes- (I). For the relations between Ambrose and Symmachus 
see Glover, 'Life and letters in the Fourth Cent.'pp.I53;ff. 
also Ottley, op.cit.page 24. (2).de util cred.8.20."DecrevA- 
-ram tamdiu esse catechumenus in ecclesia, donee aut inveni- 
-rem quod vellem,aut mihi persuaderem non esse quaere&dum; 
opportjinissimum ergo me ac valde docilem tunc invenire 
posset,si fuisset qui posset docere"
(79).
had been living from his youth, to cease at a stroke from doing 
what he had ever done, to renounce occupations which had commen- 
-ced sometimes by being constraints and which ended by being 
necessities was nothing less than dreadful. To fight against 
these little tyrannical things,against the last revolts of the 
flesh, was to endure more than he wished". (I) In striking • 
language he has described his struggle. (2)
Meanwhile Augustine , busy with his professional 
duties, receives the honour of being selected to deliver a paneg- 
-yric in praise of the Emperor, which filled with empty plaud- 
-its, would be largely false; his conscience is shocked by the 
thought of his having to do this thing. Again- passing along the 
streets, one day he sees a happy beggar, drunk and joyous. The 
sight of this man causes Augustine to reflect that here was one 
who , by means of a few 'begged pence', had obtained what he 
himself had long been struggling after; the beggar was without a 
care, whilst he vfas full of fears and yet in his heart there was 
a ^earning for a deeper joy. Tortured and discontented, he tells 
us- "I was entangled in the life of this world, clinging to dull 
hopes, of a beauteous wife, the pomp of riches, the emptiness of 
honours, and the other hurtful and destructive pleasures".(3)
His mother urges him to be married and he is promised that, once 
married, the health-giving baptism would cleanse him. (4)
Foot Notes-(l). Bossier, op.cit.pages 3II,f.(2).Conf.8.XI.26. 
see fuller notes.(3).See de Util.Credendi,3.also de Vita 
Beata, 4.(4).Conf.VI.I3.23.
(80).
In all probability, it/was suggested to him that if he married a 
modest beautiful woman, who had culture, and was in easy cireum- 
-stances, who could bring with her means, he might then have more 
leisure to devote himself more assiduously to his search for 
Truth. (I) A pleasing maiden was found for him and asked in 
marriage, but as she was 'two years under the fit age' Augustine 
must wait for her .(2) But Augustine could not wait, and , to his 
shame be it said, he took unto himself another mistress. (3)
Still he was unhappy, he tells us-"I was becoming 
more miserable, anu Tnou nearer; Tny right nand was continually 
ready to pluck me out of the mire, and to wash me throughly, and 
I knew it not". (4) Indeed he suggests that, if it had not been 
for his fear of death and the judgment to come, a worse state 
might have been his. He had now reached his 3Ist year. He had 
broken with Manichaeism; under the influence of Ambrose, the 
Scriptures had become of greater value to him. He was a Catechu- 
-men 6f the Catholic Church; but still he was not a Christian.
He Viras troubled by his materialistic conception of God, and he 
could meet with no rational explanation concerning the existence 
of Evil. Although he felt that God must be incorruptible, uninj- 
-urable,unchangeable, yet he could not but conceive of Him as 
being in space. The old dilemma of Nebridius still worried him. 
If Evil came/ from matter, surely that seemed to limit the power
Foot Notes- (I).See Solil. I.I7,I8,end.(2).Conf.VI.I3.26. (3) 
ibid,VI.XV.23. (4). ibid,VI.16.26.
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of God. Freewill, he had heard, was the cause of man's illdoings, 
but he could not clearly discern that.
It may have been, as Alfaric suggests, (I) 
that Augustine had learned this from the preaching of Ambrose,
Still the heart of Augustine was torn between 
belief and doubt. He could not remain in such a state, he must 
find the Truth which would satisfy his heart and his reason.
I
Help as we know, was not far away. Possibly the preaching of |
Ambrose was unconsciously to Augustine, preparing the way for him ;
to receive the new influence which was to play such a part on the i
1
life and thought of the future of St. Augustine. (2) !
Foot Notes- (l). Conf.?/. 3.5. Compare Alfaric, "L'Evolution
Intellectuelle de Saint Augustin",(Paris, Emile Nourry,I9I8.) 
page, 370. (2). Alfaric suggests, page 372, ibid. that
Ambrose was familiar with the writings of Philo and Origen 
and that he, whilst making use of their thoughts for practi- 
-cal ends, was yet influenced himself by their Neo-Platonism. 
Alfaric quotes from*'De Isaac et anima', by Ambrose, page,60. 
"Quid ergo est malitj., nisi boni indigentia?. .Non enim mala^ 
sunt nisi quae privantur boni.s...Ergo indigentia boni malita 
est et definitions boni malita deprehenditur," Such was the^  
Neo-Platonic interpretation o'f evil. Though Alfaric adds 
that such an idea is to be seldom found in the preaching of 
Ambrose. At any rate Augustine himself clearly shows that he 
had only known of it through the "Platonists", more especi- 
-ally from Plotinus. See Confessions, VII.XI.(17-22).
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FULLER HOTES TO CHAPTER 4.
Page, 69, Foot-Hote (2).
De Util.Credendi, I.2.Writing to Honoratus, about 391, he says- 
"You know that we adhered to these men on no other ground than 
this- that they/promised by pure and simple reason to bring their 
disciples to God, discarding all peremptory authority, and to 
liberate them from error. For what else made me reject, for almost 
nine years continuously, the religion my parents had instilled 
into me as a child? îfhat elsemade me a follower and diligent 
'hearer* of this sect than the assertion that we Catholics are 
terrorized by superstition, and that faith is thrust upon us 
before any reason is given; whereas they bind none to believe ex- 
-cept upon the truth's being examined and made clear? By such 
promises who would not have been inveigled, especially the mind 
of a young man, desir/ous to know the Truth, and already, through 
disputation with clever persons in the Schools, grown proud and 
talkative; just such an one, indeed, as they found me; contemning 
religion as an old wives' fable and eager to apprehend and drink 
in the very Truth which they so confidently promised".
Page, 71, Foot-Note (2).
Confessions, IV.4.9."At this my heart was utterly darkened; and 
whatever I beheld was death. My native country was a torment to 
me, and my father's house a strange unhappiness; and whatever I 
had shared with him, wanting him, became a distracting torture. 
Mine eyes sought him everywhere, but he was not granted them; and 
I hated all places, for that they had not him; nor could they now 
tell me, 'he is coming', as when he was alive and absent* I bec- 
-ame a great riddle to myself, and I asked my soul, vdiy she was 
so sad, and why she disquieted me sorely; but she knew not what 
to answer me. And if I said. Trust in God, she very rightly obeyed 
me not; because that most dear friend, whom she had lost, was, 
being man, both truer and better, than that phantasm she was bid 
to trust in. Only tears were sweet to me, for they succeeded my 
friend, in the dearest of my affections".
Page 79. Foot-Note, (2).
Confessions, 8.XI.26. "The very toys of toys, and vanities of 
vanities, my ancient mistresses, still held me; they plucked my 
fleshly garment, and whispered softly, "Dost thou cast us off? 
and from that moment shall we no more be with thee for ever? 
and from that moment shàll not this or that be lawful for thee for 
ever?" And what was it which they suggested inthat I said, "this 
or that", what did they suggest, 0 my God? Let Thy mercy turn it 
away from the soul of Thy servant* üïhat defilements did they sug- 
-gest! what shame! And now I much less than half heard them, and 
not openly shewing themselves and contradicting me, but muttering 
as it were behind my back, and privily plucking me, as I was
(83).
FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 4. (Continued).
departing, but to look back on them. Yet they did retard me,so 
that I hesitated to burst and shake myself free from them, and 
to spring over whither I was called; a violent habit saying to 
me, "Thinkest thou, thou canst live without them?"
(84).
CHAPTER 5.
"THE LIFE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE",
Part II. (From 386-430, A.D.)
St. Augustine had now reached his Thirty-second year. He was 
still a prey to doubt and fear, he was troubled and distressed 
because he had not yet arrived at the Truth. Deliverance was, 
however, close at hand. About the beginning of the year 386, 
there fall into his hands certain books of the Platonists, trans- 
-lated from the Greek into the Latin. It is sufficient to say
here, that very probably these books were none other than certain
of the Enneads of Plotinus, which had been translated into the 
Latin by Victorinus Afer. Augustine often speaks of the Neo- 
Platonists under the term 'Platonists*; in another of his writ- 
-ings, (I) he explains that the most celebrated of the 'Platon- 
-ists' were Plotinus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus. Of Plotinus as 
we shall see, he ever speaks in the highest terms and in the 
Seventh Book of the Confessions, St. Augustine shows very clearly 
how much he owed to the perusal of these books. (2)
As in succeeding chapters we are to deal more
fully with the influence of Neo-Platonism on the thought of St.
Augustine, it will be sufficient, here, to state briefly, the 
impressions which these books made upon him at the time when he
Foot Notes- (I). De Civitate Dei, VIII.12. (2). Harnack in his 
article in the Encyc, Brit, on Neo-Platonism, says- "The 
best account ever written by any Church Father on Neo-Plat- 
-onism, is to be found in the Confessions of St. Augustine, 
Book, VII.Chapters, IX-XXI."
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first read them. He himself tells us/that the reading of them
"kindled in me an incredible ardour". (I). And again- "When I had
read a very few books of Plotinus...! was so kindled that I wish-
-ed to break away from all those anchors which held me, but for
the influence of certain persons." (2) Here at any rate August-
-ine judged that he had found the name of Christ. For St. August-
-ine saw in the Second person of the Neo-Platonic Trinity, the
\doS of Plotinus, the Logos of St. John, described in the
prologue to his gospel, and he learned that the VOu^ was of
the same substance as the 'ONE*. More than that, in the "Absolute
Being" of the Neo-Platonists, St. Augustine discovered a truer
conception of God than the "diffused luminous body", which he had
previously imagined God to be. In a word, he saw the Spirituality
of God as he had never done before. But further, he had also a
new light shed on the origin of Evil.He saw that the World-Soul,
the third person in the Neo-Platonic Trinity, (3) was below
"The One", or Absolute Being, and that, although it derived its
existence from the 'One', yet the further removed it was from
that 'One* the more defective it became in Being. (4) St. August-
-ine here perceives that Evil is really not-being, failure to be,
a deprivation of Good.(5) Evil hence appears to him as no longer
Foot Notes- (I),Contra Academ. 1.2,5. "Etiam mihi ipsi de me
ipse incredibile incendium in me concitarunt".(2)de Beata 
Vita, 4."Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris",True- only 
five of the M.S.S. read 'Plotini', all the rest have Platon- 
-is, but the former according to Alfaric, Grandgeorge, &c 
is undoubtedly the accepted reading. (3). Whilst Augustine 
speaks of 'person', we must note that with Plotinus it is 
'Hypostasis'.(4)Conf.VII.XI.17. (5)See De vera relig.14,27. 
written seven years before the Confessions, Here he defines 
sin as "defectus voluntarius a summa essentia".ibid40,76.
See also Bright, "Lessons from the lives of three great 
Fathers", Longmans Green & Co.I89I.Appendix XV.Page,271.
(86).
the creation of God, hut as springing from a Will and an Imagin- 
-ation which has turned aside from God. But he found something 
still more valuable, something which led him to enter into the 
realm of mysticism. He tells us- "And being thence admonished to 
return to myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being 
my guide;...and I entered and beheld with the eye of my soul, such 
as it was, above the same eye of Ay soul, above my mind, the 
Light Unchangeable". (l) Later, he tells us of how, withdrawing 
himself from the world of sense, there came to him the conscious- 
-ness of Absolute Being and, at a bound, he found union with 
Him- "And thus with the flash of one trembling glance it arrived 
at THAT WHICH IS". (2) Here we see how truly St. Augustine had 
been impressed and had entered into the spirit of Neo-Platonism.
We shall, at a future stage, have something
more to say concerning the mysticism pf St. Augustine.
Now these books of the 'Platonists* had opened
his eyes to a great deal. They had given direction to his soul.
But St. Augustine whilst acknowledging what they had been to him 
in the hour of his travail of spirit, makes manifest also wherein 
they failed/him. He had been given an insight into the truth 
concerning the Spirituality of God, he had also light shed on the 
problem of Evil. But he did not find in the Enneads of Plotinus 
what he had learned in the gospels and what was taught by the 
Foot Notes- (I). Conf.VII.X.I6. (2). ibid, VII.17.23.
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Christian Church, namely, "That the Word became flesh". In Neo- 
Platonism, he did not find a Saviour, one who would redeem him 
from his burden of guilt. Appealing to/his reason it failed to 
appease the pangs of conscience, or heal his disordered will.
He says- "Then I sought a way of obtaining strength sufficient to 
enjoy Thee, and found it not, until I embraced the Mediator 
betwixt God and man, the man Christ Jesus". (I)
Neo-Platonism had done much for him, bût it 
had not given him deliverance from the carnal habit, the weight 
of which continually held him back. St. Augustine now saw the 
'land of peace*, but as he tells us, it was one thing to see 
it afar off , and quite another * to keep on the way that leads 
thither*. (2)
He began now to diligently read the Epistles
of the Apostle Paul. There he found a great deal which seemed to
him to resemble what he had already seen in Neo-Platonism, but
he also saw there what was further true to his own experience.
As he read the words of Romans VII.24, "0 wretched man that I
am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? "- he felt
it to be the cry of his own heart. But, as he read on, he found
St. Paul's answer to the cry making its earnest appeal to his
heart.(3) His difficulties began to disappear; he was now sure of
God's Eternal essence, of His incomparable beauty.What he wished
was not to know more of Him,but to'be^ore steadfast in Him* .But
Foot Notes- (l).Conf.VII.IR.24. (? ).ibid,VII.?I.27. (3).ibid.
It is of interest to compare what St. Augustine writes here
in the Confessions with what he wrote to Romanianus, near-
-er to the time of his experience. See Contra Acad. 2.3. 
(beginning). The whole passage will be quoted in a subsequ- 
-ent chapter.
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he was not willing to break with his old life of selfish indulg- 
-ence; "his heart", he tells us, "had to be purged from the old 
leaven; the way well pleased me but as yet I shrank from going 
'through its straightness".(I) Again he tells us- "I had now found 
the goodly pearl, which, selling all that I had, I ought to have 
bought, and I hesitated," (2) He sought out Simplicianus, the 
'spiritual father' of Ambrose, a man of wide experience and 
saintly character, and to him he opened his heart. When he was 
told of the reading of the books of the "Platonists", translated 
by Victorinus, Simplicianus expressed his joy that Augustine had 
been so wisely guided as not to have been led astray by false 
philosophers,"whereas the Platonists' many ways led to belief in 
God and His Word" .(3) The aged saint deeply interested Augustine 
by his account of the conversion of Victorinus; who had also 
been led from the Neo-Platonic philosophy to an earnest study of 
the Scriptures, and whose conversion, late in life and at consid- 
-erable sacrifice, had been the talk of Home some 2*5 years 
previously. (4) When Augustine heard this, he tells us,-"I was 
on fire to imitate him".(5) But past habits still held him in 
their chains. He compares his state to that of a half-awakened 
sleeper, unable to shake off his lethargy, crying, "Anon, anon"; 
"Presently"; "Leave me but a little". But- he adds- "Presently, 
presently, had no present, and my little while went on for a long
Foot Notes- (D.Conf.8.1.1. (2),ibid,8.1.2. ( 3 ). ibid, 8,2. 3. cp.
de Civ.Dei,X.29. (4).Conf.8.2.(3-5) (5).Gonf.8.5.10.
"Exarsi ad imitandum".
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while".(I) He attended the services of the Church, but he had 
not yet found the peace of heart he had been seeking.One day, 
however, Augustine and his friend, Alypius, received ,a visit from 
one of their countrymen, Pontitianus, who was in high office at 
the Emperor's court. He was a baptised Christian and seeing on 
the table a copy of St. Paul's Epistles, he expressed his wonder 
and his joy.St. Augustine then told him of his search for Truth; 
whereupon, for the encouragement of Alypius and himself, Pontiti- 
-anus related the story of the conversion of St.Antony, an 
Egyptian monk,and proceeded to dilate on the joys of the monastic 
life. Pontitianus further told the story of how two friends of 
his o?m, courtiers and officers in attendance on the Emperor, 
had been so deeply impressed on reading the account of the life 
of St, Antony , that they resigned their commissions and entered 
the monastic life; and how that their brides, when they heard of 
it, also 'dedicated their virginity unto God*. (2)
This recital so moved Augustine that he was over- 
-whelmed with a burning sense of shame; he realized that in order 
to have peace, he must make a decided choice. Vividly describing 
his feelings, Augustine tells us- "Thus soul-sick was I, and 
tormented, accusing myself much more severely than my wont, roll- 
-ing and turning me in ray chain, till that were wholly broken, 
whereby I now was but just, but still was,held". (3)
Foot Notes- (l).Gonf.VIII.5.12."Modo et modo non habebant modura".
(2).ibid, 8.6.15. (3).ibid,8.XI.25.
( 90) .
Then the storm broke. Rising, he left Alypius who was sitting by 
his side, and withdrew that he might weep alone. As Augustine 
cast himself beneath a fig tree, weeping in penitence of spirit, 
he heard from a house close by a voice, *as of a boy or girl... 
chanting and oft repeating,* Take up and read*'Take up and read'. 
Instantly", he tells us- "my countenance altered, I began to think 
most intently, whether children were wont in any kind of play to 
sing such words; nor could I remember ever to have heard the like. 
So, checking the torrent of my tears, I arose, interpreting it 
to be no other than a command from God to open the book and read 
the first chapter I should find.... Eagerly then I returned to the 
place where Alypius was sitting; for there had I laid the 
volume of the Apostle, when I arose thence. I seized, opened,& 
in silence read that section, on which my eyes first fell: 'Not 
in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not 
ih strife and envying: but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence,' No further 
would I read; nor needed I : for instantly at the end of this 
sentence, by a light as it were of serenity infused into my heart, 
all the darkness of doubt vanished away."(I)
So did Augustine pass into the light and find 
liberty and peace. He relates his wonderful experience to 
Alypius, who was now sitting by his side, and he, reading further, 
came upon the sentence, 'him that is weak in the faith receive'.
Foot Notes- (I).Confessions, 8.XII.(28-30).
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This he applied to himself. Together they go and tell Monnica the 
glad tidings, to her unspeakable joy. (I)
The conversion of Augustine probably took place 
in the summer of 386; he was desirous at once of resigning his 
post as Professor of Rhetoric, but deferred doing so until the 
vacation. He alleged as the ground of his resignation, the chest 
weakness, possibly asthma, from which he frequently suffered; but 
his real reason was that he had made up his mind to dedicate 
himself henceforth to the pursuit of Truth, in preparation for hie 
baptism and possible retirement from the world; for the monastic 
life forcibly appealed to him. (2).
Upon his retirement, a friend and professorial 
colleague, Verecundus by name, placed at his disposal his country 
house, 'Cassiciacum', on the outskirts of Milan, situated towards 
the top of the mountains, with a view of the beautiful lakes and 
plains of Lombardy. In his Confessions, Augustine makes no mention 
of those who accompanied him in his retreat, but suggests that 
he was alone with his family. (3) We shall deal at length with 
this Cassiciacum period in a subsequent chapter, and see how this 
further study will correct many of the impressions which are 
suggested to our minds as we read the account given us in the 
Confessions. It is sufficient to say here that whilst in the 
Con^ssions we are led to believe that St. Augustine devoted his 
nights and days to penitence and prayer, in preparation for his
Foot Notes- (l)Conf.8.12.(28-30) (2).see his Epistles for this 
reason.(3),Conf.IX.4.7."Profectus in uillam cum meis omnibus".
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baptism, in his books which are written at that time, we find 
that he is deeply engrossed in the study of Philosophy. Under 
the spe-il of Neo-Platonism, he speaks as an ardent follower of 
Plotinus.(I) However, in the Confessions this period is passed 
over very lightly, and it is a real help to our study of the 
development of St. Augustine's thought to have his early writings 
as a guide to his real state of mind.
In the following Spring St. Augustine returned to 
Milan, and was baptized on Easter Eve (April 24th) 387, along 
with his friend Alypius and his son Adeodatus, a lad not yet 
fifteen. To St. Augustine's great sorrow, Adeodatus died two 
years after his baptism. (2)
In the summer of that same year, Augustine planned 
that Monnica and himself, with the group of friends who had 
shared his doings at Cassiciacum, should retire to Africa and 
there carry on the life of contemplation which they had enjoyed 
together previously to his baptism. With this intention they had 
left Milan and had reached the port of Ostia when Monnica was 
taken ill and died. Five days previously she had an earnest 
conversation with her son on the subject of the future life, 
which made a deep impression upon Augustine; so that he narrates 
it and describes the experience that followed, with considerable 
detail.(3) This Ecstatic Vision which Augustine tells us of here
Foot Notes- (I).See Glover, op.cit.page,215."In these (dialogues) 
his language is not so avowedly Christian as in the Confess- 
-ions, for he is still trying to couch the new thought in the 
old terms, but the new thought is there, and if not yet fully 
developed it is still Christian". (2).see de Vita Beata,6. 
"Erat etiam nobiscum aetate minimus omnium, sed cujus ingenium 
si amore non fallor, magnum quiddam pollicetur,Adeodatus 
filius meus". (3).Conf.9.X.(//- 23-25.)
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is an excellent description of the Ecstasy as depicted by Plotinus
It is^ondition transcending thought, a stillness of the Soul in 
A
which all consciousness of external objects is suspended, and 
"the seer no longer distinguishes himself from what he sees".(I)
A few days afterwards, in her fifty-sixth year, 
Monnica passed to her rest. The death of Monnica apparently took 
place in 387, and changed Augustine's plans,He remained in Italy 
for something like ten months, spending most of his time at Rome,
where he made a closer study of the Manichaean system in order
that he might be the better able to confute its heresies.
The ninth book of the Confessions, closes 
with an account of the death and burial of Monnica and tells us 
of the grief of Augustine. Here his autobiography ends; for the
remaining books of the Confessions add nothing to the story of his
life. For the closing years of the life of Augustine we are 
indebted, in the main to Possidius, The Dishop of Calama, who
enjoyed a close friendship with St. Augustine for more than 40
years.
In the August or September of 388, Augustine
returned to Africa, and upon his arrival at his old town of
Thagaste, he took up his abode in a house which he had inherited 
from his father. He sold his possessions, gave the proceeds to 
the poor, keeping back only the house in which he lived and what
Foot Notes- (I). See Ottley, op.cit.page 37. For the account of 
this Mystic experience at Ostia, see fuller notes at the 
close of the present chapter.
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would suffice for his barest needs. Here he lived for three 
years, in retirement from the world with a company of kindred 
spirits who had all things in common, and who had pledged them- 
-selves to a life of prayer, meditation, and self-discipline,(I) 
The next year, 389, once again Augustine is 
plunged into grief by reason of the death of his dearly loved son 
Adeodatus,
Whilst he had been in Rome, after the death of his 
mother, Augustine had written *de Quantitate Animae*, and two of 
the volumes of his * de Libero Arbitrio*. He now at Thagaste comp- 
-letes his study and adds another volume to his * de Libero Arb- 
-itrio*. During these years of retirement he also wrote *de Gen- 
-esi contra Manichaeos', *de Musica* (books 1-6) and *de MagistroJ 
and began his *de Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, and his 
*de Vera Religions*.
In 391, however, his life of quiet was interrupted 
by a visit to Hippo Regius, which was destined to have an affect 
on his whole future. His fame had spread far and wide, and he 
was well known for his piety and learning. It was whilst he was 
listening to the sermon of the aged bishop Valerius, that the 
preacher declared that they were in great need of another priest. 
Thereupon, greatly to Augustine's surprise and dismay, the people 
demanded that he should accept the office. Augustine was far from 
willing to give up his life of meditation and literary activity 
and take up a position for which he felt he was not qualified;
Foot Notes- (l).Possidius, Vita August.c.3. Epistles,CXXVI.7.
GLVII.39.
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and it was only after great pressure had been brought to bear 
upon him, and because he felt that perchance the hand of God 
might be leading him all unwillingly, that finally he yielded.
He begged that a few months might be given him to prepare forhis 
new office. This was granted, and he began his duties at Easter­
tide, 392.
Very soon did both Bishop and people feel 
that their choice had been a wise one. They perceived not only 
that Augustine was a man endowed with gifts of speech, learning, 
and piety, but also that he possessed a shrewd commonsense which 
was most valuable in the work to which he had been called. So 
impressed was Valerius with his powers that, contrary to all 
custom, he often asked him to preach in his stead. Lest he might 
be tempted to leave Hippo, Valerius, within two or three years, 
begged Augustine to allow himself to be consecrated as Associate 
Bishop along with himself. A year later, upon the death of 
Valerius, when St. Augustine was but 42, he became sole Bishop of 
Hippo, an office which he held until his death.
Although he had reached thus early so high a
place in the Church, yet his manner of life was of the simplest.
He dwelt with the clergy of his household after the manner of a 
monastic community. (I) He also established a sort of Theological 
seminary, where candidates were prepared for their future duties. 
Like Ambrose, we are told that he had the vessels of the Sanctuary
Foot Notes- (I). See Sermons, 355,356.
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melted, and the silver and gold made use of to meet cases of 
extreme need, or to redeem prisoners. (I) He would take no 
money willed to the Church if poor relatives would suffer thereby. 
He was greatly in demand as a reconciler between those at enmity, 
and was often asked to settle disputes; whilst daily he busied 
himself rendering service to the poor. He rejoiced in his duties 
as a preacher, and it is on record that he often preached on five 
days in succession and even twice in one day.
There is no need to deal at length with his 
enormous literary activity, which occupied a great deal of his 
time, nor to expatiate on his work on behalf of the Church. •
It is sufficient to say that the presence of the Manichaeists in 
his diocese roused him to combat the heresy from which he had 
himself been delivered. By public debate and by a series of 
treatises which fell from his pen, he did his utmost to overcome 
the influence of their teaching.
But there were other enemies of the Christ- 
-ian Church against whom he wrote. These were the Bonatists and 
the Pelagians. (2). Whilst many of his works were of special 
value for his day and generation, they still contain much which 
is of real worth for all time.
The last twenty years of the life of St. 
Augustine were years of trouble and sorrow. Rome was sacked by
Foot Notes- (I).See Bright, 'Lessons from the lives of three
great Fathers.'Longmans Green & Co.1891.pages, 128,ff.for an 
excellent account. Note here- Possidius, Vit.Aug.c.24.
(2). See the work by Dr. Bardenhewer,'Patrology'Trans from 
the 2nd. Edition by Dr. Shahan.(1908).Section 94,Pages,
■ 473-508, for a full account.
(97).
Alî^ric in the year 410, and as a result of this, many of the 
educated and ruling families of the Empire fled in terror into 
Africa, In their misery the refugees strove to find some reason 
for 80 terrible a misfortune as had befallen their city and 
fortunes. It was alleged by some that this punishment had come 
because they had forsaken the ancient shrines;- "This horror 
would not have been", said some, "had we stood by the ancient 
ways. The mad policy of the Emperors in prohibiting sacrifices to 
the Gods has produced this inevitable nemesis. The sack of Rome 
is the judgment of Jove".(I) In a word, they laid the responsib- 
-ility at the door of the Christians.
It was partly in answer to that charge that St. 
Augustine began to write one of his greatest works, if not the 
greatest, his 'De Civitate Dei'. He commenced this book in 413, 
publishing it in parts between 417 and 426. It therefore occupied 
thirteen years of his life. During that period, from time to time, 
Africa was overrun by barbaric hordes, reducing towns and villages 
to ashes and inflicting most terrible sorrow and misery upon the 
inhabitants. The feeling of St. Augustine was that Bishops and 
pastors should stay beside their flock and help them in their 
time of deepest need. In 429 Gaiseric, the Vandal king, crossed 
from Spain at the urgent request of Boniface, the Count of Africa. 
Boniface was friendly to St. Augustine, but he was beaten back, 
with the remnant of his army into the fortified city of Hippo,
Eoot Notes- (l). See-J.N.Figgis, "The Political aspects of St. 
Augustine's City of God", Longmans, I92I.page, 6. Also 
Dr. J.E.C.Wellden, "St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei", S.P.C.K.
2 Vols, see especially Introduction, Vol.I. also Bright,op.cil 
Appendix, 1%., page, 263.
(98).
where Possidius and several of the bishops had taken refuge, 
Augustine was greatly troubled by the dreadful calamities that 
had befallen his beloved land. Once he declared to his friends- 
"What I pray God for is that He will deliver this city from the 
enemy; or, if He has determined otherwise, that He may strengthen 
His servant for His sufferings; or, which I would rather, that He 
would call me from this world to Himself", (I)
In the third month of the siege he was attacked 
by fever; ten days before his death he had retired from active 
ministry, having up to that time proclaimed unceasingly the word 
of God to his people. The end came on August, 28th 430, and, in 
the 76th year of his age St. Augustine passed to his rest.
Possidius tells us that he left no will, for, 
having embraced poverty, he had nothing to leave save his books 
and his manuscripts, which fell to the Church.(2)
In closing, may we say that our chief purp- 
-ose in these chapters which have outlined the life of St. August- 
-ine, has been to place the man in his setting and endeavour to 
show the varied influences which had been at work upon his life 
and the part which each influence contributed towards the 
enrichment of his genius. We saw the growing youth in his home 
life at Thagaste, with a Christian mother and a pagan father,each 
impressing the life, at its most plastic period. And outside the
Foot Notes- (I).Possidius, Vit.Aug.C.29,"ut aut hanc civitatem ab 
hostibus circumdatom liberare dignetur, aut,si aliud e& videtur 
suos servos ad perferendam suam voluntatem fortes faciat, aut 
certe ut Ae de hoc saeculo ad se accipiat". (2 ).Possidius, Vit.
Aug. 0.31.3%^ :
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same pull of contrary powers; on the one hand the world, the 
flesh, riches, success, ambition; and on the other the unseen 
things of the spirit, the memories of Christian teaching, the 
sensitive conscience, and the reasonings which no specious argu- 
-ments could satisfy.
There is too the Manichaean influence, followed 
by his brief essay towards the Scepticism of the New Academy; & 
yet no peace. His meeting with Ambrose, the new view which he 
receives of the 014 Testament, & his becoming a Catechumen of the 
Church. Finally his discovery of the books of the 'Platonists*, 
and a study of the Epistles of St. Paul.
We venture to think that it was Neo-Platonism which 
opened the doorway for him into a new life and that,from the 
day when he first read the Enneads in a Latin translation right 
on to the close of his life, it was that philosophy which exercis- 
-ed a very pronounced influence upon Augustine's life and thought.
It is of course true that this influence was more 
pronounced at first, as will be seen when we study his early 
writings; true also that Augustine believed later that he owed 
little to the teaching of Plotinus. But all unconsciously much 
that was essentially Neo-Platonic enriched his thought , so that 
through this philosophy the Christian Father was able to more 
perfectly clarify the doctrines of the Church.
( 1 0 0 ) .
FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 5.
Page 93, Foot Note- (l). The Mystic Experience at Ostia.
They were standing together leaning over the window ledge of the 
house wherecthey were staying, looking into the garden. They were 
discoursing on the nature of the eternal life of the Saints, and 
when they had reached the point at which the greatest delight of 
the earthly senses became unworthy of being named in the same 
breath as those of the spiritual life, then occurred this mystic 
experience.
Confessions, IX.X.24. "We raising up ourselves with a more glowing 
affection towards the * Self-J^ame *, did by degrees passthrough all 
things bodily, even the very heaven, whence sun and moon, and 
stars shine upon the earth; yea, we were soaring higher yet, by 
inward musing, and discourse, and admiring of Thy works; and we 
came to our own minds, and went beyond them, that we might arrive 
at that region of never-failing plenty, where Thou feedest Israel 
for ever with the food of truth, and where life is the Wisdom 
by whom all these things are made, and what have been, and what 
shall be, and she is not made, but is, as she hath been, and so 
shall she be ever; yea rather, to 'have been'and 'hereafter to be' 
are not in her, but only 'to be', seeing she is eternal...
?5.We were saying then; if to any the tumult of the flesh were 
hushed, hushed the images of earth, and waters, and air, hushed 
also the poles of heaven, yea the very soul be hushed to herself, 
and by not thinking on self surmount self, hushed all dreams and 
imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign, and whatso- 
-ever exists only in transition, since if any could hear, all 
these say. We made not ourselves, but He made us that abidetfe for 
ever- If then having uttered this, they too should be hushed, 
having roused only our ears to Him who made them, and He alone 
speak, no;^  by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His Word, not 
through any tongue of flesh, nor Angel's voice, nor sound of 
thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, but, might hear 
Whom in these things we love, we might hear His Very Self with- 
-out these, (as we two now strained ourselves, and in swift 
thought touched on that Eternal Wisdom, which abideth over all;) 
could this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike 
be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its 
beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be for ever 
like that one moment of understanding which now we sighed after; 
were not this ,Enter into thy Master's joy?."
We may compare this Ecstasy as it is recounted here with the 
Enneads, V.1.2. see Appendix,III.
Plotinus taught that the way which man must take to enter into 
communion with God, was to climb, by degrees from nature, upwards 
by means of the highest forms, inward to the mind, then above the 
mind, thus would man enter into union with the One.
(lOl).
FULLER NOTES ON CHAPTER 5. (Continued)
See Harnack, "History of Dogma", Vol.I.E.T. page 352, on 
"Neo-Platonism",
"Man frees himself from every sin through asceticism. But he is 
to reach still higher; he is not only to be without sin, but he 
is to be "God"....The soul can only see and touch the Original 
Essence in a condition of complete passivity and rest. Hence, in 
order to attain to this highest, the soul must subject itself to 
a spiritual exercise. It must begin with the contemplation of 
material things, their diversity and harmony, then retire into ' 
itself and sink itself in its own essence, and thence mount up 
to the Nous, to the world of Ideas; but, as it still does not find 
the One and Highest Essence there, as the call always comes to it 
from there. "We have not made o u r s e l v e s " i t  must, as it were, 
lose sight of itself in a state of intense concentration, in 
mute contemplation and complete forgetfulness of all things. In 
that moment it enjoys the highest and indescribable blessedness; 
it is itself, as it were, swallowed up by Deity and bathed in 
the light of Eternity."
It will be evident that St. Augustine here in his description of 
his Ecstasy has most closely followed the very words of Plotinus,
End of Part I.
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SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS. .PART 9.
CHAPTER I. St. Augustine and Neo-Platonism
Before the time of Augustine many of the ideas of Hellenism had 
entered into Christian thought. It may be that the preaching of 
Ambrose had prepared Augustine for the reception of the teaching 
of Plotinus. Victorinus suggested as a greater influence (I) By 
his translation of the books of the Enneads, (2) By the admirat- 
-ion Augustine himself had for him. Victorinus ; a pioneer in 
the adaptation of Neo-Platonic doctrines to Christian Theology; 
an Augustine before Augustine. Outline of the doctrine of Vict- 
-orinus; his indebtedness to Neo-Platonism. Influence of Victorin- 
-us on the thought of Augustine. Impression which the reading of 
the books of the 'Platonists* made upon him- where they failed 
him. By the 'Platonists* Auguâtine means the Neo-Platonists. 
Evidence of Augustine's knowledge of the Enneads. His high praise 
of Plotinus; and criticism of him. Augustine's knowledge of the 
writings of Porphyry. Augustine's indebtedness to Neo-Plat/onism 
in several directions, but whilst this Philosophy reveals to him 
the truth, he finds it powerless to deliver him from the sins of 
the flesh.
CHAPTER P. The Christian Philosopher at Cassiciacum
An additional chapter to the Confessions, furnished by his acc- 
-ount of his sojourn at Cassiciacum, a country house lent to 
Augustine by his friend Verecundus. The reason suggested , since 
Augustine had resigned his professorship, as to why he should 
undertake the teaching of youth. The picture which is given in 
the Dialogues of the life there; Augustine and his duties. The 
chief subject of his lectures that of Philosophy as the gateway 
to the blessed life. In the instruction of his pupils, Augustine 
was grounding himself in the knowledge of Philosophy.Frequent 
references to Philosophy. It is that of Neo-Platonism which he 
has in mind. Difference between the tone of the Confessions and 
that of the Dialogues explained. He unites a love for Philosophy 
with a like love for Religion. Abundant evidence that the devot- 
-ional life is not neglected. Review of the writings of Augustine 
at Cassiciacum. Contra Academicos, dedicated to Romanianus.,outl~ 
-ined. De beata Vita, the title and a great deal of the argument 
taken from the Enneads. Precis given of this tractate on Happin- 
-ess. The De Ordine, which has for its themejthe Divine Provid- 
-ence. These books of the De Ordine steeped in Neo-Platonism.
The Soliloquia; a revelation of Augustine's devotional spirit.
(11).
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER a. THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE.
The importance of the study of Augustine's Psychology; it lay at 
the core of all his thinking and his Psychology forms the basis 
of his Metaphysics. His study of Neo-Platonism presented August- 
-ine with a dependable system. With Augustine there were two 
kinds of knowledge, the knowledge or God, & the knowledge of the 
Soul,Augustine's discovery of the immediate certainty of Inner 
Experience; how he illustrates this. By intuition the Soul arriv- 
-es at the basis of knowledge. Augustine influenced by Plotinus 
in his doctrine of Ideas, Augustine's definition of the Soul; the 
Soul the centre of his Psychology.The Soul the link between the 
world of Spirit and that of Sense. Simple in essence the Soul is 
manifold in its operations. It can neither grow nor diminish with 
the body; although it feels in every part of the body it is not 
to be regarded as body.The sympathy which unites the organs indie* 
-ates the presence of the Soul in the whole body.Augustine devel- 
-opes the ideas of Plotinus on the difference between the irrat- 
-ional Soul and the rational. Sensation, an active power of the 
Soul. The Interior Sense, Pleasure & pain are experienced by the 
Soul.Memory associated with the Imagination by Augustine & Plotin- 
-uâ alike.The two kinds of Memory, Sensible & Intellectual. 
Discursive and Intuitive Reasoning, their distinction. The Immor- 
-tality of the Soul, here also Augustine closely follows Plotinus, 
The Soul's return; its Purification,Illumination, and Union.
The Seven degrees of the Soul described.
CHAPTER 4. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AS SET FORTH BY ST.AUGUST-
-INE AND IN THE ENNEADS.
No doubt in the mind of Augustine with respect to the Existence 
of God.His early conceptions of God.From Neo-Platonism Augustine 
is convinced of the Spirituality of the Divine Being. The Ineffa- 
-bility of God and His Incomprehensibility; these truths express- 
-od in the writings of Clement,Justin,Tertullian. Augustine prob- 
-ably is first made familimr with the negative conception of God 
through Plotinus. The Simplicity of God's nature, therefore He is 
Unchangeable, hence Eternal, God the source of all Beauty; three 
grades of Beauty.Augustine arrives at a knowledge of God by 
intuition, that is by the absolute and immediate certainty of 
consciousness. Augustine's discovery of the Principle of Unity.
The knowledge of God does not come easily, there are stages in 
the upward way. The Mysticism of Plotinus and Augustine.
(Ill)
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 5. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE
WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND IN 
NEO-PLATONISM.
Enquiry as to how far the Triad of the Neo-Platonic hierarchy 
resembles the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Some analogies 
between these. Divergence of opinion with certain Fathers of the 
Church as to substantial identity of thought in the conception 
of the Triad and that of the Christian Trinity.Comparisons betw- 
-een the three Hypostases and the three persons , and the parts 
they severally play, Augustine's explanation of the difference. 
Love present in the Christian Trinity, and mutual fellowship. 
Influence of Neo-Platonism on the Christian view. Danger of 
Modalism in Augustine's theory of the Trinity. Augustine's diffic* 
-ulty in reconciling the thought of the Simplicity of the Divine 
Being with the three-fold personality. Here we>^  see the influence 
of Neo-Platonism.
CHAPTER 6. GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD IN HIS WORK
OF CREATION.
How Augustine differs from Plotinus in his doctrine of Creation. 
Outline of the theory of Plotinus.He safeguards himself with resp- 
-ect to his view of the Simplicity of the Divine nature by reduc- 
-ing activity within the circle of the three Supreme Beings to a 
minimum. He is careful not to introduce the thought of change into 
his conception of the Godhead. Plotinus affirms the eternity of 
Matter, he describes it as an image, a shadow of the divine. He 
conceives of the world as having been 'generated', begotten in 
eternity.The Neo-Platonic Principles are devoid of Will as well 
as Love; the world came into being as a result of necessity.
His description of Matter.Augustine held that the world had been 
created not begotten,since the world could not be either co-equal 
or co-eternal with God. God, according to St.Augustine made the 
world out of nothing.God made the world because of His goodness, 
and His Will.Augustine cannot believe that matter is eternal, 
so he affirms whilst God did not make the world in time, he made 
it with Time. God has only to do with Eternity. Augustine declares 
there was no change in God's plan because of the creation,for all 
things are eternally present to God. In order to reconcile his 
view of the Divine Simplicity with his theory of the Creation, 
Augustine regards the Goodness, Knowledge, Will, and action of 
God as His attributes. Finite things, according to Augustine cann- 
-ot add to the sum of Being since they are of the nature of negat- 
-ion.The world depends on God for the limited reality it has.
(iv).
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 7. THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON THE
THEORIES OF ST. AUGUSTINE CONCERNING 
PROVIDENCE, EVIL, OPTIMISM, AND 
FREEDOM.
Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism because it professed to give 
a solution of the pressing problem of evil; an authoritative 
revelation of truth. But when he was delivered from its bondage 
he welcomes all the help he can obtain from Neo-Platonism that 
he may hotly contest that specious and dangerous doctrine of 
the Manichaeists. On all the subjects dealt with in this chapter 
Augustine closely associates himself with Plotinus.The world, 
according to both Augustine & Plotinus,is dependent upon God for 
its very life. The Providence of God is universal says Augustine. 
So too Plotinus tells us that a principle of order pervades the 
entire realm of existence. Both agree this cannot be the result 
of chance. From this prevailing harmony Augustine deduces the 
Unity of the creation, and, therefore, the Unity of the Creator. 
But how are we to account for the presence of Evil in the world? 
Augustine does not associate Evil with Matter; adopting the view 
of Plotinus that evil is a negation of Being, a negation of Good. 
Hence Evil is in the realm of Non-Being. But since Augustine* 
knows something of the profound reality of sin and its misery,he 
puts forward a second theory which is also made use of by Plotin- 
-us, namely, that evil has been chosen to enhance the glory & 
beauty of the world. It is a necessity for greater Being, We 
are unable to pass adequate judgment on the disorders of the 
Universe since we only see a part of the whole, and we are members 
of the very Order we are censuring. But a third theory urged by 
Augustine is, that moral evil or sin is due to God's gift of 
Freedom to man. This theory is also advanced by Plotinus.
Two kinds of Freedom examined. Is Freedom of choice to choose 
wrongly to be regarded as true Freedom? Both Augustine & Plotinus 
say that this is not freedom but bondage to the lower nature.
'Freedom is really shown in right action} says Plotinus. 'Man 
using evilly his free-will hath lost both himself and it,' says 
Augustine. Illustration if this from what Plotinus has to say 
concerning the fall and return of the Soul. The Optimism of 
the Christian Father and the Philosopher indicated.
(t . )
SYNOPSES OF THE CHAPTERS.
CHAPTER 8. A SUMMARY OP RESULTS.
Philo the fore-runner of Plotinus. Gnostics and the Christian 
Apologists. The School of Alexandria, Clement & Origen & their 
work. Thus the Christian Church in its doctrines became enriched 
by what it received from Neo-Platonism, long before Augustine 
entered it.Augustine, himself tells us of the help of the 'books 
of the Platônists', in delivering him. from the bondage of Manich* 
-aeism. Plato and his influence;Augustine indebted to Aristotle. 
Predominating influence was that of Plotinus. Augustine fired by 
the example of Yictorinus studies the Pauline Epistles & his 
conversion is complete. The Influence of Neo-Platonism on the 
LIFE of Augustine; (l)Through Philosophy he is led to Christ, 
finds his vocation, becomes the Bishop of Hippo,the Ecclesiast- 
-ical statesman. (2) By means of the teaching of Plotinus August- 
-ine enters the realm of Mystical Piety. Heiler's view.
The Influence of Neo-Platonism on the THOUGHT of Augustine.
(I) Psychological; (2). Porphyry's books known to him. (3) The 
influence of Plotinus on Augustine's doctrine of God,Evil.
(4) Earlier writings exhibit profound influence. Later the hold 
of Neo-Platonism wanes, but never wholly disappears. Augustine 
makes use of Plotinus to help him as a defender of the Faith.And 
Aakes use of Philosophy to aid him in giving clearer shape tb 
Christian doctrine.
( 102) .
PART TWO.
CHAPTER I.
St AUGUSTINE AND NEO-PLATONISM.
"In the Ancient World there was only one Western Theologian who 
came directly under the influence of Neo-Platonism; but that one 
is Augustine, the most important of them all".
Harnack, Article, * Neo-Platonism*, Ency.Brit.
"If we wish to see the true difference between such a Mysticism 
(that of the Christian Mystics) and the ecstatic ascent to 
reality, 'solus cum solo', taught and practised by Plotinus, we 
have but to go to St Augustine; who stands at the end of the 
Fourth Century, the typical figure which links in experience 
these two tendencies of life, and transmits them- fused in the 
crucible of his ardent temperament- to the mediaeval world".
Miss Evelyn Underhill, "The Mystic Way", page, 299.
"Aussi est-il indispensable, pour bien comprendre Saint Augustin, 
de connaître la langue et la doctrine de Plotin".
Douillet, "Les Ennéades de Plotin", Vol.2. Page, 590.
We have seen from the previous chapters that before the time of
St Augustine there had taken place a leavening of the doctrines
of the Christian Church by means of Neo-Platonism, and that many
of the ideas of Hellenism had already entered into Christian
Thought. "In effect"- writes Grandgeorge-..."it was almost the
only ÈyÉtern which was fully known, and which was in a condition
to influence the newly born philosophy of Christianity". (I)
But now with greater precision, we must endeav-
-our to make clear the way in which Augustine himself, becoming
a disciple of Plotinus, thereby imparted a Neo-Platonic colouring
to the Christian Faith of the Western Church. It may have been,
as we have already suggested, that it was the preaching of Ambro-
—se that already prepared him for the hour of his awakening,and
/
Foot Notes- (I) "Saint Augustin et le Neo-Platonisme",page,2i. j
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rendered him the more susceptible to the teaching of Plotinus 
which was destined to open for him the gateway into a new life. 
Still that may be but a conjecture. St Augustine, in the 
seventh book of his Confessions, has made it very clear to us 
that it was the translation of the books of the Platônists which 
gave him a new conception of God and His universe. We would, 
however, claim that it was Victorinus himself, the translator of 
these books into the language of Augustine, who played a promin- 
-ent part in this influence and who completed the good work which 
these books had begun. For we would recall the fact that August- 
-ine himself tells us that, when he poured out his heart to 
Simplicianus, and spoke of the 'mazes' of his wanderings} in ord- 
-er to guide him into fuller truth his friend told him of the 
conversion of Victorinus, who^in his old age^had turned from 
Neo-Platonism and had entered the Christian Church, We have 
already marked the fact that when he heard this he was deeply 
stirred and "burned to imitate him". Moreover, we know that 
Augustine had a very high opinion of the ability of Victorinus, 
and honoured him as one who was "most learned and skilled in the 
liberal sciences, and had read and weighed so many works of the 
philosophers". (I)
Furthermore Victorinus had been, like himself, 
a Rhetorician, and had stood high in the esteem of the members of 
his profession. Is it not,then, highly probable that Augustine^
Foot Notes-(l) Conf.VIII.2.3. "Philosophorum multa legerat et 
dijudicaverat et dilueidaverat".
(10*)
impressed by the story of the conversion of Victorinus, in his
eagerness for the Truth which would lighten his darkness,"would
make him his model in the crucial period of his life"? (l)
Is this not extremely likely? Does not the
fact that, when the truths of Neo-Platonism set his heart on fire,
he turned to the Epistles of 8t.Paul/thus completing his con-
-version, does this not suggest to us that here, at the outset,
Augustine was indeed following in the steps of Victorinus who
was himself a student of that Apostle? Harnack favours this view
when he says- "Unless all signs deceive, Augustine received from
Victorinus the impulse which led him to assimilate Paul's charact-
-eristic ideas, and Augustine demonstrably devoted a patient
study to the Pauline Epistles from the moment when he became more
thoroughly acquainted with Neo-Platonism", (2)
The importance of Victorinus for ourselves lies
here- that he was a pioneer in the 'borrowing' of Neo-Platonic
doctrines and in their transmission to Christian Theology, and
that he would seem to have played an important part in the form-
-ative period of Augustine's life, becoming in this way a link
between Plotinus and Augustine himself. (3)
"In fact, when we study the works of Victorinus^
we are astonished to find in him a perfect Christian Neo-Platon-
-ist, and an Augustine before Augustine. The writings 'Ad Justi-
-num Maniehaeum' and 'De generations verb! divini', and the great
Foot Notes- (l)Harnack, 'History of Dogma*,Eng.Trans.by Millar; 
Williams & Norgate, 1898. Vol.5, page 33. (2)ibid,page,34.
(3).See Douillet,op.cit.Vol.2.page,555. and elsewhere for 
his many illustrations.
(105).
work against the Arians, read like compositions by Augustine; 
only the Neo-Platonic element makes a much more natural appear- 
-ance in him than in Augustine, who had to make an effort to 
grasp it." (I)
But now let us mark the presence of Neo-Plat- 
-onism in the writings of Victorinus, and, what is much more 
important for ourselves, the influence of Neo-Platonism, through 
Yictorinus, upon Augustine. Dr. Gore has told us that not only 
was "Victorinus the first Christian Neo-Platonist who wrote in 
Latin", but that he was "the first systematically to convert the 
results of the Neo-Platonic system to the uses of Christian Theo- 
-logy". (2)
In his doctrine of the Trinity we find that
Victorinus has been greatly influenced by Plotinus. According to
Victorinus, the Father has generated the ^on, but this proceeding
forth of God in the act of creation does not involve a change in
the Divine Essence. The Son is the eterhal utterance of the
Divine Will; from all eternity He has issued forth this manifest-
-ation of Himself, but He has not lessened His content by doing
80. "The Father is God and the Son is His Will, both are one, not
by union but by simplicity of Essence, the Will proceeding forth
into actualized capacity, but not withdrawing from the Father's
own substance and identical motion". As God in His universal
thought has but one Will,therefore One and Only-begotten is the
Foot Notes- (I) Harnack, op.cit.page, 35. Foot Note, quoting Gore's 
article on 'Victorinus', in the Diet, of Christian Biog.IV. 
PP.II29-II3B. (2).Gore Article, op.cit.to which I am greatly 1  
indebted for my outline of the doctrine of Victorinus.
(106).
Son. God thought not one thing first and then another. The 
Eternal act of thought or Will has one eternal object.(I)
Victorinus further says that the generation of 
the Son is -"Non a necessitate naturae sed voluntate Patris.
Ipse se ipsum circumterminavit". With him the Son is the object 
of the Divène Self-knowledge. Since the Father eternally wills so 
He also eternally knows Himself in the Son; the Son is the expr- 
-ession, the utterance of Hie own Being. Hence the Son becomes 
an object of knowledge, and Victorinus speaks of the Son as the 
'forma* of God, and His limitation. Vfe must not think, however, 
of any outside limitation being imposed upon God; God has limited 
Himself in the Logos. Knowledge is thus conceived as 'limitation' 
or 'form'; "it is an eternal abiding relation of subject and 
object". The Son is an object of knowledge distinct from the 
Father and yet one with Him,
Victorinus describes the relationship between the 
Son and the Father by means of many terms- the Father is the 
'esse*, the Son the 'Intelligentia'; the Father is the 'motio' 
and the Son the 'motus*. All things are potentially in the Father, 
actually in the Son. He makes use of a curious comparison when he 
speaks of the relationship of the Father to the Son as being
o Lo ^ o COM utterly essential is the Son to the Being
of God that nothing can be so untrue as to describe Him as created, 
It were better to deny Him begotten than to assert Him created.
He is the 'actio'; the Father is Being; and perfect being involves
Foot Notes- (l)Victorinus in Ep.ad Ephes. I.i.see Gore.Art.Viet, 
op.cit.
(107).
perfect action. "..."The Father is greater than the Son, not in 
virtue of having or being anything which the Son is or has not, 
but as He^hat gives is prior to Him that receives. The Son has 
life, not as a creature, but in Himself. He has it as the Father 
has it, but He has received from the Father what He has and is". 
Victorinus thus makes clear his thought of the co-essential 
equality of the Son with the Father.
He is not, however, quite so easily under-
-stood when he deals with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Ghost proc-
-eeds 'from the Father and the Son*. He is *a Patre per Christum
et in Christo*. That is to say, He is after the Son in order of
place and time. Yet there is a sense in which He precedes the Son,
as being the Spirit of God, by means of which the Father begat
the Son. "He is the 'progressas* as well as the 'regressus' of
God. In a certain way the Spirit and the Son appear to be more
closely one than the Father and the Son. They are 'existentiae
duae', but they proceed forth 'in uno mo tu' and that 'motus' is
the Son; so that the Spirit is, as it were, contained in the Son.
Indeed Victorinus sometimes speaks of the Spirit as the 'Logos
in occulto' (I), and of Christ incarnate as the 'Logos in manif-
-esto'. He thinks of the Spirit as the bond or 'copula' of the
Eternal Trinity,completing the perfect circle of the Divine being.
He follows the idea of the Neo-Platonic triad of 'status'Jprogres-
-sio', 'regressus* ( ).
Foot Notes- (l). Compare, Enneads, V.1.6.where the Soul is spoken 
of as being'an obscure Logos'.
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This idea was implied by Plotinus, but was not definitely stated 
until Proclus, In his doctrine of the Trinity Victorinus places 
emphasis on the circuminsession of the three Persons.
We must notice particularly, in closing this brief 
outline of the doctrine of Victorinus, how greatly he was indebt- 
-ed to Neo-Platonism.
(I) He borrows from the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists 
in his description of the process of creation as a drawing out of 
the plenitude of God into a chain or gradation of existences;  ^
"Deus, Jesus, Spiritus, iroc/s ^ anima, angeli et deinde corporalia 
omnia submimistrata"
(2).He also does so in his conception of the Voc/Ç | 
and 'anima* as substantial substances, the source of all partic- 
-ular minds, and souls, by means of which God has informed and 
animated the lower material world. He adopts the Neo-Platonic 
thought of anima as something capable of spiritualisation but not 
yet 'Spirit', intermediate between spirit and matter,
(3) He is also a Neo-Platonist in his conception 
of the return of all things 'into God*.
(4) He is Neo-PlatoniC/too, in his doctrine of 
Matter as having no existence apart from God, but as being an 
abstraction. Still he holds that as created and fashioned by God 
it is both appreciated and depreciated. It is appreciated as a 
true revelation of God, but depreciated with the old philosophical 
depreciation and horror of the material which still clings to 
Victorinus and militates alike against his grasp of the thought
of the Incarnation and also against his clear assertion of
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responsibility,
(5) The thought of Victorinus also-concerning 
the relationship of the Father to the Son is considerably influ- 
-enced by what Plotinus said with respect to the relations which 
existed between the One and the Yoc/S . But with this differ- 
-ence- instead of an impersonal God, without will or conscious- 
-ness or motion, abstract and lifeless, Victorinus is able by 
reason of his Christian Faith to fill the Neo-Platonic concept- 
-ions with love and life and personality suffused by the very 
spirit of a Father.
A word may be added from Gore as to the influence 
of Victorinus upon the thought of Augustine. "It is worth while^' 
he says,"calling attention to the evidence suggested by a good 
deal of Victorinus* Theology, of a closer connexion than has been 
yet noticed between him and St Augustine, His strong insistence 
in his Trinitarian Theology on the double procession of the Holy 
Spirit, his conception of the Holy Spirit as the 'bond* of the 
blessed Trinity, his emphasis on the unity of Christ and His 
Church, his strong prl^edestinarianism, his vehement assertion of 
the doctrines of Grace, his assertion of the priority of Faith to 
intelligence; all these elements, important and unimportant in 
Victorinus, reappear in ST. Augustine, and it seems not at all 
improbable that the influence of the old philosopher whose conv- 
-ersion stirred him so deeply was a determining force in the 
Theology of St Augustine." (I)
Foot Notes- (I) Gore, op.cit.page, II38.
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But let U 8  now retrace our steps to what St Augustine has 
to say concerning these books of the 'Platônists*. There is no 
need for us again to relate the story of the kindling of his 
heart as he learned from them the deep truths concerning the 
Spirituality of God and the mediating Logos. Years afterwards 
he gives his account of that memorable occasion on the pages of 
his Confessions. (I) And writing in the light of a fuller 
Christian experience, he tells us, there, that even these books, 
precious as they were to him at the time he first read them, did 
not satisfy his heart's deepest needs, for he found in the 
Neo-Platonists no incarnation of the One who was the Saviour of 
the human heart. Tiiey fell short of the best,- "For", he says,
"it is one thing, from the mountain's shaggy top to see the land 
pf peace, and to find no way thither; and in vain to essay through 
ways unpassable, opposed and beset by fugitives and deserters, 
under their captain the lion and the dragon; and another to keep 
on the way that leads thither, guarded by the host of the heaven- 
-ly General". (2)
In giving an account of this time to his friend
and patron Romanianus, Augustine unites the story of the discov-
-ery of these books and of the value they were to him with an
account of his conversion in the garden. (3)
There we have additional evidence of the part
which these books played in his religious life. This passage is
Foot Notes- (l)The Confessions were written some 12 or 13 years 
afterwards. Thattis between the years 397 &399.Inge, page 
124, 'Classics of the Quiet life', says 12, years after his 
baptism. (2 ).Conf.VII.21.27, (3), Contra Academicos,XT.2.5, 
Augustine dedicates this book to Romanianus.See fuller notes 
at the end of this chapter.
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of value since it was written considerably before the Confessions 
and it; therefore, gives us the state oi his mind nearer the 
time . It makes clear to us that philosophy had opened the door 
gor him into a fuller life, and that he had adopted Neo-Platonism 
before his adhesion to Christianity. "Nothing but a philosophy 
which addressed the heart,- a philosophy which coincided with the 
inward witness of a nature in man akin to the divine,- a philos- 
-ophy which, at the same time, in its later form, contained so 
much that really or seemingly harmonized with the Christian truths 
implanted in his soul at an early age;- nothing but such a philo- 
-sophy could have possessed such attractions for him in the then 
tone of his mind". (I)
Now although Augustine refers to these
philosophers as the Platônists, it is clear that he really means
the Neo-Platonists, for in one of his books he writes- "The most
illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato,
have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but
have preferred the name of Platônists. Among these were the
renowned Plotinus, Jamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and
the African Apuleius who was learned both in the Greek and Latin
tongues". (2) We shall see,moreover, that when Augustine
quotes directly from Plotinus and Porphyry (Jamblichus he never
cites), that, in these quotations he attributes to them the same
doctrines as those which he tells us are to be found in the works
of the Platônists. We may remark here, in passing, that the
Foot Notes- (I). Neander,"Church History", Eng.Ed,trans.by Torrey 
George Bell & Sons, 1887. Vol.3. page, 504. (2) De Givitafe
Dei, VIII.12.
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Seventh book of the Confessions, as indeed the whole work, is 
imbued with the spirit of Heo-Platonism. (I)
Again in his book on the "City of God", we find an
indication that the relationship between the Soul and the Logos,
which Augustine discovered in the books of the 'Platonists*, 
corresponds to that harmony which he finds existing between the 
teaching of Plotinus and that of St. John in his gospel. (?)
From that quotation it is evident that he
was not only familiar with the teaching of Plotinus, but that^ 
from the comparisons he there makes in that passage , he was also 
acquainted with three of the books of the Enneads of Plotinus. (^)
Furthermore , we would mark the fact that the 
theory which he advances , that the Platonists considered the
Logos to be consubstantial with the Father, is to be found in the
first book of the Fifth Ennead, entitled *0n the Three Principle 
Hypostases*. (4),
Without a doubt Augustine had an intimate Know-
-ledge of the works of Plotinus. He quotes him by name at least
six times, ($). and it is perfectly clear that he knew the six
books of the Enneads, for references in his writings may be
compared to passages which are to be found in the books of the
Enneads. (6) Now, considering the great debt which Augustine
owed to Neo-Platonism, it is not surprising that he frequently
Foot Notes- (I).For evidence of this see Appendix 3. (g) De Civ. 
Dei, X.P.eee the fuller notes at the end of this chapter.
(3).Enneads, P.9.3.- V.7I.4.- IV.3.XI. (4).Enneads V.I.6. 
see Confessions, VII.IX.1%.also page 85. Thesis.For details 
of comparisons here see Appendix, 3. (5).See fuller notes 
De Civ.Dei,IX.I0.-IX.I7.- X.2.- X.I4.- X.23,- X.30.
(6).See Appendix 3. for comparative passages in substanti- 
-ation of this statement.
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expresses his admiration for that saintly philosopher, the great- 
-est of all the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus, In one of his earliest 
writings he could declare:- "The utterance of Plato, the most pure 
and bright in all philosophy, scattering the clouds of error, has 
shone forth most of all in Plotinus, the Platonic philosopher who 
has been deemed so like his master that one might think them cont- 
-emporaries, if the length of time between them did not compel 
us to say that in Plotinus Plato lived again". (I)
In one of his letters, he writes "of the very acute 
and able men" in the school of Plotinus at Rome, and of how some 
of them had been degraded by curious arts. He adds in that same 
letter that if only Plotinus and his friends had lived a little 
later they would have "changed a few words and phrases and become 
Christians, as many of the Platonists in our generation have 
done". (2) If we^may add another quotation, in the De Civitate 
Dei, Augustine remarks:- "we prefer these(the Platonists) to all 
other philosophers, and confess that they approash nearest to 
us. (3)
It is only fair to say that^ notwithstanding this
high praise, Augustine differs at times very markedly from Plot-
-inus, criticises his positions,and,in his Retractationes^he reg-
-rets somewhat his seemingly extravagant praise, (4) Still it
is very evident that at one period of his life he was deeply
impressed by the truths which Plotinus set forth. They were kind-
-red spirits, each^seeker# for the fullest knowledge of the Truth,
and fellowship with the highest. Indeed Augustine shared the
Foot Notes- (I).Contra Academicos,3.18.41. (2)Epist.118, and
De Vera Religione, I%n.also Cont.Acad. 5,20.4*^. (3)De Civ.Dei, 
VIII,9. (4).De Civ.Dei, criticising Plotinus,!.23,4-X.29,30.
Retractationes, 1.3. N.B.See fuller notes for Latin of above]
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mystic experience of Plotinus when, in an ecstatic moment, he 
was, as it were, lifted out of the body and both heard and saw 
things which no speech could fully describe,
A word should be said concerning Porphyry,the 
pupil and biographer of Plotinus, the one who did so much to 
produce something like order in the Enneads of Plotinus and vfho 
thus brought the teaching of the great master into prominence.
Now whilst, at times, Augustine sharply crit- 
-ices Porphyry, he yet speaks of him also in terms of the highest 
esteem. (I) Moreover, he makes references to Porphyry’s 
writings- ’The Return of the Soul to God’, ’The Philosophy of the 
Oracles’, ’The Letter to Anebo’, and ’The Principles of the 
Theory of Intelligibles’, (2)
In the De Civitate Dei Augustine makes frequent 
comments upon the Neo-Platcnists, sometimes speaking of Plotinus, 
at other times of Porphyry, and distinguishes wherein his 
doctrine diverges from the teaching of these great Philosophers.
But,apart from minor differences, it is not 
difficult to see in how many respects St. Augustine has been
greatly indebted to Neo-Platonism, especially the teaching of
[
Foot Notes- (I). De Civ.Dei,XIX.22, "Philosophas nobilis, doctiss-j 
-imus philosophorum, quamvis Christianorum acerrimus inimicus’j 
(2),Augustine presents the general doctrine of the ’Returnof i 
the Soul’ in several passages, s.g.Cont.Academ.III.42.(end) i 
De Ord.2.47-51. Solil.I.5.fic. He also quotes & analyses this  ^
book De Civ,Dei,X.29. cp.ibid.30,32. ’The Philosophy of Orac-i 
-les’. De Civ.Dei,X.23,-X.9,& 10.-X.26,27.and XIX.23. 'The 
Letter to Anebo’, De Civ.Dei, X.II. Augustine reproduces a 
passage from ’The Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles' I 
textually in De Musica, VI.40. Alfaric says that Augustine 
was able to know these several writings from the Latin vers- 
-ion of Victorinus. see Alfaric,op.cit page, 375. also 
Douillet, op.cit.Vol.2.page 561.
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Plotinus in the Enneads. We shall see how clearly this is to he
noticed as we examine Augustine’s earlier works. Further we
shall have an opportunity of nosti^ng^ that his doctrines and
basal ideas unmistakeably bear the marks of Neo-Platonic influ-
-ence. But at the present juncture it will be sufficient to
remark upon a few instances of very evident ’borrowings’.
For example, Augustine, in his Theory of the
Purifying and Intellectual Virtues, has closely followed what
Plotinus had already said in the book of the Enneads. (I)
Here we may compare the definitions which he gives us on Prudence,
Justice, Temperance, Courage, with those of Plotinus.
Again all the ideas which Augustine has devel-
-oped in his De Quantitate Animae 5^5. have been taken from the
Enneads, Book, I. (^); and he closely follows the Arguments of
Enneads, 4.7, 3, in De Immortalitate Animae, 8.14, (3).Moreover,
in his treatise on ’Happiness’ (De beata Vita), he has borrowed
much from Enneads 1,4, where Plotinus discourses on Happiness.
Many of the arguments which he uses in his polemical writings
against the Manichaeans. have also been drawn from what Plotinus
has said when he writes against the Gnostics. On Time and on
Eternity, as well as on ’Numbers’^ he owed much to Neo-Platonism,
And,as we have already noticed,the well-known passage in the
Confessions when he describes his ecstatic moment has been inspi^
De
Foot Notes- (I).Enneads, 1.2. see^Musica, VI.13-16. (2)See Bouiil- 
-et. op.cit.Vol. I.page, 590. (#). See Appendix, 3.
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-red by Plotinus. (l) But there is no need to multiply compari­
sons at this point. We shall see that- "if Plotinus makes Bl&to 
Plato.live again, he himself lives again in Augustine", (2)
That is to say we shall find that^far more deeply than Augustine 
was conscious of,he had caught the spirit of Plotinus and formed 
the habit of interpreting the teaching of the great Philosophy 
in terms which he employs when dealing with Christian Truth.
Now we can well understand how this came to 
pass. At a transition period in his life St Augustine weary of 
Manichaeism, and inclined to doubt whether Truth could ever be 
discovered, finds in Neo-Platonism a new orientation by means of 
which his thoughts are spiritualised. It was like the opening of 
a window through which the freshness of the morning came with its 
breath of «nvigoration, quickening him into a newness of life.
It would seem as though at first he was 
converted to Neo-Platonism and was satisfied. Then the old memor- 
-ies of his early Religious training swept across his spirit and 
he turned to the New Testament and more especially the Pauline 
Epistles to find how far this New Philosophy confirmed the teach- 
-ing he found there, for he argued that,since all Truth was one, 
this Religion could not be different from that highest wisdom.
As he thought of God in terms of the Highest Being in the Triad 
of Neo-Platonism, so he saw that Jesus Christ was none other than 
the Nous of whom Plotinus had spoken. In like manner he sought to
Foot Notes- (I) Conf. IX.10. see Appendix 3. (2) Alfaric, op.
cit. page,518.
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explain the Christian doctrines in terms of Neo-Platonic ideal-
-ism. It is true that looking back upon his experience he feels 
ashamed of his delight in wisdom. (l) What brought him to his 
senses was the fact that,whilst he had seen the Truth, he seemed 
powerless to be delivered from the flesh . It was only when he 
read in the Epistles concerning the strivings of the flesh & the 
Spirit which so aptly seemed to describe his own condition , that 
what he had longed for became his and he found deliverance from 
the bondage of the flesh by the acceptance of the Lord Jesus 
Christ as his Saviour. Still he sought to find confirmation 
of the inner experience and an added certainty from the books of 
the Platonists. (2).
But sufficient has been said, at the present 
stage of our study^to indicate how pronounced was the influence 
of Neo-Platonism upon the life and thought of Augustine. We 
shall now proceed to deal with that period of his life when 
Neo-Platonism most clearly seemed to have captuhed his heart.
Foot Notes- (l). Conf.VII.XX.26. "I prated as one well skilled;.. 
..c.For now I had begun to wish to seem wise, being filled 
with mine own punishment, yet I did not mourn, but rather 
scorn, puffed up with knowledge. For where was that charity 
building upon the foundation of humility, which is Christ 
Jesus? or when should these books teach me it?" cp.Ep.II8. 
22. where Augustine describes the road to Truth as being | 
’first humility; second humility ; third humility;’
(2),Contra Acad.111,20.43. (Col.488,) "Mihi autern certum 
est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere: non 
enim reperio valentiorem. Quod autem subtilissima rations 
persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus,ut quid sit ver- 
-um, non credendo solum, sed etiam inteliigendo apprehend- 
-ere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod 
sacris nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido."
See also Neander, op.cit.Vol.3.pp. 504-510.
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FULLER HOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part )
Page no. Foot Note- (3). Contra Aoademicos,!!.!’. 5.
"Since that vehement flame, which was about to seize me, as yet 
was not, I thought that by which I was slowly kindled, was the 
very greatest. Khen lo! certain books- when they had distilled a 
very few drops of most precious unguent on that tiny flame, it 
is past belief, and perhaps past what even you believe of me,
(and what could I say more?) nay to myself also is it past 
belief, what a conflagration of myself they lighted. What ambit- 
-ion,what human show, what empty love of fame, or, lastly,what 
incitement or band of this mortal life could hold me then?
I turned speedily and wholly back into myself. I 
cast but a glance, I confess, as one passing on, upon that relig- 
-ion which was implanted into us, as boys, and interwoven with 
our very inmost selves; but she drew me unknowing to herself.
So then stumbling, hurrying, hesitating, I seized the Apostle 
Paul; ’for never* said I, ’could they have wrought such things, 
or lived as it is plain they did live, if their writings and arg- 
-uments were opposed to this so high good. I read the whole most 
intently and carefully. But then, never so little light having 
now been shed thereon, such a countenance of wisdom gleamed upon 
me, that if I could exhibit it,- T say not to you, who ever 
hungeredst after her though unknown- but to your very adversary, 
casting aside and abandoning whatever now stimulates him so 
keenly to whatsoever pleasures, he would, amazed, panting, enkind- 
-led, fly to her Beauty."
Page 112. Foot Note- (2). De Civitate Dei, X.2.
The opinion of Plotinus the Platonist regarding enlightenment- 
"But with these more estimable philosophers we have no dispute in 
this matter. For they perceived, and in various forms abundantly 
expressed in their writings, that these spirits have the same 
source of happiness as ourselves,- a certain intelligible light,^ 
which is their God, and is different from themselves, and illumine; 
them that they may be penetrated with light, and enjoy perfect ^
happiness in the participation of God. Plotinus, commenting on 
Plato, repeatedly and strongly asserts that not even the soul 
which they believe to be the soul of the world, derives its bless- 
-edness from any other source than we do, viz. from that Light g 
which is distinct from it and created it, and by whose intelligib^x 
illumination it enjoys light in things intelligible.(cp.Enneads,  ^
II.IX.3.) He also compares those spiritual things to the vast and 
conspicuous heavenly bodies, as if God were the sun, and the soul 
the moon; (see Enneads,V.VI.4.) for they suppose that the moon 
derives its light from the sun. That great Platonist,therefore, 
says that the rational soul, or rather the intellectual soul,- 
in which class he comprehends the souls of the blessed immortals 
who inhabit heaven,- has no nature superior to it save God, the 
Creator of the world and the soul itself, and that these heavenly
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FÜELER HOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.)
Page 112. Foot Note- De Civitate Dei, X.2. continued.
spirits derive their blessed life, and the light of truth, from 
the same source as ourselves, agreeing with the gospel where we 
read,- ’There was a man sent from God whose name was John; the 
same came for a witness to bear witness of that Light, that 
through Him all might believe. He was not that Light, but that he 
might bear witness of the Light. That was the true Light which lig 
-hteth every man that cometh into the world;’- a distinction 
which sufficiently proves that the rational or intellectual soul 
such as John had cannot be its cwn light, but needs to receive 
illumination from another, the true Light. This^ohn himself 
avows when he delivers his witness: ’We have all received of His 
fulness’.(see Enneads, IV.3.XI.) (Dods trans.Vol.I.pages ,385,6.)
For translations from the Enneads, see Appendix 3.
I
Page )i 112, Foot Note- (5).
De Civitate Dei, IX.10. Translated Dods, pages,364,5. Vol.I.
"Plotinus, whose memory is quite recent, enjoys the reputation 
of having understood Plato better than any other of his disciples. 
(Plotinus died in 2 70 A.B. For his relation to Plato, see Contra 
Acad.III.41.) In speaking of human souls, he says,- ’The Father 
in compassion made their bonds mortal;’(Enneads,IV.3.12.) that is 
to say, he considered it due to the Father’s mercy that men, 
having a mortal body, should not be for ever confined in the 
misery of this life".
De Civitate Dei, IX.17. See Dods,op.cit.Vol.I. page,374.
"I am considerably surprised that such learned men,men who pro- 
-nounce all material and sensible things to be altogether inferior 
to those that are spiritual and intelligible, should mention 
bodily contact in connection with the blessed life. Is that 
sentiment of Plotinus forgotten?- ’We must fly to our beloved 
fatherland. There is the Father, there our all. What fleet or 
flight shall convey us thither? Our way is, to become like God’.
If, then, one is nearer to God the liker he is to Him, there is 
no other distance from God than unlikeness to Him. And the soul 
of man is unlike that incorporeal and unchangeable and eternal 
essence, in proportion as it craves things temporal and mutable."
Enneads
/
Enneads, 1.2.3.
T w  V
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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.) continued-
De Civitate Dei, X.I4. see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I.pages,402,3.
"The Platonist Plotinus discourses concerning providence, and 
from the beauty of flowers and foliage, proves that from the 
supreme God, whose beauty is unseen and ineffable, providence 
reaches down even to these earthly things here below; and he 
argues that all these frail and perishing things could not have 
so exquisite and elaborate a beauty, were they not fashioned by 
Him whose unseen and unchangeable beauty continually pervades all 
things", -
Here the reference is to Enneads, 3.2.13, (see Appendix,3)
De Civitate Dei, X.23. see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I.pages,4-13,4.
"And what he (Porphyry) as a Platonist means by ’Principles’, we 
know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he 
calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but ^ 
of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, 
for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the 
middle place between these two.For if, like Plotinus in his diec- 
-ussion regarding the three Principal substances, he wished us to 
understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly  ^
not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, 
between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of 
nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making 
it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No 
doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought exped- 
-ient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of 
the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both."
Compare the whole book, Enneads, V.I. ’On the Three 
Principle Hypostases’- rZLr
u It o <rrc/
Be Civitate Dei, X.30, see Dods, op.cit. Vol.I.pages,&26,7.
"If it is considered unseemly to emend anything which Plato has 
touched, why did Porphyry himself make emendations,and these not 
a few? for it is very certain that Plato wrote that the souls 
of men return after death to the bodies of beasts, Plotinus also, 
Porphyry’s teacher, held this opinion; yet Porphyry justly 
rejected it."
The reference here is to Enneads, III.4.2,
(see Appendix 3.)
Page, 113. Foot Note- (I)
^Os illud Platonis quod in philosophia purgatissimum est et 
lùuidisfîiraum, dimetis nubibus erroris emicuit, maxime in Plotino 
qui platonicus philosophas ita ejus similis judicatus est,ut ' 
siraul eos vixisse, tamen autem interesttemporis ut in hoc*ill A 
revixisse putandus sit". Contra Acad.III.la.41. (col.486.)
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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER I. (Part 2.) continued- 
Page, 113. Foot Note- (2).
Epis. 118 and De Vera Relig.I2.
"Plotini schola Romae floruit habuitque condiscipulos multos 
acutissimos et solertisaimos viros. Sed aliqui eorum magicarum 
artium curiositate depravati sunt; aliqui, Dominum Jesum Christ- 
-um ipsius veritatis atque sapientiae incommutabilis (quam cona- 
-bantur attingere) eognoscentes gesture personam, in ejus militi- 
am transierunt".
"et,paucis mutatis verbis et sententiis, Christian! fièrent,sicut 
plerique recentiorum nostroruraque teraporum Platonic! fuerunt,"
Page 113, Foot Note- (4).
Retractationes 1.3. "Verum et in his libris displicet rnihi saepe
interpositum fortunae vocabulum et quod philosophes non vera i
pietate praeditos dixi virtutie luce fulsisse.Et quod duos mundos, 
unum sensibilem,o.lterum intelligibilem, non ex Platonis vei ex 
Platonicorum persona, sed ex me a sic commendavi "
In speaking of the Platonists , that is,Plotinus and Porphyry, 
i^ustine makes use of the terms, ’Quidam docti’ (De Musica,VI.13) 
’Non mediocriter docti homines’ (De Civ.Dei,V.I.) ’Doctissimi 
homines’ (De quantitate Animae,30.) and others of a like kind.
(122).
CHAPTER, 2. .
THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHER AT CASSICIACüM.
We have fortunately other sources , to which we can turn 
apart from the Confessions, for our study of the development of 
the thought of St Augustine, and in our attempt to mark the 
influence of Neo-Platonism upon his life.
A very valuable help for the purpose which we have
in hand is the account which he has himself given us of his soj-
-ourn at Cassiciacum in the interval between his conversion and
his baptism. Indeed the writings of this important period furn-
-ish an additional chapter to the Confessions, and at the same
time correct ^ somewhat,many of the impressions which we may have
perhaps gained as we have read the brief account given to us in
St Augustine’s story of his soul’s awakening.
to
But this is hardly^be wondered at, since the
Confessions were written some twelve or thirteen years after the
events which he relates took place, and naturally he would see
the facts in a somewhat changed perspective; whilst the story of
the Cassiciacum days and his reflections at that time follow
immediately after the scene in the garden.(I)
We shall, however, see as we proceed that this
new view point does not materially contradict what we have alrea-
-dy gleaned from our study, and that, despite certain criticisms
which have been passed upon these seemingly different accounts.
Foot Notes- (I). The date of the Confessions has been estimated 
as somewhere between 397 and 400, whilst his conversion took 
place towards the end of July or the beginning of August,
386. A.D. He retired to Cassiciacum probably in the August, 
of that same year.
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the situation in the Dialogues is not incompatible with the 
representations of the Confessions. (I)
After resigning his professorship of Rhetoric 
at Milan, Augustine tells us that he retired to Cassiciacum, a 
country house which was lent to him by his friend Verecundus. (2) 
Without a doubt his chief reason for his resignation was an 
earnest desire for a season of reflection and an opportunity of 
thinking out the new implications which presented themselves to 
him. His health, it is true, had given him an occasion for 
anxiety, but he knew above all else that amid the round of his 
professional duties he would have no opportunity of giving him- 
-self to a serious consideration of the new Truth which had been 
revealed to him at this important stage of his career. The 
monastic life appealed to him; moreover, he must needs make some 
preparation for his baptism. Many reasons then prompted him to 
accept gladly his friend's offer of his country home.
That there were more than his own people with 
him in his retreat we learn from this new account of his retire- 
-ment there. In addition to his mother Monnica, his son Adeodatus, 
his brother Navigius; there also accompanied him two of his 
cousins, Lastidianus and Rusticus, his old friend Alypius, and 
two of his pupils, Trygetius and Licentius.
Foot Notes- (I). We may note L.Gourdon.'Essai sur la conversion 
de Saint Augustin*, (Cahors, I900); and H.Becker, 'Augustin 
Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwickelung*,(Leipzig, 1908).
See Montgomery's criticism of these in his vol.'St Augustine, 
aspects of his life and thought', (Hodder & Stoughton,MCMXIV) 
pages, 33, and following. (2 ).Confessions,IX.3,5.
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It may come as a matter of surprise to us that
St Augustine, so desirous of the quiet which was needful to him
at this time, should have taken so many with him into the country^
^nd thatjafter resigning his professorship,he should have taken
up this further duty of teaching the youths who shared in his
retreat. But Augustine had given up his livelihood and having
inherited little from his father, he was compelled to find some
means of support for his mother and son as well as for himself{I)
He knew the necessity of having leisure, but he had no income to
retire on; he therefore, perforce had to take pupils. When,more-
-over, we recollect that the fathers of Trygetius and Licentius
were both wealthy men, and that Romanianus, who had always been
most generous to Augustine, was the father of Licentius, it
would seem that here Augustine had found a way of obtaining his
opportunity for self-recollection, and that he^ at the same time,
thus able to obtain the wherewithal to accomplish his desires.(2)
In the Dialogues written at Cassiciacum we
have a vivid picture of the life they passed there and a glimpse
given to us of the way in which Augustine spent his time. (3)
They were indeed a merry party, bright,jocul-
-ar, and at times even boisterous. Augustine himself, upon
occasion, shares in their jest and play. They lived a common life,
Augustine admirably filling the role of guide, philosopher, and
friend,- very evidently beloved by all around him.
Foot Notes- (I). Augustine speaks (Contra Academicos,2.2.4.Col,441 
of the necessity of providing for his dependents as having 
hindered him from giving up his profession. (2).Montgomery, 
op.cit. pages, 36, 37. (3).For the best account of the
period,see ’La fin du paganisme’, Vol.I. pages,313-325, |
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Their fellowship together has been compared to that 
which took place between Cicero and his friends beneath the 
shades of the tree at Tusculum, and this indeed must often have 
been in Augustine’s mind; although, as Dr.Gibb rather suggests, 
"an apter comparison would be that of a reading party from an 
English University under the leadership of a sympathetic tutor.(I 
Monnica naturally had charge of the domestic 
arrangements, but we find her occasionally joining in their dis- 
-cussions. When the weather was fine they wandered in the mead- 
-ows, talking as they went, or,sitting beneath the shade of some 
great tree,they discoursed on the themes that were before them; 
if the day were wet, they would adjourn to a spacious bath-room 
for their talks. The conversations were taken down by a short- 
-hand writer, not only to give continuity to their debate, but 
also that they might be preserved and serve as a literary legacy 
for the friends and pupils of Augustine at Milan and elsewhere.
Sometimes Augustine must needs absent himself in
order to deal with his correspondence; at other times he is
engaged with the payment of accounts, or attending to the work on
the farm and to duties in connection with the management of the
estate.(2). Very evidently Verecundus had entrusted him with the
responsibilities of ownership, for the time being. But we see
Foot Notes- (I). Alfaric, op.cit.page,398. - See the preface to
’The Confessions’, Gibb & Montgomery, Patristic Texts.
(2).Contra Academ.I.5.I5. (col.432.) "diesque pene totus cum 
in rusticis ordinandis". Contra Academ.2.4.I0. (col.445. ) 
here we are told- that they ’rose earlier than usual to help 
the labourers with some work for which time pressed’.
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Augustine finding opportunity also for private study and devot- 
-ion.
Here and there throughout the narrative we 
have illuminating touches as with apt phrase Augustine gives us 
an insight into the personal characteristics of his companions;(I 
moreover we have descriptive scenes of happenings by night & by 
day.(2) These , and other asides, lend colour and give vividness 
to the picture 6f the days at Cassiciacum.
But their tutor is not unmindful of the fact 
that a major portion of his time must be taken up with the 
education of the youths entrusted to his care. We find him cover- 
-ing a varied field; whilst he lectured on grammar, rhetoric, & 
history, he does not neglect the study of the Classics. One day 
he explains the first book of the Georgies, and, in the week that 
follows, three others; of these he makes them read a portion 
each evening. (3)
His chief subject, however, is the study 
of philosophy as the gateway to the blessed life. Licentius,who 
was in the habit of slipping away from breakfast in order to 
write poetry, is reminded that Philosophy is much more attractive 
than the Muses; (4) and at length Licentius confesses that indeed 
Philosophy has become fairer to him than all the love tales of 
the poets, ’and with a sigh he gives thanks to Christ’. (5)
Foot Notes- (I). De 0rdine,1.2.5. (col.533.); Contra Acad.1.1.&.
Contra Acad.1.2.5, De Ordine,I.7. De beata vita,7.14.
(2 ).See De Ordine,I.#.X 3.6.: 8. (25,26.) (3). Contra Acad.
2.4.10. De Ordine, 1.8.26. (4).De Ordine,I.3.8. & I.5.12.
(5).De Ordine, I.8.21.(col.542.)
(127).
Still Augustine is anxious that there shall be a good ground- 
-work of other knowledge before Philosophy is fully studied.
We find; for example, Augustine writing to Romanianus concern- 
-ing his son Licentius:- "Your boy is beginning to take an int- 
-erest in philosophy, but I restrain him somewhat, that he may 
make firmer and better progress when he has been thoroughly 
trained in the necessary disciplines". (I)
In our brief outline of this period we have seen 
the kind of life which St Augustine lived at Cassiciacum, and 
that he endeavoured to instruct his pupils in philosophy. In 
doing this, however, we must remember that the master himself 
was feeling his way towards certainty in deeper matters, and 
that he sought to arrive at a solution of the problems which 
vexed him by the help of the New Philosophy which had appealed 
so strongly to him. Whilst instructing his pupils he was then 
endeavouring to ground himself in philospphical knowledge.
Before we pass in review the writings of this 
time which will clearly indicate how markedly St Augustine was 
under the influence of Philosophy, let us see how Philosophy 
had made its appeal to him before his acquaintance with Neo-Pla- 
-tonism. We have already noticed that as a youth of nineteen, 
the reading of the Hortensius kindled within him a remarkable 
ardour. Whilst later he had become attracted by Aristotle’s 
Categories or Predicaments. But these experiences were but, 
as it were, preliminary essays into a new field of knowledge.
Foot Notes- (I). Montgomery, op.cit. page, 36.
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As we read the Dialogues we are impressed by the fact that, at 
this stage of his development. Philosophy has won his whole- 
-hearted allegiance, and taken him captive.
In order to illustrate this, let us here mark 
the frequent references which he makes to Philosophy. He 
expresses his delight that he has escaped from the world and has 
taken refuge- *in the bosom of Philosophy*. (I) Writing to 
Romanianus he says-’At the time when you were absent, I never 
ceased to aspire after Philosophy, and after that life which was 
more pleasing and agreeable to me than anything else*. (2)
He declares that after reading the Epistles of St.Paul the face 
of Philosophy appeared to him in all its attractive beauty.(3).
But what did St Augustine precisely mean when
he made use of the word ’Philosophy’? He has supplied us with
numerous definitions in his early as well as in his later writ-
-ings. He tells us that- ’Philosophy consists of a taste for &
a love of Wisdom’; (4) that the very name ’Philosophers’ signi-
-fies those who profess the love of Wiâdom; and he adds-’now if
Wisdom is God, by whom all things are made, as authority and
truth show, then the Philosopher is a lover of God’. (5)
Again he says- ’To be a Philosopher is, according to Plato, to
love God’. (6) Philosophy is the guide of men in order that they
may learn the principle of all things. (?) It treats of God and
Foot Notes- (I). Contra Acad. I.I.3.(col.424) ’in philosophise 
gremium confugere’. (2).Contra Acad.2.2.5. (col.442.)
(3). Contra Acad.2.2.(6.& 7) cols.442,3. (4). De Moribus 
Ecclesiae, 21,38.’Et quia ipsum nomen si consideretur,rem 
magnam toto animo appetendam signifient, siquidem philosop- 
-hia est amor studiumque sapientiae’. (5). De Civ.Dei,8.I. 
also Contra Acad.2.3.7. (col.443).(6)De Civ.Dei,X 8.8.
(7^* De Ordine, 2.5.16. (col.562^.
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and the Soul, and by its help we are able to know our nature 
and whence it came.(l) It gives satisfaction to all our 
aspirations and leads us to blessedness. (2)
All this assuredly indicates how warmly August- 
-ine had embraced Philosophy and what expectations he had from 
its guidance.
Now from our knowledge of the experiences
of St. Augustine up to the present, there can be no doubt that
he is here thinking of Neo-Platonism. Grandgeorge, who has
made an exhaustive survey of the works of Augustine, assures us
that very evidently the systems of philosophy which had attracted
St Augustine most were those of Plato and the Neo-Platonists.
Grandgeorge informs us that Augustine quotes Plato fifty-two
times, and that the Neo-Platonists are mentioned forty times: &
he adds- ’This is not surprising for the philosophy of Plato
agreed fully on several points with Christianity; the fame of
Plato was also very great in the time of St Augustine...and the
philosophy of Plato was a system which, more than any other,
would please a spirit such as that of St. Augustine, eager, as
he was for Truth and Beauty’. (3)
But despite the fact that Augustine has
written in the highest terms of appreciation concerning Plato, (4=)
it is probable that in reality Plato had not the influence upon
him that we might have expected. For one thing, as we have seen.
Foot Notes- (I^De Ordine, 2.18.47.(col.581.) (2).Be beata vita,
I.I.(col.497) ’Si ad philosophiae portum,de quo jam in beat- 
-ae vitae, regionem solumque proceditur’. (3) ’Saint August- 
-in et Le Neo-Platonisme’,L.Grandgeorge,Paris,1896. page,32.
(4).See Contra Acad.3.17.37.(col.483.) also De Civ.Dei,8.4;
8.II;22.28. De Vera Relig.3.3.(col.1208)
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Augustine often uses the term ’Platonists* when clearly he
means the ’Neo-Platonists*. For another, he was not happy with
the Greek language, and preferred rather to tead Greek philos-
-ophy through the medium of a translation. (l). This leads us
to conclude that it was Neo-Platonism which exercised a predomin-
-ating influence upon his thought. Indeed, Augustine himself
later, referring to the writings composed ’in his breathing
time’, suffused as they were by the spirit of Neo-Platonism,
tells us that they were written in a style which, although enlist
-ed in the service of God, yet breathed something of the pride
of the Schools. (2) Here we have an indication of the fact
that Augustine himself realised that he was under the spell of
Neo-Platonism. Now there has been much criticism with respect
to the difference in tone and atmosphere which exists between
the writings of this Cassiciacum period and those of the Confes-
-sions. Critics have gone so far as to maintain that Augustine
was not really converted to Christianity at all, but only to
Neo-Platonism. But does that affirmation fully meet all the facts
of the case? After all at Cassiciacum , Augustine was but a
novitiate in the Christian Faith; feeling his way towards greater
certainty, and a surer conception of the Truth.Neo-Platonism had
attracted him, helped to make clear much that had been hard to
understand, and, moreover, to him did not appear, at this period
Foot Notes- (l).Dr.Gibb tells us (Gibb & Montgomery,Confessions, 
op.cit.Preface,p.XXXIX) ’Possibly the reading of the Enneads 
led St Augustine to acquaint himself with the works of Plato. 
...He seems to have knoum,though perhaps at second-hand, 
Phaedrus, Philebus, Thea^tetyi8,Charmides, Laws. With Tima eus 
(which was tr^lated into Latin by Cicero) he was familiar.’ 
(2). Confessions, IX.4.7.
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to differ very greatly from Christianity. (I) Indeed we have 
already remarked that when Augustine read the Pauline Epistles 
he found there the same truths which had been revealed to him in 
Neo-Platonism. It would be very surprising if we found in the 
Dialogues what is to be seen , at a later period, in the Confes- 
-sions. In the record of his life there is more maturity in his 
Christian thought; and whilst there is even in the Confessions 
abundant evidence of the influence of Neo-Platonism, (2) it is 
clear that he has become more truly grounded in the Christian 
Faith. It is perfectly true that the atmosphere of the Confess- 
-ions is different from that of the Dialogues. But in the former 
book he is giving an account of his Soul’s pilgrimage, whilst in 
the latter books he is engaged in Philosophical speculation 
which he seeks to reconcile with Christian Truth.At Cassiciacum 
he was in touch with young men who knew little about Christian- 
-ity, but who were deeply interested in Philosophy. Neo-Platonisn 
had led him into the light, was it too much that he should assume 
that through the same gate-way of Philosophy he might also be
able to lead his young friends to Christ?
Further, in the mind of Augustine there
seemed to be nothing incongruous in uniting a love for Philosophy
with a like love for Religion. Perhaps, too, St Augustine is here
assuring his old friends that, in spite of the fact that he has
Foot Notes- (I),Contra Acad.3.20.43.(col.488.) ’Apud Platonicos 
me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet repertum esse 
confido". (2).Notably in his view of Evil, in his thought 
concerning the ’Inner Sense’, Time, Eternity, Memory, his 
conception of Ideas, the Order of the world,Providence, and 
his account of the Mystic Vision ; as well as other clear 
indications of the spell of Neo-Platonism.
(132).
become a Christian, he has not given up his study of Philosophy.
There is abundant evidence in the Dialogues 
that the devotional life was not forgotten and that whilst he was 
busy teaching his pupils the knowledge of the Schools he was 
himself a seeker after the highest Truth to which Philosophy had 
opened his eyes. For example we read that he had formed the
habit of spending, - ’the beginning or ending, generally the half,
of the night in watching and seeking out truth nor do I allow
myself to be taken away from myself by the studies of the young 
men’. (l) Again we read- ’I prayed to God with almost daily 
weeping that my wounds might be healed, but often upbraided 
myself as unworthy to be healed as soon as I wished*• (2)
Several times we have mention made of his daily prayers. (3)
Thus we see that whilst he was busy with the problems of Philos- 
-ophy he was also careful concerning the nurture of the inner 
life. Impressed by all that Heo-Platonism had been able to reveal 
to him, he regarded Philosophy as his guide into the highest 
realms of Truth.
But now, ere this chapter is brought to a 
close, we must pass rapidly in review the writings which he penn- 
-ed during his days of retirement; for here we shall be able to 
find abundant illustration of the influence of this newly found 
Philosophy.
Foot Notes- (I). De Ordine. 1.3.6. (col.533), (2). De Ordine,
I.10.29, (col.547.) (3). De Ordine, 1.8.25.(col.544).
Soliloquia, I.(2-6). (cols.698-602) Epist. 3,4. addressed to 
Nebridius, "Thus I talked with myself, then prayed according 
to my custom, and fell asleep".
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In his first work, that of the Contra Academicos, (I) we are able
to indicate few direct references to the books of the Enneads,
perhaps this may have been due to the fact that at the first he
had none of the writings of Plotinus with him; or it may be
that he was only a beginner in the study of that Philosophy,
which was so greatly to enrich his thought; indeed he gives us
hints of this, as he frequently makes reference to his lack of
knowledge, and declares that he can hardly yet speak of himself
as a wise man, although he hopes some day to become one. (2)
On the other hand he continually speaks of the
Philosophy to which he has become attached, as being the highest
ideal that he has been able to find, as the ’harbour* by which
he is to enter the life of happiness. (3) Wisdom, he says,claims
for itself, sometimes authority, at other times Reason. The form-
-er enjoins faith; the latter, on the other hand, gains for us
knowledge. (4) But whilst the one is the gateway for the
multitude, the other is only accessible to the few. The one is
useful, but the other makes greater demands upon us. Accordingly
it is Wisdom which, above all else he will seek. (5) The new
convert makes mention of the Christian ’Mysteries’, and that very
name he borrows from Neo-Platonism. (6) We gather then from
these writings against the Sceptical Philosophers as well as from
the other writings of the period that Augustine has taken Ploti-
-nus to be his guide in the firm belief that his teaching does
Foot Notes- (I). These books in three vols.were written in 386.
(2)Contra Acad. 1.1.3.(col.424), also Book 2.(2,6,9,) Book,3 
(12,17). &c. (3). Cont.Acad.I.I.3.(col.424) C.Acad.2.I.I.
(cols.439,440) C.Acad.2.3.8.(col.444.) (4). See Martin,
’Saint Augustin’ (Les Grands Philosophes, 2nd.2d.Paris.1923) 
pages,1-5.for St.Augustine's distinction between knowledge 
and Wisdom. (6 ).C.Acad. 3.20.43. (cols.487 8)
(1:4).
not contradict what is set forth in the Sacred Scriptures.
Indeed, Alfaric goes so far as to say,-
/
"Moralement comme intellectuellement c’est au Néoplatonisme qu il 
s’est converti, plutôt qu’a l’Evangile". (I)
These first books of the Contra Academicos,
St Augustine dedicates to his friend and patron, Romanianus.
Hie treatise opens with a debate on the question 
of Truth. It is agreed at the outset, that whilst happiness may 
not consist in the possession of Truth, yet Truth, at any rate, 
should be sought after. Finally after a discussion which occupies 
several days, they conclude that Truth is to be found in the 
Philosophy of Plato, revived by Plotinus. Augustine then proc- 
-eeds to declare that the Wisdom taught by the Schools, that is 
by Meo-Platonism, is not alien with that which the Church procl- 
-aims concerning the Christian Faith. In spite of the fact that 
the Holy Scriptures warn us against the philosophy of this world, 
these do not condemn the highest truths which lead men beyond 
what has been revealed to sense, that is, to intelligible realit-
-ies. In short whilst Augustine trusts that he will find nothing
u
in the teaching of the Platonists which is opposed to the teacing 
of the Holy Religion, yet the latter is presented by the Church 
in a simpler way and one better fitted for the needs of the 
multitude. (2^
Dialectic with its subtle distinctions
could never have the power of delivering the souls of men from
error or cleansing them from earthly stains, if the Almighty God
Foot Notes- (l). Alfaric, op.cit. page, 399. (2).Contra Acad.3. 
20.43. (col.488) "Apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris 
nostris non repugnet reperturum esse confido".
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had not united Hie Intelligence with the human frame, that men
might be taught by example as well as precept to enter again into
themselves and return to their Fatherland. Then Augustine sounds
the Christian note as he declares that the Wisdom which formerly
was the possession of the elite has become in Jesus Christ at the
disposal of the many. (l)
Very probably Augustine had here in his mind the
third tractate of the first book of the Enneads, which deals with
’Dialectic* or ’The Upward way’. We see also a recollection of
the ’Nous’ of Plotinus,; indeed, it may be that we have a parallel
between the words of Augustine here and those of Plotinus. (2)
We may note also a passage where, speaking of
Plato, Augustine says- "He has given thus to Philosophy its last
and definite form. According to the terms of his teaching there
are two worlds, widely separated, the one Intelligible, where
Truth dwells, the other Sensible, made in the image of the formey,
which is manifested to us who feel by sight and touch. The Soul
which knows itself raises itself to the first; that which is
ignorant of itself remains imprisoned in the second. The one
contemplates pure ideas; the other sees them laboriously through
opinions. This one restrains itself by practising the ’Civic’ or
inferior virtues; that other realises the true moral sense set
apart for the few wise." (3)
Augustine here presents also a reference to the |
doctrine of Porphyry’s ’Return of the Soul’ from which he often
Foot Notes- (l). Contra Academicos, 3.XIX.42.XX.43. cp.De Ordine, 
2.5.16, (2).Enneads, V.I.II. (3).Contra Acad.3.17. 37. (col.484]
C- ^  — H* j / . 2 - /"S'/ * / " 2. 2^.-3). { ' 3'Z * ^  ^
(136).
quotes in the tenth book of the De Civitate Dei. (I)
About this time Augustine sends a letter to 
Hermogenianus, in reply to one which he had received from his 
friend who has expressed his pleasure in reading the Contra 
Academicos. It is only needful to quote the final sentence- 
"But whatever be the value of those treatises, what I most rejoice 
in is, not that I have vanquished the Academicians, as you 
express it (using the language rather of friendly partiality than 
of truth), but that I have broken and cast away from me the odious 
bonds by which I was kept back from the nourishing breasts of 
philosophy, through despair of attaining that truth which is the 
food of the soul. " (2)
Immediately after the completion of the first book 
of the 'Contra Academicos', Augustine began his 'De beata Vita*.
In this treatise on the subject of Happiness he not only borrows 
his title but a great deal of his argument from the Enneads. (3) 
Just as he had dedicated his previous book to Romanianus, so he 
addresses this in a preface to his friend Theodoras, and in this 
preface he explains the origin and aim of his new work. (4)
In the following brief outline of Augustine's 
tractate it will be readily seen how deeply indebted he was here 
to Plotinus.
Foot Notes- (l). See Bouillet, op.cit. Vol.I.page LXX, for a
translation of Porphyry’s , Fifth Ennead, Book 2.30. 'On 
the Return of beings to the First*. (2) Epistle, I.(A.D.386.) 
The works of Augustine, Vol.VI.page,3.translated Dods.
(T. & T. Clark; Edinburgh, 1872.) (3).Enneads, 1.4. on
'Happiness', (4).De beata Vita,4.(col.500.)This preface poin- 
-ts clearly to the fact that Augustine, fired by the reading 
of Plotinus, had resigned his professorship that he might dev- 
-ote himself to the study of Philosophy.He however mentions, 
also, here his 'pectoris dolor*. Bee Fuller Notes. *
(137).
Let us grant, says St Augustine, that we all wish for
happiness. Does not happiness, however, imply an absence of
unhappiness? Still whilst we may say that the unfortunate man is
unhappy because of his poverty, it does not follow that all who
are poor are, on that account, unhappy. (I^
For example, the man who is in possession of
Wisdom may stand in need of many things without necessarily
being unhappy, since he has sufficient moral character not to be
afraid of physical privation. He possesses also what he ever
desires. (2^ On the other hand have we never known men
who live in the sunshine of material well-being who yet live a
life of misery, since Wisdom is absent? In a word then, it is
folly which constitutes the real poverty. (3)
Indeed Wisdom should be esteemed the best kind of
wealth since it suggests the thought of fulness. (4)
To put it more correctly. Wisdom is to the Soul
what nourishment is to the body, and in addition Wisdom declares
itself to be greatly superior to all material food. Still, as
with feastings it is needful to shun all excess, so too with the
banquets of the Spirit. Wisdom presupposes frugality, propriety,
the things which Cicero has rightly associated with moderation
and temperance. In effect. Wisdom implies an agreeable manner, a
just temperament; lacking nothing, it has yet nothing too much.
Foot Notes- (l). Plotinus begins his treatise on Happiness by 
asking the same question.Enneads, I.IV.I. see Appendix, 3.
(2).De beata Vit.25.cp.Enneads, I.IV.4. where Plotinus also 
agrees that it is the sage who possesses happiness, (See App- 
-endix, 3.) (3).compare Enneads,!,IV.2. (4). De beata Vit.
31. * Et si egestas est ipsa stultitia plenitudo erit sapie- 
-ntia". see Enneads, I.IV.3.
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for if this were the case it would be wanting in moderation. All
things are held in fitting restraint, since Wisdom avoids all
things that create vanity, such as luxury, pride,ambition; and
also all that hampers us, as meanness, fear, melancholy, or
indeed cupidity. Wisdom is the regulating principle of the Soul.
(I) Whosoever, therefore, is happy has accordingly his own
power of moderation (modus), which is Wisdom. But when we speak
of Wisdom, of what do we think? Surely of the Wisdom of God.
But we have it on the Divine Authority that the Son of God is
nothing else than the Wisdom of God, and that the Son of God is
really God. Whoever then has God is happy. But what do you
estimate wisdom to be, is it not really Truth? For even thus is
it written; *I am the Truth*. But it indeed becomes Truth by
reason of such a high standard from which it proceeds, and through
its own innate perfection , it transforms us. But the Standard
which represents Wisdom cannot be measured by any other thing;
measureless itself, it constitutes the First Principle, from
which all comes. In other words, it is God Himself. Whoever then
through the Truth has arrived at the highest standard (summum
modum), is happy. For such has God in his soul, that is he enjoys
God. (2) But, adds St Augustine, there is^a certain friendly
Adviser who acts with us in order that the very thought of God
Foot Notes- (l). De beata Vit.32,♦Sapientia igitur plenitudo. In 
plenitudine autem modus. Modus igitur animi in sapientia est 
....Ut ne quid nimis*. Compare Enneads, 1.8.2. (See Appendix 
3.) (2). Plotinus establishes a close analogy between the
Supreme Being or the Sovereign Rule and Wisdom. He also makes 
man* s highest well being to consist in the observance of the 
Standard. See Enneads, 1.8.2. (Appendix,3.)
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may be recalled to our minds, that we may seek Him, that, with 
every loath^some thing thrust far from us, we may thirst after 
Him. From that very Fount of Truth He Himself comes to us.
Now that mysterious Agent is only capable of 
producing such effects in us as He is the All Powerful One and 
the Sovereignly Good. Without losing any part of His own life.
He participates in the perfection of the Divine Nature.
Happiness therefore, consists for us, in our 
union with Him, that through Him we may arrive at the Contemplat- 
-ion of Wisdom and by Wisdom at the possession of the Supreme 
from whom all things proceed.
So closely does the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Trinity here 
given by St Augustine, resemble that of the Church, that Monnica 
joyously gives expression to her feelings by breaking forth into 
the Ambrosian hymn to the Trinity,
’Help us as we pray, 0 Trinity!* (I)
Here then we can well see how closely Augustine in these days at
Cassiciacum, followed in the steps of Plotinus.
But passing onward to notice the other books of
this same period, we find that the day after St Augustine had
completed his book on the subject of Happiness, he begins his
first treatise on *De Ordine*, a book which has for its theme the
Foot Notes- (I). This thought of an inward guide or friendly adv- 
-iser is referred to again and again by Augustine.Solil.I.
(ft 2,& 3) It is He who makes us understand,(Solil.1.15, )He 
is identified with Reason, (Solil.I.I.). Is named as being 
by the side of Sovereign Intelligence and of the First-Prin- 
-ciple. (De Ordine,2.26.) A like idea although somewhat diff- 
-erent from that of the Universal Soul,known as superior Rea-
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Divine Providence. He himself gives us an explanation of the 
purpose of this book:- have written two books on "Order*, in 
which the great question is considered, as to whether the Order 
of the Divine Providence is concerned with everything, good and 
bad alike. But when I saw that it was a theme difficult to under- 
-stand and that it lay somewhat beyond the grasp of those with 
whom I was dealing; I chose rather to speak concerning the order 
of applying oneself to learning by what means one can advance 
from things corporeal to things incorporeal”. (I)
We shall find in these books also a strongly 
Neo-Platonic influence. Plotinus had dealt with the subject of 
Providence in the second tractate of the third book of his 
Enneads. From this and from other portions of the writings of 
Plotinus, Augustine has been able to make use of many suggestions.
This new work he dedicates to his friend Zenobius, 
to whom he addresses his second letter, probably about the same 
time. In the first and second chapters of his first book of the 
*De Ordine* St Augustine has given to us a delightful description 
of the character of his friend.
Since we shall be dealing with this book in a later
chapter when we discuss the influence of Neo-Platonism upon St
Augustine’s doctrine of Providence and Optimism, it is unneces-
-sary to give an outline here of the author’s argument. (2)
Foot Notes- (l).Retractationes, I.3.1.(cols.27,28.) (2) See Aopen- 
-dix, 3.for parallel passages. Enneads,1.2.(I-6);I. 3.(1-6 ;;
1.6.(1-2); 1.8.5; 2.3.7; 2.3.18; 3 . 2 . ( 2 , II,I4,I7);3.3.5;
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Immediately St Augustine had finished his De Ordine, he began to 
commit to writing his meditations or ’talks with himself’, to 
which he gives the name ’Soliloquia’, These are in two books, 
and they were written probably in the December of the year which 
preceded his baptism, or at any rate, early in 387.A.D.
In these books we have another side of Augustine's 
nature portrayed; here we have presented to us the outpourings 
of his soul as he cried out after God. As a Candidate preparing 
for Christian baptism he felt it to be needful to cherish and 
foster the life of the Spirit.Possibly he is here carrying out 
in a very practical way the advice so frequently given by Plotin- 
-us, that if a man would enter upon the Upward Way which would 
lead him to be ’alone with the alone’ he must begin his quest by 
entering into himself. (l)
In his very prayers we are able to see here 
that he very evidently thinks of God in terms which Plotinus has 
set before him. In his doctrine of Grace also, he follows the 
conceptions of Neo-Platonism.
In his Soliloquia Augustine moreover has drawn
from the writings of Porphyry; notably from his treatise ’On the
Return of the Soul’, (2) and also from his other work, ’The Phil-
-osophy of the Oracles*. (3^ . In the first book there are
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, V.S.2. and V.1.12. &c.(2).Solil.1.6.12. 
(col.606). Solil.I.X.17.(cols.609,610) compare Retract.I.4.4.
(3). In his invocation (Solil.1.1.(2-6) (Cols.598-602 ) 
Bouillet,(op.cit.Vol.3.page,626.) suggests that possibly 
Augustine had in his mind Porphyry’s invocation to God, in 
book X. of his ’Philoëophy of the Oracles’ See also Alfaric, 
op.cit.432.page, where he draws attention to the analogy.
See also. Bright,’Lessons from the lives of three great Fath-
-ers’ (2nd.Bd.Longmans Green.I89l)Appendix,XI.pp.253-257.
(142).
two references to the 'Platonists*. (I)
Here we bring our study of the Dialogues to a 
close. They have been of special value since here we have 
abundant illustration of how closely Augustine had fellowship 
with Plotinus. (2)
Foot Notes- (l). In Solil. I.IV.9.(Col.604.) Augustine says-
”If the things which Plato and Plotinus have said concerning 
God are true, is it not enough for thee thud to know God, 
since they knew Him”. Again towards the close of Solil.
I.13.23. (Col.^14) he apparently refers to the Platonists 
when he says- ”Tale aliquid sapientiae 8tudiosissimis,nec 
acute, jam tamen videntibus, magistri optimi faciunt”.
(2). For parallel passages see Appendix, 3. under, Enneads, 
I.2.(4,5.); 1.3.6; I.6.N;V.I.11,12.; 7.3.17.
(143).
PULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 5>. (Part ?. )
Page, I%6. FOOT NOTE- (4).
De beata Vita, 4. (Col.500).
"The false charm of women and the attractions of honours, I conf- 
-ess it, held me back from flying quickly to the bosom of Philos- 
-ophy. I wished at first to attain that two-fold object, in order 
that, with full sails set and by the help of oars , I might make 
that harbour and settle down there, a thing which only a very few 
most fottunate ones have been able to achieve. But after having 
read some books of Plotinus, (I) to whom I know you were greatly 
attached, and after having compared them as well as I could with 
the authors who have dedicated themselves to the Holy mysteries,
I was fired with such an ardour that I should have wished to 
break all my chains, if I had not been held back by the fear of 
wounding certain persons."
foot Note- (I), There is another reading, "Lectis autem Platonis 
paucissimis libris", Alfaric however and others prefer 
"Lectis autem Plotini paucissimis libris". see Alfaric, op. 
cit. page, 375.
(144).
CHAPTER,, 3.
THE INFLUENCE OF NEO-PLATONISM ON 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE.
"Saint Augustin a emprunte a Plotin le fond de sa psychologie; 
ces emprunts, dont ce Père indique lui-meme quelques-uns dans 
divers traités, sont faciles à reconnaître,parce qu’ils portent 
sur des théories qui sont propres à notre auteur."
Bouillet, ’Les Ennèades de Plotin’. Vol.2.page,588.
It is of considerable importance for our study of St. Augustine 
that we examine in detail his Psychology, since it lay at the 
heart of all his thinking, and coloured his thought on man, the 
world , and God,
We do not find, however, any systematic outline 
of his Psychological considerations set forth in any one treatise; 
we have to piece together the thoughts which are scattered through 
-out his varied writings, before we can arrive at any true concep- 
-tion of his position.
Like Plotinus Augustin© is an eclectic; gather- 
-ing his material from Plato, and the Neo-Platonists, from the 
Stoics and the Peripatetics; the main source being undoubtedly 
Neo-Platonic. Indeed, it has been remarked that Augustine became 
a Psychologist because of the influence of Neo-Platonism. That, 
however, is scarcely true. Without a doubt it was the study of 
the writings of Plotinus which gave his thoughts a direction and 
helped materially in their development, furnishing him with a 
dialectic, so that he became a master in the art of self-observa-
-tion and self-analysis.
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But in our survey of the life of Augustine we have 
seen that he possessed the psychological temperament; that is,he 
had innate qualities which were of value for psychological study. 
Keen, ardent, responsive to all that went on around him, observ- 
-ant not only of the workings of his own mind but of the minds 
of others, he was deeply interested in all psychological phenorn- 
-ena. Long before he had khowledge of Neo-Platonism he had been 
drawn to Philosophy, and with considerable intensity of feeling 
had given himself to the pursuit of Truth, questioning,probing,
and never contented until he had reached a solution to his prob-
-lems which commended itself to his intelligence,
Would it not then be nearer the truth to say that,
whilst Augustine had always been a psychologist, it was Neo-Plat-
-onism which shaped his Psychology to à definite mould and 
presented him with a system which appeared to him to be depend- 
-able? Whilst we would claim,then,no great originality for his 
system as such, we have no hesitation in declaring that it has 
been largely through Augustine that the science of modern Psychol- 
-ogy has been enriched. And, were it not that such a question 
were alien to our present theme, it would be of considerable 
interest for us to notice in how many ways Augustine has eontrib- 
-uted to modern Psychological knowledge.
But to return- there is an originality associa- 
-ted with Augustine’s system of Psychology; it reveals itself in 
the v/ay in which he applies Psychological data to Christian Truth; 
his Psychology, as we shall see, forms a basis for his Metaphysics.
( 146).
Indeed we might confidently assert , his Philosophy was hut 
the means to/ an end- that of the knowledge of God,
With Augustine there were two kinds of knowledge 
that were of the greatest importance, the knowledge of the Soul 
and the knowledge of God. And because of his hunger after God and 
his eager desire to obtain a fuller conception of the Divine 
Nature, he gave himself so earnestly to the pursuit of Philoso- 
-phy. In the Soliloquies he represents Reason as putting
to him the question- ’YOiat do you wish to know?*, to which he 
makes answer- * I desire to know God and the Soul; nothing more*. 
Again we find him saying, in terse utterance, *Deus semper idem, 
noverim me noverim Te*. (I)
In our outline of Augustine's treatise on Happiness 
we saw that happiness consisted in a knowledge of the Truth, it 
could only be gained by the man who pursued Wisdom, a philosopher 
was a lover of Wisdom and, since Wisdom was God, therefore, a 
Philosopher was a lover of God, Very frequently throughout his 
many writings Augustine dwells upon the question of Truth, For him 
Truth was one, wherever it was to be found; it had sprung from 
the fount of all Truth that is God, So as he seeks Truth he is 
seeking the One who will satisfy his deepest needs and who will 
also reveal the Truth to his enquiring mind.
Now it was from the study of the Enneads that 
Augustine had learned that if a man desired to know God he must 
first of all seek to know himself; that it was not by going with- 
Foot Notes- (I). Solil. 1.2.7.(Col.602.) Solil. 2.I.I.(Col.619).
(147),
-out that God would be found, HE was within. It was a familiar
philosophical counsel, 'Enow thyself. In a familiar passage in
his Oonfessions, Augustine tells us how being admonished to
return to himself, he obeyed and- 'beheld with the eye of my soul
...the Light Unchangeable'. (l) In another chapter coloured
by reminiscences of Plotinus, making clear to us the progress of
his thought, Augustine tells us how the beauty of the world
around him led him to judge clearly as to the unchangeable and
true; so he is led from bodies to Soul, from the faculty of sens-
-ation to one that is within, that is, the 'Inner Sense*, then
upward to the reasoning faculty, and so to the Eternal and
Unchangeable, thus- 'with a flash of one trembling glance it arr-
-ived at THAT WHICH IS'. (2)
When he confined himself to objects of Sense he
lost his way- 'Too late loved I Thee; 0 Thou Beauty of ancient
days, yet ever new; too late I loved Thee! And behold, Thou wert
within, and I abroad, and there I searched for Thee, deformed I,
plunging amid those fair forms which Thou hadst made. Thou wert
with me, but I was not with Thee. Things held me far from Thee,
which, unless they were in Thee were not at all". (3)
So he finds that his own spiritual experience
coincides with what he has found in Neo-Platonism, that in man's
Foot Notes- (I).Confessions, Vii.X.16. The whole passage is perme- 
-ated with the thought of Plotinus who, in giving his direct- 
-ions for self-purification, by which alone can the Soul att- 
-ain unto the vision of the Divine, bids us- 'Withdraw into 
yourself and look\ Enneads, 1.6.9. IV. 3.1. * cLutoù^ y/y 
- fCliv 7 Z .Gonf.VII. 17.23. cp.Enneads,V. 1.2 ;V. 3.2. 
V . 3.G# (3).Confessions, X.27.38.
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very being there shines the light which lighteneth the world, and 
that only as man searches into the recesses of his own Soul can 
he become assured of the Deity which is akin to himself, One who 
is the unchanging Light of Reason, (I) the fountain of Life, (2) 
the supreme Good towards which human nature aspires, and the insp- 
-iration and cause of its upward struggling. So we find August- 
-ine exclaiming,-'By my very soul will I ascend to Him. I will pasi 
beyond the power whereby I am united to my body, and fill its 
whole frame with life*. (3) Thus in the totality of his ov/n 
personality Augustine like Plotinus, sees *a trace of that mystcr- 
-ious Unity*, whence he was derived. (4)
He has now discovered that his reasoning faculty is 
a ray of the unchanging Light; (5) his will has brought him into 
contact with the Being whose Will and Powers are one. (6 ) He 
acknowledges that the One whom the Neo-Platonists have described 
is the*true God*, the author of all things, the source of the 
light of truth, and the bountiful bestowèr of all blessedness".(7 ) 
But it is of considerable importance that we should 
mark this fact- that Augustine,having followed the Neo-Platonic 
direction to enter into himself- made a discovery which became 
not only a starting point for his philosophical knowledge, but was 
also fundamental to all his thinking.
Foot Notes- (I). Conf.VII.X.16. ibid,XIII.20.28. De Util.Credendi, 
XVI./ 34. De Vera Relig.2.21;39.72. and De Morib.Eccles.I.31. 
66. compare- Enneads,1.6.9.IV.8.1, (2).Gonf.3,8.16; 3.6.10,cp. 
Enneads,1.6.6;VI.9.4. (3)Conf.X.7.IX. (4).Conf.1.20.31."cp. 
Enneads,3.8.I0;6.9.I. "Vestigium secretissimae unitatis".(5). I 
Conf.12.15,20."Intellectualis natura,quae contemplation© lum- 
-inis lumen est" cp.Enn.IV.3.17. (6)Conf.7.4.6.(7)De Civ.Dei
VIII.5.
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This was the immediate certainty of Inner Experience. (I )
Hence for St. Augustine "the Soul is the living 
whole of personality, whose life is a unity, and which, by its 
self-consciousness, is certain of its own reality as the surest 
truth". (2 ) St. Augustine was sure at any rate of one thing, 
namely, that he existed; if he could not be sure of that he could 
not be certain of anything.
Now to arrive at that certainty he travels by
many routes. In the Soliloquies, for example, he says- "You wish
to know yourself, do you know that you exist? I know it,..Do
you know that you are thinking? I know it. Therefore it is true
that you think. It is true." Hence follows the conclusion-
"Consequently you know that you ARE, you know that you LIVE, you
know that you•THINK". (3)
Again in another of his earlier books, after
mentioning several Neo-Platonic ideas, Augustine says- "Or if you
do not understand these assertions, or are doubtful whether they
are true, examine at least whether you doubt that you doubt them,
and if it is certain that you doubt them ask whence it is certain
....and think it out in this way; everyone who knows that he
doubts knows something true, namely, that he doubts, and concern
-ing this thing that he knows he is certain that there is someth-
-ing true. Everyone, therefore, who doubts whether truth exists,
Foot Notes- (l).De vera Relig. 39.72.(Col.1246)."Noli foras ire, 
in teipsum redi; / in interior# homine habitat veritas".
(2).Windelband, 'History of Philosophy*(2nd.Ed.I9I0) pages, 
276, et.seq. (3). Solil. 2.I.I.(Col.619).
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has in himself a truth which he cannot doubt". (I)
But Augustine proceeds to show that all kinds of 
consciousness may be included in that state of doubting. A man 
who doubts knows that he exists, that he remembers, for his very 
doubt is related to previous knowledge that he knows and wills. 
Hence, by this process of reasoning, he postulates for man, 
thought, knowledge, and judgment. But more; it is one and the 
same mind that doubts and knows and judges and wills; hence for 
St. Augustine life is a unity. Augustine then, ih his search for 
certainty arrives at the conclusion that since we cannot depend
CCxc.
on tradition, or on the ground of^general opinion of mankind, or 
again upon what we learn from the senses, certainty must be found 
by our entering into the deepest part of our nature. (2)
From this argument, he reasons, that Truth can be 
no stranger to us, and that all the uncertainties of the phenom- 
-enal world can never destroy our certainty of knowledge.
The human spirit has been made for Truth and it 
recognises Truth when it sees it. It is therefore by an intuition 
of the Soul that man arrives at the basis of knowledge; within 
ourselves, with a loftier and more dependable knowledge than the 
senses can ever impart, the most essential conceptions of the 
spirit are to be discerned with remarkable fulness. (3)
Foot Notes- (I).De Vera Relig.39.73. (Col.1246). (2).De Civ.Dei.
XI.26,27. (See fuller notes for quotation) This is a favour- 
-ite argument with Augustine, see also De beata Vita,7.and 
Do Trinitate, X.I4.&C. (3). De Trinitate, 8.6.
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Augustine speaking of our sense of Justice and Wisdom, declares 
also that these are made clear to us by a simple inspection of 
the spirit and by the help of Reason. (I)
After meeting the argument that these concept- 
-ions or ideas in general are bound up with the words which
(u
express them,Nand showing clearly that words only imply ideas, he 
warns us against confusing simple conceptions with ideas. Ideas 
are unchangeable, eternal, universal. Whilst men may differ in 
their opinions, ideas unite them in one indissoluble bond. They 
constitute that common boon which we call knowledge. In the same 
way they existed before the world was and will remain although the 
earth shall be destroyed. Whence then have these eternal Truths 
come but from God Himself? Are they not the Ideas ,heaven sent?(3 ) 
For with God is the highest Good, the most perfect beauty.
Here Augustine in his doctrine of Ideas is 
clearly under the influence of Plotinus. Yet- "their Christian 
character is preserved in Augustine's presentation, by the fact 
that the religious idea of the deity as absolute personality is 
fused with the philosophical conception of the Deity as the sum & 
essence of all Truth". (4)
Foot Notes- (I). Epistle CXX.2.(see fuller notes) (2).De Magistro; 
I,IX.27."Knowledge includes four elements; the word, the 
reality, the idea of the word, and the idea of the reality". 
See also- De Magistro,1.2.3.(Col.890) I.XI.38.(Col.916)
De Catechizandis rudibus, 2.3. (3)."Principales formae vel 
rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae in divino 
intellectu continentur."De Diversis Quaest.83.46. see Conf.XI, 
7.9. and cp.Enneads,IV.4.16.Porphyry (Vit.Plot.I8.)tells us 
that Plotinus was the first to show the identity of Ideas with 
the Divine Intelligence. Bouillet, (Vol.I,p.35I.)asserts that 
Augustine has taken his doctrine of Ideas wholly from Plotinus 
(4J.windeiband, op.cit.page, 279.
(152).
Now it is by the,contemplation of these ideas that the human
intelligence is illumined, (l) and this illumination can be shated
by all men. (2). But in order to perceive that illumination and
to be made partakers in the Divine Ideas, it is needful that the
Soul should undergo an education, and train herself for that
wiâdom which will enable it to perceive the highest Truth. (3)
But now let us carefully examine what Augustine
has to say on the subject of the Soul; he has dwelt at consider-
-able length in many of his treatises with this question. (4)
St. Augustine defines the Soul in very much the
same way as Plotinus, who borrows his definition from Plato.
"It seems to me", says Augustine, "that the Soul is a certain
substance, a sharer of reason, fitted to govern the body".(5)
For Augustine as for Plotinus the Soul was
the centre of his Psychology. (6) The Soul is joined with the
world above and at the same time is united with the phenomenal
world below; so that it is in communication with the world of
Spirit and in touch with the realm of sense. From its upward part,
and by means of its higher nature it receives the Divine Ideas
and, stooping, it imparts these ideas to men. It has to do with
Foot Notes- (l).De Magistro, 12,40.compare with Enneads, IV.4.5.
(2)De Lib.Arb.2.33,& Enneads,I.I,8.see Appendix,3. (3) Solil,
1.13. (Cols.606,7, ) Augustine continually refers to this doc- 
-trine of Ideas. Conf.XI.VII,9.De Diver,Quaest.83,46. De Civ. 
Dei, XI.X.cp,Enneads, 2 .9,I,Epistle,XIV.De Vera Relig,XXX.56.(Col 
1236, ibid.XXXI.57.(Col.1237). See also Enneads,IV.4,16.V.8.7.
V,2.1.-3.2.4.- 3.2.13. (4).De Quantitate Animae,De Immortalitate 
Animae, De Anima et ejus in his Eps.and elsewhere, (5).De
Quant.Animae, XIII.22.(Col,693)."Nam mihi videtur esse substantia 
quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata,"compare 
with Enneads, VI.7,5. (6).Enneads, 4.4.23- 4.6.3,- 4.8.7,
(153).
Memory and Imagination, and unifies the differing parts of the 
body. We all know that there is within us life or Soul. Consc- 
-iousness assures us that we live, remember, purpose wish. Such 
consciousness is corroborated by what we see in other beings and 
by what we perceive also in the animal world. These movements 
belong to Soul; for although it is Simple in its essence, the 
Soul is yet manifold in its operations. (I), Whilst the Soul is 
present with the body it is not within it; for it remains pure of 
all mixture and ever remains itself; (2) it is dynamically omni- 
-present throughout the body and capable of feeling and action, 
as a whole, at every point. It is present *Vi et potentia* and 
'tota singulis partibus*. (3) Thus the Soul is at one and the same 
time indivisible and yet divisible; here Augustine makes use of 
the illustration of an earthworm which, whilst it may be cut up 
into several sections, yet continues to live, thereby showing 
that it cannot be deprived of the principle of life that is of 
Soul. (4) In all this reasoning Augustine closely follows Plot- 
-inus.
But, although the Soul is associated with the 
body, one must not think of it as being in any sense corporeal.
It differs entirely in its essence from the body. We cannot, for
Foot Notes- (I). De Trinitate, 3,2. also ibid,10,XI.d XX,3
(2). De Immort. Animae, XV.24,compare Enneads, IV.7.9.
(3). De Quant. Animae, XXX.61,(Cols.720,I.) compare Enneads, 
IV.3.20. (4). De Quant.Animae,XXXIX.67. (Col.724.) compare
Enneads, IV.3.8, Also De Quant.Animae,XXXII.68,(Col.725) 
compare with Enneads, IV.2,(1.2.)
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instance,speak of the magnitude of the Soul in the sense of its 
length or breadth or depth. It is not an extended thing. It is 
only by metaphor or simile that we can use the term*great * in 
respect to the Soul, (I)
The Soul can neither grow nor diminish 
with the body; (2) changes in the Soul are certainly spoken of, 
but what Augustine implies is this- there is no spatial or mater- 
-ial increase in the form of the Soul. (3) He makes use of the 
same argument as Plotinus in order that he may show that the 
Soul is not an extended thing, as he puts the question to Evodius-
"How is it that the Soul which is in a so much lesser place than
the body is yet able to contain within itself images of such iarge 
proportions as we find in Memory?” (4) And he answers that 
question by recalling the fact that great images may be reflected 
in a tiny mirror, such a mirror as we see, indeed, in the pupil 
of the human eye, Augustine also frequently makes use of the ill- 
-ustration which he borrows from Plotinus, in instituting a compar- 
-ison between the Soul and a central dot within a circle- a point 
from which radii proceed in all directions to the circumference.(6)
The Soul, then, which feels in each part of |
!
the body as if it were entirely included in it, is present entire- |
-ly there and yet cannot be regarded in any way as body, Augustine!
says- "The Soul does not in consequence occupy wholly the body as
water which fills a leather bottle or a sponge. But it is in a
Foot Notes- (I).De Quant,Animae,XVII.30.(Col,ô98.) compare Enneads, 
3,6,1, 17,2.I,"Soul has not the unity of an extended thing". 
See Appendix,3. (2 ).De Quant.Animae, XIX.33,(Col.70I)."Recte 
dicitur anima discendo quasi crescere,et contra minui dedisc- 
-endo, sed translate verbo,.."compare Enneads, IV,7.5.
(3).De Quant.Animae, V.9, (4) & (5) FOOT OF NEXT PAGE.
(155).
marvellous manner as an animation wholly incorporeal mingling 
with the body for the purpose of imbuing it with life and comman-
-ding the body by a dictatorship which it enforces on it, and
not by the weight of a bulk beneath which it is compelled to 
yield". (l)
The Soul is entirely present in the whole body, 
as can be shown by the sympathy which unites the organs. For the 
whole feels the suffering of each part of the body, even though 
that suffering is not in the whole body. For where there is pain 
in the foot, the eye turns to it, the tongue speaks of it, the 
hand moves. Now this would not take place unless something of 
the Soul which feels in the feet were also in these parts, for if
it were absent it could not feel what happened there. (2 )
Augustine has much to say on the Impassibility 
of the Soul. No changes, he tells us, which may come to the Soul 
either through the passions of the body or through desire, joy, 
fear, sadness, or the like, can ever make the Soul not a Soul; 
none of these things bring death to the Soul. (3)
He proceeds to argue that when the Soul is unit-
-ed with Reason or Wisdom it must become Divine, and therefore
immortal; otherwise the living Soul could not be a Soul,nor could
Foot Notes from PREVIOUS PAGE- (4).& (5).De Quant.Animae,V.9.
De Quant Animae; X.10-21, compare Enneads IV.7.6;IV.2.1;V.8.9. 
see also Augustine’s work- 'Concerningthe Soul and its origin*, 
a treatise written by him to refute Vicentius Victor who maint- 
-ained , as the Stoics did that the Soul is a body. De Anima et 
ejus origine, IV.27. (I).De Genesi ad Lit,8.2i.cf.
10.2 6. also Cont.Ep.Manich.XVI.20, (2),De Immort.Animae,16.2 5. 
(Col.666) cp.Enneads,IV.2.1-;IV.2.2. De Orig animae,II.4.& Enneads,
IV.7.7. (3).De Immort.Animae,V.(7,8,9.)also Porphyry's ’Principles 
of the Theory of Intelligibles*, Enneads,3,6.(6.7) also De Immor, 
Animae, V.8. compare Emmndds,III.6.9.
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reason possess life or immortality. (I)
Augustine identifies the Soul with life, and
reasons that the Soul cannot die since it contains within itself
the very principle of life. It would seem that he had either
obtained that thought from Plato himself (Phaedrus,c.54,55.) or
from Plotinus. (2) He also reproduces and develop^s the ideas
of Plotinus on the difference which exists between the two Souls,
and on the subordination of the irrational Soul to the rational.
He seeks to make clear that the Soul of the wise man, purified by
the virtues and clinging to God, is worthy of the name of Sage; &
that for the most part the lower conditions and clothing of the
body, with which that man once panted after the world, are now in
subjection to the Soul. The Rational Soul is fixed on God; the
lower Soul clings to the things that are below. The Sage who
possesses this Rational Soul sees everything in God; spirits also
share in the life of God in the measure in which they attain unto
the knowledge of God. (3)
It is by means of its superior part, that is by
Reason and Intelligence, that the Soul contemplates things
intelligible and Augustine explains how the Divine Being communic-
-ates to each Soul according to its individual capacity.(4)
Foot Notes- (l)De Imraort.Animae,V.9,(Gol,655)cp.Enneads,IV,7.10.
see also, De Trin.X.10,cp,Enneads IV,7.8. Further, De Immort. 
Animae,VIII.14.(Cols.658,9) cp.Enneads, IV.7.3. Also De Anima 
et ejus orig.IV,14.cp,Enneads,IV.7.8. (2) De Immort.Animae,
IX.16. cp.Enneads, IV,7.II.De Quant Animae,XVII.29,cp,Enneads 
IV,7.8. (3).De Anima et ejus orig.IV.14.cp.Enneads,IV.7.8,
See also De Ordine, 2.(4-7.)cp.Enneads, 1.2.(1-6);I.8.4,&c.
(4).De Magistro, XII.40.cp.Enneads, IV.4.5. De Trinit.XI.cp. 
Enneads, IV.6.2. Also Ep.I87.6. cp.Enneads, III.8,6.
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Let us now see what Augustine has to say on the subject 
of Sensation.
Plotinus^before him^held that "we must not regard 
Sensation as a passive impression made by external objects on the 
perceiving faculty. It is an activity; (I) a kind of force. (2)
Is not the eye which sees, but the active power of the Soul.(3 ) 
’External sensation,* he says, impresses forms on the ’animal 
nature*, and these forms which are spiritual things can be percei- 
-ved by the Soul. Sensation is a reception of Form, for the nature 
of Form must be an activity, which creates by being present.(4 )
The difference between sensations and spiritual perceptions is one 
of degree; sensations are dim spiritual perceptions, spiritual 
perceptions are clear sensations".(5)
Here Dr. Inge has stated the case very clearly and 
now we shall be able to see how Augustine receives help,in this 
direction,from Plotinus.
In the Confessions, (6 ) Augustine descr-
-ibes the relationship which exists between Soul and body and the
dominating power of the Soul. As he deals with the different
degrees of the Soul life, he begins with ’that power of the soul
whereby I vitalise my body*. This power he says, elsewhere, (7)
"unifies the body, resists disintegration, regulates the distribut-
-ion of nutriment within the body, and presides over growth and
generation". Then he speaks of ’the power by which I endow the
Foot Notes- (I). See Inge, op.cit* Plotinus * Vol.I.page 222.for the 
quotation. Reference here to Enneads, 3.6,1; (2)Enns.4.6.3.
(3). I.I.7.(4 ).I.1.2. (5)6.7.7. (6 )Confessions, X.7.XI.
(7). De Quant Animae, XXXIII.70.(Col.726).
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body with sense-perception*, for whilst the body receives the 
sense preception it is the Soul that interprets it. Again in 
the same treatise he defines sensation as a "passion of the body 
which does not escape the notice of the Soul" (I)
Augustine then agrees with Plotinus in speaking 
of Sensation as an active and not a passive thing. In several 
passages he brings this out very clearly and closely follows 
Plotinus as he speaks of the way in which the eye has power of 
vision. (2)
It is of interest further to see how Augustine 
has also taken from Plotinus the conception of what he calls 
’the inner Senae’ . This "Interior Sense" presides over the 
other senses; (3) it is to this sense that the others make their 
report. (4)
Augustine seems at times to regard this Inner Sense
in the light of Conscience; or perhaps it might be truer to say-
a sort of consciousness of feeling towards things below and at
the same time a^response towards things which are intimately
connected with the Moral Life. (5) In reality, of course, the
sense Idea or Se&sation does not belong to the body but to the
Soul, through the mediation of the body. For the Soul is superior
Foot Notes- (l). De Quant.Animae, XXX.58.(Col.719). (2). See Mont- 
-gomery, op.cit.page, 109, et seq. De Musica,VI.V.10.(COL,853 
De Trin.XI.2. XI.I.cp.Enneads, IV.6,I. Also De Quant.Animae, 
XXIII.(43,44).Cols 708,9.cp.Enneads, IV.6.I; IV.5.4. see 
also De Gen ad Litt.I.3t. (3).Conf.1.20.31.* I guarded by the 
inward sense the entireness of my senses*.Siebeck (quoted by 
Gibb & Montgomery, op.cit.page 23.) maintains that Augustine 
goes beyond his predecessors in the clearness with which he 
attributes to this sense, not merely the correlation of div- 
-erse sensations, but the consciousness of the self as an obj 
-ect of sensation. (4).Conf .VII,17.23.see Enneads,V.3.2;
V.3.3. Also De Lib Arb.2 .4\io,cp.Enneads,I.I.7 ;TV.3.23
(5).De Civ.Dei.XI.g7.
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to the body and that which is superior cannot be modified by jthat 
which is inferior. Augustine marks the differing degrees of 
perception. He tells us that Perception may be distinguished as 
being Corporeal, Spiritual, Intellectual.; he speaks also of a 
twofold rapture of the Soul.I)Purther, in several of his writ- 
-ings, he makes comparison between Sense Intuition and Intellect- 
-ual Intuition, these, although they may be regarded as being 
similar, may still be distinguished.
Before we leave this subject of Sensation, a
word should be added concerning Pleasure and Pain.It is not the
body but the Soul which experiences pleasure and pain, says
Augustine; (3) pleasure and pain are born of the union of the
soul and the body. The body is the occasion of these but not the
cause.’Feeling does not belong then to the body but to the Soul,
through the medium of the body’ (4)
Augustine explains the origin of pleasure
and pain in the same way as does Plotinus. (5) The passions are
connected with the imagination and are the result of concupisc-
-ence. (6 ) Dr Inge remarks- "Plotinus is right in saying...
that pleasure and pain are not pure sensations, since they are
states of consciousness; and, on the other hand, that they are
not affections ( îio<ô^  ) of the Soul. What is characteristic of
Foot Notes- (I). De Genes.ad Litt.XII.26. (see fuller notes) (2 ). 
De Trinitate, XI,I, "Potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum.
Is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni men- 
-tis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior" cp.Enneads,IV.6.1 
De Trinitate, XI.9.16. XII.15.24. and Eimeads IV.6.3. (3)
De Civ.Dei,XIV.15.&4).De Genes, ad Litt.XII.20. See also Inge 
’Plotinus’, Vol. I.page 225. (5).De Musica, VI.5-9. cp.Enneads 
IV.4.(18-21) also III.6.4;I.8.I2. (6).De Musica, VI.XI.32. 
cp.Enneads, III.6.5. also De Musica, VI.5,13,14, and Enneads 
III.6.5. last clause.
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pleasure and pain is that they "tell us nothing beyond themselves, 
have no meaning, and suggest no object or idea*. And when they are 
over, they are as if they had never been. ...This isolation and 
ephemeral character of pleasure and pain stamp them as being very 
slightly connected with the real or/ spiritual world....The Soul 
can therefore to a large extent conquer them by living upon its 
own highest level. It will then continue to be conscious of them, 
but not as states of itself," (I)
We come now to the discussion of Memory. Here 
St. Augustine has displayed in a remarkable manner, his gifts as 
a Psychologist. Nourrisson says- "Or,on peut affirmer qu’il ne se 
rencontre point dans toutes les oeuvres de saint Augustin, de 
théorie philosophique qu’il plus approfondie que la théorie de 
la mémoire." (2)
It will again be seen that here again August- 
-ine follows Plotinus very closelÿ as this philosopher deals 
with Memory, especially in the third book of the fourth Ennead.
Augustine has dealt very fully with this 
them^in his classical passage in the Confessions, ( 3 )  and has 
also referred to Memory in his Seventh letter to Nebridius, as 
well as made mention of it in many other treatises, hence, it is 
impossible for us in this chapter to give anything like an adequ- 
-ate survey of his Psychology of Memory.
Augustine and Plotinus both regard Memory as 
being closely connected with Imagination. Memory does not
Foot Notes- (I). Inge, ’Plotinus’, op.cit.Vol.I.pp.225,6.
(2). Nourrisson, ’La Philosophie fie Saint Augustin’,op.cit, 
Vol.I.page 133. (3).Confessions, X.VIII.I2-XX7I.37.
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depend on the sense organs. (I)
In the Confessions, Augustine says- "I come to the 
fields and spacious palaces of my memory, where are the treasures 
of innumerable images, brought into it from things of all sorts 
perceived by the senses. There is stored up whatsoever besides 
we think..." (Ji) There are, he tells us two kinds of memory, 
the Sensible Memory and the Intellectual; the one is derived from 
sense impressions, the other from scientific knowledge of numbers, 
and of intellectual operations. More, the Intellectual Memory 
recalls to us our passions and the states of the spirit. Memory 
whilst closely associated with the imagination, may yet be 
exercised independently of such images. (3) Memory is an essent- 
-ially active state. (4). We may notice that in the passage 
from the Confessions to which we have just referred, (8)
Augustine speaks of Memory and the Will as being associated, as 
also does Plotinus. (5) Augustine says- "For even while I dwell 
in darkness and silence, in my memory I can produce colours if I 
will, and discern betwixt black and white and what others I will 
....For these too I call for, and forthwith they appear".
Sometimes we find Augustine making use of the
term memory to mean, not only the storehouse of ideas or images,
but also potential thought. In a passage from the De Trinitate,
(6) he first of all uses memory in the ordinary sense , saying,
that when we have thought out a truth we hand it over to memory
Foot Notes- (I).(toWtfW«. De Musica,1.8.cp.Enneads,IV.3.26. (2 ) 
Confess.X.VIII.12.cp.Enneads, IV.3.29.(3).Nebridius Ep.7. 
also De Ordine, 2.2.cp, Enneads IV.3.32. {4)Cp.De Trin.XI.8. 
15. with Enneads, IV.6.3. (5) Enneads, IV.6.3. (6) De Trin. 
XV.40.
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to keep, and then he adds- "But there is a deeper depth of our
memory, (abstrusior profunditas nostrae memoriae), in which we
found that truth, when we began to think about it", Montgomery
likens this to the modern conception of the subconscious mind,(I)
We may notein closing this brief resume of what
Augustine has to say on Memory that like Plotinus, he makes
use of the word phantasia to denote a simple memory image, and 
employs
the term phantasmata for imaginary coiistructions, (g J 
Again we find Augustine and Plotinus saying 
that Memory only concerns itself with things that pass away, that 
is, memory is concerned with something that the Soul has Experien- 
-ced; it is therefore associated with time, From that it is 
argued that the Sage has no need of Memory, since, by contemplat- 
-ing always the Divine Intelligence, he has ever before him all 
the things which he contemplates, (3)
When we come to the consideration of 'Reason*, 
we find that Augustine makes the same distinction as do the 
Neo-Platonists, between Discursive Reasoning and Intuitive Reason- 
-ing or Intelligence, The Discursive Reason he speaks of as the 
*ratiocinandi potestas* or 'ratiocinatio*• He describes it thus:- 
"Reasoning is a searching for reason, that is, it is a faculty by 
means of which things are perceived by sensation. Wherefore that 
operation is for purposes of enguiry...by it the mind searches, 
but by the intuitive reason it sees", (4),
Foot Motes- (I),Montgomery, op,cit,page (?)De llusica, VI.
3P, (Col.867), cp.Snneade, 111,6.(5,6.) (3),Da diversis.
Quaest.17. cp.Enneads IV.3.^5. (4) Da Quant,Anÿme;%%VII.
53. (Cols.715,6) compare Enneads, 3#P; 7,3.3.
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If we may quote Mr Montgomery here, we find him saying that"The 
discursive reason compares and judges, but the principles by 
which it judges are supplied by the intuitive reason. The laws 
of thought, the laws of mathematical truth, as well as the sense 
of justice, and the sense of harmony which makes us admire beauty 
in art and nature, are all thought of as data supplied by
the intuitive reason. Augustine tells us, for example, that when 
in the course of his search for God he was impressed by the order 
and beauty of nature, he found himself judging of these things by 
an immutable law. He felt that this could not have come from his 
own mutable discursive reason (*ratiocinans potestas*and so 
was led up to the higher intelligence, which he found to be direc- 
-tly illuminated by the Divine light". (I)
Here we have a reference to the innate *Idea* which had 
been implanted within him by God Himself.
But how does this knowledge arise? In his earlier
writings we find Augustine adopting the old Platonic conception
of Reminiscence, he explains that such truths must have been
implanted in the mind in some earlier stage of existence, but
later he replaces that thought by one which he had received from
the Neo-Platonists. For example he says, "We ought rather to
believe that the nature of the rational mind is so constituted
that being, in the natural order of things, by the disposition of
the Creator, in touch with the things of the intelligible world,
it sees them by a certain incorporeal light of a unique character,
as the eye of the flesh sees by the corporeal light the things by
Foot Notes- (I).Montgomery, 'St.Augustine aspects of his life & 
thought*, page,126 and following.
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which it is surrounded." (I)
With regard to Augustine*© line of argument cono- 
-erning the question of the Immortality of the Soul, it is not 
necessary to enter into details; it will be sufficient to briefly 
state his line of thought .
No changes, he tells us, which take place either
through the body, or by means of the Soul itself, can make a
Soul not a Soul, (2) for none of these changes can bring death
to the Soul. (3 ) Since the Soul is united with Wisdom it must
partake of the Divine nature and therefore be Immortal. (4)
Further, the Soul cannot die because it contains within itself
the principle of life; it would seem that Augustine here had
either obtained this thought directly from Plato himself, or
through the medium of Plotinus.(5)
We may remark that in his treatment of this subject,
Augustine does little more than reproduce the thesis which Plot-
-inus had already outlined in his seventh book of the Fourth
Ennead, which has for its title * The Immortality of the Soul*.(6)
A word must be said, ere this chapter is brought
to a close, on St. Augustines*s doctrine on the Soul*s Return, &
concerning its purification. Here we may note the influence of
Foot Notas- (l)De Trinitate, XII.24. compare Enneads, 17.6.3.
Ck) The Soul contemplates things intelligible by its superior 
part, De Magistro, XII.40.cp.Enneads, 17.4.5.De Trinitate,
XI.I. & Epistle,137 cp. Enneads, 17.6.2. (2).De Immort.Animae,
7.7.(Col.654) cp.Porphyry*s 'Principles of^the Theory of Int- 
-elligibles*Bk.6.(6,7.) & Enneads, I.S.IOvDe Iramort.7.8.cp. 
Enneads, III.6.9. (4).De Immort.Animae,I,I.- XI.IBSolil,2. 
XVIII.32,33.De Immort.Animae, 7.9. cp.Enneads,17.7.ID.
St Augustine in De Iramortal.Animae,7III.14.(cols.658,9. )has 
reproduced the heart of the argument contained in Enneads,17. 
7.3.(5)In Enneads,17.7.II Plotinus makes use of a passage from 
Plato's Phaedrus, (c.54,55) comp.De Imm.Animae,IX.16.&I7.7 II, 
For (6) See foot-notes following page.
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Porphyry; Augustine frequently quotes from his book on-'The Return 
of the Soul', Augustine has also developed, in a very full way 
the Neo-Platonic ideas of the purification of the Soul,
There are, according to St Augustine, for the Soul 
three lives which surpass its ordinary state of existence. These 
are the life of Purification, that of Illumination, and,lastly, 
the life of pure Love which follows from the Soul's union with 
the Divine being.
Above all else the Soul must purify itself.
"Every reasonable Soul is not able to enjoy the vision of God,but
only that which shall have become pure and holy; that is to say,
that which shall have obtained the vision by means of which the
things of God can be perceived. Such a vision must be healthy,
serene, sincere, and responsive to the things which it compells
itself to contemplate". (I) What then will the Soul learn by
such a vision? "As long as it clings to God by means of its
love for Him it becomes illumined, and, as it were, inundated by
that intelligible light which enables it to perceive, not by the
eyes of the body but by the essential vision which becomes it,
(that is to say by its intelligence), those principles which will
make it happy." (2) Now what are the stains from which the Soul
must needs be cleansed? "The filth of the Soul, in brief, is the
Foot Notes- (fi) FROM PREVIOUS PAGE- Douillet says- speaking of St 
Augustine- "The tractate which this Father has composed ’On 
the Immortality of the Soul*, is almost entirely taken from 
Plotinus".Vol.2.page,607.op.cit.
Present Page-Foot Notes.-(l)De diversis Ouaestionibus,83,46. 
See Nourrisson page,242, Vol.I. (2). ibid.
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the love of any things whatsoever, save God and the soul; from 
which filth the more any one is cleansed, the more easily he sees 
the truth", (I). Again Augustine tells us- "God can only be 
contemplated by the Spirit. How does such a contemplation take 
place? We can make it clear to ourselves by considering the ord- 
-inary laws of vision. In the first place, the eyes themselves 
must be healthy, then, we must look with attention, so that we 
may acquire the power of attention. Now the soul is of the nature 
of the healthy eye when it is purified from bodily defilement, 
that is, when it is separated and purged from the lust of perish- 
-able thingsA. (2) And Augustine informs us that- 'The fac-
-ulty of sight for the Soul is Reason'. (3)
It is not, however, by any sudden leap, but 
only by degrees , that the Soul, having cleansed itself, is 
raised to the life of Illumination, and, after that, to the life 
of Love. St. Augustine explains it thus- "It is gradually, not 
by any sudden leap of faith, but rather by a tested knowledge, 
(certa rations) that the soul arrives at the realm of the most 
excellent life. As it diligently pays attention to the power and 
strength of harmony, it will appear to itself too unworthy , and 
consider itself too wretched as it tries by means of its own 
knowledge, to arrange harmoniously a verse and to produce melodies 
upon its lyre, whilst its very Life, which is the Soul, follows 
a devious way and dominated by passion, makes discord by reason 
of the most hideous noised caused by its own vices. But when it
Foot Notes- (I).Be Utilitate Credendi, XVI.34. (2)Solil.I.VI.12.
(Col.606) (3).Solil.I.VI.I3,"Aspectus animae ratio est".
compare Enneads, 1.2.(4.5.)
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shall have composed itself and set itself in order, and has made 
itself harmonious and beautiful, it will give its attention to 
and behold God who is the fountain from whom all truth flows 
and is Himself the Father of Truth". (I)
In his description of the way in which the Soul 
makes its return to God, Augustine tells us that there are seven 
ascents or degrees. Proceeding from the simple life of animation, 
the vegetative life (animatio), the life which man shares along 
with the animals, we come to the second stage , which is the 
Sensitive life (sensus), when the soul makes use of the senses; 
this also is held by man in common with the animals. The third 
degree marks that which specially belongs to mankind. It is the 
life of Reason, (ars) or knowledge; thought in all its varying 
manifestations, T^hen, however, the soul reaches the fourth degree 
it has arrived at a true conception of its dignity and worthiness. 
Then, does the soul venture to prefer itself not only to all other 
bodies in the Universe, but also to its own body. Augustine calls 
this the life of Virtue (virtus),
% e n  the soul has reached the fifth degree it 
is in possession of a purity for which the previous degree has 
been preparing it. Augustine speaks here of the soul enjoying a 
passivity (tranquilitas), which follows as the result of purifie- 
-ation. On reaching the sixth degree the soul has gained the 
Foot Note- (I).De Ordine, 8.XIX.50,51. (Cols.583,4)
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desire to listen to vfhat is supremely true; it here turns towards 
the Divine Intelligence, Such a stage is called Ingressio.
Lastly, on arriving at the seventh stage, the 
soul attains a vision of truth, or rather we perhaps should say, 
it has reached the moment of Contemplation (contemplatio vel 
mansio), by means of which the soul through the vision ineffable, 
raises itself even beyond the realm of thought itself and 
arrives at THAT WHICH IS. (I)
We now bring this chapter to a close and must 
have arrived at the very evident conclusion,after having been 
able to mark the many similarities which exist between the 
thought of St. Augustine and Plotinus , that there in respect to 
the Psychology, we have abundant testimony of the influence of 
Neo-Platonism upon the thought of St.Augustine.
Foot Note- (l). We may compare what Augustine has said concerning 
the stages or degrees of the soul with what Plotinus has set 
forth in his tractate on Beauty, Enneads, I.VI.(1-9) It is 
readily to be seen that Augustine, as he describes the Soul's 
ascent has Plotinus in his mind.See De Vera Religions, III,3, 
(Col.1208) and De Quant.Animae,XXXV.79.(Col.733) where he 
minutely describes the seven stages. In De Quant Animae, 
XXXIII.70.(Col.726) where he speaks of the 1st degree of the 
soul, see also Enneads, IV.4,18. In De Quant.Animae,XXXIII,71 
(Cols.j^K^J^ 726,7). here he speaks of the 2nd.degree, cp, 
Enneads, IV.4.20. Augustine expresses himself on the subject 
of the Purifying virtues in De Quant Animae, XXXIII,73,74,75. 
All the ideas which Augustine developes in these sections are 
taken from Enneads, 1.2.(4.5) We may remark further, that 
Augustine has in De Musica, VI.5.(13.14) (Cols.Z##,854,5) 
reproduced the whole theory of the purifying and intellect- 
-ual virtues, such as are to be found in the works of Plotin- 
-us and Porphyry. See Porphyry's 'Principles of the Theory 
of Intelligibles' Bouillet, Vol.2.Page 138.
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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER 3. (Part 2 ,)
Page 150, Foot Note, 2^
De Civitate Dei, XI.26."For we both are, and know that we are, and 
delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these 
three things no true-seeming illusioh disturbs us;for we do not 
come into contact with these by some bodily sense,...nor as we 
perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us 
to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation 
of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I 
know and delight in this....For if I am deceived, I am. For he 
who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this 
same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I decei- 
-ved in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am 
deceived."
Page, 151, Foot Note, I.
Epistle,120,2."Whence comes our sense of justice and wisdom and 
all that resembles such things? Not by imagination, nor by any 
other intuition. It is by a simple inspection of the spirit and 
by the steady regard of reason that we contemplate these invisible 
objects. For they have no form nor are they included in any corp- 
-oreal mass, they present no lines nor figures, they are neither 
contained within the bounds of space nor in infinitely extended 
space".
Page, 151, Foot Note 3,
Augustine tells us that it is by the reasonable Soul that man has 
power to contemplate these ideas, (De Diversis quaestionibus,83. 
46.) as well as by a certain living intuition that the soul can 
raise itself to the Divine Truth.
See, Cornford, 'From Religion to Philosophy' (Arnold, I9I2) 
pages 242-2 50. for a very illuminating section on 
the rise of Ideas,
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CHAPTER 4.
THE DOCTRINE OF GOD ACCORDING TO ST AUGUSTINE
AND AS SET FORTH IN THE ENNEADS.
Augustine never seems to have had any doubt in 
his mind concerning the existence of God. His early training, 
the piety of his mother, his attendances at religious services, 
all these led him to take the existence of God for granted.
Speaking of his life as a boy and his belief in 
prayer at that time, he says- "We found that men called upon Thee, 
and Vire learnt from them to think of Thee (according to our powers) 
as of some great One, vrho though hidden from our senses, couldest 
hear and help us." (I)
In some form or other the thought of God never 
left him, and, as we have seen, in his study of Philosophy he was 
dissatisfied when he found that 'the name of Christ was not in it*
(2) The promptings of paasion, the subtleties of
philosophical reasoning, his own doubts and fears, none of these 
things could shake his faith in the being of God.
He tells us, writing of a time immediately 
before his discovery of the books of the Neo-Platonists,- "But 
Thou sufferedst me not by any fluctuations of thought to be 
carried away from the Faith vrhereby I believed Thee both to be, 
and Thy substance to be unchangeable". (3)
Foot Notes- (I).Confessions, I.IX.14. (2).ibid,3.4.8. (3) ib,7.7.X3 
see also Confessions, 71.5.(7.8.)
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If, then, Augustine clung to a belief in the
existence of God, what was his conception of Deity?
For a long time, he tells us, he thought of God as
a Corporeal Substance, a being of length and breadth and bulk.(I)
He imagined God to be he says- * a vast and bright body, and I a
fragment of that body*. His spirit was then, as we see, involved
in the grossest form of pantheism. Tlie pure conception of God had
become obscured by sense emotion; he had been led away by the
teaching of the Manichaeists, and his difficulty in solving the
problem concerning the existence of evil. His pantheism resolves
itself into a dualism, since God could not be considered as the
creator of evil.
But we find Augustine unable to be contented with
these monstrous suggestions, and his first step vfas to renounce
his thoughts of God as a being in the likeness of a human body. (2)
He now is constrained to conceive of God as being diffused
throughout space- * as vast, through infinite spaces, on every side
penetrating the whole mass of the universe, and beyond it, every
way, through unmeasurable, boundless spaces.** (3)
Then he describes to us how that light came to him
from Neo-Platonism. After reading the books of the *Platonists*
he saw God as infinite, saw all things owed their existence to God,
and that, because of the over-ruling of the Divine, all things
harmonised in time and space. (4) It was the hour of his awakening
Foot Notes-(l).Conf.3.7.I2. also 4.16.31. (2)ibid,VII.I.I.(3) ibid 
VII.I.2. and VII.5.7. (4). ibid. VII.15.21.
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for Augustine now realized the Spirituality of God.
It was, then, through Neo-Platonism that Augustine 
was first convinced of the Spirituality of the Divine Being.
Now there is, of course, a great difference between the Absolute 
of Plotinus and the God of the Christian Faith. We shall see the 
manifest distinctions in our next chapter when we come to deal 
with the doctrine of the Trinity. But for all that there was 
much in common between the spirit of Plotinus and that of August- 
-ine. Both were devout seekers after the Truth, both were eager 
to probe to the heart of the deepest mystery of the inner life. 
Just as the idea of God coloured the whole of Augustine's thought, 
so we find that with Plotinus the One, the Good, the First Prin- 
-ciple was never absent from his mind; and both authors have 
given to us very clear conceptions concerning their belief in the
One who was for both of them the exalted head of the Universe.
For Plotinus as for Augustine there was no need to argue or to 
debate upon the question of the existence of God.
But it is one thing to be sure on this point and
a very different thing to be able to clearly express the nature
of God in well-defined terms.
How can it be possible for finite man to desc- 
-ribe the Infinite God? He surpasses all thought and He transcends
all speech. If a man were able to define God , then. He would
cease to be God. (I)
Foot Note- (I). De Ordine, 8,I8.47.8ermo,II7,5.De Civ.Dei.IX.16.
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God is beyond all our knowledge; we cannot put inté words what
He is; it is better to confess our ignorance than rashly declare
ourselves in possession of knowledge. He is best described by
negatives; in a word, He is Ineffable. Augustine often expresses
this thought. (I)
Now we have already seen that there was a consider-
-able interchange of Ideas on the part of the Philosophers and
the Christian Fathers, and that in this way many philosophical
truths have found a place in the Christian metaphysic. We have
already marked the influence of Philo, Clement of Alexandria,
Justin Martyr , and others in this direction. This truth concern-
-ing the incomprehensibility and the ineffability of God is fregu-
-ently expressed in their writings. Justin, whol^^we have seen
was a Neo-Platonist before his conversion to Christianity, says-
"We have no name which can fitly describe the supreme Principle
of the Universe. God, the Father, the Creator, the Lord, are not
names which explain His essence, but simple descriptions drawn
from His favours , and His works". (2). Whilst Ter tu Ilian decl-
-ares - "that God in Himself is hidden and inaccessible but that
He has revealed Himself by the Logos as the sun too brilliant for
our eyes in its very brightness, permits itself to be seen by
means of its rays". (3) Clement in the same way remarks - "The
name which befits Him best, the One, does not define His essence
but only expresses the absolute simplicity of His nature".(4)
Foot Notes- (I).De Ordine, XVI.44.Contra adv.leg.et proph. 1.40-
1.41. De Ordine, 2.18.47. Sermo, 17.4.&c. (2)Apol.I.46;II,8. 
10,13,14.SeeFouillee,*La Philosoph&e de Platon* (Hachette, 
1922) page,287.(3). Tert.adv.Prax.p.I4.cited^by Fouillee,page 
288, (4).Clem.Alex.Strom.I.X7II.369, Fouillee,ibid.
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Now whilst this was quite a common thought in regard to the 
Divine Being with the Philosophers of the School of Alexandria, 
it was probably through Plotinus that Augustine first became 
familiar with the idea of a negative con;6ception of God. (I)
With Plotinus the Absolute not only transcends 
all speech but all thouglit- indeed the Absolute is not only 
'without form, | ’it is no Being’, "Being", says Plotinus, "must 
have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cann- 
-ot be thought of as having definition and limit...Even the 
phrase, * transcending Being*, assigns no character, makes no ass- 
-ertion, allots no name, carries only the denial of particular 
being...Its definition, in fact, could be only ’the indefinable*; 
what is not a thing is not some definite thing". Plotinus strugg- 
-les to make himself clear; he continues- "We are talking of the 
untenable; we name, only to indicate for our ora use as best we 
may. And this name. The One, contains really no more than the 
negation of plurality...If we are led to think positively of The 
One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence..." 
Enneads, 7.5.6. (2)
God then, is Infinite and Ineffable with
Plotinus as with St. Augustine. And yet it is still possible for
reasonable beings to arrive at certain knowledge concerning God
and at some conception of what we mean when we speak of God.(3)
It is, however, better to seek what God is not than what He is.
"If, before we can know what God is, we can already know what He
Foot Notes- (I).De Ordine, 2.X7I.44.(Col.579)"3citur Deus melius 
nesciendo". ibid X7III.47.(Col.581)"cujus nulla scientia est 
in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat”. (2)See also Ennead: 
7.I.I3;V.3,(I3,I4) 71.9.5. (3),In Joann Ev.Tract.106.4.
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not...For when we aspire from this depth to that height it is a
step towards no small knowledge". (I)
By this process of reasoning Augustine arrives at
the position of being able to say that God is absolutely indeter-
-minate, that one should not ascribe to Him any qualities or
attributes- in brief, God is a being vfho is absolutely simple.(2)
But, being Simple, God is therefore, according to
St. Augustine, unchangeable, for simplicity excludes all change.
(3) Indeed, the Immutability of God can admit of no exceptions.
(4$ We may notice too that with Plotinus also God is absolutely
Simple. (5) So, in like manner, with Plotinus the Absolute is
unchangeable; in fact, with Him no motion can be associated.(6)
From the Unchangeableness of God Augustine
reasons that God must also be Eternal. For Him there can be no
past or future. He is the Eternal Now, For time implies change &
with God there is no change . "In His wholeness everywhere set
without place, eternal without time, making things changeable &
without change of Himself". (7) So also with Plotinus, God is
Eternal. Eternity is part of the very nature of God. (8)
Foot Notes- (I).Be Trinitate, Viii.2,3. (2)De Trin.XV.5.8;XV.%% 
’God is a pure Essence and his nature is Absolute’De Trin.VI.
6.8.’God is a substance both Simple and manifold’. (3),De 
Trin.VI.B.8. "Nihil enira simplex mutabile est". DecTrin.V,2.3 
’He who is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence’.
(4). De MoribuB Manich.I.I."For that exists in the highest 
sense of the word which continues always the same, which is 
throughout like itself, which cannot be corrupted or changed | 
which is not subject to time..Such things can only be âaid of i 
God". Be Nat.boni Manich.1.2.Conf.XII.XV.18. &c(5).Enneads,VI.j 
9.5;V.3.XI;3.8.9. (6).Enneads, V.I.6. (7) De Trin.V.I.2.De |
Civ.Dei, XII.14. Conf.XIiI.37,52, Conf.XI.13.16; De Trin.i2 .i4 l 
(8).Enneads,3.7.2.’The Intellectual Substance & Eternity have 
the one scope & contentEternity & the Divine Nature envel- 
-op the same entities’.Enneads,3,7.4; 3.7.5; 3.7.6.’There is 
no difference between Being and Everlasting Being’, |
(176) .
But God with Augustine and with Plotinus also was Omnipresent, 
filling all space and yet not hounded by space, Augustine expres- 
-ses himself on the matter in this way- "But these things the ohe 
true God makes and does, but as the same God, that is, as He who 
is wholly everywhere, included in no space, bound by no chains, 
mutable in no part of His being, filling heaven and earth with 
omnipresent power, not with a needy nature" (l)
In like manner God is free from all temporal 
determination, since time is only a condition of creature life, 
an image of eternity. Created things cannot be eternal, for eter- 
-nity can only be postulated of God, It follows, therefore, that 
He ought to be Infinite and Eternal. (2)
It may be remarked that Augustine holds the 
same opinion as does Plotinus on the question that time does not 
consist in a number of things which are in movement or repose.
God, then, according to Plotinus and Augustine, is 
above all being and all thought; He is also free from all determi- 
-nation, (3) His simplicity is absolute, for v/e cannot speak of 
either His quality or quantity. To predicate anything of God 
would be to say that He stands in need of something.
But although Augustine arrived at certain deduet-
-ions concerning God, by means of this negative method, yet he
in many of his writings has made very positive statements concern-
Foot Notes- (I).Be Civ Dei, VII.30.Sermo,277,13 & 18.Conf.1.3.3.
and often,Ep.187.4.God is not confined in space.De Diver,Quae- 
St.83.20. cp.Enneads,3.9.3."How,then, does Unity give rise to 
Multiplicity? By its omnipresence : there is nowhere where it 
is not; it occupies,therefore,all that is." alsoVI.5.9.
(2). Compare De Musica,VI.XI.49 &Enneads,3.7.I. alsoConf.XI.
II.13 with Enneads,3.7.6, (3),Enneads, V.5.6. VI.8.9. VI.9.6.
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-ing God. (I)
Let us see how he had reached such positive 
knowledge, and how in this way his reason was satisfied and he 
found himself in possession of a truth which commended itself to 
his whole consciousness.
What attracted St Augustine to Neo-Platonism was
its spiritual conception of God. But once he had seen that God
must he spiritual, there came to him a new revelation of the
Universe. No longer could it be solely material; in so far as it
possessed true being it owed that being to God, and was, therefore,
a Spiritual world. He expresses that thought frequently in the
Confessions. For example, we find him saying- "Thou art, and art
God and Lord of all which Thou hast created: in Thee abide, fixed
for ever, the first causes of all things unabiding; and of all
things changeable, the springs abide in Thee unchangeable: and in
Thee live the eternal reasons of all things unreasoning and temp-
-oral". (2) Again he says- "For Thou art God...whose
Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness
makeSt all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law",(3)
Augustine now was able to see all things glorified
with a beauty that had sprung from the source of all Beauty,
Dr. Inge puts it thus- "Augustine is fond of speaking of the
Beauty of God, and as he identifies beauty with symmetry (4) it is
clear that the formless ’Infinite* is for him, as for every true
Platonist, the bottom and not the top of the scale of being,
Plotinus had perhaps been the first to speak of the Divine Nature
Foot Notes- (I).See Confessions, I.17.4. and often. Also Solil. I. 
1.2, (2),Confess. 1.6.9, (3) ibid.I.Ij. 12. compare 1.18,31, 
compare Enneads,I.6.6. 111.8,10, VI.9,I, (4)Epis.120,29.
(178).
as the meeting place of the good, the true, and the beautiful; 
and this conception, which is of great value, appears also in 
Augustine, There are three grades of beauty, they both say; 
corporeal, spiritual and Divine, (l) The first being the image 
of the second, and the second of the third. (2) Augustine says 
more than once, ’All that is beautiful comes from the highest 
beauty, which is God*. " (3)
Without a doubt it was Neo-Platonism that opened 
his eyes to the perception of that truth. He now saw that all 
about him was, by its very forms, suggestive of the ideas of order 
beauty, rhythm, that had come from some loftier beauty. With St 
Augustine as with Plotinus the here was but a copy or a shadow 
of the yonder. All things reflected a supreme order, beauty and 
goodness; in a word, these things suggested God. (4) They all 
revealed an all-pervasive Unity which brought the thought of The 
One to Augustine’s mind. This was a familiar thought with Plotin- 
-us, and he often spoke of the beauty and glory of the world of 
sense as reflecting the Beauty of the Divine mind. (5)
Hence in the world without he saw a revelation of 
God. And here we have the thought of the forms, ideas, reasons &c. 
which we considered in our previous chapter.
But there, we saw that St Augustine’s Psychology
forms the basis of his Metaphysic. Augustine, as we have learned,
Foot Notes- (I).De Ord.2.16.42.59. Enneads, I.6.4.(2) De lib.arb.
2.16.41. Enneads,I.6.8.;3.8.II. ’Righteousness is the truest 
beauty’. Enarr.in Psalmos,44.3.Ep.120.20. Enneads,I.6.4.
(3)lnge, ’Christian Mysticism’,page,129. (4)Conf.VII.17.23.
(5). Enneads, V.I.4.comp.Conf,3.6.iO.'Beauty of all things 
beautiful’also Conf.4.16.29.;I0.27.38.and Enneads,VI.9.4.
See also Sermo, 14$.2. & Enneads, VI.5.I.
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was haunted by the overwhelming sense of the mystery of his ovm
personality. Following the advice of Plotinus , he entered into
himself that he might not only know himself, but also know God.(I
In the Seventh book of has Confessions, Augustine
has given us a clear account of the development of his thought.
The beauty of the world, as we have seen, suggested to Augustine
the beauty of the Creator, But Augustine with his fondness for
analysis, proceeds to examine the very faculty which would percei-
-ve this beauty, and so, led from the world/of sense to the soul
which was aware of the beauty, he thence travelled upward to the
reasoning faculty, and again onward to the eternal,unchangeable
light vfhich enables reason to form its judgments, and to that,
indeed, which is the very life of the Soul’s life,(2) So he could
exclaim- "0 Truth IVho art Eternity, and Love Who art Truth, and
Eternity ViJho art Love! Thou art my God". (3)
Thus in his own personality Augustine, like Plotinus,
had discovered ’the impress of that most mysterious Unity’ (4)
which was the very fount of his life.
It vms, then, from the principle of the absolute and
immediate certainty of consciousness, as we have seen before,
that Augustine arrived at truth; and he makes use of this method
in his search after a knowledge of God, "It belongs", says Windel-
-band, "to the essence of truth that it is or exists. But the
Being or existence of those universal truths, since they are absol-
-utely incorporeal in their nature, can be thought only as that
Foot Notes- (I).Confessions, X.7.II.’By my very soul will I ascend 
to Him’ ibid,10.XVII.26.’I will pass even beyond this power 
of mine which is called memory;..that I may approach unto 
ghee, 0 sweet Light’, and elsewhere.(2).Conf.10.6.10.see 
Ottley,op.cit page 91. (3)Conf.VII.X.16.(4)Conf.I.20.31.
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of the ideas in God, after the Neo-Platonic mode; they are the
changeless forms and norms of all reality... and the determination
of the content of the Divine mind. In Him are contained the high-
-est union; He is the absolute unity, the all-embracing truth. He
is the Being, the highest good, perfect beauty (unum, verum, bonumj
All rational knowledge is ultimately knowledge of God", (I)
In this way we see Augustine reasoning that, if
the soul of man can in thouglit and imagination and by means of
memory pervade the whole of space, much more can we attribute omni-
-presence to the Creator of the Soul.(2) If the Soul be non-materi-
-al and thereby distinguished from the body, with much greater
reason should God be distinguished from corporeality since He is
the maker of the Soul. (3) Again, if reason be eternal and unchan-
-geable, so must God be who is above all thought. God is the eter-
-nal truth and He is the incarnate Logos, (4) So he breaks forth
in his Soliloquies- "Thee I invoke, 0 God, 0 Truth, in Whom and
through Whom are all true things, which are all true, 0 God, 0
Wisdom; in Whom and through Whom are all things that are wise! 0
God, the true and highest life, in Whom and through Whom all things
true and exalted live", (5)
So St Augustine proclaims God to be ’Causa
subsistendi, ratio intelligendi, et ordo vivendi’, (6)
But we find that Augustine makes another discov-
-ery, which is of infinite importance to himself. There was a
Foot Notes- (l).Windelband, op.cit.page, 279. (2).Epistle,137,2,
'3).ibid.(4).De Lib.arb.2.14.- 2.39. De Vera Heiig.30;3I,
5). Soliloq.I.(I.a) (6).De Civ.Dei,VIII.*.
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principle of Unity in the world, that is a harmony which sprang
from the One, and which v;as only a complete harmony by its remain-
in such union. As man wandered away and lost himself amid the
multiplicity of things he lost that beauty, that oneness from his
life. The goal of the happy life, true rest, true being consisted
in fellowship with the Highest Being. All that is around man is
but an image of the infinite fulness, but only an image.Man longs
after reality and true reality can only be found along with per-
-feet blessedness in union with that One.(I)
But how are we to be sure of God, how may God be
known as the chief good? Augustine tells us- "Take away this and
that and regard good itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God,
not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of
all good. For in all these good things, whether those which I
have mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought,
we could not say that one was better than another, when we judge
truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed
upon us, such that according to it we might both approve some
things as good, and prefer one good to another. So God is to be
loved, not this and that good, but the good itself". (2)
Here we have the Christian Father proclaiming one
of the deep truths of the Christian life. Augustine ha.d learned
from his own experience, that man is ever striving after true
being because the soul, so far as it has true being, is from God
and yearns after God. But in the world there is evil, which is
really non-being since it has nothing of the true Being in it, and
as men, despite their longing after God, seek for that which is
Foot Notes- (I).De Vera Relig.35,36. see alsoFouillee,op.cit.p.289 
(2).De Trinitate,VIII.3,4.
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evil, that is the cause of unrest and sorrow. Evil, then, con- 
-sists in the will being perverted, the choice of non-being 
instead of God. So Augustine declares- "Nothing is good but a 
gobd will", to VvThich he added- "Nothing is good but God".
Augustine, in glowing terms, has expressed the 
Christian experience of redemption and the thought of God as 
omnipotent love coming to man’s rescue and giving to him deliver- 
-ance from the power of an evil will that he may be thus able to 
enjoy the fellowship for which he has longed.
God may be ineffable* it may be that we cannot with 
our slender intelligence define his VTisdom or describe His glory*' 
words may fail us, yet here is the wonder of the Father in heaven- 
that He gives Himself to man and makes men taste and see Himself. 
That is the goal of the true life and the highest knowledge of 
God. Augustine thus puts it- "For that vision of God is the beauty 
of a vision so great and so infinitely desirable, that Plotinus 
does not hesitate to say that he who enjoys all other blessings in 
abundance, and has not this, is supremely miserable". (I)
Augustine frequently utters the warning that the 
knowledge of God does not come easily, it must be sought after & 
earnestly desired.And as we have seen in our previous chapter, 
Augustine clearly marks the stages in the upward way, until at 
last there is union with God. Plotinus in beautiful phrase has 
described this for us, and for those who have never read Plotinus, 
it has been made familiar by Augustine’s account of the mystic 
vision which Monnica and he enjoyed at Ostia,
Foot Notes- (I) De Civ.Dei. X.I6.
(183).
Now in this chapter we have endeavoured to mark in several 
ways tne influence of Neo-Platonism upon St Augustine’s idea of 
God. We have seen that it was from Plotinus that Augustine first 
learned of the Spirituality and Simplicity of the Divine nature.
As vre shall find later, it was this conception of the Divine 
Simplicity, which Augustine tenaciously adhered to , that creat- 
-ed difficulty, as he sought to reconcile it with the fuller 
truth of the Divine nature which as a Christian Philosopher he 
endeavoured to proclaim. But further, influenced by Neo-Platon- ! 
-ism wefhave marked how Augustine was led to affirm the immediate 
certainty of the inner consciousness, and was able from his 
memory, reason, and soul, to arrive at some notion of the Divine 
attributes. Undoubtedly Neo-Platonism did him great service in 
giving him a vision of the Mystic way;and by the help of Neo- 
-Platonism Augustine was initiated into the realm of Mystical 
Piety which played such a part in his after life. It was through 
this Philosophy, and largely owing to Plotinus that the heart of 
Augustine was quickened with an intense desire to enjoy a mystic- 
-al union with God.For by his own spiritual experiences in this 
direction Augustine learned that it was here by intuition that 
the human soul can obtain its fullest knowledge of the Divine 
Nature.
Whilst, however, Plotinus opened the gateway for 
Augustine which led him into the blessed life, very soon the two 
part company. In the Christian conception of the Divine nature, 
there was something more than a philosophy of cold dialectic.
The God of the Christian religion was after all very different
from- the Absolute of Neo-Platonism. Ee was a God who loved men
(184)
and it was a knowledge of that love that touched the waim heart 
of Augustine, and brought about his redemption. It was because He 
loved first that love was kindled in Augustine’s heart, because 
He stooped to give his Son in order that the evil will of man 
might be transformed into the good, and the weak will migîit bec- 
-orne strong; it was this v/hich made its appeal to St. Augustine 
but he tells us, he found it not in Heo-Platonis^.
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CHAPTER 5.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE WRITINGS 
OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND IN NEO-PLATONISM.
From our study of Neo-Platonism we must have 
already gathered that, in certain of its aspects, that Philosophy 
closely resembles Christianity. It does so in its attempt to 
understand the nature of the Divine Being, and the character of 
the Universe in which man has &is home. Dr. Glover referring 
to Neo-Platonism says- "It felt the unity of nature, the divinity 
of man as God’s kinsman, the beauty of a morality modelled after 
God, the appetite of the human heart for God, and something of 
man*s hunger after redemption." (l)
Neo-Platonism summoned men to a life of bless- 
-edness; it proclaimed, as we saw in the previous chapter, the 
spirituality of God and His Universe, and that He must by His 
very nature manifest Himself. At the same time it taught that 
man must prepare himself that he might attain unto union with the 
unseen, and that, in an ineffable ’ecstasy* , his soul might be
flooded with the Divine Light.
In many ways, then, we are made conscious of 
marked resemblances which exist between its fundamental ideas 
and those of the gospel as proclaimed by the Christian Church.
It is now our purpose to enquire how far the
Trinity or Triad in the Divine hierarchy of Neo-Platonism, resem-
-bles the doctrine of the Tri-une Godhead set forth by the Christ- 
Foot Notes- (I). T.a.Glover, op.cit.Chap.IX.
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-ian Faith. We have already noticed how closely Plotinus in his 
conception of the First of his Divine Principles , approximates 
to the Christian view of the first Person in the Holy Trinity. 
And, naturally, as we consider the Triad of Plotinus, the Absol­
ute, Intelligence or Spirit, and Soul, as well as his tripartite 
division of man’s nature into Spirit, Soul, and body, there does 
appear to be a considerable likeness between the two systems.
Both Augustine and Plotinus insist on the exist- 
-ence, the unity, the spirituality, the goodness of God; for both 
of them He is the transcendent and ineffable One from Whom all 
things have sprung, to Whom all things will return, and upon Whom 
all things depend for their very being.
Furthermore, both, in attempting to describe the
nature of the Second and Third Principles of the Godhead, make
use of terms which are analogous. We have, for example, in the
Nous or the Logos, the mind and word of God and the expression of
the thought of the Eternal. In like manner we may find a close
kinship existing between Soul and Spirit. It is not then to be
wondered at that we find a considerable divergence of opinion
expressed by the Fathers of the Christian Church on the question
of the substantial identity of thought in the conception of the
philosophical Triad and the Christian Trinity. Indeed, several
have believed that they could see in the Three Divine Hypostases
of Plotinus the three Personsof the Holy Trinity. (I)
Foot Note- (I). Notably, Justin Martyr, Eusebius, Theodoret,Greg- 
-ory, Clement, Cyril. (Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.page, 257.
See also Inge, ’Plotinus’, op.cit.Vol.2.pages, 209, 210.
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For example, Cyril, referring to Enneads, V.I.6, says- j
"We find in the Greek Philosophers themselves a knowledge of the 
Holy Trinity. They say in effect that the three natures are closed 
-ly united, without anything separating them, and that the Soul, 
which occupies the third place, is in precisely the same intimate 
way related to Intelligence, which occupies the second place, as 
Intelligence is associated with the One. So we see that these 
philosophers maintain an existence of intimacy between that which 
engenders and that which is engendered; that this is their belief 
is shown by the words of Plotinus." (I)
Again, in writing upon the Neo-Platonic theory of 
the Three Hypostases, Cyril adds-
"When they admit the Three Principle Hypostases and declare that 
the substance of God extends to these Three Hypostases, when they 
make use sometimes of the same name of the Trinity they are in 
agreement with the belief of the Christians, and they lose nothing 
if they wish to apply the term consubstantiality to the Three 
Hypostases, in order to present their conception of the unity of 
God in which the three-fold form does not imply a difference of 
nature, and, in which the Hypostases are not inferior to each 
other." (2)
But many other references might be cited, 
suggesting that in their earnest desire to win converts to the 
Christian Faith they have emphasized a resemblance which was only 
apparent, and sought to reconcile the teaching/of Neo-Platonism 
with that of the Christian Church.
Such an attempt, however, ended in failure 
for among the Christian apologists there were many who, whilst 
they admitted a likeness between the two doctrines, yet stoutly 
denied that there was any real agreement; in fact, some went so 
far as to say that the Neo-Platonists differed totally in their 
doctrine of the Trinity , from that which the Christian Church 
acknowledged.
Foot Notes- (I).Contra Jul.VIII.see Douillet, Vol.3.pages, 15,16. 
translated from the French of Douillet. See Fuller notes at 
the end of this chapter for a translation of Enneads,V.I.6.
(2).Cont.Jul.VIII.-Douillet, Vol.3. page,626,foot-note, 
translated from the French of Douillet.
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If we compare the Trinity of Plotinus with that of 
St Augustine, we notice that both use the term Hypostasis whichP 
with Plotinus means substantial existence. St. Augustine, however, 
has clearly pointed out, (I) that although the same term is used 
the meaning is not quite the same. Whilst the Neo-Platonists 
suggest a difference between Hypostasis and Being, Augustine 
speaks of one being (or essence), and three substances. Now if 
Plotinus adopts the Christian meaning of the term, that is, if he 
thinks of three substantial existences, then his Godhead is three- 
-fold, and he thereby violates his principle of the Unity of the 
Godhead which he so frequently emphasizes. We must bear in mind, 
however, that Hypostasis is not the same as Person, and at the 
samectime remember that Plotinus never calls his Divine Principle^ 
Persons. (2).
As we have already remarked, the First Hypos- 
-tasis of Plotinus is The One, The Absolute, transcending all 
else; simple, infinite, eternal, unknowable, transcending even 
the quality of Being. It acts everywhere, in the sense that with- 
-out it nothing can exist, and yet it is nowhere, in that it is 
above all else. It is the unchanging cause from which there 
emanates the Nous or Intellectual Principle, which is the image 
( f M o V )  of it. (3)
Vm
Foot Notes- (I).De Civ.Dei, X.23.De Trinitate V.Î5t.I0. for the
translation see fuller notes at the end of the present chap- 
-ter. (2). Inge, op. cit.’Plotinus*, Vol.2. page, 210.
(3). Enneads, V.I.7. translated in the fuller notes at the 
end of the present chapter.
(189).
The Second Hypostasis, the Nous, the Divine thought. 
Intelligence, best called, perhaps, the Intellectual-Principle, 
is a real Being, the first ’thing* of which existence may be 
affirmed. It is an image of the First, emanating from the One, 
mediating the Unknowable One to the world. (I)
Here we find the beginning of Plurality or Multiplic- 
-ity. For the Intellectual-Principle contains within itself the 
totality of the Divine Thoughts, commonly spoken of as the 
/ S ^ o(f, ifîif ^‘»X*‘These are the Originals, Archetypes, Intellective 
forms of all that exists in the lower sphere of the world. But 
the Intellectual-Principle to be of real help to the world, whilst 
it looks upward to the Absolute, cannot bend to the lower world 
of sense. So we find it engendering a power *apt to the realiz- 
-ation of its thought*, apt, that is, to Creation. (2)
There emanates, therefore, from the Second 
Hypostasis a third, the Universal Soul, the All-Soul commonly 
known as ^  ^  X*7 *This plays the part of a mediating agency 
between the world of the Intellective Order above it and that of 
Sense below, thereby bestowing life and beauty to the Universe. (3)
Briefly, then, we have here described the 
Three Principle Hypostases of Plotinus. And, at once we see how 
very greatly these differ in character from the Th%e Persons of 
the Christian Trinity.
Foot Notes-(I) Enneads, V.8.9.translated at the end of this chap- 
-ter. (2). Mackenna, op.cit.Vol.I.page, 120. (3).Enneads,IV 
3.XI."Such mediation and representation there m s t  have been, 
since it was equally impossible for the created%o be without 
share in the Supreme, and for the Supreme to descend/,<to the 
created". Mackenna, Vol.3.page 22.
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In Neo-Platonism the Three Hypostases are inferior and 
subordinate, the Second to the First and the Third to the Second. 
They are in no sense co-eternal or co-equal; whilst, on the other 
hand, in the teaching of Augustine the three Persons in the 
Trinity are of the same rank and possess the same Essence. (I)
Moreover, the part which each plays is very diff- 
-erent. The Absolute does not of himself create the world; He 
cannot stoop to the realm of thought or sense, but remains above 
and beyond everything else in lonely isolation, august and infin- 
-ite. He cannot come to man; man must reach upward to Him.
As Ottley puts it- "To Plotinus it appeared inconcei-
-vable that the immutable ’One’ should act upon the many except
as a principle of attraction. It could not go after the lost sheep:
at best it would draw all things towards itself; whereas the
Gospel proclaimed an actual descent of Deity into the very heart
of the world to redeem, to heal, and to aid the aspiring will of
man: an Incarnation of the Divine, uniting matter and spirit.
Such an idea was wholly uncongenial to Neo-Platonic thought...its
whole tendency being to remove the divine nature as far as possible
from any possible contact with the material universe". (2)
Again, the Second Hypostasis can only look upward
to the heights of the Absolute. He too remains aloof from the life
and thought of the world. Moreover, in the doctrine of Plotinus,
it is the Soul that plays the part of the Creator.
But in the conception of the Christian Church of
the Trinity, the Father draws near to His children, He has made
them in His own image. He loves them and seeks to reveal His will 
Foot Notes- (I).De Trin.VII.V.IO.-V.8.0.see Fuller notes.
(2).Ottley, op.cit.page,59.cp.Baron von Hugel,’The Mystical Elem- 
-ement oi Religion.*vol.I.1.25.
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to them. Whereas in the Neo-Platonic triad, there iaii& complete 
absence of love, the three are Principles, not Persons. How can 
we possibly find any comparison between the Nous of Plotinus, or 
the Logos, if we may call Him so, and the Word that became flesh, 
the Saviour of men, who took upon Himself the form of humanity?
In the Christian Trinity the work of Creation 
is not confined to the third person; it is the Father and the Son 
who create; it is the Holy Spirit who broods over the unformed 
Kosmos; each of the Three playing a part in the work of the 
Creation. Now much as Augustine acknowledged the help which he 
received from Neo-Platonism, in assisting him to perceive the 
Unity and spirituality of God, he yet very clearly saw wherein it 
failed to satisfy perfectly his yearnings. Neo-Platonism maint- 
-ained, it is true, that God manifested Himself in the Nous or 
Logos, that is, in His Son; but in Neo-Platonism the Nous was but 
an emanation of the Absolute and not/a complete manifestation of
A
His inner being. Now Justine saw that in His Son, Jesus Christ,
God’s manifestation of Himself was full and complete, and that
from the Father and the Son there proceeded the Holy Spirit
which was identical in nature with both. (I)
Augustine tells us himself that he saw in
Neo-Platonism no mediating Logos, saw not the Divine Saviour
there. He saw in the Holy Scriptures that the Son was in the
form of the Father and naturally the same in substance, but he
read further ’that He emptied Himself...and became obedient unto
Foot Notes- (I). See Watson, "The Philosophical Basis of Religion" 
page, 332.
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death, and that death the death of the cross.•.those books have 
not". (I) In a word, Neo-Platonism proclaimed no gospel of 
a Saviour.
We are able now to see the wide disparity 
which existed between these two doctrines of the Trinity.
With the Neo-Platonists, all Being is inferior 
to that from which it has sprung, and only gives an imperfect 
image of it. So we see that, of these three divine Hypostases,the 
last is subordinate to the second, as the second is to the first; 
they are, in no sense whatsoever, coeternal or coequal. (2)
Within the divine hierarchy itself there is 
also a complete absence of mutual and loving fellowship; the 
first does not love the second, nor the second the third, in the 
intimate way that we would have expected; moreover, there is no 
outflowing of a fulness of love from the Godhead towards men; a 
love which can stoop and save.
How different it is with the Holy Trinity! 
There, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are each, in the 
same way, equal and eternal; they each act as one, and, in a 
mysterious but very real sense, they are one. One in being, power, 
and dignity. Their relationship with each other is that of cordial
love, a love which reveals itself in each of their manifestations
in its complete fulness.
The only real identity between the two doctrines 
seems to lie in this, that they are alike in proclaiming a three-
-fold Godhead, and that this unity admits at the same time of
plurality.
Foot Notes- (l)Confessions, VII.IX.14. (2).Enneads, 5.2.2.
(193).
Was the teaching of Plotinus here, on that account, of no value 
to Augustine or the Fathers of the Christian Church# By no means. 
Indeed the philosophical doctrines as enunciated by Plotinus 
and others helped to clarify the ideas of the Christian Apologists 
when they found it needful to define and defend the doctrine of | 
the Church, and they were not slow to make use of their arguments.
But with regard to Augustine himself; although he 
differed greatly from Plotinus in his conception of the Godhead 
he was very evidently influenced here in his conception of that 
doctrine. In the previous chapter we saw that one thing of fund- 
-amental importance Augustine had received from Plotinus, and 
this was his conception of the Simplicity of the Divine Nature.
But Augustine found considerable difficulty in reconciling that 
thought of the Unity and Simplicity of God with the doctrine of 
the Christian Church concerning the threeifold personality of the 
Godhead.
Now in the Christian view of the Trinity there 
is much , we must confess, which has militated against the co- 
-eguality of the Godhead. For example, the Son is begotten. He 
does not exist of Himself; from that there springs the thought of 
the pre-eminence of the Father over the Son, since the begetter 
is considered to be greater than the begotten. Further, the Holy 
Spirit is not even created, but proceeds alike from the Father 
and the Son. It is clear, however that the dignity and co-equal- 
-ity of each was fully recognised by the Church Fathers from the 
time of Theophilus of Antioch, (I7I-I83) when the name of the 
Trinity first came to be accepted, and when baptism was administ-
-ered - ’in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit^,
Fo^T- NcTG- 0) K f /, ûfp.ctT. -
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In the time of Origen, however, the question was raised as to 
whether the Holy Spirit might or might not be a creature, and we 
find in his day a growing tendency to associate the idea of 
createdness with the Holy Spirit. In factii, as Neander says,"the 
Fathers alternated between the doctrine of the Holy Ghost as 
being part of the Trinity and a good gift through Christ" (I)
Now St Augustine, whilst seeking to maintain 
the orthodox position and at the same time attempting to give a 
rational explanation of the Trinity, comes perilously near to what 
is known as Modal ism. And here he seems to have been influenced 
by Neo-Platonism.
We have seen that Augustine had accepted the
view of Plotinus that we can best know God by knowing ourselves.
This helps him towards an understanding of the nature of the
Godhead. (2) He conceives of the mind as being an essential
unity, and yet that unity may be perceived by means of differing
manifestations.For example, he sometimes speaks of the mind which
is one in its essence, whose unity is yet capable of being displa-
-yed by means of three different, though not separated functions^
memory, intelligence, love. (3) Or again, he speaks of ’Memory,
Intelligence, Will’. (4) Of- ’being, knowing,willing’;^f- ’being,
life, knowledge;’ or further, of human consciousness as the
consciousness of wisdom, love, and happiness. (6)
And St Augustine reasons that, since the mind of
man is made in the image of God, we can think of the unity in
Foot Notes- (I).Neander,Church History, Vol.2.pages,337-9. (2)
De Trinitate, IX.2.2. see fuller notes. (3) De Trinit.VIII.8. 
12. (4).Sermo,52,cap.VII.X.(I9-23) De Trin.X.I.Hc. (5)Conf. 
XIII.XI.12. see fuller notes.(6).De Civ.Dei,XI.26.see fuller 
notes.
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distinction which is found in our own self-consciousness as
analogous to the unity of the three Persons in God. (I)
What Augustine seeks to show is this, that,whilst
there are here in these illustrations three modes of activity
which may be separately distinguished, nevertheless in each of
them the whole mind is active. So in the Divine Trinity each
Person contributes something to the production of the Divine
self-consciousness, whilst the essential unity of the Divine |
Being is unimpaired. If we may quote Windelband, "In accordance
with these relations thus recognised in man's mental life, August-j
-ine then not only seeks to gain an analogical idea of the myst- I
-ery of the Trinity, but recognises , also, in the esse,nosse, &
velle, the fundamental determination of all reality. Being,know-
-ing, and willing, comprise all reality, and in omnipresence,
omniscience, and perfect goodness, the deity encompasses the
universe". (2)
But how can Augustine reconcile this thought of
the simplicity of the divine being with the three-fold thought of
the Divine nature? If we take his illustrations in their entirety,
do they not seem to suggest that all thought of personality has
been forgotten and that the Persons in the Trinity are but as
attributes of the Supreme One? If that be so, then they would
seem to be merely subjective. "Here", says Dr. Watson, "we have
in Augustine's doctrine a clear instance of the power of Neo-Plat-
-onism over him. He is prevented, by his perception of the import-
-ance of holding fast by the idea of God as self-manifesting, from
Foot Notes- (I).See Watson, op.cit.’Philosophical basis of Helig- 
-ion’, pages, 333.f. (2). Windelband, op.cit.Page, 280.
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admitting that God is indefinable, he is unable to reconcile 
the doctrine of the three Persons with the conception, taken 
from Neo-Platonism, of the absolute simplicity of the divine 
nature". (I)
We see then that,despite the profound differences 
which exist between the doctrine of God according to Plotinus, 
and the conception of the Holy Trinity in the writings of St 
Augustine, tb»t even here, Neo-Platonism had left a distinct 
influence upon his mind and helped him to give a clearer exposit- 
-ion if the doctrine of three Persons in One Being.
Foot Notes- (I). Watson, op.cit. pages, 335,336#
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FULLER NOTES TO CHAPTER &. (Part 2.)
Page, 187. Foot Note-(l).
Enneads, 7.I.6."The offspring of the prior to Divine Mind can be 
no other than that Mind itself and thus is the loftiest being in 
the universe, all else following upon it- the soul, for example, 
being an utterance and act of the Intellectual-Principle as that 
is an utterance and act of The One. But in soul the utterance 
is obscured, for soul is an image and must look to its own origi-l 
-nal: that Principle, on the contrary^ looks to the First with- 
-out mediation- thus becoming what it is- and has that vision not | 
as from a distance but as the immediate next with nothing inter- 
-vening, close to the One as Soul to it."
Mackenna, Vol.4.page 9.
N.B. Had Cyril noted the whole passage he would have marked this 
essential difference, namely, that in Neo-Platonism the three 
divine Hypostases are never equal. In the same section as the 
above passage, Enneads, V.I.6.- we read"At the same time, the 
offspring is always minor". In the Christian Trinity, each of the| 
Three Persons is of the same substance and they are co-equal.®
In order to mark the difference which exists between the theory 
of Plotinus and the doctrine of the Christian Church on the 
Trinity, we may note the following-
De Civ.Dei, XI.ID."There is, accordingly, a good which is alone 
simple, and therefore alone unchangeable<p and this is God. By 
this Good have all others been created, but not simple, and there- 
-fore not unchangeable. "Created", I say,- that is, made, not 
begotten. For that which is begotten of the simple Good is simple 
as itself, and the same as itself. These two we call the Father 
and the Son; and both together with the Holy Spirit are one God; 
and to this Spirit the epithet Holy is in Scripture, as it were, 
appropriated. And He is another than the Father and the Son,for 
He is neither the Father nor the Son. I say "another", not "anoth- 
-er thing", because He is equally with them the simple Good, un- 
-changeable and co-eternal. And this Trinity is one God; and none 
the less simple because a Trinity. For we do not say that the 
nature of the good is simple, because the Father alone possesses 
it, or the Son alone, or the Holy Ghost alone; nor do we say, with 
the Sabellian heretics, that it is only nominally a Trinity, and 
has no real distinction of persons; but we say it is simple, bec- 
-ause it is what it has, with the exception of the relation of the 
persons to one another."
Dods, Vol.I.pages, 447,8.
(198).
Page, 188. Foot Note- (I).
De Civ.Dei,X.23."And what Porphyry as a Platonist means by 
"principles", we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God 
the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind 
of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or 
nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of 
as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like 
Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substan- 
-ces, (B) he wished us to understand by this third the soul of 
Mature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place 
between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son.For 
Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the 
Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it 
after, but between the others.No doubt he spoke according to his 
light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy 
Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, 
but of both."
24. "Accordingly, wften we speak of God, we do not affirm two or 
three principles, no more than we are at liberty to affirm two or 
three gods; although,speaking of each, of the Father, or of the 
Son, or of the Holy Ghost, we confess that each is God: and yet 
we do not say, as the Sabellian heretics say, that the Father is 
the same as the Son, and the Holy Spirit the same as the Father 
and the Son; but we say that the Father is the Father of the Son, 
and the Son the Son of the Father, and that the Holy Spirit of 
of the Father and the Son is neither the Father nor the Son. It 
was therefore truly said that man is cleansed only by a Principle, 
although the Platonists erred in speaking in the plural of princi- 
-ples. But Porphyry, being under the dominion of these envious 
powers, whose influence he was at once ashamed of and afraid t6 
throw off, refused to recognise that Christ is the Principle by 
whose incarnation we are purified."
(I) Enneads,7.I. Dods, Vol.I.pages, 413,4.
see also De Civ.Dei, X.29.
De Trinitate,V.H«IO."They indeed use the word hypostasis; but/ 
they intend to put a difference, I know not what, between 
and hypostasis: so that most of ourselves who treat these, things 
in the Greek language, are accustomed to say, ^t/ctv 
T f or, in Latin, one essence, three substances?
I PSIS Dods,page, 155.
De Trinitate,V.IX.10. "By essence we understand the same thing 
which is understood by substance; we do not dare to say one 
essence, three substances, but one essence, or substance and 
three persons."
Dods, page, 155.
(199).
Puller notes to Chapter 5 (Part 2. )
Page, 188, Foot Note- (3)
Enneads, V.I.7."The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of 
The One, firstly because there is a certain necessity that the 
first should have its offspring, carrying onward much of its 
quality, in other words that there be something in its likeness 
as the sun’s rays tell of the sun".
Mackenna, Vol.IV.page, 9.
PAGE, 189. Foot Note- (I)
Enneads, V.8.9."The very figment of Being needs some imposed image 
of Beauty, to make it passable, and even to ensure its existence; 
it exists to the degree in which it has taken some share in the 
beauty of idea; and the more deeply it has drawn on this, the less 
imperfect it is, precisely because the nature which is essentially 
the beautiful has entered into it the more intimately".
Mackenna, Vol.IV. page, 84.
Page, 190, Foot Note- (I).
De Trinitate, VII.V.IO." So the Trinity , if one essence, is also 
one substance".
De Trinitate, V.8.9."Whatever, therefore, is spoken of God in res- 
-pect to Himself, is both spoken singly of each person, that is, 
of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and together of 
the Trinity itself, not plurally but in the singular. For inasmuch 
as to God it is not one thing to be, and another thing to be great, 
but to Him it is the same thing to be, as it is to be great; there- 
-fore, as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three 
greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness. I say essence, 
which in Greek is called , and which we call more usually
substance,"
Dods, Page,155.
Contra Maxim- "Unam esse virtutem, unam substantiam unam deitatem 
unam gloriam".
Epistle, 149, 2.5."Let it not be supposed that in this Trinity 
there is any separation in respect of time or place, but that these 
three are equal and co-eternal and absolutely of one nature: and 
that the creatures have been made not some by the Father, and some 
by the Son, and some by the Holy Spirit, but that each and all 
have been or are now being created subsist in the Trinity as their 
Creator; and that no one is saved by the Father without the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit without the Father and 
the Son, but by the Father, the^Son , and the Holy Spirit, the only 
one,true,immortal, (that is absolutely unchangeable) God, these 
things presenting the three to our apprehension separately,indeed, 
but in no wise separated"
Dods,pages, 336.7
(200).
FULLER NOTES CHAPTER 5 (Continued)
Page, jètià 194. Foot Note- (2).
De Trinitate, IX.2.2."Where, then, is the Trinity? Let us attend 
as much as we can, and let us invoke the everlasting light, that 
He may illuminate our darkness, and that we may see in ourselves, 
as much as we are permitted, the image of God."
De Trinitate , IX.IV.4."The three are one, and are also equal,viz. 
the mind itself, and the love, and the knowledge of it. The same 
three exist substantially, and are predicated relatively. The 
same three are inseparable. The same three are not joined and 
commingled like parts, but that they are of one essence, and are 
relatives".
De Trinitate, XV.3.5."And in this we found( that is man in resp- 
-ect to his mind) a kind of trinity, that is, the mind, and the 
knowledge whereby the mind knows itself, and the love whereby it 
loves both itself and its knowledge of itself; and these three 
are shown to be mutually equal and of one essence".
Dods,pages, 381,2
Confessions, XIII.XI.12."Which of us comprehendeth the Almighty 
Trinity? and yet which speaks not of It, if indeed it be It?
Rare is the soul, which while it speaks of It, knows what it 
speaks of...I would that men would consider these three, that are 
in themselves. These three be indeed far other than the Trinity;
I do but tell, where they may practise themselves, and there prove 
and feel how far they be. Now the three I spake of, are; To BE, 
to KNOW, and to WILL. For I AM, and KNOW, and WILL: I am KNOWING & 
WILLING: and I know myself to BE, and to WILL: and I will to BE 
and to KNOW".
De Civitate Dei, XI.26."And we indeed recognise in ourselves the 
image/ of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, 
thou^ it be not equal to God.,.being neither co-eternal, nor, 
to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him,- is yet nearer to 
Him than any other of His works...For we both are, and know that 
we are, and delight in our being, and in our knowledge of it."
(201).
CHAPTER 6.
GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD IN HIS WORK 
OF CREATION.
We have now reached the point in our study of the doctrines of 
St. Augustine when we must consider what his views were concern- 
-ing God’s relation to the world, and whether, on this question, 
he owed anything to Plotinus.
We will confine ourselves in this present chapter 
to a contemplation of God’s relation to the world in the work of 
Creation.
It has already been remarked that both Augustine 
and Plotinus emphasize the spirituality of the Universe, and 
that both strongly affirm that the world owes its existence to 
God; whilst, however, there is agreement in this direction, they 
differ very considerably in their opinions as to the manner in 
which God’s action upon the world took place.
Both had to overcome certain difficulties if 
they were to safeguard themselves against apparent inconsisten- 
-cies, consonant with their conception of the nature of the 
Divine Being. Now, whilst Augustine takes an independent line 
of thought in his doctrine of the Creation, and very clearly 
divergeas from the doctrine of Plotinus, nevertheless he is 
still influenced somewhat, by what he has learned from Neo-Platon- 
-ism.
According to the Christian view of the Godhead, 
the Three Persons are co-equal and co-eternal, their action, 
therefore, is a united action. Augustine tells us, "Every think-
(202).
-ing being and animal and corporeal creature, no matter how 
many exist, is perceived, without any doubt, to be from the 
Trinity as creator, so that it is not thought that any part of 
the whole creation has been made, at one time by the Father, at 
another by the Son, and at another by the Holy Spirit, but that 
at the same time each and every part of the nature of the God- 
-head made it". (I)
But if we consider the doctrine of Plotinus, 
the Absolute can have no direct contact with the world, such an 
association with matter would soil its purity.So too in regard 
to the Intellectual-Principle what connection can there be on 
its part with the world of Sense? It can only look upward and, 
whilst receiving its power and light from above, reflect the mind 
and thought of the Absolute, and impart its power to the world 
of Soul below. It would seem then, at first sight, as if only the 
Soul had to do with the work of Creation.
Plotinus, however, takes pains to explain that 
whilst the Soul alone in its descent comes into contact with 
matter, yet^by emanation^each of the Divine Hypostases has a share 
in the relationship which exists between God and the world.
He tells us, for example,- "The Good is that on 
which all else depends, towards which all Existences aspire as to 
their source and their need, while Itself is without need, suffic- 
-ient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term of 
all, giving out from Itself the Intellectual-Principle and Exist- 
-ence and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act.. .All..is with
the King of All, unfailing Cause of Good and Beauty and controller
Foot NoTÈ (?) hc VCKA , Vk bC lUZ . ^ .26 , rc .
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of all; and what is Good in the second degree depends upon the
Second-Principle and tertiary Good upon the Third."(I)
Within the Intellectual-Principle are the Ideas,
forms, patterns upon which the world and every individual thing
within it,is to he moulded and by which the world itself can
be shaped. The ’here* is an image, a copy of the ’yonder*. (2)
Plotinus says- "The Intellectual-Principle, then,
in its unperturbed serenity has brought the universe into being,
by communicating from its store to Matter: and this gift is the
Reason-form flowing from it. For the Emanation of the Intellectu-
-al Principle is Reason, an emanation unfailing as long as the
Intellectual Principle continues to have place among beings".(3)
"So", Plotinus adds, "from this, the One Intellect-
-ual Principle, and the Reason-Form emanating from it, our Univ-
-erse rises and develops part, and inevitably are formed groups
concordant and helpful in contrast with groups discordant and
combative;...Its two extremes are Matter and the Divine Reason;
its governing principle is Soul, presiding over the conjunction
of the two, and to be thought of not as labouring in the task but
as administering serenely by little more than an act of presence".
(4) But here we are confronted with a difficulty.
Plotinus has insisted, as we have seen, on the absolute simplicity
of the One. How then can the Infinite, the Simplex, come into
Foot Notes- (I).Enneads, 1.8.2. Mackenna, Vol.I.pages, 93,4.
(2). So too Augustine, De Genesi ad Litt.IV.24."In the Word 
(Logos) of God are found the eternal Reasons of all things , 
even of those which have been made in time".Cp.De Civ.Dei,XI. 
10.also XII.31. (3) Enneads, 3.2,2. Mackenna, Vol.2.page,13. 
(4). ibid, pages, 13,14.
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contact with the finite and complex? Plotinus himself sees that 
the association of action with his conception of the nature of 
the Divine Being will violate his view of the Simplicity.
He, therefore, seeks , as much as possible, to minimise 
that activity, and endeavours practically to annul any thought 
of movement.
The Absolute is motionless, aloof and apart from the 
realm of mundane things. The Intellectual-Principle, whilst it 
communicates from its store to Matter, yet dwells- "in its
unperturbed serenity". The Soul, although it governs, is- "to be
thought of, not as labouring in the task but as administering 
serenely by little more than an act of presence".
In describing the creation, Plotinus compares
the creating principle to a spring, having an endless source with-
-in itself, and although it supplies all the rivers yet it is 
never exhausted by what these take; or again he likens it to the 
'life which courses through some mighty tree while yet it is the 
stationary Principle of the whole'. (I)
Yet again, Plotinus in speaking of the First- 
Principle, says- "But such is the blessedness of this Being that 
in its very non-action it magnificently operates and in its 
self-dwelling it produces mightily". (2)
But in ascribing the creation of the world to 
the whole of the Divine Being, Plotinus is careful not to introd- 
-uce any thought of change into his conception of the Godhead.
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, 3.8.10. (2). ibid, 3.2.1.
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God must not be thought of as having determined , as 
it were, by second thoughts.to make a world. So in order to 
preserve the immutability of the Divine Being, Plotinus affirms 
the Eternity of the world of matter. He says-"Since we hold the 
eternal existence of the Universe, the utter absence of a beginn- 
-ing ^o it, we are forced, in sound and sequent reasoning, to 
explain the providence ruling in the Universe as a universal 
consonance with the divine Intelligence to which the Kosmos is 
subsequent not in time but in the fact of derivation, in the fact 
that the Divine Intelligence, preceding it in Kind, is its cause 
as being the Archtype and Model which it merely images, the 
primal by which, from all eternity, it has its existence and 
subsistence". (l)
The world, then, has only a causal commencement, 
not in time nor in space, since God is everywhere and eternal. In 
the mind of God there was ever the Thought of the world;the 
world of matter is but an image^a shadow^from the Divine.
Moreover, consonant with that thought of the 
eternity of the world, Plotinus does not use the term created.
He tells us that the world has been 'generated*; it has been be- 
-gotten, not made. Begotten in eternity, ever existing, it can 
never be destroyed. This is how Plotinus expresses himself- 
"In other words, things commonly described as generated have never 
known a beginning: all has been and will be. Nor can anything 
disappear unless where a later form is possible: without such a 
future there can be no/ dissolution. If we are told that there 
is always Matter as a possible term, we ask why then should not 
Foot Notes- (I).Enneads, 3.2.1. Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 12.
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Matter itself come# to nothingness. If we are told it may, then
we ask why it should ever have been generated. If the answer
comes that it had its necessary place as the ultimate of the
series, we return that the necessity still holds. With Matter %
left aside as wholly isolated, the Divine Beings are not every-
-where but in some bounded place, walled off, so to speak; if 
not
that is^possible. Matter itself must receive the Divine Light 
(and so cannot be annihilated)." (I)
We have seen already that the Neo-Platonic 
Principles are devoid of Love, they are no less devoid of Will.
The world came into being not because of the Love of God, accor- 
-ding to Plotinus,but as a result of necessity. (2) "This Kosmos 
of parts", Plotinus says- "has come into being not as the result 
of a judgment establishing its desirability, but by the sheer 
necessity of a secondary Kind",
But how are we to account for Unity giving 
birth to plurality; eternity giving place to time, and succession; 
^  harmony yielding to division? We shall see that the reason is 
to be found in the existence of Matter. But what does Plotinus 
mean by Matter? With him the term '^'*7 ; which unfortunately has 
been translated Matter, does not bear the connotation which we 
usually associate with matter, Plotinus interprets it as the 
indefinite (®Ca a p o v  j the indeterminate i^ (r it is
"but the bare receptacle of
Foot Notes-(I) Enneads, 2.9.3. Mackenna, Vol.I.page,219.
(2). Enneads, 3.2.2., Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 13.
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Forms; the subject of energy, as we should say, viewed by abstr- 
-action as separated from the energy which alone gives it being 
and reality.” (I) Plotinus says concerning Matter, "Investig- 
-ation will show us that Matter has no reality and is not capable 
of being affected. Matter must be bodiless- for body is a later 
production, a compound made by Matter in conjunction with some 
other entity. Thus it is included among incorporeal things in 
the sense that body is something that is neither Real-Being nor 
Matter, Matter is not Soul: it is not Intellect, is not Life, is 
no Ideal-Principle; no Reason-Principle; it is no limit or bound, 
for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does 
it produce? ....It has no title to the name of Being, It will be 
more plausibly called a non-being,and this in the sense not of 
movement (away from Being) or station (in Not-Being) but of 
veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and 
phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence; 
...a phantasm unabiding sind yet unable to withdraw-.so absolute 
its lack of all Being". (2) We can now understand how it was that 
Plotinus conceived of the world as an image, a phantom, a shadow.
"For Plotinus", says Windelband, "the world of
the senses is not in itself evil any more than it is in itself
good; but because in it light passes over into darkness, because
it thus presents a mixture of Being and Non-being, it is good so
far as it has part in God or the Good; that is so far as it is;
and on the other hand, it is evil in so far as it has part in
matter or the Evil; i.e.in so far as it is not (has no real,posit-
Foot Notes- (I).See Inge, "Philosophy of Plotinus’, Vol.I.page 
128, and following. (2). Enneads, 3.6.7. Mackenna, Vol.2. 
pages, 77,8.
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m ^ ^  *
-ive existence). Evil proper, the true evil ( /T
is matter, negation; the corporeal world can he called evil only
because it is formed out of matter; it is secondary evil (
 ^ov KcLk o y )' and the predicate "evil" belongs to souls only if 
they give themselves over to matter". (l)
It is in this way that Plotinus seeks to preserve 
his theory of the Simplicity of the Divine Nature and at the 
same time to account for the world of existence as owing its 
being to God. We have dwelt upon the question of Matter thus 
in detail for later we shall see how Augustine was led to 
make use of this theory in his attempt to explain God's associ- 
-ation with the world.
But now let us turn to Augustine's account of
the Creation. Asserting with Plotinus that the world had a causal
commencement and that it had been brought into being by God,
Augustine yet arrives at very different conclusions.
In the first place, Augustine held that the world
had not been engendered, but created. He distinguishes very clear*
-ly between begetting and creating. God begat His Son, for He
was co-eternal with Himself. (2). But Augustine would not
accept the doctrine that the world was co-equal^wdth God. The
heavens and the earth, being subject to change, and unlike the
immutable God, must have been created, for only that which is
absolutely selü^-exio-teat unchangeable is self-existent. (3)
When we think of the Creation, moreover, we must not
Foot Notes- (I). Windelband, op.cit.page,247, (2).Contra Secund. 
Manich.3.8. (3) See Watson, 'The Philosophical Basis of 
Religion*, page 338.
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imagine God as a workman who applies to matter his industry. He
was no fashioner of pre-existent matter. God is not simply the
Architect of the world, He is its Creator. Matter and form were
created at the same time ; God made the world out of nothing.
Augustine explains this by saying- "When we say that
He made it out of nothing, we mean that there was no pre-existent
Matter, unmade by Himself, without which He could not have made
the world". (l)
But , if God made the world, it was not because of
necessity says St. Augustine; it was rather an act of goodness on
His part; He found it good to create it, and if he found that it
was good to create it , it was because of his will. The will of
God is, therefore, says Augustine,the cause of the Creation.
"He who asks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause
of the will of God. Shall we not then, reply to them that cause
is efficient? Now the producer is always greater that that which
is produced; but there is nothing greater than the will of God;
there is, therefore no point in asking what is the cause of it? '
(2) Augustine found a difficulty in reconciling
the conception of the Eternity of God with a creation that was
not eternal. He grants that many ages may have passed since the
world was created, but he adds- "let I have no doubt that no
created thing is co-eternal with the Creator." (3)
Now whilst Augustine could not think oâ a
world co-eternal with God, neither could he conceive of God as
Foot Notes- (I). Augustine, Ad 0résium,I-2. De Fid# et symbolo, 
1,2. De Vera Relig.XvIIIé35.De Genesi contra Manich.1.6.
"Et ideo Deus^^r^ctissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, 
quia etiamsi ^ formata de is ta materia fâcta sunt,haec ipsa mat- 
-eria tamen^nihilo facta est". (2).De Diversis Quaest.83.28.
(3) De Civ.Dei,XII.I6. see also ibid.XII.I5.
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'aa creating the world in time. He reasons that Time cannot be 
thought of in connection with God, for God has only to do with 
Eternity. Time has no meaning apart from change, the ground of 
change lies in things, but God being absolutely immutable can 
experience no change, and therefore for Him there is no time.
Plotinus had said- "Eternity is characteristic of 
the Intellectual-Principle, time of the Soul- for we hold that 
time has its substantial being in the activity of the soul, and 
springs from soul..,We repeat, identity belongs to the eternal, 
time must be the medium of diversity". (l) And we find that 
Augustine closely follows him here.
Time began, says Augustine, with creatures, that is 
with creation; hence he declares the world was not made in time 
but with Time. (2) Whilst, Augustine finds himself unable
to accept the truth which Plotinus holds concerning the eternity 
of the world, he yet comes here very closely to that thesis 
without making God and the world co-eternal. (3)
Augustine too is prepared to admit that there 
may be new things created by God, but he argues, such new crea- 
-tion does not necessitate a change in God's will, since all 
things must be included in God's plan. God cannot think one 
thing at one time and another thing at another time. All things 
are eternally present to God. (4)
FOOT Notes- (I). Enneads, IV.4.I5. (2).See Confessions,XI.13.16. 
alsdbany other passageç.in the same book of the Confess.
(3).Be Genesi ad Litt.9.26."Hie ergo incommutabili aeternit- 
-ate vivens creavit omnia simul ex quibus eurrerent tempora 
et implerentur loca,temporalibusque et localibus rerum moti- 
-bus saecula volverentur". (4).De Civ.Dei,XII.20."What can 
seem more in accordance with godly reason than to believe 
that it is possible for God both to create new things never 
before created ,and in doing so,to preserve His will unalt- 
-ered"
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We are able now to see the difficulties with which 
Augustine was confronted in his attempt to maintain his view 
of the Simplicity of the Divine nature, and at the same time 
set forth such a view of God's work in the Creation of the 
World.
It is true that like perplexities had troubled 
Plotinus, but he has sought to overcome them by reducing the 
Divine activity to a minimum by representing the power as 
emanating from the three Hypostases from one to another, So that 
"in its very non-action it magnificently operates".
But Augustine, on the other hand , had already 
admitted creative action on the part of God, and further he had 
declared that God made the world because He wished to make it.
In thw work of Creation, Augustine has then set before us the 
Goodness, the Knowledge, and the Will of God. He endeavours,
/V «51. -
however,^to violate his view as a Psychologist, by regarding: these 
as but the attributes of God. These, he/ declares, are each and 
all parts of God's Unity. God is not God apart from His goodness; 
He is absolute Goodness; He is The Good; so with His Will and His 
Knowledge. All contribute to the glory and splendour of the 
Divine Nature. (l).
It is unthinkable for Augustine to identify 
the world with God, and yet how was it possible for him to 
explain the world apart from God? He solves his difficulty by 
adopting the Neo-Platonic view that finite things cannot add to 
the sum of being, since they partake of the nature of negation. 
Then it would seem to logically follow from that, that the world 
cannot partake of reality at all, but is only an illusion. But
Foot Note- (I) See Watson,'The Philosophical basis of Religion* 
page,337.
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St. Augustine will not agree to that; hence he seeks to show 
that the world depends upon God for the limited reality which 
it possesses. As it partakes of the nature of God it has being; 
as it remains apart from God it can only be an illusion.
"Whilst this", says Dr. Watson, "is the logical 
consequence of Augustine's Neo-Platonic doctrine that finite 
being is purely negative, his more explicit doctrine is that 
the world is a relatively independent existence, which owes its 
origin to the creative power of God". (I)
We see then that whilst Augustine differs 
greatly in the view he takes of the creation, from that which 
Plotinus has set forth, nevertheless there are even here, very 
evident signs of the influence of Neo-platonism upon his 
thought.
Foot Note- (I). Watson, op.cit. "The philosophical Basis of 
Religion", page, 356.
(213).
CHAPTER 7.
THE INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS ON THE THEORIES OF 
ST. AUGUSTINE CONCERNING PROVIDENCE, EVIL, 
OPTIMISM, AND FREEDOM.
"De graves raisons conduisirent saint Augustin a etudier et à 
adopter les idees fondamentales de la théorie professes par 
Plotin sur la Providence."
Douillet; Vol. 2. Page, 523.
In our study of the life of St. Augustine we have 
seen that at an impressionable period he was attracted to Manich- 
-aeism by its specious promises of enlightenment upon life's 
most pressing and most perplexing problems. Here was a System 
which professed to give just that of which the world sttod in 
need; an authoritative revelation of truth; (I) a solution of the 
pressing problem of evil; in a word, an explanation of the mean- 
-ing of life. As we know Manichaeism exercised a marked influ- 
-ence upon Augustine's mental and spiritual development for the 
nine years during which he remained as 'a hearer'. It offered a 
dualistic explanation of the Universe. It proclaimed an eternal 
warfare between the rival powers of light and darkness, good and 
evil, and,by means of the dualism which existed in the world, 
it solved the harassing problem of evil which had long vexed the 
heart of St. Augustine. He tells us that here in this system he 
found an answer to the question. Whence is Evil?
When, however, Augustine was delivered from the
bondage of Manichaeism by means of Neo-Platonism, and had grasped
the principle of the spiritual Unity of the world, he was not 
Foot Note- (I) De Utilitate Credendi, 1.2.
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slow to accept all the help he could receive from that Philos- 
-ophy in order that he might warmly contest what he now saw to be 
a most specious and most dangerous doctrine.
In many of his treatises against the Manichaeans 
as well as when he is dealing with the order and harmony which 
exists in the universe, we find St. Augustine closely associates 
himself with Plotinus and makes free use of many of his argum- 
-ents and illustrâtions .CO Here then on the themes of Providence, 
Evil and Freedom we shall be able to find that St. Augustine has 
been profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism.
In the previous chapter we saw that whilst for 
Plotinus the world owed its existence to an emanation, and that 
it was begotten by the Divine Hypostases, on the other hand St. 
Augustine affirmed a creation by the Will and owing to the good- 
-ness and Love of God.
Despite these differences, however, there
is complete agreement upon the fact that the world owes its exist-
-ence to God. Plotinus declares and Augustine follows him in a
like assertion that the world and all things in it have received 
their
forms and patterns from the mind of the Supreme Being.
But now, God in His infinite goodness and
Love, having brought the world into being , does not cease to
act upon it or in it when the work of His creation has become
perfected. Indeed the world, so Augustine and Plotinus tell us
frequently, is dependent upon Him for its very life, indeed,
Foot Note- (I) Most especially do we see thiswith respect to the 
writings of Plotinus against the Gnostics.These held the 
same dualistic principle, as the Maàichaeans, & Augustine 
found here powerful arguments whereby he too could combat 
Manichaeism.
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the world would cease to be were it not for God's continuous 
action upon it. Augustine says- "There is about His work a 
continuity by means of which He directs and rules every creature. 
That continuity of operation which gives to all things a harmony 
that charms us, and which makes them incomparable and ineffable, 
and, if one could only take it in, their stable movement is
|v
evident to those who pay attention. Now su^ress that continuity
and that movement ceases and when such movement is at an end, as
a result things will perish...That is why we believe and affirm
that God works ceaselessly in His creatures..Hence it follows
that if He were to withdraw his cooperation, we should have neith-
-er life, nor movement, nor Being". (l)
And the Providence of God is universal, extend-
-ing to all things, man, animal, plant, even to things that are
most insignificant. Everywhere there is to be seen that harmony
which is the result of an over-ruling Providence.
Augustine describes this many times . Here he says- "God supreme
and true, with His Word and Holy Spirit (which three are one) one
God omnipotent, creator and maker of every soul and of every body;
...who has given to the good and to the evil, being in common with
stones, vegetable life in common with trees, sensuous life in
common with brutes, intellectual life in common with angels alone;
from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom
are measure, weight, number ; from whom is everything which has an 
existence in nature, of whatever kind it be, and of whatever value 
from whom are the seeds of forms and the forms of seeds, and the 
motion of seeds and of forms; who gave also to flesh its origin, 
beauty, health, reproductive fecundity, disposition of members, &
Foot Note- (l).De Genesi ad Litt. 17.12. also ibid, 7.20.
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the salutary concord of its parts; ...who has not left, not to
not
speak of heaven and earth, angels and men, hut^even the entrails 
of the smallest and most contemptible animal, or the feather of 
a bird, or the little flower of a plant, or the leaf of a tree, 
without an harmony,- that G6d can never be believed to have left 
the kingdoms of men, their dominations and servitudes, outside 
of the laws of His providence". (I)
And Plotinus, in very much the same way tells us- 
"We cannot but recognise from what we observe in this universe 
that some such principle of order prevails throughout the entire 
of existence- the minutest things a tributary to the vast total; 
the marvellous art shown not merely in the mightiest works and 
sublimest members of the All, but even amid such littleness as 
one would think Providence must disdain: the varied workmanship 
of wonder in any and every animal form; the world of vegetation, 
too; the grace of fruits and even of leaves, the lavishness, the 
delicacy, the diversity of exquisite bloom: and all this not iss- 
-uing once, and then to die out, but made ever and ever anew as 
the Transcendent Beings move variously over this earth." (2)
Now both Augustine and Plotinus declare with *mph- 
-atic insistence that all this cannot be the result of Chance.(3) 
Everywhere there is evidence of prevailing law and Universal 
Order which even extends to particular things.
Augustine in his treatise on Order tells us- "All
things act according to Order in our world of sense. In all
Foot Notes- (I). De Civ.Dei, V.II.- XXII.24.-Confess.VII.5.7.&c.
(2). Enneads, III.2.1%.-cp.De Civ.Dei, X.14.where Augustine 
quotes this passage^, mentioning Plotinus by name.Enns.V. 1.4 
and often. (3l.Enneads, %.2.1.-3.2.13.-De Ord.I.I.
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material being we are able to behold a wonderful harmony. Each 
is linked with eac%; cause and effect, everywhere. Even the app- 
-arently insignificant thing has a real purpose. God guides all 
events; order is everywhere. What is called chance is but Provid- 
-ence forgotten". (I)
So too Plotinus, in many places tells us- "All 
things must be enchained; and the sympathy and correspondence obt- 
-aining in any one closely knit organism must exist, first and 
most intensely, in the All". .."and there is nothing undesigned, 
nothing of chance, in all the process".(2) Again he says- 
"The Universe is permeated by one Soul, Cause of all things and 
events; every separate phenomenon as a member of a whole moves 
in its place with the general movement; all the various causes
I
spring into action from one source: therefore, it is argued, the
entire descending claim of causes and all their interaction must
follow inevitably and so constitute a universal determination". (.3
Now from this prevailing harmony Augustine deduees
the Unity of the Creation and argues that the Godhead must be
a Unity.He affirms that if only the Manichaeists had acknowledged
the admirable unity which is everywhere present, they would have
affirmed that there was but one God, and that He was the Father
of Unity and is perfectly good, and is Providence. (4)
Moreover, Augustine reasons that in man's
struggle after being lies his search for Unity. "Things which
2.3.7.
Foot Notes- (l). De Ordine, I. c.I-VI. (2). Enneads,
(3)Enneads, 3X.1.4.-see also Enneads,3.2.1,-3.3.6. 3 9 .  
and often. (4). De Genesi contra Manich.I.21. 4».
(218).
tend towards existence tend towards order; and in attaining
order they attain existence, as far as that is possible with a
creature. For order reduces to a certain uniformity that which
it arranges; and existence is nothing else than being one. Thus,
so far as anything acquires unity, so far it exists." (I)
Then Augustine goes on to say that the source of
every kind of obscure trouble arises from an absence of unity.(2)
We see then both Plotinus and Augustine are agreed
that there is law, harmony, order, and beauty in the Universe
and that these things proclaim the mind and beauty of the Divine
Being. Plotinus in an eloquent passage says, "Surely no one see-
-ing the loveliness lavish in the world of sense- this vast
orderliness, the Form which the stars even in their remoteness
display- no one could be so dull-witted, so immoveable, as not
to be carried by all this to recollection, and gripped by rever-
-ent awe in the thought of all this, so great, sprung from that
greatness. Not to answer thus could only be to have neither fath-
-omed this world nor had any vision of that other". (3),
But despite the fact that Providence watched
over the world and that there were everywhere perfect Order,
Law, and Beauty, nevertheless the world was not as perfect as one
would expect. This had given Augustine much thought. The world
was marred by the presence of Evil in it; whence came such Evil?
Foot Notes- (I). De moribus Manichaeorum, VI.8. (2).De lib arb.
3.23.70. (3).Enneads, 2.9.16. Mackenna, page,239. Vol.2. 
compare De Civ.Dei, VIII.6.
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How are we to justify the misery of this life if the world is
ruled by Providence? We see how Augustine in his many treatises
debates this question. In the book of the Confessions he says- ! 
"God is good, yea most mightily and incomparably better than all 
these: but yet He, the Good created them good;...Where is evil 
then and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, & 
what its seed? ..Whence is it then? seeing God the Good, hath 
created all these things good...Or was there some evil matter of 
which He made, and formed, and ordered it, yet left something in 
it, which He did not convert into good?...Had He no might to turn 
and change the whole, so that no evil should remain in it,seeing 
He is Almighty? ..Or if it were from eternity, why suffered He it
so to be for infinite spaces of times past, and was pleased so
long after to make something out of it? " (I)
One cannot associate evil with matter, reasons St.
Augustine, since matter has been created by God, and to link evil 
with matter will be in an indirect way to make God responsible 
for Evil. "On that account," says Augustine, "Matter which the 
ancients call Hyle cannot be spoken of as Evil". (2)
Again we find Augustine saying- "One may perhaps
ask, whence comes sin, and then add, whence comes Evil? If it
comes from the angel, whence comes the angel? But without doubt 
both man and angel come from God. But that is no reason for refer- 
-ring to God evils and faults by a chain of sequences as some 
ignorant spirits do who are not able to penetrate dnto the heart
Foot Notes- (I). Confessions, VII.V.7. (2). De natura boni cont.
Manich. 18.
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of things..We know God and all the objections which trouble us
may spring from ourselves". (l). Augustine is drawing near to a
solution of his problem.
We may now notice seberal ways in which Augustine
endeavours to vindicate the ways of Providence. In the first
place he begins by an enquiry concerning the Nature of Evil, foll*^
-owing the direction of Plotinus whose view of Evil Augustine
adopts. (2). I
We find Plotinus saying- "Those enquiring
whence Evil enters into beings, or rather into a certain order of
beings, would be making the best beginning if they established,
first of all, what precisely Evil is, what constitutes its
Nature, At once we should know whence it comes, where it has its
native seat and where it is present merely as an accident;" (3)
We have seen that Augustine affirmed that all
things lower than the Creator had only an apparent reality. In
a sense they were 'real* as coming from God, but in a sense they
are 'unreal' since they are not wholly what He is- the sole
unchanging reality. In effect things only 'are', that is only
exist, as they partake of the being of God. In his Confessions
he says- "I looked back on other things; and I saw that they owed
their being to Thee;...and all things are true so far as they be;
(vera sunt quantum sunt) nor is there any falsehood, unless when
that is thought to be, which is not." (4)
Foot Notes- (l). De duabus animabus con.Manich.8. (2).De morib. 
Manich. 2.X. (3). Enneads, I.8.I. (4). Confessions,VII.15.
21.compare Confess.XI.4.6."Nec ita pulchra sunt nec ita bona 
sunt, nec ita sunt sicut tu, Conditor rerum;cui comparata 
nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt".
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All things made by God are good, he says many times. If Evil 
existed in God, it would be good, but being external to God it is 
outside all being and substance. In one of his Manichaean treat» 
-ises he says- "Evil is not a substance but a hostile defect of 
substance". (I)
Augustine arrives therefore, at the conclusion
that Evil is nothing real, it is negation of being, a deprivat-
-ion of good. Since God is the true Being , and it is outside
God it is a deprivation of being. Augustine repeats this with
emphasis in many of his writings. In the Confessions he says-
"As yet I knew not that evil was nothing but a privation of good,
until at last a thing ceases altogether to be," (2) Again- "There-
-fore, if they shall be deprived of all good, they shall no longer
be. So long therefore as they are, they are good; therefore what-
-soever is, is good. That even then..is not any substance; for
were it a substance, it should be good". (3)
This was then, Augustine's first attempt to
throw light upon the problem of Evil. Let us compare this with
what Plotinus has to say on the matter. "Evil",Plotinus tells us,
"manifests itself as the very absence of Good." (4) "Evil cannot
have place among Beings or in the Beyond-Being; these are good.
There remains, only, if Evil exist at all, that it be situate in
the realm of Non-Being, that it be some mode, as it were, of the
Non-Being, that it have its seat in something in touch with Non-
-Being or to a certain degree communicate in Non-Being.By this
Foot Notes- (I). De Moribus Manich.2.8.XI.'inconvenientia inimica 
substantiae'. (2 Kill, 7.12 .^ <( 3). ibid, VII. 12.18. ,De Civ.Dei, 
XI.9.- XI.22. and often. (4). Enneads, I.8.I.
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Non-Being, of course, we are not to understand something that 
simply does not exist, but only something of an utterly different 
order from Authentic-Being;... the Non-Being we are thinking of 
is, rather, an image of Being or perhaps something still further 
removed than even an image". (l)
Plotinus, then, like Augustine, holds that Evil 
is deprivation of Being.
But Augustine, who knew so well the misery of the
human heart and the profound reality of sin, was aware that to
simply affirm the negative character of Evil and nothing more
would be of little profit. Hence he proceeds to argue further that
Evil has been included in the Order of the Universe for a wise
purpose, that is that it may enhance its glory and beauty. Whilst
then, God dial not choose Evil, nevertheless He permits it, since
things both good and evil have been included by Him in His Order.
"You ask", says Augustine, "how can evil itself be in the order
when God has chosen the Order? For without a doubt there are evil
things in the Order itself . Do you then consider that it is a
poor order that God should Choose good things and that God should
not include bad? Nay the very fact that He elects to choose good
and not to choose evil, proclaims it to be a great order and one
of Divine arrangement. That very Order and arrangement has been
made because in this way He could thus preserve harmony, along
with variety in His Universe. For that reason Evilmust be regarded
as being unavoidable. Just as in oratory, the very beauty of
speech becomes the more pleasing by reason of its antitheses, so
Foot Notes- (l). Enneads, 1.8.3. Mackenna, page 94. see also Enneaëe 
III.2.5.
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it is by its contraries that the beauty of all things is in like 
manner brought forth." (l)
Augustine frequently illustrates this; we find 
him saying, "What can be more offensive than an executioner?.,, 
yet even he holds a needful place in the law of the land, in the 
punishment of criminals who are hostile to the Order.What more 
sordid, more devoid of dignity, more shameful than prostitutes 
procurers, and other pests of like nature? But take these away 
from society and everything would be thrown into confusion by 
reason of rampant lust". (2)
Hence we see that Augustine has arrived at 
the conception of Evil as a necessity for greater Being. God 
has permitted it to be included in His order that through the 
Evil as well as despite the Evil greater glory and beauty and 
good may be the result. Such was the finding also of Plotinus; it 
forms the basis of the Optimism of both Augustine and Plotinus.
Plotinus asks- "Are the evils of the Universe 
necessary because it is of later origin than the Higher Sphere? 
Perhaps rather because without evil the All would be incomplete. 
For most or even all forms of evil serve the Universe- much as 
the poisonous snake has its use- though in most cases their funct- 
-ion is unknown. Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings 
about much that is beautiful, in artistic creations for example, 
and it stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse 
in security". (3)
Foot Notes- (I). De Ordine, I.VII.18.(Col.540) cp.De Civ.Dei,XI.
18.- XII.5. (2). De 0rd.2.4.I2. see also, ibid.2.4.13.(Cols, 
560,1). (3).Enneads, 2.3.18. Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 177.
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In like manner both Plotinus and St. Augustine agree that all 
other ills, such as poverty and sickness, grief, nay even injust- 
-ice play their part in the world , contribute to the greater 
perfection of the Universe, and become conditions of greater 
moral well-being. (I).
It would be folly to expect that all things 
should be made equal; if this were so where would be the variety? 
The very charm, beauty, and splendour of the world in its perf- 
-ection demand that there should be things and creatures of vary- 
-ing degrees and grades. The Statue which is but more or less 
perfect does not cease to be beautiful because all its parts are 
not comely. It is in this way that both our authors proclaim 
their optimism.
Is it possible for any one of us to pass wise
judgment upon the order or seeming disorder of the Universe? Both
Plotinus and Augustine ask, and we find them giving the same
answer. We are not able to judge wisely because we ourselves form
a part of the Universe, and because we see only the imperfection
af a part, and the beauty of the whole escapes our notice. (2)
Moreover, in the moral and spiritual world,
as we/behold injustice, calamity, suffering , in the case of the
righteous, we must remember that we only can view things from the
standpoint of the present brief life, whilst God has all eternity
to perfect his work. We ought to judge therefore not from the
single point of space or time, but from the totality and univers-
Foot Notes- (I). Enneads, III.2.5. & De lib.arb.B. IX.26.(Col.1009, 
Enneads,3.2.11.& De.Ord.2.4.13.- Enneads,3.3.5. &.De Ord.1.7, 
18.- Enneads, 17.3.16. & De Div.Quaest.24,27. &c. (2).See 
De Civ.Dei, XII.4.De.0rd.I.I.De Genesi con.Manich.I.16. De 
Musica,VI.XI, De Vera Relig.40.Conf.VII.13.19.cp.Enneads,
3.2.3,7.
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-ality of things. (I)
Furthermore, hidden causes; reasons that we are 
ignorant of because of our very limited humanity make our judg- 
-ment impossible; the Universe is wholly regulated by a Provid- 
-ence whose designs cannot be determined .
So for both Plotinus and Augustine the avtiv- 
-ity of the Divine Being towards His Universe makes for ever 
increasing blessing; He is the centre to which all things turn.
One final quotation from Plotinus will 
express all that needs to be said further on this point.
"Nor would it be sound to condemn this Kosmos as less than beaut- 
-iful, as less than the noblest possible in the corporeal; and 
neither can any charge be laid against its source.
The world; we must reflect, is a product of Necessity, not of del- 
-iberate purpose: it is due to a higher Kind engendering in its 
own likeness by a natural process. And none the less, a second 
consideration, if a considered plan brought it into being it 
would still be no disgrace to its maker- for it stands a stately 
whole, complete within itself, serving at once its own purpose 
and that of all its parts which, leading and lesser alike, are of 
such a nature as to further the interests of the total. It is 
therefore, impossible to condemn the whole on the merits of the 
parts which, besides, must be judged only as they enter harmoniou- 
-sly or not into the whole, the main consideration, quite overpast 
-ing the members which thus cease to have importance. To linger 
about the parts is to condemn not the Kosmos but some isolated 
appendage of it; in the entire living Being we fasten our eyes on 
*00t Note- (I).De Lib.art.3.23.(66,7,8.) (Cols.I033f.
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on a hair or a toe neglecting the marvellous spectacle of the com- 
-plete Man; we ignore all the tribes and kinds of animals except 
for the meanest; we pass over an entire race, humanity, and bring 
forward- Thersites. No: this thing that has come into Being is 
(not a mass of fragments, but) the Kosmos complete: do but survey 
it, and surely this is the pleading you will hear:-
I am made by God: from that God I came perfect above 
all forms of life, adequate to my function, self-sufficing, lack- 
-ing nothing: for I am the container of all, that is of every 
plant and every animal, of all Kinds of created things, and many 
Gods and nations of Spirit-Beings and lofty souls and men happy 
in their goodness.
And do not think that, while earth is ornate 
with all its growths and with living things of every race, and 
while the very sea has answered to the power of Soul, do not 
think that the great air and the ether and the far-spread heavens 
remain void of it: there it is that all good Souls dwell, infusing 
life into the stars and into that orderly eternal circuit of the 
heavens which in its conscious movement ever about the one centra 
seeking nothing beyond, is a faithful copy of the divine Mind.
And all that is within me strives towards the Good; and eaah, to 
the measure of its faculty, attains. For from that Good all the 
heavens depend, with all my own Soul and the Gods that dwell in 
my every part, and all that lives and grows, and even all in me 
that you may judge inanimate". (l)
Foot Note- (I). Enneads, 3,2,3. Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 14,15.
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Before we bring this chapter to a close we must briefly 
touch upon a third theory which St. Augustine adduces concerning 
the presence of Sin or Moral Evil in the Universe. Sin says 
Augustine is due to the Freedom which God has granted to man.
God in His infinite goodness, when he created man, end- 
-owed him with the power of Freedom of choice; as mem abused that 
gift and chose wrongly sin entered into the world.
In his Confessions, Augustine says- "And I enquired
what iniquity was, and I found it to be no substance, but the
perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, 0 God, the Supr-
-eme, towards these lower things". (I)
Again we find him saying- "I believe that you
will remember that in our first discourse, it was sufficiently
ascertained that in no way can the mind become enslaved by lust
except by its own free-will; for neither can it be compelled to
commit such an infamy by a superior, nor by an equal...nor by an
inferior. ...The impulse is his own by which, for the sake of
personal gratification, he turns away his will from the Creator
to the creature: such an impulse if it be deemed a fault, is
assuredly not natural but voluntary; it may be likened to that
movement by which a stone is borne downward to the earth, for
this is the peculiar quality of the stone and that the tendency
of the soul; nevertheless indeed it is different with the former,
because the stone has no power by which it can prevent the move-
-ment by which it is borne downward, whilst, on the other hand.
Foot Notes- (l). Confessions, VII.16.22.see also De vera relig. 
14.2 7. In De vera relig.40.76.sin is defined as- 'defectus 
voiuntarius a summa essentia*See Enchiridion,XXIII.De Civ.Dei 
XIV.XI.&c.
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though the soul does not desire it, is it not thus moved when in 
neglecting the higher things it chooses the lower*. (I)
Again Augustine says- "For God, the author of natures, 
not of vices, created man upright; hut man, being of his own 
will corrupted, and justly condemned, begot corrupted and condemn- 
-ed children...and thus, from the bad use of free-will, there 
originated the whole train of evil, which with its concatenation 
of miseries, convoys the human race from its depraved origin, as 
from a corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death.... 
..those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God."(2) 
In the same book, Augustine again says- "It is He 
who gave to the Intellectual nature free-will of such a kind, 
that if he wished to forsake God his blessedness, misery should 
forthwith result...And indeed evil had never been, had not the 
mutable nature- mutable, though good, and created by the most 
high God, who created all things good- brought evil upon itself 
by sin*. (3)
We see from these quotations that nothing compels 
the Soul to obey the passions and impulses of its own will, it is 
therefore free; hence through that freedom and a wrong exercise 
of it Evil arises. Such was the finding of St. Augustine.
Now in like manner Plotinus ascribes Evil to a
like freedom. He says- "Men are no doubt involuntary sinners in
the sense that they do not not actually desire to sin; but this
does not alter the fact that wrongdoers, of their own choice, are
Foot Notes- (I). De lib.arb.3.I.8. (Col.994) (2). De Civ.Dei, XIII
14. (3). ibid, XXII.I.
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themselves, the agents; it is because they themselves act that 
the sin is in their own; if they were not agents they could not 
sin". (I)
Or again, this is how the matter is summed up 
concerning the fall of the Souls- "What can be the cause that has 
led the souls to forget God, their Father, and members of Him 
though they are, wholly His, to cease to know both themselves and 
Him? The evil that has befallen them is due to a Rebellious 
Audacity to their entry into birth (or their desire to 'become*) 
to the Primal Differentiation and to the desire of the Souls to 
have similarly a life of their own. They began to revel in free- 
-will: they indulged their own movement: they took the wrong 
path: they went far astray: thus it was that they lost the know- 
-ledge that they sprang of that Divine Order(were members of the 
.Triune..They no longer had a true vision of The Supreme or of 
themselves". (2)
Free-will, Pride, Lust- these are the causes of 
Evil, it is by these things men arrive at the state of Non-Being; 
so says Plotinus. We have already seen how St. Augustine speaks 
of Freedom as the cause of sin, he is equally insistent that sin 
is caused by Pride and Lust and frequently in his many treatises 
sounds his warning concerning these vices, (3)
A* we find Messrs Gibb and Montgomery stating the
case- "Evil has happened through the contact of the world-soul
with matter. Certain souls from a desire to be independent separ-
-ated themselves from the world-soul and descended into bodies..
Foot Notes- (l)Enneads,3.2.I0. (2)Mackenna, Vol.I.P.130. (The
Preller-Ritter extracts forming a conspectus of the Plotine- 
-an system. (3).De lib.arb.3.24.Conf.7.7.II.& often,De Fide 
spe et caritate,XXX. frequently.
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In thus placing the beginnings of sin in a wrongful choice, Plot- 
-inus approached the Christian position*'. (I).
We are now able to see that with both Augustine 
and Plotinus, the Evil in the world,(or rather we should call it 
sin,) and all its attendant miseries, has been due to mankind; it 
originates with ourselves. We cannot blame anyone or anything 
else, we are free agents in the matter, the cause of our Evil 
cannot be assigned to the stars, we cannot rail against the heavens 
We alone are responsible in this matter;Plotinus and Augustine say 
this. But man having thus brought trouble and misery into the 
world through hie sin by no means overturns the rule of Providence. 
Certain things happen , good or bad, helpful or injurious; but 
blessing or bane, beauty or ugliness, each an4 all is so made use 
of by Providence that Goodness, and Beauty, and Being is triumph- 
-ant. (8) God is never defeated; such is the optimism of the 
Philosopher and the Christian Father,
I
But a final word must be said concerning Freedom.
It must have become plain to us from our survey of what both Augus-
-tine and Plotinus have set forth in their writings that there are
indeed two kinds of Freedom. In the first place we have given to
us a Freedom to choose between good and evil; freedom of choice
and with it the power to choose wrongly. But can that ever be
really true Freedom? Are we ever then entirely free? True, we look
upon ourselves and others as being free agents; we regard others
Foot Notes- (I). St.Augustine's Confessions, Patristic Texts, op. 
cit.p.xliv. (2). Enneads, III.3.5.
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as being responsible beings and accord to them the same freedom 
which we claim for ourselves. But with respect to that freedom 
of choice, is it not true that as we choose unwisely, foolishly, 
wrongly, by reason of passion, feeling, or sensation, we really 
part with our liberty and become enslaved and under bondage to 
lesser powers? Exercising our freedom to choose evil we become 
hounded onward by our lower natûCBS, in the grip of the very 
ill which we have foolishly chosen.
But there is another kind of Freedom; The
Christian Father would speak of it as the Liberty of the Spirit.
We possess that Higher Freedom when our better nature rules,
when by union with the Infinite power that has brought all things
into being we gain dominion over sense .Augustine has defined
such Freedom for us when he speaks of it as- "The movement of the
Soul, which, without any restraint, bears it towards something
which it does not wish to lose, or which it desires to obtain".(I
Very clearly both Plotinus and Augustine have set
forth a distinction between these two kinds of Freedom.
Plotinus says that Free-Will is shown in right act-
-ion not in acts done under the driving of the senses;- "Whenso-
-ever the soul has been wrested from its own character by the for-
-ce of the Outer and so acts- rushing in a blind excitement- the
act or the state is not to be called an act or state of freedom;
so, too, when in a self-induced corruption it answers to impulses!
within itself that are not entirely right, not of its highest
nature: only when our soul acts by its native pure and independent
Foot Notes- (I). De duabus animabus con.Manich. X."Voluntas est 
animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, 
vel adipiscendum".
(232).
Reason-Principle can the act he described as ours and as an
exercise of Free-Will". (I)
Again, Plotinus often affirms that the Liberty or
Free-Will by which we pursue or accomplish evil is rather the very
negation of freedom - "All that descends to a lower state descends
against its own Free-Will, but since it has followed an impulse of
its owi^ature it is said to pay the penalty, which is no other
than the very fall itself. But in the sense that such act and
experience was necessary from eternity by a law of nature, then
one may say,...that this thing, descending from what was above it
to the service of something else, was sent down by God" (2)
In the same way Augustine expresses himself thus-
"Man using evilly his free will hath lost both himself and it,For
when through free-will sin was committed, sin being conqueror, free
-will was lost. For he serves freely, who willingly does the will
of his master. And thus he is free to commit sin who is the slave
of sin...This is the true liberty by reason of the joy in doing
right, and at the same time godly slavery by reason of the obed-
-ience to the command. But this liberty to do well, when shall it
be to man, made over and sold, unless He redeem him Whose is that
saying, * If the Son hath set you free, then shall ye be truly freei
...Therefore then are we made truly free, when God fashions us,
that is, forms and creates us." (B)
Thus have we set before us the clear distinction
which exists between the two freedoms. A word might be added to
show how Plotinus draws near to the Christian position as he tells
Foot Notes- (l). Enneads, III.S.9. Mackenna, page,131, Vol.I.
(2). ibid. Enneads, IV.8.5. (3). Enchiridion, XXX. For an ill- 
-uminating section on this, see Inge,'Plotinus*, Vol.2.pp.J8I 
-185. ' I
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US of the fall and return of the Soul.
The Soul in its original purity is free, but by 
its union with the body it becomes liable to the things of sense. 
If then it turns from the contemplation of that which is above it 
and allows its yearnings to be captured by the things that are 
carnal, it loses its pristine glory and freedom. If such a Soul 
has thus become defiled, it can only regain its lost liberty by 
setting its affections on that which is above, purifying itself 
and withdrawing itself from the attractions that are without and 
beginning to take that return which will lead it to union with 
the true Being.
But Plotinus makes it clear that the Soul 
need not of necessity suffer defilement even when it comes into 
contact with matter and enters into union with the body. It is 
able on the other hand to play the part of heavenly messenger & 
cause the body to be of use in the highest service of all.
"This is how we come to read", says Plotinus,"that 
our soul, entering into association with that complete soul and 
itself thus made perfect, walks the lofty ranges, administering 
the entire kosmos, and that as long as it does not secede and ié 
neither inbound in body nor held in any sort of servitude, so long 
it tranquilly bears its part in the governance of the All, exactly 
like the world-soul itself; for in fact it suffers no hurt what- 
-ever by furnishing body with the power of existence, since not 
every form of care for the inferior need wrest the providing soul 
from its own sure standing in the highest". (I)
Foot Note- (I). Enneads, IV.8,2. Mackenna, Vol.3.page,145.
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So do we see the Christian Father and the Neo-Platonist, Plotinus 
in close fellowship concerning the deepest things of the Spirit.
Over against the potency of sin Augustine would set 
the omnipotence of God, over against the power that would ruin and 
destroy he setfthe grace that saved. Plotinus and Augustine
I
proclaim their message/^ in different form of speech, but they
often mean the same thing, and are prompted to proclaim it with i
I
the same earnest purpose. j
Dean Inge has a beautiful reference to Plotin- | 
-us in his volume from which we have often quoted, which fitly I 
expresses the optimism of the philosopher and is pertinent to 
the theme of this chapter- with that we shall close.
"He (Plotinus) knows that the earth is full of darkness 
and cruel habitations; but he is convinced that evil is not the 
truth of things; he cannot regard it as having a substance of 
its own. "Evil", he says, "is not alone. By virtue of the nature 
of Good, the power of Good, it is not Evil only. It appears 
necessarily, bound around with bonds of Beauty, like some captive 
bound in fetters of gold; and beneath these it is hidden so that, 
while it must exist, it may not be seen by the gods, and that 
men need not always have evil before their eyes, but that when it 
comes before them they may still be not destitute of images of the 
Good and Beautiful for their remembrance.(I) In another place he |
says , in words as true as they are consoling, "Wickedness is
always human, being mixed with something contrary to itself". It is 
human, and therefore not wholly evil and not wholly incurable;
Foot Notes- (l) Enneads, 1.8.12. Mackenna, page, 108.
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for the Soul of man comes from Bod, and cannot be utterly cut 
off from Him. And above the Soul of man is the great Soul, the 
Soul of the world." (I).
Foot Note- (l). Inge, 'The Philosophy of Plotinus'. Vol. I.
. page, 22.
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CHAPTER 8.
A SUMMARY OF RESULTS.
We have now reached the stage in our study of the influence of 
Neo-Platonism upon St. Augustine, when we must gather together 
some of the fruits of our enquiry.
Nearly two centuries before the time of 
Plotinus, Philo had anticipated many of the doctrines commonly 
associated with Neo-Platonism. And whilst on several points 
there is a marked difference between Philo and Plotinus, yet we 
can see a general agreement between them. Hence, it has been 
declared that 'Philo inaugurated Neo-Platonism*. Philo frequen- 
-tly asserts the Existence and Unity of God; with him God is One, 
Simple, Unchangeable, Incomprehensible, and He is Eternal. He 
is, therefore, best known by negation. He is The One, with Philo 
as with Plotinus. His doctrine of the Logos as mediator between 
God and man, resembles in some points the Nous of Plotinus.
Whilst in what Philo has to say concerning the Powers, he closely 
follows Plato in his conception of the Ideas, although he adopts 
the view of Aristotle and represents the Ideas as existing with- 
-in the Logos. Philo too had a mystical experience of Ecstasy, 
which Plotinus, as we have seem, so fully describes. In these & 
on other points Philo anticipates Plotinus, and, without a doubt, 
Plotinus has made use of them.
We have seen also that within the Christian 
Church itself there were the Gnostic heresies which sought to 
make use of philosophical speculation in the interpretation of
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the Christian Faith,
In order that these Gnostic heresies might he 
refuted, and that, at the same time,the Christian Faith might he 
received hy the cultured people of the day, there was an earnest 
endeavour on the part of Christian apologists, Justin Martyr and 
others, to blend the doctrines of Christianity with the teaching 
of Plato,
But the most pronounced attempt to effect a 
rapprochement between Christianity and Philosophy took place in 
the great Catechetical School which existed at Alexandria, There 
we have found that Clement and Origen did their great work, and 
there,there arose a widespread interchange of ideas between 
Christianity and Neo-Platonism and Neo-Platonism and Christianity 
Many philosophers as they were converted to the 
Christian Faith, took with them the ideas and conceptions which 
they had received from Neo-Platonism, and adapted these towards 
the fuller understanding and exposition of the doctrines of the 
Christian Church; whilst, on the other hand, in the passing of 
others from Christianity to Neo-Platonism, that Philosophy was 
also leavened by much that had been received from Christianity,
If the story be true that Ammonius Saccas was 
a Christian before he became a Neo-Platonist, he surely must 
have been influenced by much of his early training.
Thus long before St. Augustine entered the 
Christian Church, its doctrines must have been enriched by much 
which its teachers had received from Neo-Platonism, It^îday have 
been that St, Augustine, as we have already suggested, had been 
prepared by the preaching of Ambrose, for many of the truths
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which he met with in the books of the Enneads of Plotinus.
From Augustine*s own account of his deliver- 
-ance from the bondage of Manichaeism, and the enlightenment 
which he received from the study of the books of the Platonists 
we are left in no doubt as to the influence which Neo-Platonism 
exercised upon his life and thought.
We need not again, detail that story, or give 
the reasons for our assertion that in the mind of St.Augustine 
the Platonists were none other than the Neo-Platonists, chiefly 
Plotinus and Porphyry. It is true that Augustine often mentions 
Plato by name and that he had a very high regard for him; indeed 
sometimes he appears to have an exact knowledge of his position, 
whilst at other times, he quite erroneously attributes to him 
views which he did not hold. Because of this, and the fact that 
Augustine did not have a very extensive knowledge of the Greek 
language, we gather that, for the most^part^his knowledge of 
Plato, with the exception perhaps of the Timaeus, had been receiv- 
-ed either from translations or through Plotinus himself.
Further, although we recognise that Augustine 
appears to have been greatly influenced by Aristotle in many 
ways, (I) yet we again would recall the fact that Plotinus himself 
was considerably indebted to that Philosopher, and we affirm that 
possibly here also, Augustine had obtained his information of the 
tenets of Aristotle, indirectly,by means of Plotinus.
We have no hesitation in saying then, that
Foot Note-(I). See Nourrisson, *La philosophie de Saint Augustin*, 
op.cit.Vol.e.pages, 107-128. for an account of Augustine’s 
indebtedness to Plato and Aristotle,
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the Neo-Platonists, especially Plotinus, exercised the predomin-
-ating influence upon his thought.
Augustine regards Plotinus, as the successor
of Plato, indeed, that he is but another Plato, and that in
Plotinus, Plato lived again. (I)
We gather from his account of his awakening, in
the Confessions, that the intense spirituality of Plotinus left
a very marked impression on the mind of Augustine, struggling as
he was in the bondage of Manichaeism and longing for a way of
escape. He saw in Plotinus, one whose deepest interest in life
was a knowledge of God, one whose mind and will were united in
the Divine quest, and who was able to describe with great clear-
-nesB the steps which must be taken by any who sought, above all
else, a mystical union with the Divine.
Augustine was eager to know the Truth about
God and his own soul, and he finds in Plotinus a kindred spirit,
who had evidently reached a knowledge of that Truth for which
he himself panted, one,too,who claimed to have found the way of
deliverance for man, a way which would lead him into the liberty
of the spirit. What wonder, then, that Augustine must have
said of Plotinus, what Plotinus had himself said of Ammoni/$us
Saccas, * This is the man for whom I have been seeking*
St. Augustine*s heart, therefore, was kindled
Foot Note- (I). De Civ.Dei, IX.10."Plotinus, whose memory is 
quite recent, enjoys the reputation of having understood 
Plato better than any other of his disciples". Contra Acad. 
3.18.
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by the reading of these books which set before him the way of
life and told him so much about God and his own soul.
But, herein lay the trouble, Augustine was still 
burdened with his sins, and troubled by his fleshly desires. He 
had had a vision of the Truth from Plotinus, but how was he to 
reach it? He vividly describes his old passions and habits 
as they hold him back and mock him as he longs to enter on the 
way which leads to Truth. How was he to see the Beauty of which 
Plotinus had written? Only the pure in heart could see God; but 
how was he to gain that purity? "As it is not for those to speak 
of the graceful forms of the material world who have never seen 
them or known their grace- men born blind, let us suppose- in the 
same way those must be silent upon the beauty of noble conduct 
and of learning and all that order who have never cared for such 
things, nor may those tell of the splendour of virtue who have 
never known the face of Justice and of Moral-Wisdom beautiful
beyond the beauty of Evening and of Dawn." (I)
How was he to obtained the cleansed sight that 
he might behold that heavenly beauty? He seeks out Simplicianus 
a man of saintly character, and to him Augustine unburdens his 
heart. Simplicianus, when he learns of what Augustine had found 
from the books of the Platonists, tells him of Victorinus, the 
translator of these very books, who, late in life had been conv- 
-erted from Neo-Platonism to Christianity by the reading of the 
Pauline Epistles. The recital deeply moved Augustine, he 'burned 
to imitate him*. Here then was the way to life, and Augustine 
following in the steps of Victorinus befgan his study of the 
Foot Note- (I).Enneads, 1.6.4. Mackenna, page, 82.
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New Testament which led him into the light and liberty of
a child of God. It is not necessary to deal further with the
fact that Victorinus at this stage was a real help to Augustine
not only because of his translation of the Enneads , but by
reason also of his exposition of Christian Truth by means of the
principles of Neo-Platonism. It was probably here that Augustine
now began to discover that all Truth was one, and that in the
writings of the New Testament, notably in the prologue to St.
John’s gospel and in the Epistles of St. Paul, there was much
which Plotinus had revealed to him. (I)
Hence Aügustine found ready to hand , in Neo-
-Platonism, a help towards the elucidation of the Christian
Mysteries. Neo-Platonism as we have frequently seen, taught him
to test all things by the principle of the ’immediate certainty
of inner experience’, and that axiom he made use of as the start-
-ing-point of philosophy.
Neo-Platonism has been described as "the half-
-way house at which Augustine made a stay between Manichaeism &
Christianity". (2) But in our judgment that is hardly a happy
description of what actually took place, since St.Augustine did
not cease to be a Neo-Platonist after he became a Christian.
Indeed its influence upon him continued for several years, and
even when his devotion towards that philosophy waned, he was
quite ready to make use of the arguments of Plotinus to aid him
in his writings against the adversaries of the Christian Faith.
Foot Notes-(I)."Which beginning of the holy Gospel of St.John,a 
certain Platonist, said, ought to be written in letters of 
gold". De Civ.Dei, X.29. (2). Elsee, op.cit.page,IIÜ.
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Let us, however, examine more minutely the question 
concerning the influence of Neo-Platonism upon Augustine,
Without a doubt, it is possible gor us to affirm 
that Neo-Platonism influenced his whole life. Before the reading 
of the books of the Enneads, we find Augustine as a man of the 
world engaged in his professional duties as a Rhetorician, troubl- 
-ed by his sins, haunted by thoughts of God and eager to know 
the Truth, but still more or less entangled by the affairs of 
a mundane character, pleasures, gaiety, passions of the flesh & 
the honours of his profession and the esteem of his fellows. We 
see him then at that time torn as it were between two worlds and 
hence distracted, and often depressed. He would fain enter the 
Christian Church and share the faith of his mother, but his 
intellect craved for certainty. He found himself unable to take 
the spiritual experiences of others on trust, above all else he 
must himself be sure.
We have marked the fact that he was quickened 
in his admiration for higher things when as a youth he read 
Cicero's Hortensius; he saw that in comparison with the noble 
thoughts of philosophy wealth and worldly success were poor 
indeed, but he did not,on that account there and then,give up 
his pursuit of them. And he is disappointed that he is unable 
to find the name of Christ in the Hortensius, somehow he feels 
that it falls short of the best.
Then we find Augustine drawn to Manichaeism 
because of its apparent devoutness of spirit, and the supposed 
ascetic sanctity of many of its followers, as well as by its 
promise of enlightenment. Writing to his friend Honoratus, he
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says- "For you know, Honoratus, that for no other reason we fell 
in with such men, (the Manichees) than because they used to say 
that, apart from all terror of authority, by pure and simple 
reason, they would lead within to God, and set free from all 
error those who were willing to be their hearers." (I)
Here we have evidence that Augustine was impatient 
of Authority, and desirjlous of something which would commend 
itself to his reason.
But we come to his most important essay into 
the realm of spiritual truth. The teaching of Neo-Platonism 
made it evident that Truth did exist and could be obtained by all 
vfho would give themselves to its search. As a result of his Neo- 
-Platonic studies he is led to turn^tb almost immediately^to the 
writings of St. Paul, and there he finds a confirmation of the 
truth which philosophy has revealed to him. (?)
In the De Ordine, St. Augustine clearly shows us
what Neo-Platonism had done for him, he says-**There are two ways
that we can follow when we are troubled with difficulties, that
of Reason and that of Authority. Philosophy offers us reason,&
scarcely succeeds in liberating a very few; and so far from teach-
-ing them to despise these mysteries" (that is the deeper doctr-
-ines of Christianity) "it only brings them understand them
as they ought to be understood. True and genuine philosophy has no
other business than to teach us what is the un-caused Cause of
all things ('principium sine principio*), how great is the
Foot Notes- (l)*De ITtilitate Credendi,?. cp.De beata vita,4.
(?).Contra Acad.?,5.(Col.44?) "Itaque titubans,properans, 
haesitans arripio apostolum Paulumrneque enim vere isti,inqu- 
-am, tanta potuissent, vixissentque ita ut eos vixisse mamif- 
-estun est, si eorum Litterae atque rationes huic tanto bono 
adversarentur"*
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Intelligence which abides in it, and what it was that for our 
salvation issued thence without any degeneration", (I)
Augustine very evidently believed that in his 
study of the tenets of Neo-Platonism he would not find in it 
anything which contradicted the beliefs of the Church. (2)
We see then that Neo-Platonism played a notable 
part in the conversion of Augustine. Whilst his entrance into 
the Christian Church opened up gradually for him, the rich treas- 
-ures of Religion. The whole current of his after life was there- 
-by changed; he finds his vocation in the ministry; presently 
he becomes the Bishop of Hippo. There he develops , in after 
years, into a great Ecclesiastical statesman. His knowledge of 
the principles of philosophy as expounded by the Neo-Platonists, 
become invaluable to him as he enters upon the work of shaping 
and helping to clarify the doctrines of the Church. Thus he 
becomes one of the founders of modern thought, with the result 
that in every age men of very differing faiths have turned to 
him for guidance.
It is in this way that we would suggest that 
Neo-Platonism had a very marked and beneficial influence upon 
the life of St. Augustine.
Moreover, it was the study of the Enneads of 
Plotinus that quickened his life of the Spirit and led him into 
the realm of Mystical Piety. In reality, the conversion of St. 
Augustine to Christ was a conversion to mystical piety. The act 
of conversion was nothing else than the deliberate decision to 
ascetic celibacy, which in those days, formed the indispensable
Foot Notes- (I).De Ordine, 3.V.I6. (col.560).see Montgomery oc 
cit.page,48. (2).Contra Acad.3.20.43.(col.488).
(245).
precondition of personal mysticism. (l)
Whilst the thoughts which Augustine had received from 
Plotinus, and which are so clearly present in Augustine’s early 
writings, recede into the background and their place is taken by 
Christian and preeminently ecclesiastical ideas, these Neo-Platon- 
-ic conceptions do not really disappear entirely. For the Mystic- 
-al vision remains throughout his whole life as the final goal 
of all effort after salvation. Indeed, Heiler goes so far as to 
say- "The last and most precious thing after which the passionate | 
heart of Augustine longs, is not God’s sovereign rule over the 
whole earth; not the blessedness of forgiveness which God so 
freely bestows*, but the mystical enjoyment and vision of the 
immeasurable Divine Beauty". (2)
We find Augustine again and again referring to 
this mystical union with God,in his writings. He says- "The Soul 
that has died to the world is sunk in Holy contemplation and 
rests in the Eternal Divine calm". (3) It enjoys that Holy love; 
(4)it embraces God and clings to Him; (5) it becomes conformed 
into the image of God; (6) in a word it is deified. (7)
This most blessed vision is imparted here on
earth to happy souls in special hours of grace, but it experiences!
tU I
its full completion only after^death of the body, then this
vision continues through all eternity. (8)
f
Foot Notes- (I).See F.Heiler, "Der Katholizisimus seine idee und 
sein erscheinung"• 2nd.Ed.1923. pages,104-106. (2)ib.page,I04
(3)De Spiritu et Lit.V. (4)Conf.*.I. (3).De Ordine,2.7.
(6) De Moribus Eccl.Cath.XIII.22. (7).Epistle,X.2. (8).See alsoi 
De Ord.2.24,47. Solil. 1.23. De Civ.Dei,IX.22.
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Thus, frequently in his later as well as in his earlier writings 
St, Augustine dwells upon the thought of this mystical union 
with the Supreme, and the Vision of the Divine, which he had 
first heard of from Plotinus,
Heiler, however, as he compares the account of the 
inspiring Ecstasy which Plotinus givws in his closing chapter of 
the Enneads, with the portrayal of the heavenly bliss that 
Augustine sets before us in the ninth book of the Confessions, 
clearly shows wherein the Mysticism of Augustine differed from 
that of Plotinus, he says- "Certainly in contradistinction to 
the Neo-Platonists who were his schoolmasters, Augustine never 
overstepped the bounds of Christian Personality. Like Plato,he j
I
too remains standing at the vision of the Highest Good and does §
not step forward to the Ecstasy which extinguishes individual j
personality". (I) j
Now although we feel that Heiler has been guilty
of extravagance in the stress he has placed on the Mysticism of I
I
St. Augustine, for as Inge puts it "there are important parts of l|
his teaching which have no affinity to Mysticism", (2) yet, if we [
allow for that overemphasis and lack of balance in Heller's judg- I 
-ment in this matter, in these directions we are still of opinion I 
that Neo-Platonism left a very lasting influence upon the life I 
of Augustine and that to the end of his days, "he remained half a i 
Platonist". (3)
But as we have already in this thesis attempted to
Foot Notes- (l)Heiler, op.cit.page, 105. (2). 'Christian Mysticism*! 
op.cit. page, 128, (3) ibid. I
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show, we have abundant evidence that Neo-Platonism also played 
an important part in stimulating the thought of St. Augustine.
There is no need here to enter into details. ïïe will 
content ourselves with simply giving a brief resume of our find- 
-ings.
Sometimes we find that Augustine makes use of the 
thought which he has received from Plotinus and adapts it to the 
Christian Faith, whilst at other times, as in the case of his 
tractate on the Immortality of the Soul, he takes the whole of the 
arguments from the Enneads, and makes use of them as his ovm.
Indeed we might say that in his treatises on 
the Quantity of the Soul, the Origin of the Soul in man, as well 
as in the case of the work we have just named, there is overwhelm- 
-ing widence of his indebtedness to Plotinus.
With regard to the Psychology of St. Augustine,
whilst he rejects the Neo-Platonic idea of Metempsychosis, he
practically makes use of all that he has learned from Plotinus
on that subject, to form the basis of his own system. Thus all
that Augustine has to say on the Soul, that it has no magnitude;
that the sympathy which unites the organs is a proof of the pres-
-ence of the Soul in its entirety in every part of the body^
that whilst we speak of its presence in^the body we should rather
think of it as being with the body, that it is impassiblef\^hence
it is immortal- all this the Christian Father borrowed from
Plotinus. liîhilst Augustine had little to say on the idea of the
World-Soul, yet he did not deny its existence, indeed he regarded
the Universe as a living organism. (I) As Dean Inge says-
"The Neo-Platonic teaching about the relation of individual souls 
Foot Note- (I). De Civ.Dei, IV.I2;VII.5.
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to the World Soul may have helped him to formulate his own 
teaching about the Mystical union of Christians with Christ".(I)
If we t/urn to what Augustine has to say on 
Sensation and the Inner Sense; on Pleasure and Pain; on the two 
kinds of Memory; on the distinction between Discursive and Intuit- 
-ive Reasoning; on ideas; and on the seven degrees of the life of 
the Soul, although he differs here in his nomenclature ; we find 
he has been wholly inspired by Plotinus.
When we recall these evidences, it is not surpri- 
-sing that Bouillet should say- "In order to thoroughly understand 
Augustine it is indispensable to know the speech and doctrine of 
Plotinus". (2)
But it is not only with regard to his Psychol- 
-ogical knowledge that he shows his indebtedness to Neo-Platonism. 
He also received from Plotinus his theory of Numbers; his concep- 
-tion of Beauty; his doctrine of the Providential Order of the 
world, and the universal harmony which exists; his views^of non- 
-being; as well as considerable help from the writings of Plotinus 
against the Gnostics, which he was able to make use of in his 
treatises against the Manichaeans.
Moreover we find that Augustine was familiar 
with the writings of Porphyry, which had been translated into 
Latin by Victorinus. There is no need to refer to the many quotat- 
-ions which Augustine has made from these books, especially in his 
De Civitate Dei. (3) Briefly^these were his Letter to Anebo? his 
book on Abstinence;his tractate on the Return of the Soul to God;
Foot Notes- (I). Christian Mysticism, op.cit.page,130. (2)
Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.2.page,590. (3). Book,X. and elsewhere.
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the Philosophy of the Oracles; the Principles of the theory of 
the Intelligibles. Often do we find Augustine critising Porphyres 
statements, sometimes,as in the case of his work the Return of the 
Soul to God,he makes use of his views. But for St. Augustine, 
Plotinus was the authority, and was ever held in the highest 
esteem.
In this connection, ere we bring this chapter to a 
close,we must again refer to the deep and lasting influence which 
Plotinus had upon our Christian Father in the realm of Metaphysics 
We have seen that in their doctrines of the 
Trinity and the Creation of the wotld, there were marked differen- 
-ces between them; and that yet even here Augustine received 
considerable help. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity,
!
we saw that with Plotinus the three Principles are subordinated
one to another, and are in no sense co-equal and co-eternal.
The Intellectual Principle is an emanation from the Absolute, the
Soul is an emanation from the Nous. There is thus no thought of
that perfect equality which subsists between the Three Persons
which was in the mind of Augustine with respect to the Holy
Trinity, moreover, there was a complete absence of love. The only
real resemblance seemed to lie in the fact that whilst the hypos-
-tases or Persons in the Godhead are three, yet both Christian &
Neo-Platonist proclaim the essential unity of the Divine Being,&
yet that this unity admits of plurality.
But still we find that in his earlier writings
Augustine influenced by Plotinus, thought of the Second Person in 
the Trinity as the Logos, the speech or Wisdom of God, in whom
were the ideas,forms,conceptions of all created things, and in 
this way the Christian Father thought that here there was a like-
-ness between the Nous of Plotinus and the Logos which he read 
of in the prologue of St, John's gospel. But here the resemblance 
ended, for in the Scriptures Augustine found that God had in his 
Son revealed Himself as Love , which took upon itself the nature 
of man, and dying for men, so brought about their deliverance 
from the bondage of Sin. These truths he found not in Neo-Platon- 
-ism. As we have also pointed out Augustine also sometimes 
speaks of the Holy Spirit in terms of the Neo-Platonic Soul, 
these are but indications of the great influence which Neo-Plat- 
-onism had upon him, at that time.
In the doctrine of Creation, we saw that whilst 
for Plotinus God had begotten the world, thus affirming the 
eternity of matter; for Augustine the world had been created out 
of nothing. Created by the Will and goodness of God according to 
the view of Augustine, begotten by necessity as Plotinus states 
the matter. But here also Augustine was powerfully influenced 
by Neo-Platonism in what he says as to Time and Space. VThilst 
the world was not eternal, according to Augustine, it could not 
be created in time, but with Time.
But with regard to the being of God and His 
nature, it was from Plotinus that Augustine learned the great 
truth concerning His Spirituality, His Simplicity, His Unity.
And that thought of the Simplicity of God which was so persisten- 
-tly emphasized by Plotinus, receives a like emphasis on the 
part of Augustine. Here then we have a very manifest influence 
on the mind of Augustine. He follows Plotinus closel# as he 
delineates His attributes; dwells upon his ineffability; proclaims
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that God can be best known by nescience.
But, as we have seen, neither Plotinus nor August- 
-ine ùould be contented with the attitude of negation with respect 
to the Divine Being. Hence we find them both positing certain 
affirmations concerning God. From the realm of the world about 
them they,beholding there the beauty and harmony and goodness of 
all things which owe their very existence to God, proclaim the 
fact that God must be The Beauty, The Supreme Goodness,
Entering into their ovm hearts they make discover- 
-ies there which help them in their knowledge of God. And thus 
Augustine follows in the steps of the Philosopher.
Lastly, Augustine learned from Neo-Platonism 
much that shed a new light upon his perplexity with regard to 
Evil. The Jorld for any real being that it might possess owed 
that being to God, as it was closely associated with God it had 
greater being, as it lost touch with God it ceased to have being. 
God could not have created Evil, since^HE was Good; therefore 
it belonged to the realm of non-being, it was but a privation of 
good.
We have now said sufficient to indicate the infl- 
-dence which Neo-Platonism had upon the thought of Augustine.
If we turn to his earlier writings we find them 
steeped in the spirit of Neo-Platonism; in his lectures at 
Cassiciacum he speaks as a Neo-Platonist. If Plato lived again 
in Plotinus, it seemed almost as though at that time, Plotinus 
lived again in Augustine. (I) Alfaric speaking of Augustine's 
first writings at Thagaste says- "He proclaims himself on the 
Foot Note- (I). Alfaric, op.cit. page, 518,
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highest questions of Theology; on the nature of God, and the 
Ideas; on Good and Evil; on the Soul and Matter; on Being and 
non-being, in the same way but even perhaps a more pronounced 
fashion than does Plotinus. Any page devoted to these latter 
problems agrees so closely with the spirit and even the terminol- 
-ogy of the Enneads, that it would seem, indeed, to be but a 
fragment of that work".(l) And Alfaric adds- "If Augustine had 
died after writing his Soliloquies, or his treatise on the Quant- 
-ity of the Soul, one could only have thought of him as a convinc- 
-ed Neo-Platonist, more or less touched with Christianity." (?)
But in later years, as Augustine obtained a 
fuller knowledge of Christian Truth, more and more the influence 
of Neo-Platonism upon him wanes. He is then more pronouncedly 
Christian, and tends increasingly towards the orthodox position.
In a word, his philosophy becomes subservient to his faith.
It was only as he played the part of defender of the Faith that 
again he turned to Plotinus for help and made use of the weapons 
from his armoury. Neo-Platonism had been of real help to him in 
his early days, it had made many truths clear to him, it had led 
him to Christ.
But the influence of that teaching never wholly 
disappeared, by the help of Neo-Platonism Augustine was able to 
clarify Christian truth and play the part of fashioner of the 
dogmas and doctrines of the Christian Church. More than that the 
inspiration which it gave him for the inner life of the Spirit 
remained as a help in the culture of his own heart.
Through Augustine Neo-Platonism entered into the 
Christian religion, and since that day it has been at home in spirit 
Foot Motes-(I).Alfaric,op.oit, page,518. (2 )ibid,page,527.
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within the Christian Church, and it was largely through St. Aug- 
-ustine that Christian Theology became Neo-Platonic.
It would have been of deepest interest to have 
traced the influence of Neo-Platonism upon mediaeval and modern 
thought, but that would carry us far beyond the limits of our 
present theme.
It is sufficient to add that Plotinus and his 
influence is still at work in devout hearts to-day and this is 
due to the Christian Fathers virho have reflected his teaching & 
not the least among them has been St. Augustine,
;-. ft.
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APPENDIX, 2.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE LIFE OF ST.AUGUSTINE.
A.D.
354. Augustine born at Thagaste, November, I3th.
(De beata vita, 6. Possidius, Vit.Aug. 31.)
365? (Autumn) He departs for Madaura, for school.
369-370. He returns from Madaura to Thagaste, where he had been 
at school- how long is not stated- he spent a year in 
idleness while his father was endeavouring to raise 
funds to send him to Carthage for further study; fell 
into evil ways.
(Confessions, 2.III. (5 and 6.))
370. He goes to Carthage, and there distinguishes himself in the 
school of Rhetoric.
(Confessions, 3.1.1. - 3.III.6.)
c37I. Patricius dies. (Confessions, 3.IV.7.) Augustine is supp- 
-orted by his mother with the help of a wealthy friend, 
Romanianus.
(Contra Academicos, 2. (2, & 3.) )
372. Birth of Adeodatus.
(Confessions, 9.VI.14.)
373. Augustine reads the 'Hortensius*, of Cicero; is inspired 
to seek a higher life. He turns to the Scriptures, but he 
is repelled by reason of the harshness of their style.
(Confessions, 3.IV.(7-9.))
373-374. Becomes a Manichaean 'Auditor*.
(Confessions, 5.VI.10.)
375. Professor of Rhetoric at Thagaste.
(Confessions, 4.IV.7. )
376. Returned to Carthage and taught Rhetoric there.
(Confessions, 4.VII.12. Contra Acad.2.II.3.)
c380. Wrote a treatise, *de Pulchro et Apto*. (lost).
(Confessions, 4.XIII.20.)
38;^ . Beginning to feel doubts as to the Manichaean system
and finding that Faustus the great Manichaean preacher 
from whom he had expected to receive help, could not 
solve his problems, Augustine becomes inclined to accept 
the doctrines of the New Academy.
(Confessions, 5.(10,12,19.) (De utilitate Cred.8.20. )
(2).
383. (Autumn) Went to Rome. (Confessions, 5.Till.14.)
384. Appointed public teacher of Rhetoric at Milan. Monnica 
joined him there.
(Confessions, 5.XIII.23.) (Confessions,6.I.i.)
385. Honoured in having to deliver a formal panegyric in the 
presence of the Emperor.
(Contra Litt.Petil. 3.25.30.)
385. At Milan he meets with Ambrose, who helps him greatly,but 
he is still held back by the flesh; becomes a Catechumen.
(Confessions, 5.XIV.25.)
385-6. A translation of the Enneads of Plotinus by Victorinus 
is put into his hands; this freed his mind from a 
materialistic conception of God and also gave him a 
new conception of the origin of Evil. He begins to 
study the Pauline Epistles.
(Confessions, 7.IX.I3.-26.- 7.XXI.27. )
386. He is relieved of his intellectual difficulties but is 
still fettered by the sins of the flesh. At length the 
inner struggle issued in his conversion, towards the end 
of July or the beginning of August.
(Confessions, 8.VI.13.- 8.XII.29.- cp. 9.II.2.)
386-7, Augustine in retirement at Cassiciacum, a villa on the 
outskirts of Milan, which was lent to him by his friend 
Verecundus. Probably in August he enters upon his 
retreat. Augustine writes there. Contra Academicos,
De beata vita. De Ordine, his Soliloquia, a tract De 
Immortalitate animae, and a few epistles.
387. Augustine returned to Mileui. Wrote De Immortalitate
Animae, and began De Musica, (Retract.I.5.6.) Baptized 
by Ambrose on Easter Eve, April, 24th. together with his 
son Adeodatus, a gifted lad of 15. (Possid.vit.Aug.I.)
(Confessions, 9.VI.14.)
Sets out for Africa with Monnica, who died at Ostia in 
her 56th.year. After her death, Augustine returned to 
Rome.
(Confessions, 9.(23-29.)
387-388. Wrote at Rome, De Moribus Ecclesiae et Manichaeorum,
De quantitate animae, De libero arbitrio,(books, I,& 2. 
the remaining books later in Africa.)
(Retract.I.7.4 I.- 1.8- 1.9.)
388. (Autumn) Augustine returns to Africa.
(De Civitate Dei, XXII.8.)
At the end of the year he returns to Thagaste. Having
sold his property there he lives a monastic life in
(3).
388. company with a few friends.
(Epistles, CXXVI.7.- CLVII.39.)
389. Death of Adeodatus. (Confessions, 9.TI.14. )
Augustine writes De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Libero
Arbitrio, (book, 3.) De Musica, (books. I, & VI.)
De Magistro, (Confessions, 9.VI.14. and Retract.1.12.)
and began De diversis Quaestionibus, 83. (Retract.I,10-13,
and 2 6.)
390. De vera Religione.
391. Augustine ordained Presbyter of Hippo by Valerius its
bishop. Wrote De Utilitate credendi, and De duabus anima-
-bus contra Manichaeos. (Retract.I,(14-2 5) )
Founded a monastery at Hippo. (Possid.V.)
392. Held a public debate with Fortunatus, a Manichaean.
(Retract. I.16.)
Wrote Contra Fortunatum. (August, 28th. & 29th. 392.)
393. Council at Hippo. Augustine, on the invitation of the 
assembled bishops, delivered a dissertation. De Fide et 
Symbolo. (Retract. I.17.)
Wrote De Genesi ad litteram.
394-5. Wrote Expositio in Epistolam ad Galatas, Expositio quarum-
-dam Propositionum, ex Epist.ad Romanos. De Libero Arbit- 
-rio, completed. (Retract.1.9.) De diversis Quaestionibus, 
83, de mendacio. (Retract.I.18-27.)
395. Ordained assistant Bishop to Valerius, towards the end of 
the year. (Epist. 322.) Wrote De continentia.
c396. Bishop Valerius dies, Augustine bewomes sole Bishop.
Wrote De Agone Christiano.
397. De diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum. De doctrina Chris- 
-tiana commenced. Contra Epistolafim Manich.,quae dicitur 
Fundamenti. (Retract.2.2.)
398-400. Began the Confessions. (Retract.2.1-6.) Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum. Began De Trinitate, (400-416) De Catechi- 
zandis Rudibus. (Retract.2.14.)
401. De Genesi ad litteram, begun. (401-415.)
De Bono Conjugali.
402. Montra Litteras Petiliani Donatistae.
404. Wrote De actis cum Felice, (Dec.7.& 12th).
(4).
405* Contra Secundiniim. De Natura Boni,
410. Fall of Rome.
412. De Peccat, Meritis. De Spiritu et Lit.
413. Augustine begins the De Civitate Dei, in his 58th year 
and completes it at the age of 71*
418. De gratia Christi,
419. De Nuptiis. De Anima.
420. Contra Adv.Leg.et Proph.
421. Enchiridion. (Retract.2*63*) De cura pro mortuis.
(Retract. 2.64.)
426* St Augustine completes De doctrina Christiana and the 
De Civitate Dei.
427* Augustine writes the Retractationes, also De gratia et 
Lib*Arb.
430* St. Augustine dies on August 28th, in the third month of
the siege of Hippo by the Vandals.
NOTE TO APPENDIX, III.
After the frequent references that have already been made in 
the successive chapters of our Thesis, to similarities in the 
thought and expression of St. Augustine and Plotinus, it may 
seem that such an Appendix as this is quite needless.
But, having included a scheme of comparisons in 
our plan, we felt compelled to adhere to our original intent- 
-ion. We have, however, contented ourselves by giving a 
brief selection from each of the six Enneads. To set forth 
all the parallel passages that are suggested in the works of 
Alfaric, Bouillet, and Grandgeorge, would make this Appendix 
as large as the Thesis itself. Moreover, it is not really 
vital to our object to stress verbal likenesses, or to point 
to kinship of illustration. These, after all, are but of minor 
and secondary importance.
It is of far greater moment to mark
the influence of Neo-Platonism on the basal and fundamental
truths of Augustine, and to indicate the influence of that 
Philosophy upon his Philosophical and Theological ideas, and 
this we have endeavoured to do.
For the suggested comparisons which have 
been included in this Appendix we are indebted to Bouillet; 
as, however, he seems to make use of a different text of the 
Enneads from that which Mackenna has followed, in some cases the 
likeness between Augustine and Plotinus seems somewhat strained.
We are responsible for the translations from
the French, and for the renderings of the Latin especially of
early writings of St.Augustine.
(%).
APPENDIX 3.
COMPARATIVE PASSAGES in the writings of Augustine 
with those to be found in the ENNEADS of PLOTINUS.
THE FIRST BNNEAD.
First Tractate 
The Animate and the Man.
ENNEADS, I.1.7. compared with DE MUSICA, VI.4.5. (Col.848)
DB LIB.ARB.Ï.8.I8. (Cols.940,S. 
DE LIB.ARB.2.4.10. (Cols.960,I.
Enneads, I.1.7. ”From the organised body and something else, let 
us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms 
a distinct Principle, the Animate ; and in this Principle are 
vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to 
belong to the Animate.
But the "We" ? How have We Sense-Perception?
By the fact that We are not separate from the Animate so constit- 
-uted, even though certainly other and nobler elements go to 
make up the entire many-sided nature of Man.
The faculty of perception in the Soul cannot act by the immediate 
grasping of sensible objects, but only by the discerning of impr- 
-essions printed upon the Animate by sensation: these impressions 
are already Intelligibles while the outer sensation is a mere 
phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) which is nearer to 
Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-Forms. 
And by means of these Ideal-Forms, by which the Soul wields 
single lordship over the Animate, we have Discursive-Reasoning, 
Sense-Knowledge and Intellection. From this moment we have peculi- 
-arly the We: before this there was only the "Ours"; but at this 
stage stands the WE (the authentic Human-Principle) loftily pres- 
-iding over the Animate.
There is no reason why the entire compound entity should not be 
described as the Animate or Living-Being- mingled in a lower 
phase, but above that point the beginning of the veritable man, 
distinct from all that is kin to the lion, all that is of the 
order of the multiple brute. And since The Man, so understood, is 
essentially the associate of the reasoning Soul, in our reasoning 
it is this "We" that reasons, in that the use and act of reason 
is a characteristic Act of the Soul."
Mackenna, Vol.I.pages, 35,36.
(2).
Enneads, 1.1.7, compared with DE îiUSICA, VI. IV. 5.
De Musica, VI.IV.5. "M. But I wish now to ask, which, pray, of 
these four kinds (of harmony) do you judge to he the most outst- 
-anding? I am inclined to think that, by reason of the very 
judgment which we are capable of passing upon them, there is a 
fifth class; that, by meams of which, unison in harmony gives us 
pleasure and failure in harmony displeases us....Is there not 
such a class which, whilst it has to do with the other four, is 
yet separate and distinct from them a4i?" D."Yes, indeed, I think 
that there is such a class which may be distinguished from these 
others. If indeed, there is something pertaining to sound which 
may be associated with the body, something of the nature of hear- 
-ing, which by sounds in the body, the soul becomes aware of; 
something which is at work in the production of a harmony of a 
longer or a shorter duration, something which has to do with 
memory ; apart from all these there is surely, injfi the natural 
order of things, a sense which has the power of approving or of 
expressing disapproval on these things".
Enneads, I.I.7., compared with De Lib. Arb. I.8.18.
De Lib.Arb. I.8.IB."Whatever is it that sets man over the beasts 
of the field as their chief? Is it the power of mind, or should 
we call it spirit? Would it not be a better name, if using the 
language of the divine books, we were to speak of that power as 
'ordination*? If it is agreed that man holds dominion and lords 
it over all other things, then, indeed, is man most highly
ordained But when you find that Reason is dominated by the
things which cause distress to the Soul can man be said to be 
ordained? For it is not a proper order, neither is it an order 
universally recognised when better things are in subjection to 
the worse".
Enneads, I.I.7., compared with De Lib.Arb.2.4.10.
De Lib.Arb,2.4.ID."I think too that it is clear, that this 
Inner Sense does not so much feel the things which it has recei- 
-ved from the five bodily senses, but that rather indeed they 
have a sense of feeling by reason of the possession of this 
Inner Sense..For bodies manifest signs of life when they feel by 
means of the bodily sense; but really that same sense is not cap- 
-able of feeling by its owm powers; but it is by the Inner Sense 
as well as by the bodily sense that there arises sensation. It 
is by the Reasoning Faculty that we become acquainted with each 
separate sense and all these things are retained by knowledge"
See also- Enneads,IV.3.23.-IV.4.(18,19)- III.I.9.-III.2.9.- 3,4.2.
IV.3.26.
(3).
We may add another comparison to Enneads, I.I.7.
De Civ. Dei, XI.27. After speaking of the irrational animals & 
their senses, St Augustine says-"For we have another and far sup- 
-erior sense, belonging to the inner man, by which we perceive 
what things are just, and what unjust,- just by means of an intel- 
-ligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in
its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the
ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's 
taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I 
am, and that I know this; and these two I love, and in the same 
manner I am assured that I love them".
St Augustine refers to the Inner Sense in Confessions,I.20.31, 
and in VII.XVII.23. This Inner Sense connects the sensations with
each other, and with the self as the subject of sensation, it is
equivalent to the Aristotelian 'Common Sense'. The Neo-Platonists 
held that such functions were to be directly attributed to the
6oct of the
Soul. See Gibb & Montgomery on the Confessions, op.cit.page,32. 
According to Siebeck, (quoted by Gibb & Montgomery) Augustine 
goes beyond his predecessors in the clearness with which he attr- 
-ibutes to this Inner Sense, not merely the correlation of diverse 
sensations, but the consciousness of the self as an object of 
sensation. See also Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.page, 325. Vol.2.page | 
571.
(4 ) .
ENNEADS, 1.1.8. compared with De Lib.Arh.î».XII. 33. (Cols.976,977 )
De Quant.Animae,32.68.(Col.72 5)
Enneads,I.I.8."And towards the Intellectual-Principle what is our 
relation? By this I mean, not that faculty in the soul which is 
one of the emanations from the Intellectual-Principle, but the 
Intellectual-Principle itself (Divine-Mind).
This also we possess as the summit of our being. And we have It 
either as common to all or as our own immediate possession: or 
again we may possess It in both d y rees. that is in common, since 
It is indivisible -/(everywhere(9ne^ and always Its entire self- 
and severally in that each personality possesses It entire in the 
First-Soul (i.e.in the Intellectual as distinguished from the 
lower phase of the Soul)."
compared with-
De Lib.Arb.2.XII.33."How as a consequence can we deny that there 
is a truth unchangeable which contains all the truths that are 
unchangeable? It is of that truth that you are unable to say; 
that it is thine or mine or that it belongs to any man, for it is 
the possession of all those who recognise unchangeable truths.
It is in an amazing way a light, now secret now flashed abroad, 
which presents itself and communicates itself to all those who 
seek it. How can we regard it as the possession of any one when 
it is shared by all who use their Reason?"
It is by reason of the unchangeableness of truth that 
St Augustine proves the existence of God and the Immortality of 
the Soul.
Enneads, I.I.8."For,note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though 
one and undivided in the All, as being present to bodies in divi- 
-sion: in so far as any bodies are Animates, the Soul has given 
itself to each of the separate material masses; or rather it app- 
-ears to be present in the bodies by the fact that it shines into 
them: it makes them living beings not by merging into body but by 
giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses 
of itself like one face caught by many mirrors."
/F/VAT. /»/. —
 ^ compared with-
De Quant Animae, 32.68."The Soul must be highly esteemed on acc- 
-ount of those things which it contemplates and reflects upon so 
that you are able to understand most clearly what is maintained 
by certain most learned men, namely that whilst the Soul keeps 
hold of itself and can in no way become divided, yet it is still 
possible for it to be shared throughout the body."
By the phrase, "certain very wise men" (quibus- 
-dam doctissimis viris) Augustine evidently means Plotinus and 
Porphyry.
(5)
THE FIRST BNNEAD.
Second Tractate 
On Virtue.
ENNEADS, 1.2.I. see translation page, 6.wZ^ o#xloJL3«X10xl 1 #
compared with De Ordine, 2.2.(4-7).
In the second section of his book of the De Ordine, Augustine 
takes up the question as to what is meant by being with God, and 
in what sense a wise man remains immovable with God.
De Ordine, 2.2. (4-7).Spirits share the life of God, according 
to the measure in which they attain knowledge of Him. By His help 
the Wise man gains a mastery over the world and avoids its allur- 
-in# powers. The Soul of the Wise man charged as a leader-or 
pilot with the conduct of the body remains, despite the inferior 
functions of thecbody attached to the Divine Wisdom, which is 
everywhere present throughout the vast universe. It is from this 
unique source of Truth that the Soul draws its spiritual know- 
-ledge. It is there as he comes to a knowledge of himself, that 
the superior part of his being dwells hence sense and memory 
abide ever in subjection in the person of the wise man.
We may compare the above also with
ENNEADS, 1.2.3."As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the 
body, and by coming to share the body's states and to think the 
body's thoughts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of 
virtue, if it threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to 
its own Act- the state of Intellection and Wisdom- never allowed 
the passions of the body to affect it- the virtue of Sophrosyn^ 
knew no fear at the parting from the body- the virtue of Fortit- 
-ude- and if reason and the Intellectual-Principle ruled- in 
which state is Righteousness. Such a disposition in the Soul, 
become thus intellective and immune to passion, it would not be 
wrong to call Likeness to God; for the Divine, too, is pure and 
the Divine-Act is such that Likeness to it is Wisdom".
See also De Musica, VI.XVI.51.
Enneads, 1.2.3. see page, lo. translated.
Enneads, 1.2.4. see page, n ,  translated
Enneads, 1.2.5. see page, %%. translated.
Enneads, 1.2.6. "Atthis height, the man is the very being that 
came from the Supreme. The primal excellence restored, the essen- 
-tial man is there; entering this sphere, he has associated him- 
-self with the reasoning phase of his nature and this will lead 
up into likeness with his highest self, as far as earthly mind is 
capable..." Mackenna, VoJ. I.page, 41-48.
(6).
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
Second Tractate 
On Virtue.
ENNEADS, 1.2.1. compared with De Musica, VI.XIII.37. &c.
Enneads, I.2.I."Since Evil is here, "haunting this world by nec- 
-essary law", and it is the Soul's design to escape from Evil, we 
must escape hence.
But what is this escape?
"In attaining Likeness to God", we read. And this is explained as 
"becoming just and holy, living by wisdom", the entire nature 
grounded in Virtue.....But, at the beginning, we are met by the 
doubt whether even in this Divine-Being all the virtues find 
place- Moral-Balance (8ophrosyn#J,for example; or Fortitude 
where there can be no danger since nothing is alien; where there 
can be nothing alluring whose lack could induce the desire of
possession But does this Power possess the Virtues? We cann-
-ot expect to find There what are called the Civic Virtues, the 
Prudence which belongs to the reasoning faculty; the Fortitude 
which conducts the emotional and passionate nature; the Sophros- 
-yny which consists in a certain pact, in a concord between the 
passionate faculty and the reason; or Rectitude which is the due 
application of all the other virtues as each in turn should comm- 
-and or obey. Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these 
virtues of the social order but by those greater qualities known 
by the same general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us 
no help at all? It is against reason, utterly to deny Likeness by 
these while admitting it by the greater: tradition at least 
recognises certain men of the civic excellence as divine, and we 
must believe that these too had in some sort attained Likeness; 
on both levels there is virtue for us, though not the same virtue. 
Now, if it be admitted that Likeness is possible, though by a 
varying use of different virtues and though the civic virtues do 
not suffice, there is no reason why we should not, by virtues 
peculiar to our state, attain Likeness to a model in which virtue 
has no place...It is from the Supreme that we derive order and 
distribution and harmony, which are virtues in this sphere:the 
Existences There, having no need of harmony, order or distribu- 
-tion, have nothing to do with virtue; and, none the less, it is 
by our possession of virtue that we become like to Them.
Thus much to show that the principle that we attain Likeness by 
virtue in no way involves the existence of virtue in the Supreme."
St Augustine has reproduced under different 
forms the theory of Plotinus on the Purification of the Soul.
We may see here from the following comparisons how Augustine has
borrowed the doctrine of the purifying and intellectual virtues 
as set forth in Enneads,i.2.
(7).
Enneads, 1.2.I. compared with De Musica, VI.XIII.37. &c.
De Musica, VI. XIII. 37. (Col.870.) "Wherefore prithee,now, I ask 
you, does this man of musical taste withdraw from the contemplât- 
-ion of things (divine), in order that such may be recalled to 
memory? Or indeed, in the case of another- an earnest soul- must
we think that he stands in need of such a return? (to God).....
(Col.87I,)This disposition , therefore, or movement of the soul, 
by which one comprehends eternal things, and learns that temporal 
things are inferior to these, even in themselves; and knows that 
these things which are superior rather than those which are infer- 
-ior must be desired; does not the name of that disposition 
appear to you to be that of Prudence? D. Yes! it seems to be 
nothing else.
38, (Col.871). Is there anything else that you think should be 
considered, which is of lesser importance, although it may not 
appear to be intimately associated with eternal things, yet, for 
all that may be linked with them? D. Assuredly I beg that this 
may be taken into account , and I desire to know how it happens 
to come within our survey.........
39, (Col.872).Love of action, therefore, in respect to the rising 
passions of one's body turns away the soul from the contemplation 
of eternal things, calling off its earnestness by reason of its 
care for pleasures of the senses....Love of labour in respect to 
bodily activities , even turns away the soul's attention and 
makes it restless....
40, (Col.872). Indeed a general love of accomplishing something, 
which turns the soul away from that which is right is roused by 
Pride, for by this fault the soul chooses rather to imitate God 
than to serve Him. ...For when the soul of itself is as nothing, 
(for otherwise it will not be subject to change, and will render 
itself liable to a defect in its essence) when, therefore of it- 
-self it realses its nothingness and that whatever it has is from 
God, abiding in his order, it is quickened in mind and in consc- 
-ience by the very presence of God Himself. Thus it has this 
inmost good. Why then become puffed up by Pride, for this is to 
set out to the remotest bounds, and, so to speak to become empty, 
that is to be less and less. But setting out towards external 
things, what is this indeed but to banish the inmost things, that 
is to put God far from itself, not with respect to spatial dist- 
-ance, but by the disposition of the mind?
Bouillet (Vol.2.page,545 footnote) reminds us here that these 
lines are taken textually from Porphyry.
Porphyry, "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles".
XLIV. "The human Soul is united by its essence with the Universal 
Being". "He who is able by his thought to enter into his 
inmost being, and thereby acquire knowledge, discovers himself in 
that act of knowledge and conscience, for there the subject which 
knows becomes identical with the object that is known. Now, in
(8).
Porphyry, "Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles"- (Contin- 
—ued)—
possessing himself, he possesses also Being. He who goes out of 
himself in order that he may attach himself to external objects, 
in the very act of going away from himself, he also removes 
himself from true Being. It is part of our very nature to estab- 
-lish ourselves within our own breast, where we may enjoy all 
the riches of our own hearts, and not to turn ourselves away 
towards that which is foreign to our ownnature, where we only 
find the most abject poverty. Otherwise, we remove ourselves 
far from Being, although He may be near to us; for it is neither 
place,nor substance, nor obstruction, which separates us from
Being, it is our turning away to non-Being. On the other hand,
the love which the Soul has for herself, leads her to a knowled- 
-ge of herself, and to union with God. Thus, one has truly said, 
that man here below, is in a prison house because he has run 
away from heaven, and he has blemished himself by breaking his 
bonds; for, in turning towards earthly things he has forsaken . 
himself and has strayed from his Divine origin; it is- as Emped- 
-ocles has said-*he is a fugitive who has deserted his Divine
country*. You see then, how it comes to pass that the life of
a vicious man is a servile life, impious and unjust, his spirit 
is full of impiety and injustice. Justice, on the other hand, 
consists, as one has rightly said, in each of us fulfilling his 
own function, rendering to each what is his due. There then you 
have the picture of true Justice."
Translated from the French of Bouillet, op.cit.Vol.I.pages,
LXXXV, LXXXVI.
DE MUSICA, VI.50. (Col.878. ) "But this act by which the Soul, 
by the help of God and our Lord, withdraws itself from the love 
of inferior beauty, subduing and slaying as it wages war against 
its own habit, triumphing in that very victory over the power of 
the air, from which envyings and evil desires hamper, flies upward 
to its source of stedfastness and support, that is God; does not 
that seem to you to be the virtue which we call TEMPERANCE ?... 
What then? When it sets out on its journey, now perceiving and 
almost grasping eternal joys, can you think it possible that the 
loss of temporal things, or any death, will hinder it from saying 
farewell to its weaker associates; 'Good were it for me to be 
set free, and to be with Christ: but to remain in the flesh, is 
needful on your account'?...But that frame of mind which fears 
neither foes nor death, what can it be called but by the name of 
FORTITUDE?....Now that very ordinance (ordinatio) which is at the 
service of none save the one God, which is equal in dignity to 
none but the purest souls, which seeks to laud it over none but 
the lordship over its own bestail nature, what name would you 
give to such a virtue? D.Why! everyone knows it is none ether than 
JUSTICE.
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DE MUSICA, VI* XVI.51. (Col.878)."But now I seek to learn this, 
(when such a virtue as this PRUDENCE is in the ascendancy it will 
stand firm within us, for it is by it that the Soul learns where 
it should take its stand, in the place to which it has raised 
itself by means of TEMPERANCE, that is a turning of its love 
towards God which is called Charity and a turning away from this 
world- in this it will have for its companions FORTITUDE & 
JUSTICE)- very well then- I seek to know whether you think when 
it shall have arrived at the fruit of its own choice by perfect 
sanctification, and when the hordes of phantasms have been wiped 
out from its remembrance,- it will then begin to live in the pres- 
-ence of God Himself with God alone then will be fulfilled that 
which is promised us from heaven "We are now the chosen sons of 
God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be,; for we know 
that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, since we shallj^ 
see Him as He is". I ask you whether you think that these 
virtues which we have been recounting here shall be ours then.
D. I cannot see , when we have escaped from the disasters with 
which we are now struggling, in what way either PRUDENCE can be 
present, for it only makes its choice in the presence of disasters 
or TEMPERANCE, which only turns its love away from disasters, or 
FORTITUDE which only keeps us safe from disasters, or JUSTICE 
which only seeks to be kin to the happiest souls and to gain the 
mastery over its lower nature before disasters;- I do not see yet 
how such virtues shall be present at the time of which you have 
been speaking."
DE MUSICA, VI.XVI. 52. (Col.879) "Your answer is not wholly absurd 
indeed, I quite agree that such has been the view of certain lear­
ned men. For when I consult books which no authority can ever 
set on one side, I come upon this sentence- 'Oh taste and see how 
gracious the Lord is'- to this the Apostle Peter has added- 'If 
you have tasted how gracious the Lord is'. And I cannot think but 
that such is brought about by means of these virtues which, in 
their/r conversion, purify the Soul. For the love of temporal 
things is not expelled save by the graciousness of eternal things.
 Other things are afterwards united, and we read- 'In Thy
Light we shall see Light. Shew forth Thy compassion to those who 
know Thee*. 'In Light*- such as we have received in Christ, who 
is the Wisdom of God, and is spoken of many times as 'The Light'. 
When, therefore, it is said- 'In Thy Light...to those who know 
Thee'- wne cannot declare that PRUDENCE will not be present. For 
how is it possible for us to know the true good of the Soul, 
where there is no PRUDENCE ?" D. I do not now know.
DE MUSICA, VI.XVI.53. (Col.879) "Very well then- Can the upright 
in heart be such without JUSTICE? D.I realise , by the repetition 
of that word that JUSTICE is indicated. M. Why then does the 
same prophet consequently remind us of that as he sings- 'And 
JUSTICE to those who are upright in heart'?, D. Clearly that is 
so. M. Well then, following upon this, recollect if it is pleasing 
to you, that we have not previously sufficiently investigated the
truth that the Soul falls through pride to the doing of certain
(10).
things associated with its own power, slew itself by neglecting 
the universal law in attending to its own affairs, for that is 
how we speak of apostasy from God. D I indeed remember, M. When 
therefore, it follows no longer in the way of self pleasing, does 
it not further seem to you that its love is fixed on God, and 
that now it lives, most temperately and most chastely, and most 
securely free from contamination? D.Truly it seems so.
DE IvIUSICA, VI. XVI.54. (Col.880) "FORTITUDE therefore remains. 
But as TEMPERANCE is opposed to any lapse which may take place 
because of the freedom of the will; so FORTITUDE makes one strong 
in the presence of opposing strength, for it is through that vir- 
-tue that we are able to gather strength, but if FORTITUDE is 
weaker than those things which it is subverting, it lies most 
wretchedly abject."
DE MUSICA, VI.XVI.S5. (Col.880) "You will not then deny that the 
Soul being thus established in that perfection and blessedness 
both beholds the Truth, and remains pure, thus it can suffer no 
harm, but being subject to the one God, it is able to rise above 
all natural things. D. I cannot conceive of anything else than 
that such an one must be most perfect and most happy. M. These 
therefore. Contemplation, Sanctification, Impassibility, Orderly 
Regulation- these four virtues are either perfect and complete 
or if they are but names chosen to fit our argument, then we have 
laboured in vain. Indeed these are the virtues which the Soul 
placed amid its struggles makes use of, such are certain powers 
which give us hope of obtaining Eternal life".
We have already noticed one passage from the Enneads which may be 
associated with the lengthy section which we have taken from 
the De Musica, we shall now quote others from the Enneads.
ENNEADS, 1.2,3, "To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct 
orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: 
'Likeness to God', he says, 'is a flight from this world's ways 
and things' : in dealing with the qualities of good citizenship 
he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguish- 
-ing word civic: and elsewhere he declares all the virtues with- 
-out exception to be purifications.
But in what sense can we call the virtues purifications, and how 
does purification issue in Likeness?
As the Soul is evil by being interfused with the body, and by 
coming to share the body's states and to think the body's though- 
-ts, so it would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it 
threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to its own Act- the 
state of Intellection and Wisdom- never allowed the passions of 
the body to affect it- the virtue of Sophrosyng^ knew no fear at 
the parting from the body- the virtue of Fortitude- and if reason 
and the Intellectual-Principle ruled- in which state is Righteous-
-ness. Such a disposition in the Soul, become thus intellective
(II).
KKHKA.DS, 1.2..1. (Continued)
and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call Likeness 
to God; for the Divine, too, is pure and the Divine-Act is such 
that Likeness to it is Wisdom".
ENNEADS, 1.2,4. "We come, so, to the question whether Purificat- 
-ion is the whole of this human quality, virtue, or merely the 
forerunner upon which virtue follows? Does virtue imply the 
achieved state of purification or doesthe mere process suffice to 
it, Virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplis- 
-hed pureness which is almost the Term?
To have been purified is to have cleansed away everything alien: 
but Goodness is something more.
If before the impurity entered there was Goodness, the Goodness 
suffices; but even so, not the act of cleansing but the cleansed 
thing that emerges will be The Good. And it remains to establish 
what (in the case of the cleansed Soul) this emergent is.
It can scarcely prove to be The Good: The Absolute Good cannot be 
thought to have taken up its abode with Evil. We can think of it 
only as something of the nature of good but paying a double 
allegiance and unable to rest in the Authentic Good.
The Soul's true Good is in devotion to the Intellectual-Principle; 
its kin; evil to the Soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is 
no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relat- 
-ion with its own; the new phase begins by a new orientation.
After the Purification, then, there is still this orientation to 
be made? No: by the purification the true alignment stands accomp-^ 
-lished. The Soul's virtue, then, is this alignment? No; it is 
what the alignment brings about within.
And this is ?
That it sees; that, like sight affected by the thing seen, the
soul admits the imprint, graven upon it and working within it, of
the vision it has come to.
But was not the Soul possessed of all this always, or had it forg- 
-otten? What is now sees, it certainly always possessed, but as 
lying away in the dark, not as acting within it: to dispel the
darkness, and thus come to knowledge of its inner content, it must
thrust towards the light".
We might also make comparison by means of Enneads, V.I.I.
^ee this under Enneads V.)
It may be that there is a reflection of the above Enneads, 1.2.4.
(iv with the Confessions, XIII.II. 3.
(12).
We may here also find comparisons between- I
ENNEADS, 1.2.4; 1.2.5. and DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.(73-75 ) I
(Cols. 728,9.)
ENNEADS, 1.2.5."So we come to the scope of the purification:....  !
how far does purification dispel the two orders of passion-
anger, desire and the like, with grief and its kin- and in what
degree the disengagement from the body is possible.Disengagement 
means simply that the soul withdraws to its own place.
It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary 
pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only 
for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it 
may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease
it by refusing assent to it..... The Soul has nothing to dread,
though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear 
therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What 
desire there may be can never be for the vile;... The Soul itself 
will be inviolately free and will be working to set the irration- 
-al part of its nature above all attack...."
Compare then- ENNEADS, 1.2,4.,5. and
DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.(73-75). "Raise yourself, therefore 
and leap up to the fourth stage, whence virtue and all true praise 
begin. For after this the Soul herself dares to take command not 
only of her own body, but, if she rules any part of the Universe 
that universal body also; she does not think now of her own well- 
-being as belonging solely to herself, but having reflected upon 
her own power and excellence, dares to discriminate and to hold 
certain things in contempt; hence the more she pleases herself 
the more does she withdraw herself from the things that are mean, 
both cleanses the whole and restores it most adorned and most 
beautified;....
DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.74.(Col.729.)"And when this shall 
have been accomplished, that is, when the Soulshall be free from 
all corruption and washed from all blemishes, then at last she 
takes her way most joyously , nor does she fear anything at all 
for herself, neither is she vexed on her own account. Accordingly 
here we reach the fifth stage: for now it both completes and poss- 
-esses purity; and right onwards any other act by means of which 
she restores the impure soul does not suffer her again to be 
defiled.In this stage she apprehends the ALL-SUSTAINING, how great 
it is; and when she perceives it, then indeed by a certain mighty 
and incredible courage she proceeds to God, that is, into the 
contemplation itself of the Truth, and that , for which one must 
toil so greatly which is the highest and most secret reward.
DB QUANTITATE ANIMAE, XXXIII.75."But this act, that is, an earnest 
longing for those things which really and in the highest degree 
exist, is the loftiest function of the Soul, apart from which it 
possesses not that which is the more perfect, the better, the more 
befitting. Consequently that will be the sixth stage of its action
(13).
DE QUANTITATE ANIMAE, 75. (continued'- for one thing the eye 
itself of the Soul becomes fine, so that it does not see in vain, 
nor at random, nor does it see amiss; for another, it preserves 
and strengthens its own purity, so that now it is able to direct 
a serene and noble gaze upon what can be seen".
We may also compare ENNEADS, 1.9.5. with De Ordine, 11.2,7.
(Cols.556,7).
DE ORDINE, II.2.7. "Nor is there anything at all which I/I think 
will be intrusted to the memory of such a Sage; if indeed he is 
ever steadfast in God, whether silent or whether he be speaking 
with men: but that one now a servant well equipped will pay heed 
as he ponders to what his Lord enjoins, and to that one as most 
just, he is grateful and makes it his business to live under the 
power which he finds over him. And this he does, not by reasoning 
but by the highest law and Order which is laid down for him".
This may also be compared with ENNËADS, IV.3.25. 
(see under Enneads,IV.)
(14).
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
THIRD TRACTATE 
On Dialectic, (She Upward Way).
The Neo-Platonists placed a very high value on the Science of 
Dialectic. See Enneads, 1.3.(1-6).
ENNEADS, I.3.1. for part translation, page lé.
ENNEADS, 1.3.2. part translation,page, l6
ENNEADS, 1.3.4. Here Plotinus defines Dialectic, as "The Method 
or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with 
final truth upon the nature and relation of things- what each is, 
how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to 
what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind 
and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there
are, and how many non^Beings to be distinguished from Beings  |
it makes itself the judge, here as in everything else: where it 
sees use, it uses; anything it finds superfluous, it leaves j
to whatever department of learning or practice may turn that mattHi 
~er to account." |
Enneads, 1.3.5. "It is the precious part of Philosophy". j
Mackenna, Vol.I. pages, 53,4. j
De Ordine, 2.38. Here we have a possible reference to the above. 
Augustine has just been dealing with Grammatical Science, he now | 
turns to discuss^Dialectic. Grammatical Science having been perf- 1 
-ectly arranged says Augustine, Reason begins to consider how it j 
has acquired a well ordered and dependable knowledge, by its def- ! 
-initions, its divisions and its deductions. In a word, it procee-l 
-ds to analyse its own machinery, and to examine its working.  ^
So Dialectic comes into being. That Science, which learns by lear-l 
-ning and then by teaching; (haec docet docere, haec docet disc- | 
-ere;. Which knows what it knows and not only desires to make ^
real scholars but actually does so. (Scit scire, sola scientéa 
facere non solum vult, sed etiam potest.) Col.576.
De Ordine, 2.18.47. may be compared with Enneads, 1.3.1.
see page, 15.
De Ordine, 2.18.47."Philosophy deals with a two-fold question; 
one concerning the Soul, the other about God. The former leads us 
to a knowledge of ourselves, the latter to a knowledge of our 
origin; the one is more agreeable to us, but the other is more 
precious; the one makes us fitted for the life of happiness, the 
other makes us happy. The former is the possession of the teach- 
-able, the latter for those who are already taught. Here is the
(15).
order of the study of Wisdom, by means of which, each becomes 
capable of understanding the Order of the Universe, it is for the 
discernment of the two worlds, and of the Author of the Universe 
Himself, unless one knows Him in this way there is no knowledge 
of the Soul." (Col.581.)
The whole passage is imbued by the spirit of Neo-Platonism. 
Plotinus taught continually that the search for the One was the 
final aim for all philosophy.
Enneads, 1.3.6. "And is it possible to be a Sage, a master in 
Dialectic, without these lower virtues? It would not^happen; 
the lower will spring either before or together with the higher, 
and is it likely that everyone normally possesses the natural 
virtues from which, when Wisdom steps in, the perfected virtue 
develops. After the natural virtues, then, Wisdom and, so the 
perfecting of the moral nature. Once the natural virtues exist, 
both orders, the natural and the higher, ripen side by side to 
their final excellence; or as one advances it carries forward the 
other towards perfection."
Mackenna, Vol.I,page,55. 
this may be compared with Soliloquia,I, 23,24,25. 
it contains the same thought, but there is no need 
to quote it in detail.
or
(16).
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
Third Tractate
On Dialectic (The Upward Way).
In DE MUSICA, VI. XII.36. St. Augustine explains how the Soul 
can by the study of Music make its return to God. This is an 
idea borrowed from Plotinus, (ENNEADS, I.3.I,2.)
ENNEADS, I,3.I,"The musician we may think of as being exceedingly 
quick to beauty, drawn in a very rapture to it: somewhat slow to 
stir of his own impulse, he answers at once to the outer stimulus: 
as the timid are sensitive to noise so he to tones and the beauty 
they convey; all that offends against unison or harmony in melod- 
-ies and rhythms repels him; he longs for measure and shapely 
pattern. This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to 
such a man; he must be drawn by the tone, rhythm and design in 
things of sense: he must learn to distinguish the material forms 
from the Authentic-Existent which is the source of all these 
correspondences and of the entire reasoned scheme in the work of 
art; he must be led to theBeauty that manifests itself through 
these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other 
than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the Beauty in that 
sphere, not some one shape of beauty but the All-Beauty, the 
Absolute Beauty; and the truths of philosophy must be implanted 
in him to lead him to faith in that which, unknowing it, he 
possesses within himself.
ENNEADS, 1,3.2. "The born lover, to whose degree the musician 
also may attain- and then either come to a stand or pass beyond- 
has a certain memory of beauty but, severed from it now, he no 
longer comprehends it: spellbound by visible loveliness he clings 
amazed about that. His lesson must be to fall down no longer in 
bewildered delight before some, one embodied form; he must be led, 
under a system of mental discipline, to beauty everywhere and 
made to discern the One Principle underlying all, a Principle 
apart from the material forms, springing from another source, and 
eKsewhere more truly present. The beauty, for example, in a noble 
course of life and in an admirably organised social system may be 
pointed out to him- a first training this in the loveliness of 
the immaterial- he must learn to recognise the beauty in the arts, 
sciences, virtues; then these severed and particular forms must 
be brought under the one principle by the explanation of their 
origin. From the virtues he is to be led to the Intellectual- 
Principle, to the Authentic-Existent; thence onward, he treads 
the upward way".
DE MUSICA, VI.XII.36. (Col.870)."Come now, tell me whether these 
harmonies which we have been discussing, appear to you to be 
subject to change. D.In no way. M.Then do you deny that they are 
not eternal. D.I fully confess that they are eternal.M.Have you no
(17).
DE MUSICA, VI.36 (Continued)-
fear that by reason of their very dissimilarity, it may be sugges- 
-ted to you that they may deceive? D,Nothing is more certain to 
me than the similarity of these harmonies,M. Whence then comes 
the belief which is attributed concerning the Soul, that it is 
eternal and unchangeable, unless from the one eternal and immut- 
-able God? D. I do not see that one can believe anything else, 
M.Well then, is this not clear, when anyone questioning within 
himself, in order that he may discover the unchangeable truth, 
does not such an one move towards God? Unless Memory controls 
his very movement it is not possible that any one can perceive 
that truth, for it cannot be recalled by any suggestion from 
without, D.That is clear,"
We may mark a close parallel here between this thought of
Augustine and ENNEADS, V.I.II,(see ENNEADS, V.)
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
FOURTH TRACTATE
On True Happiness,
Augustine, as we have seen borrows his title De beata Vita from 
Plotinus and at the same time adopts a great deal of the 
arguments which this Tractate makes use of.
ENNEADS, I.IV.I."Are we to make True Happiness one and the same 
thing with Welfare or Prosperity and therefore within the reach 
of the other living beings as well as ourselves?....And if,even, 
we set Happiness in some ultimate Term pursued by inborn tendency, 
then on this head, too, we must allow it to animals from the 
moment of their attaining this Ultimate:"
De beata Vita, lOiLet us grant that we all aspire after happin- ! 
-ess. What is it then to be happy unless it is to be not unhappy? i 
De beata Vita, (?3,24). "I say therefore that it does not follow 
that if anyone is in need he is unhappy, anyone who is not in need 
is happy." |
In De diversis Quaestionibus, 83.5.-Augustine asks the question, | 
"Utrum animal irrationals beatum esse possit?" There Augustine | 
makes answer that the beasts do not know happiness because they | 
do not possess knowledge. The same remark is made by Plotinus.
ENNEADS, I.IV.2."Perhaps, however, the theory is that the Goodof 
any state consists not in the condition itself but in the know- 
-ledge and perception of it".
(18)
We may also add a further quotatlon-
ENNEADS, I.IV.2."Perhaps, then, those are in the right who found 
happiness not on hare living or even on sensitive life but on the 
life of Reason".
Compare this with De beata Vita, 26-28. Here, Augustine argues 
that there are some men who lead a life of unhappiness even whilst 
they loll in the lap of luxury. He quotes Cicero who speaks of a 
certain man who, whilst possessing every kind of good thing, yet 
life a life of supreme wretchedness for he was in constant fear 
of losing all that he possessed. His fear- says Augustine- was due 
to a certain lack of judgment. Hence, 'it is golly which constit- 
-utes real poverty.
ENNEADS, I.IV.3.Alf mere Being is insufficient, if happiness deman- 
-ds fulness of life and exists, therefore, where nothing is lacking 
of all that belongs to the idea of life, then happiness can exist 
only in a being that lives fully".
In like manner Augustine says- De beata Vita, 30,31. (Col.517) :
Wisdom should be esteemed the best kind of wealth since it suggests^
the thought of fulness. "Et si egestas est ipsa stultitia,plenitudo 
erit sapientia".
ENNEADS, I.IV.4. "Once the man is a Sage, the means of happiness, 
the way to good; are within, for nothing is good that lies outside 
him. Anything he desires further than this he seeks as a necessity, 
and not for himself but for a subordinate, for the body bound to I 
him, to which since it has life he must minister the needs of life, 
not needs, however, to the true man of this degree. He knows him- 
-self to stand above all such things, and what he gives to the 
lower he so gives as to leave his true life undiminished....Adverse 
fortune does not shake his felicity: the life so founded is stable ; 
ever. Suppose death strikes at his household or at his friends; he | 
knows what death is, as the victims, if they are among the wise, 
know too. And if death taking from him his familiars and intimates 
does bring grief, it is not to him, not to the true man, but to
that in him which stands apart from the Supreme, to that lower
man in whose distress he takes no part".
We may compare this with- De beata vita, 25. where Augustine very
closely follows Plotinus.He who has Wisdom can stand in need of |
many things and yet abide in the happy life. He has no fear either-
of the death of the body, or distresses, or want. He has the peace i
of happiness within.
In the same way we may compare ENNEADS, 1.4.7. with this section 
also Enneads, 1.4.8. which carries forward the same thought 
concerning the endurance of the Sage since his life is grounded 
on Wisdom. There is an echo of Enneads, 1.4.15. in De beata Vita, 
26-28— , quoted above. I
(19).
Lastly we would note in connection with this Tractate on Happi- 
-ness that Augustine and Plotinus arrive at the same conclusion. 
Both find true happiness in Wisdom and both agree that such 
Wisdom is only to be found in the life of the man who has found 
the Highest Wisdom, that is the one who has found God,
We may compare then- ENNEADS, I.IV.I6. with De Beata Vita,33,34,
Enneads, I,IV,16."Those that refuse to place the Sage aloft in the 
Intellectual Realm but drag him down to the accidental, dreading 
accident for him, have substituted for the Sage we have in mind 
another person altogether; they offer us a tolerable sort of man 
and they assign to him a life ofmingled good and ill, a case, 
after all, not easy to conceive. But admitting the possibility of 
such a mixed state, it could not be deserved to be called a life 
of happiness; it misses the Great, both in the dignity of Wisdom 
and in the integrity of Good.The life of true happiness is not 
a thing of mixture. And Plato rightly taught that he who is to be 
wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme, 
fixing his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living by That".
De beata Vita, 33,34.(Cols. 518,9.) But if you ask what is Wisdom 
..it is nothing else than a regulating principle in the Soul,Or 
we may speak of it as to the Soul what nourishment is to the body 
But when we speak of Wisdom of what do we think? Surely of the 
Wisdom of God, Now the Son of God is none other than the Wisdom 
of God,and the Son of God is really God, \fhoever then has God is 
h&PPy. (See pages, 137,8,9, of this Thesis for a fuller account; 
the above is only a very condensed paraphrase, but it is suffic- 
-ient to indicate that Augustine and Plotinus present the same 
argument ).
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
SIXTH TRACTATE.
Beauty.
ENNEADS I.VI.I."Almost everyone declares that the symmetry of 
parts towards each other and towards a whole, with, besides, a
certain charm of colour, constitutes the beauty recognised by the
eye, that in visible things, as indeed in all else, universally, 
the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical,patterned".
Augustine may have had this in his mind when he wrote in-
DE ORDINE, 2.XI.30. (Col.571 )."Reason is the movement of the mind, 
This enables us to distinguish and arrange what we learn, by mean: 
of analysis and synthesis. It declares itself sometimes even in
(20)
objects perceived by the smell, the taste and the touch...On/, the 
other hand it proclaims itself in a very direct way by many things 
which please the sight or the hearing, for example, the very 
symmetry of a house, or a rhythmic chant will please us. In a 
word, Reason, which is only another term for Orderly arrangement, 
gives birth to Beauty as well as harmony".
So also we may find a parallel thought to this in Enneads, 1.6.2.
Enneads, I.6.2."Let us,then, go back to the source, and indicate 
at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things.... 
Our interpretation is that the soul- by the very truth of its 
nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existants in the hierar- 
-chy of Being- when it sees anything of that kin or any trace of 
that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to 
itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all 
its affinity." j
Compare Confessions, III.VI.10."And I indeed ought to have passed |
by even philosophers who spake truth concerning them, for love of !
Thee, ray Father, supremely good. Beauty of all things beautiful".
Enneads, I.6.2."But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has j
grouped and coordinated what from a diversity of parts was to I 
become a unity; it has rallied confusion into co-operation: it has! 
made the sum one harmonious coherence: for the Idea is a unity and 
what it moulds must come to unity as far as multiplicity may..,.. 
This, then, is how the material thing becomes beautiful- by comm- 
-unicating in the thought that flows from the Divine".
also a like thought in Enneads 1.6.3.
Compare with Confessions, IV.XIII.20."These things I then knew not 
and I loved these lower beauties, and I was sinking to the very 
depths, and to my friends I said, 'do we love any thing but the 
beautiful? IThat then is the beautiful? and what is beauty? üVhat 
is it that attracts and wins us to the things we love? for unless 
there were in them a grace and beauty, they could by no means 
draw us unto them. ' And I marked and perceived that in bodies 
themselves, there was a beauty, from their forming a sort of whole 
and again, another from apt and mutual correspondence, as of a 
part of the body with its whole, or a shoe with a foot, and the 
like".
Enneads, I.6.6."That divine order from which the wellspring of 
Beauty rises and all the race of Beauty..., in the Soul's becoming 
a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God, for from 
the Divine comes all the Beauty and all the Good in beings.,...
The beauty in things of a lower order- actions and pursuits for 
instance- comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also 
the author of the beauty found in the world of sense. For the 
Soul, a divine thing, a fragment as it were of the Primal Beauty,
(21).
makes beautiful to the fulness of their capacity all things what-
-soever that it grasps and moulds".
Compare- CONFESSIONS, 1.7.13."For Thou art God...whose Unity is 
the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all
things fair; and orderest all things by^Aiy law".
ENNEADS, 1.6.7."And one that shall know thisxvision- with what 
passion of love shall he not be seized, with what pang of desire, 
what longing to be molten into one with This, what wondering 
delight! If he that has never seen this Being must hunger for It 
as for all his welfare, he that has knovm must love and reverence 
It as the very Beauty; he will be flooded with awe and gladness, 
stricken by a salutary terror; he loves with a veritable love, 
with sharp desire; all other loves than this he must despise, and 
disdain all that once seemed fair..And for This, the sternest and 
the uttermost combat is set before the Souls; all our labour is 
for this, lest we be left without part in this noblest vision, 
which to attain is to be blessed in the blissful sight, which to 
fail of is to fail utterly. For not he that has failed of the joy^ 
that is in colour or in visible forms, not he that has failed of 
power or of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he that 
has failed of only This, for Vidiose winning he should renounce 
kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky, if only, 
spurning the world of sense from beneath his feet, and straining 
to This, he may see".
We may compare this with-
SOLILOQUIA, I.XIII.22. (Col.613). "But do I love on account of 
Wisdom herself, or do I wish that other things are also mine, or 
am I afraid that on account of this, life, tranquility, friends 
will be wanting? But can one have the love for the beautiful in 
such a fashion, in which I do not only refuse the rest, but even 
seek those who call to me, those who long for me, who hold me, 
who enjoy themselves with me. Inasmuch as these are merely friend- 
-ly to me, so much the more will my love become more degraded".
We may compare this also with Enneads, 1.3,2.
Compare too- De Civitate Dei, X.16."For that vision of God is the 
beauty of a vision so great, and so infinitely desirable, that 
Plotinus does not hesitate to say that he who enjoys all other 
blessings in abundance, and has not this, is supremely miserable"
Enneads, I.6,8."Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland"; this 
is the soundest counsel. But what is this flight? How are we to 
gain the open sea?,..The Fatherland to us is There whence we have 
come, and There is The Father. What then is our course, what the 
manner of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the 
feet bring us only from land to land;nor need you think of coach
(22).
or ship to carry you away".
Compare this with, Confessions, I.XVIII.28. "For it is not by our 
feet, or change of place, that men leave Thee, or return unto 
Thee. Or did that Thy younger son look out for horses or chariots, 
or ships, fly with visible wings, or journey by the motion of his 
limbs, that he might in a far country waste in riotous living all 
Thou gaveSt at his departure? A loving Father, when Thou gavest, 
and more loving unto him, vrhen he returned empty. So then in 
lustful, that is, in darkened affections, is the true distance 
from Thy face".
see also Confessions, VIII.8.19. for a similar 
thought. A like reference is to be found in De Civ.Dei,IX.17.
Enneads, I.6.8."When he perceives those shapes of grace that show 
in body, let him not pursue; he must know them for copies, vesti- 
-ges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of".
Compare with Confessions, 1.20.31."For it was my sin, that not in 
Him, but in His creatures- myself and others- I sought for pleas- 
lures, sublimities, truths, and so fell headlong into sorrows, 
confusions, errors".
ENNEADS, 1.6.9, "Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do 
not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a 
statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he 
smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, 
until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also; cut 
away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, brinf 
light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of 
beauty and never cease chiseling your statue, until there shall 
shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until 
you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the staid
-less shrine This is the only eye that sees the mighty Beauty
If the eye that adventures the vision be dimmed by vice, impure, 
or weak, and unable in its cowardly blenching to see the utter- 
-most brightness, then it sees nothing even though another point 
to what lies plain to sight before it. To any vision must be 
brought an eye adapted to what is to be seen, and having some 
likeness to it. Never did eye see the sun unless it had first 
become sunlike, and never can the soul have vision of the First 
Beauty unless itself be beautiful. Therefore, first let each 
become godlike and each beautiful who cares to see God and 
Beauty",
We are able to compare this with the following passages from the 
Confessions.
CONFESSIONS, VII,X.16."And being thence admonished to return to 
myself, I entered even into my inward self, Thou being my Guide:
( 23)
and able I was, for Thou wert become my Helper, And I entered & 
beheld with the eye of my soul, (such as it was) above the same 
eye of ray soul, above my mind, the Light Unchangeable, ...He that 
knows the Truth, knows what that Light is; and he that knows It, 
knows eternity. Love knoweth it, 0 Truth Who art Eternity! and 
Love Who art Truth! and Eternity Who art Love! Thou art my God,to 
Thee do I sigh night and day. Thee when I first knew, Thou 1ifteds 
-St me up, that I might see there was what I might see, and that 
I was not yet such as to see. And Thou didst beat back the weak- 
-ness of my sight, streaming forth Thy beams of light upon me 
most strongly, and I trembled with love and awe; and I perceived 
myself to be far off from Thee, in the region of unlikeness,"
CONFESSIONS, VI,IV.6."And by believing might I have been cured, 
that so the eyesight of ray soul being cleared, might in some way 
be directed to Thy Truth, which abideth always, and in no part 
faileth".
CONFESSIONS, VII.XX,26."But having thus read those books of the 
Platonists, and thence being taught to search for incorporeal 
truth, I saw Thy invisible things understood by those things which 
are made; and though cast back, I perceived what that was, which 
through the darkness of my mind I was hindered from contemplating"^
The different degrees which Augustine marks in his De Quantitate 
Animae, on the theme of Beauty, are the same as those which 
Plotinus describes in his Enneads, 1.6.
Bouillet, (Vol.I., page LX. ) calls attention here to Porphyry's 
"Principles of the Theory of Intelligibles",
IX."The Soul is itself bound to ,the body .when, it turns itself to 
its passions, which it feels, ( tiiirTP^Y^ ûpos 7k ) it
detaches itself Jrom the body when it turns itself away from its 
passions ).
(24)
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
SIXTH TRACTATE.
Beauty•
ENNEADS, I.VI. 4. compared with De 0rdiP.I6.(42,59. )
Both St. Augustine and Plotinus say that there are three grades 
of Beauty. The first being the image of the second, and the sec- 
-ond of the third.
ENNEADS, I.VI.4."But there are earlier & loftier beauties than 
these. In the sense-bound life we are no longer granted to know 
them; but the soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and pro- 
-claims them. To the vision of these we must mount, leaving 
sense to its own low place. As it is not for those to speak of 
the graceful forms of the material world who have never seen them 
or known their grace- men born blind,let us suppose- in the same 
way those must be silent upon the beauty of noble conduct and of 
learning and all that orderwho have never cared for such things, 
nor may those tell of the splendour of virtue who have never kno?q 
the face of Justice and of Moral-Wisdom beautiful beyond the 
beauty of Evening and of Dawn. Such a vision, is for those only 
who see with the Soul's sight- and at the vision, they will rej- , 
-oice, and awe will fall upon them and a trouble deeper than all | 
the rest could ever stir, for now they are moving in the realm of 
Truth. This is the spirit that Beauty must ever induce, wonder- 
-ment and a delicious trouble, longing and love and a trembling 
that is all delight. For the unseen all this may be felt as for 
the seen; and this the Souls feel for it, every soul in some 
degree, but those the more deeply that are the more truly apt to 
this higher love- just as all take delight in the beauty of the 
body but all are not stung as sharply, and those only that feel 
the keener wound are known as Lovers."
Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 82.
ENNEADS, 1.6.6* may also be compared with Confessions,3.6.10.
for the translation of the Soneads, see 
page 20.
Confessions, 3.6.10."Beauty of all things beautiful". also
Confessions, 1.7.12,"For Thou art Bod, Almighty and Good,..whose 
Unity is the mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness 
makest all things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".
(25).
THE FIRST ENNEAD.
EIGHTH TRACTATE 
On Evil.
ENNEADS, I.8.2."The Good is that on which all else depends,tovmrds 
which all Existences aspire as to their source and their need, 
while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to 
no other, the measure and Term of all, giving out from itself 
the Intellectual-Principle and Existence and Soul and Life and 
all Intellective-Act".
In the same way as we have seen (Thesis, page 138.) Augustine in 
his treatise on Happiness speaks of the Standard, which is the 
measure and term of all. Here we see how he reasons.
De beata Vita, 34. (col.518) "But what must we think of Wisdom, 
unless it is the Wisdom of God? But let us receive from divine 
authority the statement that the Son of God is none else than 
the Wisdom of God: and the Son of God is really God,.,.But what 
do you thinlc to be Wisdom, unless it be the Truth? For even 
it is said of this: I am the Truth. But in order that it may be 
the Truth, it becomes such by means of a certain high standard 
from which it proceeds; and into which being perfect itself it 
betakes itself."
ENNEADS, 1.8.3. "Evil cannot have place among Beings or in the 
Beyond-Being; these are good. There remains, only, if Evil exist 
at all, that it be situate in the realm of Non-Being, that it be 
some mode, as it were, of the Non-Being, that it have its seat in 
something in touch with Non-Being or to a certain degree communic- 
-ate in Noh-Being."
see also Enneads, III.2.5.
We have already noticed (Chapter, VII. Thesis) that Augustine 
took the conception of evil as being negative from Neo-Platoniem. 
Here we have some comparisons with Enneads, 1.8.3.
Confessions, 3.VII. 12."Because as yet I knew not that evil was 
nothing but a privation of good, (privationem boni) until at last 
a thing ceases altogether to be." cp.also ibid,IV.XV.24.
Confessions, IV.XV.26."I returned not to Thee, but I passed on 
and on to things which have bo being, neither in Thee, nor in me, 
nor in the body. Neither were they created for me by Thy truth, 
but by my vanity devised out of things corporeal".
See also Confessions, VII.V.7,"Where is evil then, and whence, 
and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed?
Or hath it no being? Why then fear we and avoid what is not?"
(26.
ENNEADS, I.8.4."The Soul wrought to perfection, addressed towards 
the Intellectual-Principle is steadfastly pure; it has turned 
away from Matter; all that is undetermined, that is outside of 
measure, that is evil, it neither sees nor draws near; it endures 
in its purity, only, and wholly, determined by the Intellectual- 
Principle. ... The Soul that breaks away from this source of its 
reality to the non-perfect and non-primal is, as it were, a 
secondary, an image, to the loyal Soul, By its falling-away- and 
to the extent of the fall- it is stripped of Determination, bevo- 
-mes wholly indeterminate, sees darkness. Looking to what repels 
vision as we look when we are said to see darkness, it has taken 
Matter into itself".
Compare the above with- De Ordine, 2.III.8. St Augustine here 
defines the phrase 'being with God', to mean knowing God, And he 
adds that with God is to be found those treasures of Wisdom which 
the Wise man possesses. But in that case the element of foolish- 
-ness will become associayed with God, For if the Wise man finds 
whatever things that are in God, it will be tantamount to saying 
that sin and disease are likewise associated with God, Augustine, 
however,reasons that the books of the Wise declare that such 
things arise dimply from an absence of thought, as darkness arises 
from a failure of light. To say then that one cannot know foolish- 
-ness is no more absurd than to declare that we cannot see the 
darkness.(De Ordine,2.3.10. Col.559.)Now thecWise man sees every- 
-thing in God, as he sees God, directly and without effort.It is 
this fact which leads one, therefore, to say that the Wise man '
is in no sense submissive to the/laws of Matter",
We may add what Plotinus has to say also in Enneads, 1.8.5. !
concerning Evil,
Enneads, 1.8.5."Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absol- 
-ute lack. What falls in some degree short of the Good is not 
Evil; considered in its own kind it might even be perfect, but 
where there is utter dearth, there we have Essential Evil, void of 
all share in Good; this is the case with Matter."
ENNEADS, I.8.9."We utterly eliminate every kind of Form; and the 
object in which there is none whatever we call Matter; if we are 
to see Matter we must so completely abolish Form that we take 
shapelessness into our very selves".
Compare this with-
Confessions, XII.VI.6."So I conceived of that Matter as having 
innumerable forms and diverse, and therefore did not conceive it
at all and I bent myself to the bodies themselves, and looked
more deeply into their changeableness, by which they cease to be 
what they have been, and begin to be what thejjjware not; and jchis 
same shifting from form to form, I suspected to be through a cert- 
-ain formless state, not through a mere nothing; ...for the change- 
-ablenessof changeable things, is itself capable of all those 
forme, into which these changeable things are changed. And this
(27) .
changeablenese, what is it? Is it Soul? Is it body? Is it that 
which constituteth soul or body?Might one say, *a nothing some- 
-thing*, an *is, is not*, I would say, this were it: and yet in 
some way was it even then, as being capable of receiving these 
visible and compound figures".
ENNEADS, 1,8.12."What Soul could contain Evil unless by contact 
with the lower Kind? There could be no desire, no sorrow, no rage, 
no fear: fear touches the compounded dreading its dissolution;
pain and sorrow are the accompaniments of the dissolution; desires 
spring from something troubling the grouped being or are a prov- 
-ision against trouble threatened; a,ll impression^ is the stroke 
of something unreasonable outside the Soul, accepted only because 
the Soul is not devoid of parts or phases;"
Augustine follows Plotinus in associating Pleasure and Pain with 
the Soul, by reason of its union with the body, see- 
De Civitate Dei, XIV.15."And the pains which are called bodily 
are pains of the Soul in and from the body. For what pain or 
desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the Soul?But when 
the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant..that the 
man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the 
sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh sensation causing pain, or 
gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discom­
fort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking 
from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadn- 
-ess is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us 
in spite of ourselves".
(28).
Enneads, I.8.10. and Porphyry's, "Principles of the Theory
of Intelligibles", Ennead, 3.Book,6. (6.7.) 
may be compared with De Immort.Animae, V.7.(Col.654;
Enneads, I.8.10."Now as, going upward from virtue, we come to the 
Beautiful and to the Good, so, going downward from Vice we reach 
the Essential Evil: from Vice as the starting point we come to 
the vision of Evil, as far as such vision is possible, and we 
become evil to the extent of our participation in it, We are 
become dwellers in the Place of Unlikeness, where, fallen from al! 
our resemblance to the Divlnf,we lie in gloom and mud: for if 
the Soul abandons itself unreservedly to the extreme of vicious- 
-ness, it is no longer a vicious Soul merely, for mere vice is 
still human, still carries some trace of good: it has taken to 
itself another nature, the Evil, and as far as the Soul can die 
it is dead. And the death of Soul is twofold: while still sunk in 
body to lie do;m in Matter and drench itself with it: when it has 
left the body, to lie in the other world until, somehow, it stirs 
again and lifts its sight from the mud: and this is our "going 
down to Hades and slumbering there", i
Mackenna, Vol.I.page, 105.
Porphyry's "Theory of Intelligibles"- Ennead,3.Book,6.(6,7.)
"The Soul is an essence without extension, immaterial, incorrupt- 
-ible; its being consists in a life which is its very own. When 
the being of an essence is its very own life, and its passions 
spring from its course of life, its death consists in a life of 
a certain character, and not in the entire deprivation of life.
For the passion which this essence experiences by its death does 
not lead to a complete loss of life".
Translated from Bouillet, Vol.I.LIX.
De Immortalitate Aniraae, V.7."But now let us see to what an ext- 
-ent it may be understood that the Soul suffers change...What on 
the contrary is wont to be regarded as of greater value than 
change? Who denies that the Soul exists, at one time foolish, 
at another time wise?...Let us see firstly in how many ways what 
is called change of Soul may be understood; indeed, several 
kinds of change may be discovered, but, as I think, there are two 
which are more manifest, or, at least more distinct. For the Soul 
is said to be changeable either according to the passions of the 
body, or on account of her own; according to the body, as by age 
grief, toil, annoyance, or through pleasure; in accordance with 
her own passions, as by desire, joy, fear, sadness, study, instr- 
-uction. All these changes, it is needless to argue, will not 
bring about the death of the Soul, there is no fear of the Soul 
being torn asunder on her account..No changes which take place 
either through the body or through the Soul itself can ever make 
a soul not a soul; although whether some may spring through itself 
by means of which it is itself the cause, is a great question."
É
(29).
THE SECOND ENNEAD.
THIRD TRACTATE 
Are the Stars Causes?
ENNEADS, II,3.7."All things must he enchained; and the sympathy 
and correspondence obtaining in any one closely knit organism 
must exist, first, and most intensely, in the All,There must be 
one principle constituting this unit of many forms of life and
enclosing the several members within the unity, while at the same
time, precisely as in each thing of detail the parts too have each 
a definite function, so in the All (the higher All) each several 
member must have its own task- but more markedly so since in this 
case the parts are not merely members but themselves Alls, memb- 
-ers of the loftier Kind,...And there is nothing undesigned, 
nothing of chance, in all the process: all is one scheme of diff- 
-erentiation, starting from the Firsts and working itself out in 
a continuous progression of Kinds,"
As we saw(in Chapter VII. of our Thesis), Augustine in his doctr- 
-ine of Providence was gretly influenced by Plotinus. We may com-
-pare here what he has to say in hid 'De Ordine'.
DE ORDINE, I,(Chaps.I-VI.) Here Augustine tells us,-All things 
act according to Order in our world of Sense, In all material 
being we are able to behold a wonderful harmony. Each is linked 
with each, cause and effect, effect and cause are everywhere evid- 
-ent, even the apparently insignificant thing has a real purpose. 
God guides all things and is present in all happenings. Order is 
aii-pervasive*
See also Enneads, III.1.4; IiI,2.I;III,3.6,7,
ENNEADS, II,3.13."The gist of the whole matter lies in the consid-l 
-ation that Soul governs this All by the plan contained in the 
Reason-Principle and plays in the All exactly the part of the 
particular principle whic& in every living-thing forms the members 
of the organism and adjusts them to the unity of which they are 
portions; the entire force of the Soul is represented in the All, 
but, in the parts. Soul is present only in proportion to the 
degree of essential reality held by each of such partial objects. 
....The ensouled fall into two classes. The one kind has a motion 
of its own, but haphazard like that of horses between the shafts 
but before their driver sets the course; they are set right by the 
whip. In the Living-Being possessed of Reason, the nature-principle 
includes the driver; where the driver is intelligent, it takes in
the main a straight path to a set end."
(30)
A comparison may be seen in the idea of Augustine concerning the 
function of the Holy Spirit. In De Ordine, 2.26., the Holy Spirit 
is spoken of as being by the side of Sovereign Intelligence.
See also page, 139, Thesis, where in a reference to De beata Vita 
35. it is found that in that passage Augustine represents the 
Holy Spirit as Guide and Director.
ENNEADS, II.3.18."Without evil the All would be incomplete. For 
most or even all forms of Evil serve the Universe- much as the 
poisonous snake has its use- though in most cases their function 
is unknown. Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings about 
much that is beautiful, in artistic creations, for example, and 
it stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse in 
security".
Augustine proclaims a like Optimism, and following Plotinus he 
makes use of like illustration as he seeks to show that the part- 
-ial disorders of the world, under the hand of God contribute 
to its general harmony.
DE ORDINE, 2,IV.12, (Col. 560 ). "Tfhat is more offensive than an 
executioner? Vi/hat can be more cruel or more awful to the mind?Yet 
even he holds a needful place under the very law of the land and 
in a well governed state his name is associated with Order. Now 
he is harmful in his design but only in the punishment of crimin- 
-ale who are themselves harmful to the Order.What more sordid, 
more void of dignity, more full of shamelessness can be conceived 
than prostitutes, procurers^, and other pests of that class?
But remove prostitutes from human society and you will throw 
everything into confusion by reason of lust."
DE ORDINE, 2.IV.13.(Col.561) "Poets love to introduce what they 
speak of as barbarisms or solecisms, or if we may use the terms
rhetorical figures and Metaplasms, just as they with like reason
seek to avoid evident faults. Yet take thes away from their 
songs and we should spoil the sweetest music. So too an absolutely 
perfect discourse would bore us by reason of its very perfection, 
but let it be varied by touches of carelessness and we are all 
the more pleased. We all disapprove of sophistry, but a serious 
discourse is enhanced by its use. So evil is needful for the har­
mony of the Cosmos. Turn where you please and you will find that 
everything proclaims the fact that all things are ordered for the 
best in the world about us".
So also in De Libero Arbitrio, 3.IX.25, (Col,1008,9.) we
find the same thought.
(31).
THE SECOND ENNEAD.
FOURTH TRACTATE ;
I
Matter in its Two Kinds. ,
ENNEADS, 2.4.I,"What is known as Matter is understood to be a 
certain base, a recipient of Form-Ideas."  ^ ^?A.;v r<- R-N/
ENNEADS, 2.4.2."Now (it will be reasoned)if Matter must charact- 
-eristically be undetermined, void of shape, while in that sphere | 
of the Highest there can be nothing that lacks determination, j 
nothing shapeless, there can be no Matter there. Further, if all ■ 
that order is simplex, there can be no need of Matter, whose 
function is to join with some other element to form a compound; | 
it will be found of necessity in things of derived existence and | 
shifting nature- the signs which lead us to the notion of Matter-| 
- but it is unnecessary to the primal", , < , I
y r y V <9 r ^  tv f I Z %  |
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See Confessions, XII.VI.6. (Reference to be found under Enn,I.8.9J 
for comparison with above.
also note Enneads, 2.4.6, for a like thought. |
According to Plotinus matter can only be conceived by a species 
of abstraction which he calls, 'spurious reasoning'.
ENNEADS, 2.4.10,"But how can I form the conception of the size- 
lessness of Matter? How do you form the concept of any absence of 
quality? "iHhat is the Act of the Intellect, what is the mental 
approach, in such a case? The secret is Indétermination. Likeness 
knows its like; the indeterminate knows the indeterminate.Around 
this indefinite a definite conception will be realised, but the ' 
way lies through indefiniteness. All knowledge comes by Reason 
and the Intellectual Act; in this case Reason conveys information ■ 
in any account it gives, but the act which aims at being intellect 
-tual is, here, not intellection but rather its failure : therefore 
(in this crippled approach) the representation of Matter must be 
spurious, unreal, something sprung of the Alien, of the unreal, 
and bound up with the alien reason. This is Plato's meaning where 
he says that Matter is apprehended by a sort of spurious reason- 
~ing."
CONFESSIONS,XII.V.5,"So that when thought seeketh what the sense 
may conceive under this and saith to itself,-*It is no intellect- 
-ual form; as life, or justice; because it is the matter of bodies 
nor object of sense, because being invisible,.and without form.
(32).
there was in it ho object of sight or sense;'- while man's 
thought thus saith to itself, it may endeavour either to know it, 
by being ignorant of it; or to be ignorant by knowing it".
ENNEADS, 2,4.16."Then Matter is simply Alienism (the Principle 
of Difference)? No: it is merely that part of Alienism which 
stands in contradiction with the Authentic Existen&s which are 
Reason-Principles, So understood, this ngn-existent has a certain 
measure of existence; for it is identical with Privation, which 
also is a thing standing in opposition to the things that exist 
in Reason,"
Sp Augustine- Confessions, 3.7.12," B e c a u s e y e t  I knew not that 
evil was nothing but a privation of good, (atl]^"riuntTI! a 
thing ceases altogether to be".
SECOND ENNEAD.
NINTH TRACTATE
Against Those that affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and the 
Kosmos itself to be Evil: (Generally quoted as 'Against the 
Gnostics').
ENNEADS, 2.9,I,"We have seen elsewhere that the Good, the Princ- 
-iple, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal- for the secondary 
can never be simplex- that it contains nothing: that it is an 
integral Unity. Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we 
know as The One, Just as the goodness of The Good is essential 
and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The 
One is its essential. Therefore:- When we speak of The One and 
when we speak of The Good we must recognise an Identical Nature; 
we must affirm that they are the same- not, it is true, as vent- 
-uring any predication with regard to that (unknowable ) Hypostasis 
but simply as indicating it to ourselves inn the best terms we 
find. Even in calling it The First we mean no more than to express 
that it is the most absolutely simplex: it is the Self-Sufficing 
only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which 
would make it dependent upon any constituent; it is "the Self-Cont- 
-ained" because everything contained in something alien must also 
exist by that alien. Deriving then, from nothing alien, entering 
into nothing alien, in no way a made-up thing, there can be noth- 
-ing above it," also Enneads, 2.9.3.
CONFESSIONS, VII.V. 7. "îDiere is evil then, and whence, and how 
crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath 
it no being? Why then fear we and avoid what is not? 6r , if we
(33).
fear it idly, then is that very fear evil, whereby the soul is 
thus idly goaded and racked. Yea, and so much a greater evil, as 
we have nothing to fear, and yet do fear. Therefore either is that 
evil which we fear, or else evil is, that we fear.Whence is it 
then? seeing God, the Good, hath created all these things good.
He indeed, the greater and chiefest Good, hath created these less- 
-er goods; still both Creator and created, all are good, YOience 
is evil? Or was there some evil matter of which He made, and 
formed, and ordered it, yet left something in it, which He did 
not convert into good? Why so then? Had He no might to turn and 
change the whole, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing He 
is All-mighty? Lastly, why would He make any thing at all of it, 
and not rather by the same All-mightiness cause it not to be at 
all? Or, could it then be, against His will? Or if it were from 
eternity, why suffered He it so to be for infinite spaces of 
times past, and was pleased so long after tomake something out of 
it? Or if He were suddenly pleased now to effect somewhat, this 
rather should the Allmighty have effected, so that this evil matt- 
-er should not be, and He alone be, the vfhole, true, sovereign, 
and infinite Good. Or if it was not good that He who was good, 
should not also frame and create something that were good, then, 
that evil matter being taken away and brought to nothing, He might 
form good matter, whereof to create all things. For He should not 
be Allmighty, if He might not create something good without the 
aid of that matter which Himself had not created.
Grandgeorge draws a comparison (pages, 14 3,4. op.cit) between 
Enneads, II.9.8, and De Civitate Dei, XII.4.
Enneads, II.9,13. and De Civitate Dei, XI.22.- see page,140.G 
Enneads, II.8.16. and De Civitate Dei, VIII.6.-see page 123.G.
W'e may draw a comparison between Enneads, II,9.13. and De Lib.Arb, 
3.24,(cols.1007,8). I
ENNEADS II.9.13,"Those,then, that censure the constitution of/thel 
Kosmos do not understand what they are doing or where this audac- 
-ity leads them. They do not understand that there is a successive 
order of Primais, Secondaries, Tertiaries and so on continuously 
to the intimates; that nothing is to be blamed for being inferior 
to the First; that we can but accept, meekly, the constitution of | 
the total, and make our best way towards the Primais,withdrawing j 
from the tragic spectacle, as they see it, of the Kosmic spheres- i 
which in reality are all suave graciousness.".
De Libero Arbitrio, 3.9.24,"The order of creation from the highest' 
to the lowest runs thus in just ranks, so that he isonvious who 
says this is not, indeed he is envious who will say that might be 
of Buch a nature. For if he wishes such to be like its superior, 
it is already that, and is mo much so that he ought not to cast 
it from him because it should be perfect,Again he who says,
that might be like such a thing* either wishes to add to a super-
(34).
-ior perfection and will be immoderate and unjust, or lie wishes 
to destroy that and will be vexed and evil".
It may be that Augustine here has also in his mind the closing 
lines of ENNEADS, 11,9,13. "Once more, we have no right to ask 
that all men shall be good, or to rush into censure because such 
universal virtue is not possible: this would be repeating the 
error of confusing our sphere with the Supreme and treating evil 
as a nearly négligeable failure in wisdom- as good lessened and 
dwindling continuously, a continuous fading out: it would be 
like calling the Nature-Principle evil because it is not Sense- 
Perception and the thing of sense evil for not being a Reason— 
Principle. If evil is no more than that , we will be obliged to 
admit evil in the Supreme also, for there, too Soul is less exalt- 
-ed than the Intellectual-Principle, and That too has its 
Superior".
(35).
THE THIRD ENNEAD.
FIRST TRACTATE 
PATE.
We may compare Enneads, 3.1.4. with De Ordine, I.(I-VIÏ.
see page 29, of this Appendix for 
the translation.
Enneads, III.1.4." The Universe is permeated by one Soul, Cause 
of all things and events; every separate phenomenon as a member 
of a whole moves in its place with the general movement; all the 
various causes spring into action from one source: therefore, it 
is argued, the entire descending claim of causes and all their 
interaction must inevitably follow and so constitute a universal 
determination".
Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 4,5.
Enneads, 3*1.9. compared with De Lib.Arb. I.8.18. (see page,2.
of this Appendix.
Enneads, 3,I.9."When our Soul holds to its Reason- 
the guide, pure and detached and native to itself, 
we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act. 
may be truly described as our doing, for they %.ave 
source; they are the issue of the unmingled Soul, 
that is a First, a leader, a sovereign not subject 
of ignorance, not to be overthrown by the tyranny 
which, they can break in, drive and drag, so as to 
act of ours, but mere answer to stimulus".
Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 10.
Principle, to 
only then can 
Things so done 
no other 
aX Principle 
to the errors 
of the desires 
allow of no
We may also compare this with Augustine's Enchiridion, XXX. 
see page, 238, of our Thesis.
(36),
THE THIRD ENNEAD.
SECOND TRACTATE 
Providence: First Treatise
Enneads, III.2.I. may be compared to De Libero Arbitrio, 2.44,5
Enneads, III.2.I."The authentic and primal Kosmos is the Being 
of the Intellectual Principle and of the Veritable Existent, This 
contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of 
the feebleness of division, and even its parts bring no incompl- 
-eteness to it since since here the individual is not severed 
from the entire. In this Nature inheres all life and all intell- 
-ec%,a life living and having intellection as one act within a 
unity: every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content 
is its very oim, for there is no separation of thing from thing, ' 
no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest, 
and therefore nowhere is there any wronging of any other, any 
opposition. Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest through- ' 
-out and shows difference at no point; it does not make over any 
of its content into any new form; there can be no reason for 
changing what is everywhere perfect."
Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 12.
De Libero Arbitrio, 2.(44,45) " If then you will turn your eyes 
on anything changeable, whether it be towards bodily sense,or 
contemplation, you are not able to form a true conception of 
things unless you take into account some sort of harmony, which 
if that were withdrawn all would fall into chaos. Apart from 
all change whichjü^ is associated with temporal things, and their 
separate variety, there remains a certain inherent form which 
is eternal and unchangeable... .by means of this all the elements 
àne moulded and according to its own kind, each exist as harmon- 
-ies of space and time. For everything that is changeable some 
pattern is indispensable. ..But nothing is able to give form to 
itself, because it is not possible for it to supply what it does 
not itself possess, and assuredly in order that each thing may 
have a form it must be formed.... Thus it follows that both body 
and soul are fashioned by^certain unchangeable and ever^ abiding 
Form. And of this Form it has been said, 'Thou wilt chage these 
things and they shall be changed; but Thou art Thyself ^ he same
and Thy years fail not* Concerning this Form it has been
said that, remaining in itself, it makes all things new. Hence it. 
is understood that all things are governed by Providence.For if ' 
all existing things, when the form is taken away, become nothing 
the Form through which all things subsist, is itself unchangeable, 
in order that they may be imbued and live according to the harm- 
-ony of their Forms, Providence is associated with these, for 
if He were not, these things could not be."
(37).
Enneads, 111*2.2. compared with Confessions, VII.XI.17.
De Civ.Dei, XII.5.
De Ordine, 2*2.3.
Enneads, III.2.2."So from this, the One IntellectualPrinciple; 
and the Reason-Form emanating from it, our Universe rises and 
develops part, and inevitably are fçrmed groups concordant and 
helpful in contrast with groups discordant and combative; some­
times of choice and sometimes incidentally, the parts maltreat 
each other; engendering proceeds by destruction. Yet: amid all 
that they effect and accept, the divine Realm imposes the one 
harmonious act; each utters its ovm voice, but all is brought 
into accord, into an ordered system, for the universal purpose,by 
the ruling Reason-Principle",
Mackenna, Vol.2. Page, 14.
Confessions, VII.XI.17."And I beheld the other things below Thee, 
and I perceived, that they neither altogether are, nor altogether 
are not, for they are, since they are from Thee, but are not bec- 
-ause they are not what Thou art. For that truly is, which remains 
unchangeably".
De Civ.Dei, XII.5."All natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and 
have therefore a rank and species of their own, and a kind of 
internal harmony, are certainly good. And when they are in the 
places assigned to them by the order of their nature, they pres- 
-erve such being as they have received. And those things which 
have not received everlasting being, are altered for better or foi 
worse, 80 as to suit the wants and motions of those things to 
which the Creator's law has made them subservient; and thus they 
tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in 
the general scheme of the government of the universe".
De Ordine, 2. (2,3.) it is agreed that God is not subject any 
Order. Ke knows neither Imperfection nor change; He is the Supre- 
-me and Unchangeable Being. He cannot then be subordinated to any 
end. He is self-sufficient, and dwells immovable, whilst everf- 
-thing gravitates around Him.
Enneads, III.2.3. compared with Confessions, VII.XIII.19.
De Lib.Arb. 2.XVII.46.
Enneads, III.2.3, (For translation, see pages, 225,6.Thesis. )
Confessions, VII.XIII.19."And there is nothing whatsoever evil; 
yea not only to Thee, but also to Thy creation as a whole, because 
there is nothing without, which may break in, and corrupt that 
order which Thou hast appointed it. But in the parts thereof some 
things, because unharmonizing with other some, are accounted evil: 
whereas those very things harmonize with others and are good.And 
all these things which harmonize not together do yet with the 
inferior part, which we call Earth, having its own cloudy and
(38).
Enneads, III.2.3. with
Confessions, VII.XIII.19.
windy sky harmonising with it. Far he it then that I should say, 
"These things should not he;" for should I see nought hut these,
I should indeed long for the better; but still must even for 
these alone praise Thee; for that Thou art to be praised, do shew 
from the earth, dragons, and all deeps, fire, hail, snow, ice, 
and stormy wind, which fulfil Thy word....But when, from heaven, 
these praise Thee... I did now long for things better, because I 
conceived of all; and with a sounder judgment I apprehended that 
the things above were better than these below, but all together 
better than those above by themselves".
De Lib.Arb.2.XVII.46."But when you find some other kind of 
creatures, in addition to that which neither lives and that which 
lives, but has no intelligence, and that which both lives and 
thinks. Do you dare to say that there is something good which is 
not from God? ...All good things, whether they be great or small, 
can come from none other than God. For what is greater in the 
creature than intelligent life or what can be less than mere 
corporeality? VOiatever things are in any way lacking or strive 
with Him, so that they are not, nevertheless some form remains 
to them, so that in a certain measure they are. But whatever defic- 
-lent in any form remains, it is ignorant of that which it is 
deficient from that Form, and He does not permit its movements ... 
to depart from the laws of His own harmony. Whatever therefore is 
praiseworthy is directed by the nature of things, whether it be 
judged worthy of scant or abundant praise, and such must be attrib- 
-uted to the most excellent and ineffable praise of the Creator".
Enneads, III.2.5. compared with De Lib.Arb.III.IX.26.
Confessions, 3.7.12.
Enneads, III.2.5. "Now, once Happiness is possible at all to 
Souls in this Universe, if some fail of it, the blame must fall 
not upon the place but upon the feebleness insufficient to the 
staunch combat in the one arena where the rewards of excellence 
are offered. Men are not born divine; what wonder that they do not 
enjoy a divine life. And poverty and sickness mean nothing to the 
good- only to the evil are they disastrous- and where there is 
body there must be ill-health. Besides, these accidents are not 
without their service in the coordination and completion of/the 
Universal system. One thing perishes, and the Kosmic Reason-whose 
control nothing anywhere eludes- employs that ending to the beginn- 
-ing of something new; and, so, when the body suffers and the Soul, 
under the affliction,loses power, all that has been bound under 
illness and evil is brought into a new set of relations, into 
another class or order. Some of these troubles are helpful to the 
very sufferers- poverty and sickness, for example- and as for vice, 
even this brings something to the general service: it acts as a 
lesson in right doing, and, in many ways even, produces good;thus, 
by setting men face to face with the ways and consequences of
(39).
Enneads, III.2.5,
iniquity, it calls them from lethargy, stirs the deeper mind and 
sets the understanding to work; by the contrast of the evil under 
which wrong-doers labour it displays the worth of the right.
Not that evil exists for that purpose; but, as we have already 
indicated, once the wrong has come to be, the Reason of the Kos- 
-mos employs it to good ends; and precisely the proof of the 
mightiest power is to be able to use the ignoble nobly and, given 
formlessness, to make it the material of unknown forms.
The principle is that evil by definition is a falling short in 
good, and good cannot be at full strength in this Sphere where it 
is lodged in the alien; the good here is in something else, in ^ 
something distinct from the Good, and this something else constitu 
-tes the falling short for it is not good. And this is why evil 
is ineradicable; there is, first, the fact that in relation to 
this principle of Good, thing will always stand less than thing, 
and, besides, all things come into being through it, and are what 
they are by standing away from it"
Mackenna, Vol.2.pages, 17,8.
De Lib.Arb.III.IX.26."If indeed our very misery is of value for
the completer perfection of the universe, something must be lack- 
-ing in its perfection , if we are to be always happy. So too 
in that case, if the Soul has not arrived at wretchedness except 
by sinning, even our sins are needful for the perfection of the 
universe which God hath established.In what way then can God 
justly inflict punishment for sin, since if these sins were abs- 
-ent his creature would not be complete and perfect? Here is the 
answer. Sins themselves, or misery itself - these are not needful 
for the perfection of the universe, but Souls and a fulness of 
soul life. If men will these things , they sin, and if they have 
sinned, they are miserable. And if, despite the removal of these 
sins from them, wretchedness persists, or indeed has prec/deded 
their sins, then the order and administration of the universe may 
rightly be said to have been marred.But when happiness is present 
to those who sin not, the universe is perfect. But because of the 
presence of soul, misery follows those who sin and blessedness 
those who do rightly. For there are certain natures who pay the 
penalty of their sins, that they may be compelled to correspond to 
the glory of the universe , and that the dishonour which follows 
sin may be corrected by the punishment of the sinner”.
Confessions,III.VII. 12."Bacause as yet I knew not that evil was 
nothing but a privation of good until at last a thing ceases 
altogether to be".
(40).
Enneads III.
THIRD TRACTATE.
On Providence, Second Treatise.
Enneads, III.3.5. compared with De Ordine,I.VII.18,(Col,540. )
Enneads, III.3.5."All such right-doing, then, is linked to Provid 
-ence; but it is not therefore performed by it; men or other 
agents, living or lifeless, are causes of certain things happen- 
-ing, and any good that may result is taken up again by Provid- 
-ence. In the total, then, the right rules and what has happened 
amiss is transformed and corrected. Thus to take an example from 
a single body, the Providence of a living organism implies its 
health; let it be gashed or otherwise wounded, and that Reason- 
Principle which governs it sets to work to draw it together, knit 
it anew, heal it, and put the affected part to rights. In sum, 
evil belongs to the sequence of things, but it comes(not from 
Providence but) from necessity. It originates in ourselves; It 
has its causes no doubt, but we^are not, therefore, forced to it 
by Providence: some of these causes we adapt to the operation of 
Providence and of its subordinates, but with others we fail to 
make the connection.The act of the libertine>ie not done by 
Providence or in accordance with Providence; neither is the act- 
-ion of the good done by Providence- it is done by a man- but it
is done in accordance with Providence, for it is an act conson-
-ant with the Reason-Principle".
Mackenna, Vol.2. pages, 42,3.
De Ordine, I.VII.I8."God does not choose evil, we must not for 
one moment suppose that God chooses evil, despite the fact that 
evil is present in the Order,And on the other hand he often 
chooses an Order just because through Himself Evil has been 
preferred.But, you ask, how can evil itself be in the Order when 
God has not chosen it? For, without a doubt, there are evils in 
that very order that have not been chosen by God. Do you imagine 
then that it is a poor order that God should choose good things 
and that He should not choose bad? For, contrary to the Order the- 
-re are evils which God does not choose, and yet despite that
fact he chose the Order. Just consider; the very fact that He
elects to choose good and not evil is for the reason that the 
Order may be a great Order and a Divine arrangement. And that 
very order and arrangement has been made because God would pree- 
-erve the harmony of His universe by reason of its variety.
For that reason evil has been made unavoidable. Just as in orat— 
ory, it is by way of antithesis that it becomes the more pleasing 
so it is by contraries that tho beauty of all things, in like 
manner has been established."
(41).
THE THIRD ENNEAD.
FOURTH TRACTATE 
Our Tutelary Spirit.
Enneads, III.4.2. compared with De Lib.Arb. I.8.18.
see page, 2.Appendix.3.
Enneads, III.4.2."Now, in humanity the lower is not supreme; it in 
is an accompaniment ; but neither does the better rule unfailingly; 
the lower element also has a footing, and Man,therefore, lives 
in part under sensation, for he has the organs of sensation, and 
in large part even by the merely vegetative principle, for the 
body grows and propagates; all the graded phases are in a collab- 
-oration, but the entire form, man takes rank by the dominant,& 
when the 1 ife-principle leaves the body it is what it is, wha& 
it most intensely lived. This is why we must break away towards 
the High; we dare not keep ourselves set towards the sensuous 
principle, following the images of sense, or towards the merely 
vegetative, intent upon the gratifications of eating and procrea­
tion; our life must be pointed towards the Intellective, towards 
the Intellectual-Principle, towards God".
Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 47.
THE THIRD ENNEAD.
SIXTH TRACTATE
THE IMPASSIVITY OF THE UNEMBODIED.
Enneads, III.6.I. compared withDe Quantitate Animae, XVII.30.
Enneads, III.6.I."If the Soul were material and had magnitude, it 
would be difficult, indeed quite impossible, to make it appear to 
be immune, unchangeable, when any of such emotions lodge in it.
And even considering it as an Authentic Being, devoid of magnitude 
and necessarily indestructible, we must be very careful how we 
attribute any such experiences to it or we will find ourselves 
unconsciously making it subject to dissolution".
Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 68.
De Quantitate, Animae, XVII. 30."\Vhat if that ^ troubles you which 
the Greeks are wont to speak of as but which we call
longanimas (length of Soul) one may observe that many words are 
transferred from the body to the Soul, just as in like manner they 
are transferred from the soul to the body; for when Vergil spoke 
of a "worthless mountain", and of a "very just land", these words
(42).
you recognise have been transferred from the soul to the^body, 
why be surprised if we , in like manner speak of longanimas, 
where length, save for bodily forms cannot be? That which is spok- 
-en of as greatness of soul, among the virtues, does not rightly 
refer to space at all but to a certain strength, that is to the 
power and potency of soul". 5^^ ■
We may also compare Enneads, III.6.I. with De Immortalitate Ani- 
-mae, 7.7. (see translation, page, 28, of this Appendix.)
Enneads, III.6.I."Even in the superior phase of the Soul- that 
which preceded the impressionable faculty and any sensation- how 
can we reconcile immunity with the indwelling of vice, false 
notions, ignorance? Inviolability ; and yet likings and dislikings 
the Soul enjoying, grieving, angry, grudging, envying, desiring, 
never at peace but stirring and shifting with everything that 
confronts it!"
Mackenna, Vol.2.page, 68.
Enneads, III.6.4. may be compared to De Musica, VI.V.9,
Enneads, III.6.4."We have, however, still to examine what is call 
-ed the affective phase of the Soul. ..In general terms it means 
the centre about which we recognise the affections to be grouped; 
and by affections v/e mean those states upon which follow pleasure 
and pain...It should, however,be quite clear that the Soul or 
Mind is the seat of all imaginative representation- both the 
higher representation known as opinion or judgment and the lower 
representation which is not so much a judgment as a vague notion 
unattended by discrimination...It is equally certain that in all 
that follows upon the mental act or state, the disturbance, conf- 
-ined to the body, belongs to the sense-order; trembling, pallor 
inability to speak, have obviously nothing to do with the spirit- 
-ual portion of the being.The Soul, in fact, would have to be 
described as corporeal if it were the seat of such symptoms; 
besides, in that case the trouble would not even reach the body 
since the only transmitting principle, oppressed by sensation, 
jarred out of itself, would be inhibited.".... The affective 
phase of the Soul or Mind will be the operative cause of all 
affection; it originates the movement either under the stimulus 
of some sense-presentment or independently- and it is a question 
to be examined whether the judgment leading to the movement 
operates from above or not- but the affective phase itself 
remains unmoved like Melody dictating music".
Mackenna, Vol.2.pages72,3.
De Musica, VI.V.9."I do not believe that this body is animated 
by the Soul, except for the purpose of the Soul being of service 
to it. Nor do I think that the soul suffers anything from this, 
but that divinely, she is able to act by its help when in subjec-
(43).
-tion to its overlordship; I am convinced that just as, more or 
less she yields to its ministrations, so she labours now with 
ease, or again with difficulty,..And therefore, when it eagerly 
strives in its attentiveness,there arise, what is spoken of as, 
grief and toil".
Enneads, III.6.4. may be compared with De Musica, VI.V.(13,14. )
Enneads, III.6.5."Separation ...is the condition of the soul no 
longer entering into the body to lie at its mercy; it is to 
stand as a light, set in the midst of trouble but unperturbed 
through all. In the particular case of the affective phase of 
the Soul, purification is its awakening from the baseless visions 
which beset it, the refusal to see them; its separation consists 
in limiting its descent towards the lower and accepting no pict- 
-ure thence, and of course in the banning for its part too of 
all which the higher Soul ignores when it has arisen from the 
trouble storm and is no longer bound to the flesh by the chains of 
sensuality and of multiplicity but has subdued to itself the body 
and its entire surrounding so that it holds sovereignity, tranqu- 
-illy, over all".
Mackenna, Vol.2. page, 74.
De Musica, VI.V. ( 13,14. ) "Vihsn the Soul has turned aside from its j 
Lord to become the slave of itself, it inevitably loses in its
power; but when , on the other hand it leaves the service of
itself and busies itself with that of its Lord , it gains immeas- 
-urably...For it is the function of the Soul both to be ruled by
its Superior and to rule its inferior. God is the only Superior
of the Soul and its body the only inferior, that is if you direct 
your attention to the thought of the Soul in its entirety. As 
therefore it cannot be its whole self without God , so it cannot 
excel without devoting its service to Him....Wherefore as it is 
fixed on God it chooses eternal things and becomes greater, and 
greater is also its service in its own way througîi that. But when 
God is neglected, the Soul being intent on service of a carnal 
nature, which leads to Concupiscence, it feels its own passions 
which it displays and becomes less...14, But when the Soul has 
turned itself to its Lord a greater care springs into being ih- 
lest it may be turned away from Him. Then, unrestrained by 
daily habit and tumultuous recollections since in its conversion 
it has joined itself to its Lord, the power of carnal affairs 
dies down; thus its passions by which it was being carried away 
into outside things, being calmed it reaps the fruit of leisure 
within".
(44).
Enneads, III.6.9. may be compared with De Immort.Animae, 7.8.
Enneads, III.6.9."It must, first, be noted that there are a 
variety of modes in which an object may be said to be present to 
another or to exist in another. There is a*presence* which acts 
by changing the object- fpr good or for ill- as we see in the 
case of bodies, especially v/here there is life. But there is 
also a 'presence* which acts, towards good or ill, with no modifi- 
-cation of the object, as we have indicated in the case of the ‘ 
Soul. Then there is the case represented by the stamping of a 
design upon wax, where the 'presence* of the added pattern 
causes no modification in the substance nor does its obliterat- 
-ion diminish it".
Mackenna, Vol.2.79,80.
De Immortalitate Animae, V.8."None of these changes, it is hardly 
needful to say, bring about death to the Soul; there is no fear 
of its being torn asunder through these very things. For in 
accordance with our idea of change, as the name implies, a thing 
is said to be subject to change when it is changed in its entirety 
For if a piece of white wax from some quarter or other assumes a 
black colour, it is no less wax; and if it assumes a round form 
in place of a square, or instead of being soft it becomes hard, 
or becomes cold from being hot, these things are in the subject 
and that subject is wax. Wax it remains, nothing more or less 
than wax. It is possible then for a certain change therefore to 
take place within the subject , and yet it is not changed as we 
have been thinking of change."
Enneads III.
EIGHTH TRACTATE
Nature Contemplation and the One.
Enneads, III.8.10. may be compared with De Quant. Animae,33.76.
Enneads, III.8.10."But:- As one looks up to the heavens and sees 
the splendour of the stars thinks of the Maker and searches, so 
whoever has contemplated the Intellectual Universe and known it 
and wondered for it must search after its Maker too. What Being 
has raised so noble a fabric? Andwhere? And how? Yfho has begott- 
-en such a child, this Intellectual-Principle, this lovely abund- 
-ance so abundantly endowed? The Source of all this cannot be 
an Intellect; nor can it be an abundant power: it must have been 
before Intellect and abundance were; these are later and things 
of lack; abundance had to be made abundant and Intellection needed 
to know. These are very near to the un-needing, to that whivh has 
no need of Knowing, they have abundance and intellection authent- 
-ically, as being the first to possess. But, there is That before 
them which neither needs nor possesses anything, since, needing 
or possessing anything else, it would not be what it is- The 
Good." Mackenna, Vol.2.pages, 135,6.
(45).
St Augustine teaches like Plotinus that the intuition of true 
being is the highest degree by means of which the Soul raises 
itself to God.
De Quantitate Animae, 33.76."Now indeed in that contemplation and 
vision of the truth, which is the seventh and last step of the 
Soul...and what shall I say of the joys that there are, such as 
the enjoyment of the highest Good, with its serenity and inspirât- 
-ion of eternity? Certain great and incomparable Souls, have 
proclaimed these things which we believe they have seen and do 
see, and have determined how much must be said. This certainly 
I dare to say to you now, if God demands that course for us, and 
we assume that in that direction lies our path; we shall have to 
to hold fast continually, that we may arrive by the strength and 
wisdom of God at that high condition, or high source or high 
principle of all things, or if by any other fashion so great a 
thing can more fitly address itself to us".
(46).
THE FOHRTH ENNEAD
SECOND TRACTATE 
On the Essence of the Soul.
Enneads, IV.2.I. compared with De Quant. Animae, 32.68.
see page 4.
Enneads, IV.2.I. "The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, 
which we affirm to be soul has not the unity of an extended 
thing; it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility 
lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is 
indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any 
part. To have penetrated this idea is to know the greatness of 
the soul and its power, the divinity and wonder of its being, as 
a nature transcending the sphere of Things, Itself devoid of mass 
it is present to all mass; it exists here and yet is There, and 
this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity; thus it 
is "parted and not parted" or, better, it has never known partit- 
-ion, never become a parted thing, but remains a self-gathered 
integral, and is "parted among bodies" merely in the sense that 
bodies, in virtue of their own sundered existence, cannot receive 
it unless in some partitive mode; the partition, in other words, 
is an occurrence in body not in soul".
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 4.
see also comparison with De Quant.Animae, XVII.30. page 41.of this 
Appendix.
Enneads, TV.8.1."This unity of an Essence is not like that of body
which is a unit by the mode of continuous extension, the mode of
distinct parts each occupying its own space. Nor is it such a
unity as we have dealt with in the case of quality".
Mackenna, Vol.3.page,4.
Enneads, IV.2.2."If it had the nature of body it would consist 
of isolated members each unaware of the conditions of every other; 
there would be a particular soul- say of the finger- answering as 
a distinct and independent entity to every local experience; in 
general terms, there would be a multiplicity of soulô administer- 
-ing each individual; and, moreover, the universe would be govern- 
-ed not by one soul but by an incalculable number each standing 
apart to itself. But without a dominant unity, continuity is 
meaningless."
Mackenna, Vol.3.page,5.
We may compare the above with De Immortalitate Animae, XVI.25.
also withEpistle, CLXVI.2.4.
(47).
De Immortalitate, Animae, XVI.25."Surely the whole mass which 
occupies a place is not in its own several parts but in all; 
wherefore one part of it is here and another there. The Soul, 
indeed, is not only present in the universal mass of its body^ 
but it is also present wholly in each of the particular parts.
For the whole feels the suffering of a part of the body, even 
though that suffering is not in the whole body. For when there is 
any pain in the foot, the eye turns to it, the tongue speaks, 
the hand moves. How this would not take place, unless something 
of the soul which feels in the foot were also in these parts; fori 
if it were absent it could not feel what happened there. For this 
information could not credibly exist if it were not announced by 
feeling the pain, for the suffering which is experienced does 
not pass,through- the whole of the mass, but for all that it does 
not allow the other parts of the soul which are elsewhere to 
escape, but the whole soul feels what takes place in a portion of 
the foot, and there it fee4s as much pain as is there. Therefore 
the whole is present at the same time as it is in the individual 
parts which whole feels alike as in these separate parte."
Epistle, CLXVI.2.4." On the Origin of the Soul of Man".
"But if matter be used to designate nothing but that which , 
whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and heig­
ht, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater 
part of space and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in 
every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is not mater- 
-ial. For it pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a 
local distribution of parts but by a certain vital influence, 
being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of 
the body and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger 
parts, but here with more energy and there with less energy, it 
is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every 
part of it. For even that which the mind perceives, in only a 
part of the body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived than by 
the whole mind; for when any part of the living flesh is touched 
by a finely pointed instrument, although the place affected is 
not only not the whole body butscarcely discernible in its surf- 
-ace, the contact does not escape the entdie mind and yet the 
contact is felt not over the whole body but only at the one point 
where it takes place.How comes it then that what takes place in 
only a part of the body is immediately known to the whole mind or 
soul unless the whole soul is present at that part and at the 
same time not deserting all the other parts of the body".
(48).
FOURTH ENNEAD.
THIRD TRACTATE.
Problems of the Soul.
Enneads, IV.3.I,"We will only be obeying the ordinance of the
God who bade us know ourselves"
compare this with Confessions, VII.X.16. 
see Appendix, 3. page 2P,
Enneads, IV.3,8. compared with De Quantitate Animae, XXXII.67.
Enneads, IV.3,8."It is no external limit that defines the individ- 
-ual being or the extension of souls any more than of God; on the 
contrary each in right of its own power is all that it chooses to 
be; and we are not to think of it as going forth from itself (los- 
-ing its unity by any partition): the fact is simply that the ele- 
-ment within it, which is apt- to entrance into body, has the power 
of immediate projection any whither: the soul is certainly not 
wrenched asunder by its presence at once in foot/or finger. Its 
presence in the All is similarly unbroken;over its entire range 
it exists in every several part of everything having even veget- 
-able life, even in a part cut off from the main; in any possible 
segment it is as it is at its source. For the body of the All is a 
unit, and soul is everywhere present to it as to one thing",
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 18.
St, Augustine has just made use of the well known illustration of . 
the earth worm which although it was cut up into many pieces , yet i 
it was still alive in its several parts. Hence he deduces that 
you cannot deprive it of Soul, that is of the principle of vitalityî 
He continues- j
De Quant.Animae, XXXII.67,"If therefore you have looked closely in*j 
-to this similitudeand marked in what manner it is possible whilst ! 
the body has been dissected for the Soul not to be cut up. Perceive 
now in what waÿ the pieces themselves of the body when the soul has 
not been severed are able to live".
Enneads, IV.3.17. may be compared to Confessions, XII.XV.20,
Enneads, IV.3.17."All the souls, then, shine down upon the heavens 
and spend there the main of themselves and the best: only their 
lower phases illuminate the lower realms; and those souls which de- 
-scend deepest show their light furthest down- not themselves the 
better for the depth to which they have penetrated. There is, we i
may put it, something that is centre; about it a circle of light 
shed from it; round centre and first circle alike, another circle, i
light from light; outside that again, notanother circle of light but 
one which lacking light of its own, must borrow". i
(49).
Confessions, XII.XV.?0."But that wisdom which is created, that is 
the intellectual nature, which hy contemplating the light is 
light. For this, though created, is also called wisdom. But what 
difference there is betwixt the Light which enlighteneth, and 
which is enlightened, so much is there betwixt the Wisdom that 
createth, and that created".
EnneadB, IV.3.18./ may be compared with Be Quant, Animae, 27.53 
where Augustine refers to the distinction which Plotinus makes !■ 
between Reason and Reasoning.
Enneads, IV.3,18,"fhere remains still something to be said on the 
question whether the soul uses deliberate reason before its desc- 
-ent and again when it has left the body. Reasoning is for this 
sphere; it is the act of the soul fallen into perplexity, distra- 
-cted with cares, diminished in strength: the need of délibérât- 
-ion goes with the less self-sufficing intelligence ; ...but if 
souls in the Supreme operate without reasoning, hovf can they be 
called reasoning souls? One answer might be that they have the 
power of deliberating to happy issue, should occasion arise: but 
all is met by repudiating the particular kind of reasoning inten- 
-ded (the earthly and discursive type); we may represent to our- 
-selves a reasoning that flows uninterruptedly from the Intellects! 
-ual-Principle in them, an inherent state, an enduring activi&y, 
an assertion that is real; in this way they would be users of 
reason even when in that over-world",
Mackenna, Vol,3,page, 29,
De Quant.Animae, 27.53."But rightly that perhaps is named Ratio- 
-cination (an exercise of reasoning powers), since Reason may be 
a certain faculty of mind, but Ratiocination on the other hand, 
is a searching forreason, that is it is a faculty by means of 
which things are perceived by sensation. Wherefore the former is 
for purposes of enquiry, whilst the latter is for life itself. 
Hence, when that faculty of mind which is called Reasoning has 
been directed towards something which it sees or perceives, it 
is called Knowledge",
Enneads, IV. 3./ 25, may be compared with Dejdiversis Quaest.I7.
Enneads, IV,3.25,"No memory, therefore , can be asccribed td any 
divine being, or to the Authentic-Existent or the Intellectual-
Principle: these are intangibly immune; time does not approach 
them; they possess eternity centred round Being;they know nothing 
of past and sequent; all/ is an unbroken state of identity, not 
receptive of change",
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 38*
De diversis Quaest,17,"Every past thing is not now present; every 
future thing is not yet present; consequently every past thing 
and every future event is absent. But with God there is nothimg
(50).
absent. Neither past therefore, nor future, hut all/is present 
with God",
Enneads, IV,3,26. may be compared to De Musica, 1.8.
Enneads, IV.3.26."It may be suggested thJ'while the soul is 
perhaps not in itself a remembering principle, yet that, having 
lost its purity and acquired some degree of modification by its 
presence in body, it becomes capable of reproducing the imprints 
of sensible objects and experiences, and that, seated, as roughly 
speaking it is, within the body- it may reasonably be thought 
capable of accepting such impressions, and in such a manner as to 
retain them (thus in some sense possessing m e m o r y . F u r t h e r  
there is one order of which the memory must obviously belong to 
the soul; it alone can remember its own movements, for example 
its desires and those frustrations of desire in which the coveted 
thing never came to the body: the body can have nothing to tell 
about things which never approached it, and the soul cannot use 
the body as a means to the remembrance of what the body by its 
nature cannot know".
Mackenna, Vol.3,page, 40,
De Musica, I.8."What about Memory? I think that it should be 
ascribed to Soul. For if we do not perceive through the senses 
anything which we intrust to memory, therefore memory must be 
considered to be in the body".
Enneads, IV.3,29." may be compared with Confessions, X.8.I2,
Enneads, IV.3,29."We may well conceive that where there is to 
be memory of a sense-perception, this perception becomes a mere 
presentment, and that to this image-grasping power, a distinct 
thing, belongs the memory, the retention of the object: for in 
this imaging faculty the perception culminates; the impression 
passes away but the vision remains present to the imagination.
By the fact of harbouring the presentment of an object that has 
disappeared, the imagination is, at once, a seat of memory; 
where the persistence of the image is brief, the memory is poor; 
people of powerful memory are those in whom the image-holding 
power is firmer, not easily allowing the record to be jostled 
out of its grip,"
Mackenna, Vol.3,page, 44,
Confessions, X,8,I2,"I come to the fields and spacious palaces of 
my memory, where are the treasures of innumerable images, brought 
into it from things of all sorts perceived by the senses. There 
is stored up, whatever besides we think, either by enlarging or 
diminishing, or any other way varying those things which the 
sense hath come to, and whatever else hath been committed and la- 
-id up, which forgetfulness hath not yet swallowed up and buried?
(51).
Enneads, IV.3.32. may be compared with De Ordine, 2.9.6.
Enneads, IV,3.32."The lower soul must be always striving to att- 
—ain to memory of the activities of the higher; this will be 
especially so when it is itself of a line . quality, .^or there 
will always be some that are better from the beginning and 
bettered here by the guidance of the higher. The loftier, on the 
contrary, must desire to come to a happy forgetfulness of all 
that has reached it through the lower: for one reason, there is 
always the possibility that the very excellence of the lower 
prove detrimental to the higher, tending to keep it down by sheer 
force of vitality. In any case the mors urgent the intention 
towards the Supreme, the more extensive will be the soul's forget 
-fulness, unless indeed, when the entire living has, even here, 
been such that memory has nothing but the noblest to deal with: 
in this world itself, all is best when human interests have been 
held aloof; so, therefore,it must be with the memory of them.
In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forget- 
-ful. It flees multiplicity; it seeks to escape the unbounded by 
drawing all to unity, for only thus is itfree frdm entanglement 
light-footed, self-conducted."
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 4 6.
De Ordine, 2.2.6."Do you therefore deny that it is not merely 
from the body and from the rational part of the soul but from 
the whole Soul that the wise man remains steadfast; if indeed 
that part which is made use of by the/ senses can be denied to 
the foolish soul....The Soul of the wise man purified by the 
virtues and now clinging to God is worthy indeed of being called 
wise, but yet, up to a certain point, if I might put it thus, 
the lower things , those that are the clothing of the body with 
which that very one who has now withdrawn to himself, once pants; 
after the world, these things are now in subjection to the Soul. 
...Now I believe that it is in that subjected part that memory 
dwells. Consequently the Wise man makes use of these by holding 
them in subjection, conquering them and forcing them to submit.
,, .he does not venture to vaubt himself nor glow with pride 
because of his lordship, nor does he dare to make use of these 
lower things although they belong to his life, in a random or 
careless way or extravagantly. For it is to that vilest part of 
his nature that these things cling which he wishes most of all 
to forget".
(52).
Enneads IV.
FOURTH TRACTATE 
Questions referring to the Soul.
Enneads IV.4.5. compared with De Magistro, XII.40. (Col.917).
Enneads, IV.4,5."At any time when we have not been in direct vis-: 
-ion of that sphere, memory is the source of its activity within 
us; when we have possessed that vision, its presence is due to the; 
principle by which we have enjoyed that vision: this principle i 
awakens where it awakens; and it alone has vision in that order; | 
for this is no matter to be brought to us by way of analogy, or I 
by the syllogistic reasoning whose* grounds lie elsewhere; the j !  
power which, even here, we possess of discoursing upon the Intell^ 
-ectual Beings is vested, as we show, in that principle which ■ 
alone is capable of their contemplation."
Hackenna, Vol.3 pages, 51,52.
De Magistro, XII,40."When with regard to those things which we 
perceive mentally, that is by means of the intelligence and the | 
reason, one is guided, then those things indeed which we speak of f 
as being present, we descry in that inner light of truth, by }
means of which that which is spoken of as the inner man is ilium-' 
-ined and enjoys. But then also our hearer if he himself also 
sees those things by the secret and guileless eye, knows what I ; 
say, not merely by words but by its contemplation. Wherefore 
I teach that one truth not by my utterance of truth but because 
he beholds the truth; for it is taught not by my words, but by I
the very things of God which has revealed them to him secretly. |
So when one is asked concerning these things one is able to reply?!;
Enneads, IV.4.16. may be compared with Confessions XI.7'%«
XII.29.40.
De Div.Quest.83.46.
Enneads, IV.4.I6."The ordering principle is no conjoint of matter 
and idea but is soul, pure idea, the power and energy second only 
to the Intellectual-Principle: and because the succession is a 
fact of the things themselves, inhibited as they are from this 
comprehensive unity."
Confessions, XI.7,9."And therefore unto the Word coeternal with 
The® Thou dost at once and eternally say all that Thou dost say;
and vfhatever Thou sayest shall be made is made",
see Confessions, XII.29.40. where the same Truth is stated.
The Reasons which are all present to the Soul are the Ideas which
it has received from the Divine Intelligence. Thus does Augustine 
follow Plotinus.
(53). |:
Compare also Enneads, IV.4.16. with De Div.Quest. 83.46.
De Div.Quest.83.4 6."We are able in the Latin tongue to call them 
Ideas, forms or species, so that we seem to use figuratively 
the term Legos, from word. But if we call them Reasons, we depart 
indeed, from a suitable interpretation (for Reasons in the Greek 
language are called Logoi not Ideas) , but yet anyone who desires 
to make use of this designation has not departed from the thing 
itself.For the Ideas are principles, forms or Reasons of things 
fixed and unchangeable, which have not themselves been fashioned 
and on that account remain throughout eternity in the same fashioE 
since they abide in the Divine Intelligence.And since they them- 
-selves are not born, neither do they perish, yet it is said that : 
according to these, that is after their pattern everything which ? 
can spring into being and perish, and everything which does spring 
into being and does perish is fashioned. The Soul indeed declares | 
that it is not possible to behold them unless rationally, by that j 
part of itself which exce/ls, that is by the mind and reason, as | 
if by a cert&inlook or by the inner and intellective eye", i
ENNEADS IV. SIXTH TRACTATE. i
I
Perception and Memory.
Enneads, IV.B.2, may be compared to De Trinitate, XI.2. !
Enneads, IV.6.2."But if perception does not go by impression, what 
is the process? The mind affirms something not contained within 
it: this is precisely the characteristic of a power- not to accept 
impression but, within its allotted sphere, to act.
Besides, the very condition of the mind being able to exercise i
discrimination upon what it is to see and hear is not, of course, 
that these objects be equally impressions made upon it; on the 
contrary, there must be no impressions, nothing to which the mind 
is passive; there can be only acts of that which the objects 
become known....it belongs to the faculty, and the soul-essence, ;
to read the imprints thus appearing before it, as they reach the 
point, at which they become matter of its knowledge".
Mackenna, Vol.3. page,118.
De Trinitate, XI.2."When, then, we see any corporeal object, these 
three things; as is most easy to do, are to be considered and 
distinguished: First, the object itself which we see; whether a 
stone, or flame, or any other thing that can be seen by the eyes; 
and this certainly might exist also already before it was seen; 
next, vision or the act of seeing, which did not exist before we 
perceived the object itself which is presented to the sense; in 
the third place, that which keeps the sense of the eye in the obj- 
-ect seen, so long as it is seen, viz. the attention of the mind.
In these three, then, not only is there an evident distinction, 
but also a diverse nature".
(54). il
Enneads, IV.6.2. may be compared with De Trinitate, XI.I.
Enneads, IV.6.2."The knowing of the things belonging to the j
Intellectual is not in any such degree attended by impact or |
impression: they come forward, on the contrary, as from within, !
unlike the sense-objects known as from without; they have more 
emphatically the character of acts; they are acts in the stricter; 
sense, for their origin is in the soul, and every concept of I
this Intellectual order is the soul about its Act. I
Mackenna, Vol.3, page, 119. I
De Trinitate, XI.I,"No one doubts that, as the inner man is endu- 
-ad with understanding, so is the outer with bodily sense...And 1 
owing to that very order of our condition whereby we are made mo*Hj 
-tal and fleshly, we handle things visible more easily and more ;| 
familiarly than things intelligible; since the former are outwardjl 
the latter inward; and the former are perceived by the bodily | 
sense, the latter are understood by the mind; and we ourselves, 
that is our minds, are not sensible things, that is, bodies, but 
intelligible things, since we are life. And yet, as I said, we 
are so familiarly occupied with bodies, and our thought has proj- 
-ected itself outwardly with so wonderful a proclivity towards |
bodies, that, when it has been withdrawn from the uncertainty of 
things corporeal, that it may be fixed with a nuch more certain 
and stable knowledge in that which is spirit it flies back .to 
those bodies".
Enneads, IV.6.3. may be compared with, De Trinitate,XI.4,
XI.6,
X.6.
Enneads, IV.6.3.”To the sense-order it (Memory) stands in a simil- 
-ar nearness and to such things it gives a radiance out of its 
own store and, as it wereCp elaborates them to visibility: the 
power is always ripe and, so to say, in travail towards them, so 
that, whenever it puts out its strength in the direction of what 
has once been present in it, it sees that object as present still; 
and the more intent its effort the more durable is the presence".
Mackenna, Vol.3.page,120.
De Trinitate, XI.4."Commonly, when we have looked for some little 
time at a light, and then shut our eyes, there seem to play before 
our eyes certain bright colours variously changing themselves, and 
shining less and less until they wholly cease; and these we must 
understand to be the remains of that form which was wrought in the 
sense, while the shining body was seen, and that these variations 
take place in them as they slowly and step by step fade away".
Snaeads, IV.6.3. "Now, if memory were a matter of/seal-impress- 
-ions retained, the multiplicity of objects would have no weaken- 
-ing effect on the memory. Further, pn the same hypothesis, we
(55).
Enneade, 17.6.3. (continued).
would have no need of thinking back to revive remembrance; nor 
would we be subject to forgetting and recalling; all would lie / 
engraved within.".
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 120.
De Trinitate, XI.3."Vision is produced from a thing that is vis- 
-ible, together with one who sees; in such way that, on the part 
of him who sees, there is the sense of seeing and the intention 
of looking and gazing at the object; while yet that information 
of the sense, which is called vision is imprinted only by the 
body which is seen, that is, by some visible thing; which being 
taken avray, that form remains no more which was in the sense so 
long as that which was seen was present; yet the sense itself 
remains, which existed also before anything was perceived; just 
as the trace of a thing in water remains so long as the body 
itself, which is impressed on it, is in the water; but if this 
has been taken away, there will no longer be any such trace, |
although the water remains, which existed also before /// it took 
the form of that body".
Enneads, IV.6.3."The very fact that we train ourselves to rememb-j 
-er shows that what we get by the process is a strengthening of 
the mind; just so, exercises for feet and hands enable us to do ! 
easily acts which are in no sense contained or laid up in those 
members, but to which they may be fitted by persevereing effort. 
How else can it be explained that we forget a thing heard once or 
twice but remember what is often repeated, and that we recall 
a long time afterwards what at first hearing we failed to hold-f"
Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 120.
Compare this with-
De Trinitate, XI.8."But the will averts the memory from the sense;! 
when, through its being intent on something else, it does not 
suffer things present to cleave to it. As any one may see, when 
often we do not seem tp ourselves to have heard some one who was 
speaking to us, because we were thinking of something else.But 
this is a mistake; for we did hear, but we do not remember, 
because the words of the speaker presently slipped out of the 
perception of our ears, through the bidding of the will being 
diverted elsewhere, by which they are usually fixed in the 
memory".
FOURTH ENNEAD.
SEVENTH TRACTATE.
The Immortality of the Soul.
Enneads, IV.7.3. may be compared with De Immort. Animae, VIII.14.
Enneads, IV.7.3,"Perhaps we will be asked to consider body as a 
simple entity (disregarding the question of any constituent elem- 
-cnts): they will tell us, then, that no doubt, as purely material
(56).
Enneads, IV.7.3, (continued).
it cannot have a self-springing life- since matter is without 
quality- but that life is introduced by the fact that the Matter 
is brought to order under Forming-Idea. But if by this Forming- 
Idea they mean an essential, a real being, then it is not the 
conjoint of body and idea that constitutes soul; it must be one 
of the two items and that one, being (by hypothesis) outside of 
the Matter, cannot be body; to make it body would simply force 
us to repeat our former analysis. If on the contrary they do not 
mean by this Forming-Idea a real being, but some condition or 
modification of the Matter, they must tell us how and whence this 
modification, with resultant life, can have found the way into th 
Matter; for very certainly Matter does not mould itself to patt- 
-ern or bring itself to life.It becomes clear that since neither 
Matter nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought 
upon the stage by some directing principle external and transc- 
-endent to all that is corporeal. In fact, body itself could not 
exist in any form if soul-power did not; body passes; dissolution 
is in its very nature; all would disappear in a twinkling if all 
were body.,,,All bodies are in ceaseless process of dissolution; 
how can the kosmoB be made over to any one of them without being 
turned into a senseless haphazard drift? ...But: given soul, all 
these material things become its collaborators towards the coher- 
-ence of the kosmos and of every living being, all the qualities 
of all the separate objects converging to the purpose of the 
universe: failing soul in the things of the universe, they could 
not even exist, much less play their ordered parts".
Mackenna, Vol.3.page, 124,f.
De Immortal!tate Animae, VIII.14."But if what we have alleged is 
true, then the body has been made by someone, and that someone 
not inferior to itself. For it would have been impossible for it 
to have furnished what it has supplied by its own power. Now it 
could not have been mad© by an qqual; for it is reasonable -when 
one is doing any creative work to take counsel with someohe 
better than oneself concerning what one is making. For with 
respect to a body that grows it is surely not absurd to say that 
it must be like unto the one from whom it has sprung. Therefore 
the whole universe has been created by some power and nature 
which is mightier and better certainly than corporeal beings; for 
if the body had been made by a mere body it could not become 
universal, for it is true what we assumed at the beginning of 
our argument , namely that nothing could be made of itself.
But this nature and power which is the incorporeal maker of the 
universal body holds the universe in his present sway, for He did 
not make it and then depart from it, neither did He set asunder 
the thing that He had made, ..For all that it possesses it has 
received from Him and if // it were abandoned by the Being to 
whom it owes its life , it would cease to be."
(57). '
Enneads, IV.7.5. may be compared to De Quant.Animae, XIX.33.
Enneads, IV.7.5."What answer can be made by those declaring soul , 
to bs corporeal? Is every part of the soul in any one body, soul 
entire, soul perfectly true to its essential being? and may the 
same be said of every part of the part? If so, the magnitude 
makes no contribution to the soul's essential nature, as it must 
if soul (as corporeal) were a definite magnitude; it is, as body 
cannot be, an "all-everywhcre", a complets identity present at 
each and every point, the part all that the whole is. To deny 
that every part is soul is to make soul a compound from soulless I 
elements. Further, if a definite magnitude, the double limit of I 
larger or smaller, is to bo imposed upon each separate soul, then! 
anything outside those limits is no soul.... surely no honest | 
mind can fail to gather that such a thing in which part is ident-' 
-ical with whole has a nature which transcends quantity, and 
must of necessity be without quantity: only so could it remain 
identical when quantity is filched from it, only by being indiff- 
-erent to amount or extension, by being in essence something 
apart. Thus the Soul and the Heason-Principles are without 
quantity". Mackenna, Vol.3.pages, 127,8.
In De Quantitate Animae, 30 & 33. Augustine speaks of the 
way in which thw word growth is used concerning the Soul and 
indicates that it is only to be understood in a metaphorical 
sense that one can use the term growth,in association with the 
Soul. The Soul has no magnitude.
We might point out frequent comparisons in connection 
with this tractate, which Augustine closely follows.For example, 
Enneads, IV,7.6 may be cp.with De Quant.Animae,V.9.
IV.7.7.   De Orig.Animae,II.4.
IV.7.8.   De Trinitate, X.IO.
IV.7.9. ...... De Immort.Animae,XV.24
IV.7,10.   De Immort.Anim.V.3.
IV. 7. II ......  De Immort.Anim, IX. 16.
but we have already given sufficient illustrations.
(58).
Enneads, 17.8.I. may be compared with Confessions, 7ÏI.X.I6.
see Appendix,3.pages,22,3.
Enneads, 17.8.I."Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the 
body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self- 
-encentered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, 
assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest 
life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within IT by 
having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the 
Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet there comes the moment 
of descent from intellection to reasoning, and after that sojourn 
in the divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be 
descending, and how did the soul ever enter into my body, the soul 
which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself 
to be".
Mackenna, Vol.3. page, 143.
This may also De compared with Confessions, X.XL.65. where St. 
Augustine is thinking of the mystical experiences such as came to 
him at Ostia.
Gonfession8,X.XL.65."And sometimes Thou admittest me to an affect- 
-ion, very unusual, in my inmost soul; rising to a strange sweet- 
-ness, which if it were perfected in me, I know not what in it 
would not belong to the life to come. But through ray miserable 
encumbrances I sink down again into those lower things, and am 
swept back by former custom, and am held, and greatly weep, but 
am greatly held".
(59).
THE FIFTH ENNEAD.
FIRST TRACTATE.
The Three Initial Hypostases,
Enneads, 7.I.I, (see page II of the Appendix),
Enneads, 7.I.I."What can it be that has brought the souls to 
forget the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and 
entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It?
The evil that has overtaken them has its source ih self-will, in 
the entry into the sphere of process, and in the primal differen- 
-tiation with the desire for self ownership. They conceived a 
pleasure in this freedom and largely indulged their oim motion; 
thus they were hurried down the wrong path, and in the end,drift- 
-ing further and further, they caiic to lose' ovon the thought of 
their origin in the Divine* A child wrenched young from home and 
brought up during many years at a distance will fail in knowledge 
of its father and of itself: the souls, in this wagae way, no 
longer discern either the divinity or their own nature; ignorance 
of their rank brings self-depreciation; they misplace their resp- 
-ect, honouring everything more than themselves; all their awe 
and admiration is for the alien, and, clinging to this, they have 
broken apart, as far as a soul may, and they make light of what 
they have deserted; their regard for the mundane and their disre- 
-gard of themselves bring about their utter ignoring of the divind 
Admmring pursuit of the external is a confession of infer- 
-iority; and nothing thus holding itself inferior to things that 
rise and perish, nothing counting itself less honourable and less 
enduring than all else it admires could ever form any notion of 
either the nature or the power of God,*
Mackenna, 7ol.I7.page I,
Enneads, 7.1.2. may be likened to Confessions, IX.X.25.
Enneads, 7.I.2."Let every soul recall, then, at the outset the 
truth that soul is the author of all living things, that it has |
breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth 
and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the 
sky; it is the maker of the sun: itself formed and ordered this 
vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion; and it is a 
principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and move- 
-ment and life, and it must of necessity be more honourable than 
they, for they gather or dissolve as soul brings them life or 
abandons them, but soul, since it never can abandon itself, is of 
eternal being. How life was purveyed to the universe of things 
and to the separate beings in it may be thus conceived:- 
That great soul must stand pictured before another soul, one not 
mean, a soul that has become worthy to look, emancipate from the 
lure, from /#//all that binds its fellows in bewitchment, holding
( 6 0 ) .
ENNEADS 7,1.2, (continued)-
itself in quietude. Let net merely the enveloping body be at 
peace, body's turmoil stilled, but all that lies around, earth at 
peace, and sea at peace, and air and the very heavens. Into that 
heaven, all at rest, let the great soul be conceived to roll 
invrard at every point, penetrating, permeating, from all sides 
pouring in its light. As the rays of the sun throwing their brill- 
-ancs upon a lowering cloud.L-akes it gleam all gold, so the soul 
entering the material expanse of the heavens has given life, has 
given immortality: what was abject it has lifted up; and the 
heavenly system, moved now in endless motion by the soul that 
loads it in wisdom, has become a living and a blessed thing; the 
soul domiciled within, it takes worth where, before the soul, it 
was stark body- clay and water- or rather the blankness of Matter, 
the absence of Being, and, as an author says, "the execration of 
the Gods",
Mackenna, Vol.4. pages, 2,3,
Confessions, IX.X,25."¥e were saying then: If to any the tumult of 
the flesh were hushed, hushed the images of earth<p and waters, and 
air, hushed alsc the poles of heaven, yea the very soul be hushed 
to herself, and by not thinking on self surmount self, hushed all 
dreams and imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign, and 
whatsoever exists only in transition, since if any could hear, all 
these say. We made not ourselves, but He made us that abideth for 
ever - If then having uttered this, they too should be hushed, 
having roused only our oars to Him who made them, and He alone 
speak, not by them, but by Himself, that we may hear His Word, not 
through any tongue of flesh, nor angel's voice, nor sound of 
thunder, nor in the dark riddle of a similitude, but, might hear 
ViThom in these things we love, might hear His Very Self without 
these, (as we two now strained ourselves, and in swift thought 
touched on that Eternal wisdom, vdiich abideth over all;)- could 
this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike be 
withdrawn, and thisj(pne ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its 
beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be for ever 
like that one moment of understanding which now we sighed after; 
were not this. Enter into Thy Master's joy?
Enneads, 7.1.4, compare this withConfessions, III.6.10.
10.27.38.
Enneads, 7.1.4."Admiring the/ world of sense as we look out upon 
its vastness and beauty and the order of its eternal march, think- 
~ing of the gods within it, seen and hidden, and the celestial 
spirits and all the life of animal and plant, let us mount to its 
archtype, to the yet more authentic sphere: there we are to contera 
-plate all things as members of the Intellectual- eternal in their 
own right, vested with a self-springing consciousness and life- 
and, presiding over all these, the unsoiled Intelligence and the 
unapproachable wisdom". Mackenna,7ol.4.page, 5.
(61).
Enneads, V.I.4. and
Confessions, 3.6.10. "And I indeed ought to have passed by even 
philosophers who spake truth concerning them, for love of Thee, 
my Father, supremely good. Beauty of all things beautiful." 
............   compare also-
Enneads, I.6.2."Let us then, go back to the source, and indicate 
at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things".
Mackenna, Vol.I. page, 79.
Enneads, VI.9.4."For Beauty is posterior to the One and comes 
from him, as the light of the day comes from the sun".
Bouillet, Vol.3.page, 543.
Enneads, V.I.6."Origin from the Supreme must not be taken to 
imply any movement in it:...Given this immobility in the Supreme 
it can neither have yielded assent nor uttered decree hor stirred 
in any way towards the existence of a secondary", (Thesis,P.175.)
Mackenna, Vol.4.page,8.
Enneads, V.I.XI."Further, since the soul's attention to these 
matters is intermittent, there must be within us an Intellectual- 
Principle acquainted with that Right not by momentary act but in 
permanent possession. Similarly there must be also the principle 
of this principle, its cause, God...Within our nature is such a 
centre by which we grasp and are linked and held; and those of us 
are firmly in the Supreme whose collective tendency is There".
(Thesis, P.I35.) Mackenna, Vol.4.page,15.
Enneads, V.I.I2." If there is to be perception of what is thus 
present, we must turn the perceptive faculty inward and hold it td 
attention there. Hoping to hear a desired voice we let all others 
pass and are alert for the coming at last of that most welcome of 
sounds: so here, we must let the hearings of sense go by, save 
for sheer necessity, and keep the soul's perception bright and 
quick to the sounds from above", (Thesis, P.141.)
Mackenna, Vol.4.page, 15.
Enneads, V,2.2."There is from the first principle to ultimate an 
outgoing in which unfailingly each principle retains its own seat 
while its o f takes another rank, a lower, though on the 
other hand every being is in identity with its prior as long as 
it holds that contact". (Thesis, P .192),
Mackenna, Vol.4.page,17.
(62).
THE FIFTH ENNEAD.
THIRD TRACTATE.
The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent.
Enneads, V.3;I3. "Thus The One is in truth beyond all statement: 
any affirmation is of a thing; but the all-transcending, resting 
above even the most august divine Mind, possesses alone of all 
true being, and is not a thing among things; we can give it no 
name because that would imply predication: we can but try to ind- 
-icate, in our own feeble way, something concerning it: when in 
our perplexity we object, "Then it is without self-perception, 
without self-consciousness, ignorant of itself"; we must remember 
that we have been considering it only in its opposites."
Mackenna, Vol.4.page, 36.
Enneads, V.3.I4. "How, then, do we ourselves come to be speaking 
of it? Mo doubt we deal with it, but we do not state it; we have 
neither knowledge nor intellection of it. But in what sense do we 
even deal with it when we have no hold upon it? We do not, it is 
true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are 
utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as 
to be able to speak about it. And we can and do state what it is 
not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speak 
-ing of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we 
may still possess it. Those divinely possessed and inspired have 
at least the knowledge that they hold some greater thing within 
them though they cannot tell what it is; from the movements that 
stir them and the utterances that come from them they perceive 
the power, not themselves, that moves them; in the same way, it 
must be, we stand towards the Supreme when we hold the Intellect- 
-ual-Principle pure; we know the divine Mind within, that which 
gives Being and all else of that order; but we know, too, that 
other, know that it is none of these, but a nobler principle 
than anything we know as Being; fuller and greater; above reason, 
mind and feeling; conferring these powers, not to be confounded 
with them." Mackenna, Vol.4.Page, 38.
Enneads, V,3.13-14. see Thesis,P.174.
Plotinus is speaking here of the Supreme Being
Enneads, V.5.6."Its definition, in fact, could be only 'the
indefinable*: what is not a thing is not some definite thing.
We are in agony for a true expression; wo are talking of the 
untenable; vfe name, only to indicate for our own use as best we 
may. And this name, The One, contains really no more than the 
negation of plurality: ...If we are led to think positively of 
The One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence: 
the designation, a mere aid to enquiry, was never intended for 
more than a preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to
(o3).
EÎIEIi'lDS, 7 . 5 .6 .  ( C o n t i n u e d ) .
to be followed by the rejection of even that statement: it was 
the best that offered, but remains inadequate to express the 
Nature indicated. For this is a principle not to be conveyed by 
any sound; it cannot be known on any hearing but, if at all,by 
vision; and to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of 
even that". Mackenna, Vol.4,pages, 54,55.
See Thesis, P.176.
we may compare the above with
De Ordine, 2.XVI.44."God is best kno^m by nescience.
De Ordine, 2.,xviII.47."Cüjus nulla scientia est in amima nisi 
scire quomodo eum nesciat".
...
(64),
SIXTH ENNEAD
Tractate Four.
The One and identical Being is everywhere present 
in its entirety.
Enneads, VI.4.I.may/he compared with De Trinitate, VI.6.8.
Enneads, VI.4.I."On the other hand , the part of the soul which 
is present in the foot is identical vfith the part of the soul 
which is in the hand, as one may see from the perceptions."
Douillet, Vol.3.page, 305.
De Trinitate, VI.6.8,"For it (th 
simple than the body, because it 
extension of place, but in each 
whole, and whole in each several 
when anything takes place in any 
body, such as the soul can feel, 
in the whole^body, yet the whole 
soul is not^consciouG of it".
e Soul) is on this account more 
is not diffused in bulk through 
body, it is both whole in the 
part of it; and, therefore, 
small particle whatever of the 
although it does not take place 
soul feels it, since the whole
Plotinus in this part of his 
of the body. Enneads, VI.4(l. 
of the body does not partake 
whiteness of another part of 
is identical to the whiteness 
kind, but it is not identical 
Douillet, Vol.3 
The basis of the ideas which 
found in Augustine's Epistle, 
Section, 18,It is a long pass
tractate refers also to the whiten?; 
"Besides the whiteness of one part 
in the quality experienced by the 
the body, the whiteness of one part 
of another part with respect to 
with respect to harmony."
. page,305.
Plotinus develop^s here is to be 
187,*0n the Presence of God*, 
age and there is no need to quote it.
Enneads, VI.4.1^. may be compared with De Trinitate, XII.7.10.
Enneads, VI.4.ik"We are thus become two men at once (the 
intellectual man and in addition, the sensitive man) we are no 
longer only one or tne other, as previously, or rather, we are 
still sometimes only one of two, the kind of man which has been 
added to the former man, it is that kind of man which remains 
when the first man sleeps, and then in a certain sense , because 
we do not then reflecton the conceptions of the Intellect, it is 
not present".
Douillet, Vol.3.page,334.
(65).
De Trinitate, XII.VU. 10."As we said of the nature of the human 
mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the 
truth it is the image of God; and in the case when anything is 
divided from it, and diverted in purpose to the dealing with 
temporal things; nevertheless on that side on which it beholds 
and consults truth, here also it is the image of God, but on that 
side whereby it is directed to the dealing with the lower things, 
it is not the image of God".
Enneads SIX.
TRACTATE FIVE.
Enneads, VI.5.I. may be compared to Augustine's remark which he 
makes in his Tractate according to St. John.
Enneads, VI.5.I."When a principle one in its harmony and identic- 
-al is everywhere present in its entirety, it becomes a common 
conception of the human intelligence: now all declare instinctive 
-ly that the deity who dwells in each of us is in all things one 
and identical,"
Douillet, Vol.3.page,341.
Tractatus in Joannem. "How this is the power of true deity, that 
He is not able to be wholly hidden from the rational creature 
creature when he makes use of his reason. For with the exception 
of a few in whom their nattre is/grossly'depraved, God is confess 
-ed to be the author of His world".
see Thesis, page, 178.
SIXTH ENNEAD
TRACTATE SEVEN.
HÔW THE MULTITUDE OF IDEAS EXIST; & ON THE 
GOOD.
Enneads, VI.7.5."The Superior man (the reasonable man ) is better 
he possesses a diviner soul and clearer sensations. Plato, with- 
-out a doubt, has this in mind when he says, 'Man is the Soul;
(he adds in his definition) who makes use of the body', because 
the diviner Soul rules when it makes use of the body, and it only
uses the body in the second degree*.
Douillet, Vol.3.page, 420.
De Quantitate Animae, XIII.22."But if you wish me to define the 
Soul for you, and indeed you ask, what is the Soul? I can easily
reply. For it seems to me, that the Soul is a certain substance
participating in reason, which is fitted to govern the body*.
( 6 6 ) ,
SIXTH ENNEAD.
TRACTATE EIGHT.
On Free Will and the Will of the One.
Enneads, VI.8.9."It is impossible that the Principle of all things 
should be regarded as accidental, not merely that he should be 
conceived as being less perfect by accident, but yet he should 
be conceived of as being good by accident,çr good in any other 
fashion, as a thing less complete. The -Principle of all things 
ought to be better than these, therefore a determined being; I 
say determined in the sense that // is in an unique way, but not 
determine by necessity for necessity has no existence for Him".
see Thesis, page, 176.
TRACTATE NINE.
ON THE GOOD OR THE ONE.
Enneads, VI.9.I. Here we find a thought which is frequently
expressed by St. Augustine.
Enneads, VI.9.I."All beings are beings through their Unity, both 
such as are primarily beings, and such as in any respect whatever 
are said to be classed in the order of beings. For what would
they be, if they were not One? For if deprived of unity they are
no longer that which they were said to be"...."Health, likewise, 
then has a subsistence, when the body is coordinated in Unity; 
and beauty then flourishes when the nature of unity embraces its 
members".
Confessions, I.VII,12."For Thou art God...Whose Unity is the 
mould of all things; who out of Thy own fairness makest all 
things fair; and orderest all things by Thy law".
Confessions, 1.20.31."For even then I was, I lived, and felt; and 
had an implanted providence over my own well-being,- a trace of 
that mysterious Unity, whence I was derived".
De Moribus Manich,6."To be, is none other than to be one. In so 
far as anything, therefore, attains unity, in so far it IS. For 
unity worketh congruity and harmony, whereby things composite 
Are in so far as they ARE: for things uncompounded are in them-
-selves, because they are one".
See also Confessions, IV.XV.2.4.
(67).
Enneads, 71.9.4. "For Beauty is posterior to the One and comes 
from Him as the light of the day comes from the Sun."
Bouillet, Vol.3.page, 543.
Enneads, I.6.2."Let us then, go hack to the source, and indicate 
at once the Principle that bestows beauty on material things".
Mackenna, Vol.I.page, 79.
Confessions, 3.6.10."And I indeed ought to have passed by even 
philosophers who spake truth concerning them for love of Thee, 
my Father, supremely good, Beauty of all things beautiful."
Enneads, VI.9.5,"But the One and Principle of all things is 
Simple...But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may be 
appropriately called in common ONE, yet not as being first some- 
-thing else and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account 
difficult $0 be known; but is principally to be known from its 
offspring essence."
Taylor, pages, 308,9, 
see Thesis, page, 174.
Enneads, VI,8.XI,"This, therefore, is manifested by the mandate 
of the mysteries, which orders that they shall not be divulged to 
those who are uninitiated. For as that which is divine cannot be 
unfolded to the multitude, this mandate forbids the attempt to 
elucidate it to any one but him who is fortunately able to perc- 
-eive it. Since, therefore, (in this conjunction with deity) 
there were not two things, but the perceiver was one with the 
thing perceived, as not being (properly speaking) vision but 
union; whoever becomes one by mingling with deity, and afterwards 
recollects this union, will have with himself an image of it".
Taylor, pages, 320,1.
Plotinus refers to the mysteries again in Enneads, V.V.II. 
Mackenna translates the term there, "sanctities of the shrine".
Augustine speaks of the Mysteries in Contra Academicos, 9.1.I. 
and De Ordine, 2,5.16.
De Ordine, 9,5, are two ways that we can follow when we
are troubled with difficulties, that of reason and that of 
authority. Philosophy offers us reason, and scarcely succeeds 
in liberating a very few; and so far from teaching them to desp- 
-ise these Mysteries it only brings them to understand them as 
they ought to be understood. True and genuine philosophy has no 
other business than to teach us what is the uncaused Cause of all 
things, how great is the Intelligence which abides in it, and 
what it was that for our salvation issued thence without a;ïy
( 6 8 ) .
degeneration, How it is this same omnipotent God, v^ ho is at the 
same time tripotent, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who is taught 
in those sacred Mysteries which, by the way of a sincere and 
firm faith deliver the masses of mankind; and they teach this 
neither confusedly, as some assett, nor arrogantly, as many 
allege", (Col.562.) I have made use of' the translation by 
Montgomery, page, 48, op.cit.
We should bear in mind in making our comparisons, this fact 
which Alfaric and others suggest, namely that it is highly prob- 
-able that often Victorinus in making his translation of the 
Enneads,contented himself with giving a paraphrase of the Greek 
of Plotinus . So that, it is just possible that Augustine had 
no literal or accurate rendering to guide him. If this be the case 
it is remarkable that Augustine should in certain passages have 
approximated so closely to the literal text.
But again, we would emphasize what we stated 
in the opening note of this Appendix. Our main purpose has not 
to concern ourselves with the discovery of verbal resemblances 
between St. Augustine and Plotinus, but rather to indicate a 
resemblance in the thought and spirit of our authors and to indic- 
-ate that Augustine undoubtedly received guidance from the 
truths of Neo-Platonism as proclaimed by Plotinus.
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